Colombian presidential election, June 17 2018

[Biden 2024]

Well? There doesn't appear to an active thread on this topic, so here we are. The first round will take place on the 27th of May followed by a runoff (if needed) on the 17th of June, and it appears that Duque and Petro are all-but-certain to be the top two vote-getters as it stands.

I will now open the #discussion.

[WMS]

Sorry Man, Colombia is Hash's baby and I didn't want to touch it, instead waiting patiently for Hash to post something about this year's election.

If he ever does, that is

[Hash]

Sorry Man, Colombia is Hash's baby and I didn't want to touch it, instead waiting patiently for Hash to post something about this year's election.

If he ever does, that is

Yes, I've become something of an obsessive expert on Colombian politics and have already written tons about various topics. But, appreciating that most people with only a passing interest in this election may not read my word vomits and shamelessly plagiarizing Foucaulf, here is a very brief basic background introduction before I can go into a bit more detail about the actual candidates.

Colombian politics in short

System of government: A decentralized presidential republic, which isn't all that exciting or different from basically literally every other country in Latin America in its broad outlines.

• President: Directly elected to a single, non-renewable 4-year term, ineligible for reelection, using a two round system like France. The Vice President is elected on the same ticket, and is gaining in political prominence. The executive branch is stronger than the legislative, and the idea of 'divided government' doesn't really exist.
• Congress: Bicameral (House and Senate), elected to a 4-year term prior to the presidential election (March). Senators are elected a single national constituency. Reps. are elected in multi-member territorial constituencies, most of them corresponding to departments. Elected a somewhat unique and bizarre mess of an electoral system, which is still somewhat preferable to the abomination of an electoral system used prior to 2003.

History: Yeah, won't even try to give an abridged version here. To sum it up: a lot of conflict, but very few instances of military authoritarianism or coups, and a long overrated history of 'democracy' with regular elections. Hybrid institutions, with formal democratic institutions coexisting with informal authoritarian structures or practices, and a gap between de jure and de facto. Substantial and significant regional differences, despite not being a federal state since 1886. A weak and somewhat illegitimate state which long lacked any semblance of real national unity or nationalist myth. The survival of clientelistic practices. The absence or weakness of populism, in sharp contrast to practically every other Latin American country, at least until 2002. The weakness of the democratic left in contrast to most Latin American countries today. Massive political apathy, with some of the lowest turnout anywhere in the Americas.

The current armed conflict is far more complicated and much less straightforward than people commonly assume, or that popular TV shows depict it.

Parties: In reality, they don't really matter for the topic at hand, but an explanation may be useful for later on. These classifications are broad categories and not really all that useful, but whatever.

Traditional parties: The Liberal and Conservative parties, founded in the nineteenth century and which have survived far longer than in most Latin American countries. Despite their best attempts to pretend otherwise, they don't have much in the way of ideology and are really federations of regional and local clientelistic machines and their caciques, particularly since the 1970s and the loss of their only real timeless principle (murdering one another). Much weakened since the late 1990s, but still important major parties. The Liberals do make some real efforts at having coherent policies and paying lip service to the 'great traditions' of Colombian liberalism, which is perhaps marginally more positive than Colombian conservatism but still not something I'd really be proud of. The Conservatives don't even try and their congressmen will sell themselves off to successive government, at the cost of a lot of blackmailing and hefty bribes.

Uribismo: Only once in opposition did uribismo - followers of former President/current senator Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-10) - become a single political party, the Centro Democrático (CD), which merits a category of its own. Uribismo is a personalistic, 'caudillistic' movement built around Uribe and his ideas, whatever they may be, which means that it is one of the most disciplined, cohesive and ideologically (semi-)coherent parties in Colombia. Uribismo claims to be 'centrist' but is very obviously right-wing/far-right, both economically and 'socially', with Uribe's main legacy being 'democratic security' (a hard-line, hawkish, 'anti-terrorist' security policy). Uribismo often comes dangerously close to creepy cultism in its hero worship of Uribe, and it is a movement with a lot ugly hatred and vitriol. It ranges from rather bland regional political clans, former Uribe administration officials and fairly intelligent and respectable personalities to far-right lunatics. Uribe, like Donald Trump, is extremely active on Twitter and is increasingly mentally unhinged.

Neo-traditional parties: Parties like the Partido de la U, Cambio Radical (CR) and Opción Ciudadana. Founded between the late 1990s and mid-2000s, often by dissidents of the traditional parties, they are all predominantly federations of regional and local clientelistic machines and their caciques with varying degrees of internal discipline and coherence. The Partido de la U has by now lost all ideological coherence and most of its internal discipline, deeply internally divided and held together largely for legal purposes. CR is far more disciplined and coherent, held together by its de facto leader Germán Vargas Lleras, although also a very venal, unscrupulous party with few qualms about endorsing objectively horrible people. Opción Ciudadana, which may thankfully die soon, takes these traits to a whole other level as a 'trash collector' party which collects and recycles other parties' trash (beyond the pale individuals), who then support the government behind the scenes and are just in it for the bribes and free food.

Alternative parties: Newer parties like the Polo Democrático Alternativo, Greens, UP, MAIS and now the 'list of decency' with alternative referring to their largely non/anti-clientelistic ways and greater ideological coherence, largely 'progressive' and left-wing. The Polo is Colombia's main left-wing party since 2005, but is a hot mess and no longer really represents much of the left, dogged by infighting for over a decade. The Greens, who got their real start with the green wave that never was in 2010, have often lacked a common direction, historically made up of conflicting groups, although now appear more united around centrist/centre-left pragmatism and progressive reformism. The 'list of decency' is a new multi-party coalition list identified with Gustavo Petro, the main overarching tone being anti-establishment/anti-system radical/alternative left and ecosocialism - similar to Mélenchon's France insoumise.

Christian (evangelical) parties: A resurgent category which includes the MIRA party and the new 'Colombia Juste Libres' alliance. Christian (meaning evangelical/Pentecostal) parties, except MIRA, disappeared around 2003 and participated through other parties. MIRA is a testimonial party and political arm of the Church of God Ministry of Jesus Christ International. It has a small but disciplined base, but is nevertheless widely recognized by others for their hard work as legislators.

How you win elections: With votes and a lot of dirty illegal money. There are basically two kinds of votes:

• Voto de opinión: Predominantly urban votes not 'controlled' by a clientelist machine, voting based on individual political opinion, issues or candidate. Found largely in large cities like departmental capitals.
• Voto de maquinarias/estructuras: Refers to the votes 'controlled' by a clientelist machine or 'structure', associated with a particular boss (cacique/gamonal) and their family and networks of operators. Found largely in poorer rural areas, and stereotypically associated with the Caribbean coast, they mobilize their voters through vote buying, patron-client relationships and associated personal/material benefits and the provision of transportation and a free lunch on election day. Strongest in local and congressional elections, where the political futures of machine's boss or 'heirs' are directly at stake, they require an extra push (and lots of money) in presidential elections and it is still estimated they transfer less than half of their potential to their presidential candidate. Once in power, their support is critical for the approval of a president's agenda, and is ensured through 'marmalade' (pork-barrel spending) and 'quotas' (patronage appointments).

While it is possible to win a congressional or mayoral election with only one of the above, no presidential candidate has, to date, won without both of the above. Antanas Mockus tried, and failed, to win without machines in 2010. Juan Manuel Santos and Álvaro Uribe won both of their elections with both, although Uribe in 2002 also had a third category (guy holding a gun to your head and telling you who to vote for). The common wisdom is that, in presidential elections, 70% of votes are from the former category but that in congressional elections 70% of votes from the latter category.

Key political issues: It's hella depressing, although this election offers sharper ideological contrasts than any of the last ones.

• The very difficult and bleak future of the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC, a polarizing and complicated multi-faceted issue which raises key questions about transitional justice, victims' rights, impunity/justice for war crimes, drug trafficking, coca cultivation/illicit crops, reintegration of demobilized fighters and the political reincorporation of the FARC.
• The growing security threats in critical regions posed by guerrillas, FARC dissidents and neo-paramilitary criminal groups which threatens the viability of the peace agreement and has already had massive humanitarian consequences. As recent events along the Ecuadorian border show, it is a transnational problem.
• The Venezuelan migrant crisis, a humanitarian issue of massive proportions which creates a major challenge in a country which has been a country of mass emigration for most of its recent history. The sheer number of Venezuelan migrants, many of whom are only 'passing through', puts more pressure on already weak healthcare, education, job market and border security.
• Relations with Venezuela and the Maduro dictatorship. Both soft and hard strategies (i.e. 'my new best friend' and diplomatic standoffs) have, basically, failed.
• Corruption is widespread and spreading everywhere, challenging the legitimacy and strength of an already weak democracy. Naturally, everyone is against it, but very few, if any, of the solutions being proposed would realistically have a major impact and there is an infuriatingly large amount of hypocrisy on this issue.
• Judicial reform is necessary to fix obvious problems in the institutional design of the judiciary and 'clean up the mess', but nobody can agree on how to fix it. An additional problem, more academic but very serious, is avoiding gimmicky populist 'quick fixes' which would weaken judicial independence, legal protection of fundamental rights and the 'good' aspects of the current system.
• Colombia's Obamacare-like healthcare system is hated by everyone and has a lot of problems, although concrete solutions which could be imagined to have a positive impact are very hard to come by.
• Security in Colombia is instinctively associated with the conflict, but the real security concern of most urban citizens is about petty crime, drug dealers, delinquents, robberies/assaults and microtrafficking. Debates, as elsewhere, are between more punitive/retributive and preventive/restorative views on criminality and its causes.
• Colombia's economy has slowed down in the past 2-3 years, with growing pessimism about the general state of the economy. As elsewhere, policy debates are around the benefits of corporate tax cuts, indirect v. direct taxation, deregulation/'simplification' and basically how to create jobs and expand the formal economy. The issue of poverty somewhat overlaps here as well.
• A growing debate about the environmental, natural resources, mining and local input over resource extraction projects. Are environmental protection and Colombia's extractivist, mineral-dependent economic model compatible at all? Should local communities have a say over mining and other extraction projects in their territory, particularly when having that say is vetoing such projects?
• An overdue pension reform which I am less well-read about but which regardless promises nasty surprises since all candidates are still promising that everyone can have the cake and eat it.
• There are many problems with Colombia's political institutions and electoral systems which need fixing, but little to no trust in those who need to make those changes (Congress), which is giving rise to more radical demagogic and potentially dangerous 'solutions' like a constituent assembly. Recent attempts at institutional/political/electoral reform - in 2015 and 2017 - either failed because congressmen were in no mood (2017) or got watered down by judicial review (2015), and the defects of past reforms (2003) are clearer than before.
• Political debate has turned bitter, nasty and acrimonious with lies and half-truths quite common. Political Twitter is a brutal minefield which makes you lose faith in human existence, particularly when the likes of 'Popeye' (Pablo Escobar's former assassin) has turned into a right-wing political commentator. It would be great if the next president could reduce this nastiness, but that appears very unlikely.

[Hash]

These are the candidates, again with abridged biographic blurbs.

Iván Duque (CD, supp. MIRA, CJL, Cons.): The 41-year old uribista candidate is a former one-term senator, first elected in 2014. He comes from a political family, but has a more technocratic career, having worked for the IDB for 9 years. He makes up for his relative inexperience with his youth, charisma, likeability, intelligence, self-confidence and astuteness. Duque is a relative moderate in the world of uribismo, where the far-right furibista elements were suspicious of him as a potential 'Trojan Horse' who could betray Uribe like Santos did, although these concerns were allayed or silenced. Duque enjoys pretending that he is an anti-populist, Macron-like centrist reformist, although in reality he is the most right-wing of the major candidates with a rather generic right-wing conservative platform you'd find in most places. He is the quintessential 'modern' centre-right candidate - young, slick, smooth talker, adept at political marketing strategies. His gimmick is the 'orange economy' (creative economy) and everything 'high tech' - incessantly boasting Big Data, digitalized-everything, e-government, new technologies etc. His economic policy is boilerplate neoliberalism (with some caveats and exceptions), he strongly supports the traditional 'war on drugs' (including aerial fumigation and forced crop substitution) and is - at least in public - the most socially conservative of the major candidates (opposing same-sex marriage and adoption rights), although I have reason to believe that he personally is rather liberal there. He claims that he would not tear up the peace agreement - his line is 'ni trizas ni risas' (neither scissors nor smiles/laughs) - but would make 'structural modifications' to it, which opponents claim would end up destroying the peace agreement in letter and spirit. His 'structural modifications' would do away with most of the 'structural reforms' included in the text and intended to prevent future violence.

Duque's problem isn't him - he is an intelligent, well-spoken, level-headed articulate right-winger (a rarity in the world of Trumpismo-Fordismo) - but rather Álvaro Uribe, portrayed by all of his opponents as the puppet master, a claim both men deny although it is a fact that Duque's presidency would mean the return of Uribe and his loyalists to power, which worries many people (for good reason). The concern is that Uribe, who from his Twitter activity appears increasingly unhinged and angry, will come and take his revenge on everybody who crossed him in the past 8 years (the courts, certain politicians, the media etc.) and destroy the work of 'the traitor' Santos. Again, the problem isn't Duque, but instead the people behind him - including book-burning Ayatollah Alejandro Ordóñez, far-right moron María Fernanda Cabal, Rafael Nieto and all the 'good boys' of Uribe's administrations 'victims of political persecution'.

Running-mate: Marta Lucía Ramírez, an experienced politician who notably served as foreign trade minister (1998-2002), the first woman defence minister (2002-03) and senator (2006-09). She was the Conservative Party's presidential candidate in 2014 and won 15.5%, despite lacking the support of most of the Conservative caucus. A presidential candidate this year as well, she lost to Duque in the right-wing primary on March 11 and he picked her as his running-mate that same night. She is not a loyal uribista and is less beholden to Uribe, notably opposing his 'second reelection'.

Gustavo Petro (Petro President/Colombia Humana, supp. MAIS, AICO): The anti-establishment populist left candidate appealing to the indignados while terrifying the right as the incarnation of castrochavismo. He is a former M-19 guerrillero (imprisoned in the 1980s, demobilized in 1990), who served in the House (1991-1994, 1998-2006) and Senate (2006-2010) and most famously as mayor of Bogotá (2012-2015). He was the Polo's presidential candidate in 2010. Petro is a polarizing figure, who has some passionate supporters on social media (second only in their cultist devotion to uribistas) but also passionate 'haters' on the right who panic at the prospect of Petro, particularly in the current circumstances with Venezuela. Comparable in his personality to Mélenchon, Petro is a complicated man: an outstanding legislator, but a poor administrator; laudable ideas (at least to leftists) but poor execution. Elected mayor of Bogotá in 2011, he came in with one of the most ambitious left-wing urban agendas but left office with low popularity, a mixed and incomplete record. One of his problems is that he is arrogant, narcissistic, controlling and egocentric - he thinks that he is brilliant, loves the sound of his own voice and has an over inflated ego. He is not a 'team player' and is bad at creating and keeping a team together. Petro's platform is one of the most left-wing in Colombian history, directly attacking the mineral-dependent extractivist economic model (oil and mining) and vowing to replace it with a poorly explained ecosocialism with re-industrialization, increased agricultural productivity and renewable energies. He also challenges the neoliberal/right-wing public policies dominant since the 1990s, promising free post-secondary education, universal healthcare, robust public pensions, publicly-owned public services and agrarian reform. He is the most socially liberal candidate, and is also the most credible and vocal supporters of indigenous and Afro-Colombian rights. He views the peace agreement as a good but incomplete starting point for the structural transformations of the country he seeks. But, if elected, he would govern alone with most of the powers against him (courts, Congress, media etc.) and has said that he would call a constituent assembly, a slippery slope and potentially dangerous idea which invites comparisons with Maduro's constituent assembly. Petro's opponents on the right claim he is a castrochavista communist who would be the 'fast track to Venezuela', due in part to his past sympathies for Chávez and his continued whataboutism on the Venezuelan crisis.

Running-mate: Ángela María Robledo, a Green representative since 2014. She is a competent, hard-working, talented and respected left-wing congresswoman who has worked primarily on issues relating to women's rights, victims, children's rights, sexual violence, human rights and social exclusion.

Sergio Fajardo (Coalition Colombia - Greens and Polo): Fajardo is a mathematician, former mayor of Medellín (2004-2007) and governor of Antioquia (2012-2015). He is an independent who has made opposition to traditional politics, clientelism and corruption the trademarks of his political career. Although now the target of the usual criticisms and dug-up controversies, his term as mayor coincided with Medellín's much-vaunted and internationally acclaimed transformation into a new model for urban planning and innovation (an embellished image). As governor, education was one of his major priorities, although his record was less than stellar in the end. He was wildly popular as both mayor and governor, and remains the most popular candidate - few people actively dislike or hate him, unlike the two candidates above, because he is not a polarizing or divisive figure. Indeed, in this polarized and acrimonious campaign, Fajardo's strategy is to be the unifying, 'anti-polarization' candidate with an image of 'hope' rather than 'fear'. He is the candidate of the 'Coalition Colombia', a coalition between the Greens and the Polo built around the themes of anti-corruption, education, honesty, good governance, centre-left pragmatism. His platform makes less ambitious promises than Petro, but perhaps more realistic (but also a bit vaguer), somewhat comparable to Justin Trudeau. Fajardo is famously indecisive, intentionally vague and non-committal on many issues (although his final platform is substantive), which is why his support has declined significantly since March, why most of the left - despite the Polo still formally behind him (largely because the Polo is controlled by Jorge Robledo, who hates Petro) - is now behind Petro and why his former financiers in the Antioquia business elite have largely abandoned him for Duque.

Running-mate: Claudia López, a retiring Green senator first elected in 2014 and an acclaimed political scientist and researcher, most famous for her work on 'parapolítica' in the mid-2000s. She is a pugnacious, impassioned woman who is appreciated by her fans on social media for her no holds barred congressional debates on corruption and her straight-talk (calling politicians corrupt to their face and triggering right-wingers). She adds a necessary 'punch' and emotion to Fajardo, the somewhat dry and overly rational math prof, but she is not particularly popular with the economic elite, who don't really appreciate her reminding people how many of them gave money to the paramilitaries and guerrillas. She was one of the three potential pre-candidates of the Coalition, but dropped out last fall (along with Robledo), to clear the field for Fajardo.

Germán Vargas Lleras (#Mejor Vargas Lleras, supp. CR, La U, Cons.) Vargas Lleras is the quintessential traditional Colombian elite politician, another product of the old Bogotan political elite (maternal grandson of former president Carlos Lleras Restrepo) and an ambitious politician who has been dreaming of the presidency since he was a teenager. Having gone through all the traditional steps and having patiently waited his turn, the presidency would be the capstone to a long career which began in the late 1980s as a galanista Liberal. He is a former city councillor, four-term senator, presidential candidate (10% in 2010), interior minister, housing minister and most recently Santos II's Vice President (2014-17). He is a very intelligent, experienced micromanager with a feisty, explosive and often unpleasant character, who doesn't tolerate mediocrity and who doesn't have time for phony pleasantries, a personality which everybody learned about with a Dec. 2016 video of him hitting a bodyguard on the head (the coscorrón incident). He has tried to soften that image, 'laughing along' at the the memes of his Addams family-like candidacy announcement video or creating an Instagram account for his dog 'Mancho Vargas'. He also seems to be a genuinely loving father to his only daughter, a talented hip-hop dancer who was forced to grow up in Miami because of death threats against her father since the late 1990s (he is the victim of two terrorist attacks, in which he lost fingers on one of his hands).

But he is also a 'todo vale' (everything/anything goes, the ends justify the means) politician, who has no moral reservations in allying with most of Colombia's disreputable, nasty if not downright criminal political machines/structures (even those led by convicted criminals, like 'el Gordo' García Romero, or, in the past, now convicted murderer Kiko Gómez). Vargas Lleras wants to win the presidency using traditional means: a strong, national alliance of regional caciques and their clientelist machines, without any regard for how nasty or criminal these regional caciques are as long as they can provide votes. Vargas Lleras is a sly political operator with years of experience in the nasty tricks and corrupt alliances which have characterized Colombian politics for decades. urban public opinion isn't very keen on that sort of old politics, so Vargas Lleras also needs to pretend that he is a modern, independent centre-right conservative with a well-defined and thorough policy agenda accompanied by presentable allies - so instead of getting on the ballot through his political party, which has been involved in countless sordid criminal and corrupt alliances over the years, he got ballot access 'by signatures' with his own movement, #Mejor Vargas Lleras. Vargas Lleras is a right-winger, but having failed to compete for uribismo with right-wing votes, has moved a bit to the centre, notably reversing course on the peace agreement and finally supporting it more enthusiastically than ever before. But his economic platform is still typically pro-business right-wing/neoliberal, not very different to Duque except in the details (perhaps a bit more focused on big business rather than small business, and not really interested in pretending to be even a bit 'green). While supportive of the peace agreement, he promises a hard line on security and crime.

Running-mate: Juan Carlos Pinzón, former defence minister (2011-15) and ambassador to the US (2015-17). Santos was Pinzón's former mentor, and he owes all his jobs to Santos, but that didn't keep him from betraying him. He was a right-wing presidential candidate, as an independent, but his rather pathetic campaign didn't get anywhere and he dropped out of the race right after the March 11 congressional election to be Vargas' running-mate. He doesn't bring much to the campaign, except maybe reinforcing uribismo's claims that Vargas is the santista candidate ('the co-pilot on a crashing plane').

Humberto de la Calle (Liberal, supp. ASI): De la Calle is a career politician who has been in politics since the 1980s, following a rather typical career path up until the 1990s/2000, at which point he basically dropped out of circulation to re-appear years later as the government's chief negotiator in the peace negotiations with the FARC in Cuba, which is now the main draw of his candidacy. He unsuccessfully ran for president in 1994, losing the Liberal primary to Ernesto Samper, very reluctantly agreeing to be his vice president in a marriage of convenience which was made impossible by the Proceso 8.000 and led de la Calle to resign in 1996. De la Calle received widespread praise for his role as chief negotiator. Not only did he secure an historic peace agreement in the end, but he was crucial throughout the actual peace talks in ensuring the government spoke with a single voice, in keeping the negotiations focused, in resolving disputes and controversies and ensuring that the talks didn’t break down during the several times where they seemed to be on the verge of collapse. This candidacy is about 'defending his baby', with the peace agreement being his key appeal to a small base and the key overarching element of his platform, which basically proposes to build on it to achieve goals like poverty reduction, environmental protection, inclusive/equitable economic growth, long-term peace, better education, tourism, a rural middle-class and clean government. His platform is, overall, socially democratic (despite, ironically, being from the more 'neoliberal' faction of the party in the 1990s), comparable to contemporary W. European social democrats. De la Calle's candidacy never took off, attempts at an alliance with Fajardo failed and his candidacy is now an insurance policy for the Liberal Party to negotiate a deal for the runoff. In an ideal world, de la Calle would make, I think, an excellent president - he is smart, experienced, honest, respectable and a true statesman. But the problem is with the people who (ostensibly) accompany him - the Liberal Party, its leader (Cesar Gaviria) and the Liberals' traditional list of caciques and machine politicians in the congressional elections.

Running-mate: Clara López, former caretaker mayor of Bogotá, 2014 Polo presidential candidate (15%) and labour minister (2016-17). Clara López also dropped out of the race early this year to become de la Calle's running-mate, adding to his 'pro-peace' and centre-left credentials but also the image of him as 'Santos' other candidate' (as Clara joined the cabinet, against her party's orders, in 2016). She was forcibly pushed out of the Polo in 2017 by Jorge Robledo's faction and unsuccessfully tried to build a 'pro-peace' candidacy.

Jorge Antonio Trujillo (Todos Somos Colombia): The little-known minor candidate, Trujillo is an evangelical pastor. He briefly served in the Senate in 2009-10 with the 'trash collector' Convergencia Ciudadana/PIN (now Opción Ciudadana) party as a result of the 'carrusel of parapolítica' (as accused senators resign, allowing defeated lower-ranked candidates to get their seats), but he lost reelection in 2010 (getting about 20,000 preferential votes). He said the 2010-11 rainy season, which killed over 100 people, was 'divine punishment'. He is homophobic, basically believing that homosexuality is an unnatural disease which he promises to help cure. He hasn't been invited to any debates and has really only campaigned in evangelical churches, but most of the evangelical vote is behind Duque. He is the candidate of the new little-known 'Todos Somos Colombia', which got its legal recognition as a party through the 'Afro loophole' - as an Afro-Colombian party, it doesn't need to meet stringent legal requirements for party registration, and is the renamed continuation of the Afro party 'Fundación Ebano', connected to the highly controversial and corrupt former congressman Yahir Acuña (investigated for parapolítica and a professional vote buyer) which became famous in 2014 for winning the 2 special Afro-Colombian seats with candidates who weren't even black.

Running-mate: Freddy Obando, an Afro-Colombian evangelical pastor.

[Hash]

Campaigns held their closing events yesterday and expat voting in the consulates opened today. No polls will be published this week, so here are the last polls from the major pollsters contracted by the main media groups:

Pollster: Duque / Petro / Fajardo / Vargas / dlCalle / Blank
Invamer (Semana/Caracol TV): 41.5 / 29.5 / 16.3 / 6.6 / 1.9 / 3.3
Guarumo (El Tiempo): 37.6 / 24.2 / 16 / 11 / 2.3 / 5.8
CifrasConceptos (Caracol Radio): 35 / 24 / 16 / 14.3 / 3.5 / 5.4
Datexco (W Radio): 36.4 / 31.8 / 16 / 6.2 / 2.1 / 6.9
CNC (CM&/Canal1): 36 / 27 / 18 / 10 / 4 / 5
YanHaas (RCN/regional media): 35 / 26 / 14 / 6 / 3 / 8

Pollsters have converged on similar outcomes and all show the same finish line: Duque and Petro advancing to the runoff, Fajardo in third but not really within striking distance of second, Vargas stagnant in fourth.

However, pollsters can only semi-accurately capture the voto de opinión (and even that depends on how well they can distinguish between likely voters and non-voters), and this election will be a major test of how strong the voto de maquinaria is in relation to the voto de opinión. Vargas Lleras is the candidate with the strongest collection of machines/structures, which in the congressional elections won up to 5 million votes, but as the polls show his voto de opinión is weak; in contrast, Petro obviously has a powerful appeal to part of the voto de opinión, but as the congressional elections showed, he has only weak support from machines/structures. Therefore, one of the main uncertainties is whether or not Vargas Lleras' todo vale coalition of machines/structures shows its might on May 27 and wins him a place in the runoff.

The boss of the polling firm Cifras & Conceptos has done a Nate Silver-like 'forecast model' combining his polls with inferences on the strength of each candidates' machines/structures. Because of the numbers they have given, they've been rather controversial and he will either be crowned as Colombia's master forecaster or run out of town. His last forecast was released on May 15 and the numbers differ substantially from polls:

Duque 32.9 - 36.9
Vargas Lleras 20.3 - 23.5
Petro: 16.8 - 19.9
Fajardo 12.6 - 15.5
De la Calle 3.4 - 5.0
Voto en blanco 4.6 - 6.2

[WMS]

Hey, maybe the Colombian left can unify behind a good candidate and take advantage of splits on the right to finally win an election-

Petro? Dumbasses.

[Skye]

Fingers crossed for a Duque win. Not because I'm a fan of him, but because I think Petro is dangerous.

Be very, very wary of someone who admires Chávez's ideas, and who waited far too long to denounce Maduro.

[Lord Halifax]

Fingers crossed for a Duque win. Not because I'm a fan of him, but because I think Petro is dangerous.

Vargas Lleras is most likely to finish second. Would you still support Duque over him?

[Hash]

Hey, maybe the Colombian left can unify behind a good candidate and take advantage of splits on the right to finally win an election-

Petro? Dumbasses.

La izquierda unida jamás será izquierda, especially in Colombia where the left is even dumber than in France and which has a long history, since the 1940s, of revelling in its own divisions. The Colombian left was only briefly united between 2002-3 and 2006-7, which allowed them a certain degree of limited electoral success, but the left has been gradually fracturing ever since and the Polo slowly disintegrating with an emblematic figure leaving nearly every single year for over a decade. A good part of it is thanks to Petro, who can't be a behaved team-player in a collective party which isn't built around his own figure, although the dogmatism of certain 'radical' sectors in the Polo (including Robledo's MOIR) has contributed to running a lot of good people out of the party and further marginalizing the Polo (besides these same faction's boneheaded idiocy in sticking with the klepto Moreno brothers until the end and giving ammo to the right for a decade). I still find it particularly hilarious how Robledo's 'radical anti-neoliberal' (historically Maoist) MOIR basically pushed Clara López out of the party and seized control of the party machinery, only to ally with ni chicha ni limona Fajardo less than a year later (though credit to Robledo for accepting reality and stepping aside in the name of the greater collective interest).

But Petro is still, clearly, the left's strongest best: he's a charismatic, rabble-rousing populist [demagogue?], one of the few politicians who can match Uribe tit for tat and appeal to a much broader electorate than other left-wingers. If the polls are right and even if he loses to Duque in June, he will have set a new historic record for the left (he already set a new record in the March primaries).

Many progressive anti-uribista columnists/journalists, like Daniel Coronell or the amazing 'La Pulla', are deeply frustrated and depressed at the prospect of a Duque/Petro runoff, but that seems to be the niche viewpoints of what Gaitán called the país político rather than the país nacional.

I doubt 'the left' could have won this election regardless, particularly given the general mood around the peace process and the ghost of Venezuela.

Vargas Lleras is most likely to finish second. Would you still support Duque over him?

I don't why you would claim that Vargas is 'most likely' to finish second. There's a good possibility that he might (it's probably more likely that he upsets Petro for second than Fajardo), but from there to claim that he is 'most likely' to finish second is still a major stretch. Cifras/Conceptos' models are untested and are based on the assumption that the machines will be able to transfer a rather high percentage of their March votes to the candidate, which is questionable, particularly given that Vargas Lleras' campaign doesn't have much momentum and, more importantly, doesn't seem to be particularly flushed with cash (unlike the Odebrecht-funded Santos 2010/2014 campaigns) and when the machines don't receive the cash they need from central office, you get something like the 2014 first round, the plebiscite or Cartagena's mayoral by-election a few weeks ago. As I explained, presidential elections are far less defined by machines than congressional or local elections, although you still need both (which is why Duque will probably win, because he has both, unlike everyone else).

[Skye]

Fingers crossed for a Duque win. Not because I'm a fan of him, but because I think Petro is dangerous.

Vargas Lleras is most likely to finish second. Would you still support Duque over him?

Are you crazy? Polling clearly indicates a Duque/Petro runoff.

[Lord Halifax]

Fingers crossed for a Duque win. Not because I'm a fan of him, but because I think Petro is dangerous.

Vargas Lleras is most likely to finish second. Would you still support Duque over him?

Are you crazy? Polling clearly indicates a Duque/Petro runoff.

Machines are more important than polls. You didn't answer my question.

[Lord Halifax]

Vargas Lleras is most likely to finish second. Would you still support Duque over him?

I don't why you would claim that Vargas is 'most likely' to finish second. There's a good possibility that he might (it's probably more likely that he upsets Petro for second than Fajardo), but from there to claim that he is 'most likely' to finish second is still a major stretch. Cifras/Conceptos' models are untested and are based on the assumption that the machines will be able to transfer a rather high percentage of their March votes to the candidate, which is questionable, particularly given that Vargas Lleras' campaign doesn't have much momentum and, more importantly, doesn't seem to be particularly flushed with cash (unlike the Odebrecht-funded Santos 2010/2014 campaigns) and when the machines don't receive the cash they need from central office, you get something like the 2014 first round, the plebiscite or Cartagena's mayoral by-election a few weeks ago. As I explained, presidential elections are far less defined by machines than congressional or local elections, although you still need both (which is why Duque will probably win, because he has both, unlike everyone else).

Cool, I just have more faith in machines than polls when it comes to a place like Colombia. Even in a presidential election.

[WMS]

Hey, maybe the Colombian left can unify behind a good candidate and take advantage of splits on the right to finally win an election-

Petro? Dumbasses.

La izquierda unida jamás será izquierda, especially in Colombia where the left is even dumber than in France and which has a long history, since the 1940s, of revelling in its own divisions. The Colombian left was only briefly united between 2002-3 and 2006-7, which allowed them a certain degree of limited electoral success, but the left has been gradually fracturing ever since and the Polo slowly disintegrating with an emblematic figure leaving nearly every single year for over a decade. A good part of it is thanks to Petro, who can't be a behaved team-player in a collective party which isn't built around his own figure, although the dogmatism of certain 'radical' sectors in the Polo (including Robledo's MOIR) has contributed to running a lot of good people out of the party and further marginalizing the Polo (besides these same faction's boneheaded idiocy in sticking with the klepto Moreno brothers until the end and giving ammo to the right for a decade). I still find it particularly hilarious how Robledo's 'radical anti-neoliberal' (historically Maoist) MOIR basically pushed Clara López out of the party and seized control of the party machinery, only to ally with ni chicha ni limona Fajardo less than a year later (though credit to Robledo for accepting reality and stepping aside in the name of the greater collective interest).

Well, THAT was informative and has a ring of the People's Front of Judea to it

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Ick. A soft Chavista is not what I want to see, given that they without fail turn into authoritarians once in power. Which doesn't mean I want to see the authoritarian right in power either, mind you...

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Time for world politics to disappoint me yet again!

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I'd have to agree. One thing that strikes me even with my limited sources is just how much average Colombians hate the leftist guerrillas, and if the peace agreement is seen as letting them off the hook, well there you have it. And you know my viewpoint on Venezuela by now and I've found it interesting how Venezuela is used as a millstone to hang around the necks of the Latin American left...admittedly the left didn't do itself any favors by all but worshiping Hugo Chavez for many years.

[Hash]

Gustavo Petro - who, in a tweet two weeks ago basically compared himself to Moses ('splitting the waters of history') - is warning of the risk of 'fraud' by the Registraduría, orchestrated by Santos to benefit Vargas Lleras and is threatening to pull an AMLO 2006 by calling on his supporters to rally in public squares from the time polls close on Sunday until Moses Petro himself declares whether or not there has been fraud. His E-Day strategy is built on recruiting a massive network of volunteer witnesses in every single precinct to 'secure the vote' and report back on any 'substantial differences' between what they see and what the Registraduría will report online (which is an unofficial 'preconteo' with no legal value, but whatever). Basically, if Petro doesn't make the runoff, he will say that it was rigged by 'the mafias'.

As with everything Petro says, he starts off from undeniable realities (there is a lot of vote buying and other technically illegal stuff going on) and reasonable doubts (there was no technical audit of the Registraduría's software, the Council of State's February ruling on the electoral fraud against the MIRA in 2014 made clear that there is a real risk of the software being sabotaged and there are many reports of the scrutineers/returning officers being bought off or hired by shady private companies) to make unverifiable inferences and claims. The Petro cult seems more interested in grandstanding than providing evidence to support their claims, so it has turned into the usual political war of words between Petro (fraud!), the electoral authorities (no fraud!) and Petro's opponents (typical crazy Petro!). His claims will further endear him to his base (and maybe others, since a lot of people think that there's electoral fraud) while reinforcing everyone else's preconceptions about him. In Colombia and other weak democracies, 'fraud' is also what every loser says when defeated -- Uribe claimed that there was 'massive fraud' in the 2014 runoff and was getting ready to make the same claims in the 2016 plebiscite... until they won.

[Starry Eyed Jagaloon]

Who is the most natural heir to Juan Manuel Santos?

[WMS]

So, Petro is pursuing the worst possible strategy in dealing with an actual problem, antagonizing those who might have been on his side otherwise? This seems familiar from somewhere or another...

And thus Petro will legitimately lose a fraudulent election.

Fajardo/Lopez might have earned my support were I a Colombian voter - real long-time denizens of this forum will recall me as an initial strong Uribe supporter (which I still stand by: for all his many horrible flaws he DID stop the FARC et al in their tracks, and in 2002 that wasn't seen as inevitable) and it's fair to say, especially after reading Hash's earlier works on Colombia, that I gradually would've drifted away into the soft Party of the U type or something as Uribe gradually went off the deep end. But a soft social democrat governing for a term or so might be good for Colombia *now*. Oh well. Looks like it will be the Uribist's turn again.

[Famous Mortimer]

FARC is now backing Petro? Wasn't he like the one leftist who legitimately wasn't a crypto-FARCist? A lot of these switches on the left just seem random.

[Hash]

Who is the most natural heir to Juan Manuel Santos?

Nobody. There is no 'continuity' candidate since nobody wants to be associated with you when your approval rating is less than 25% and that there is a general consensus that your administration has been bad. Moreover, Santos has basically given up himself, seemingly spending more time abroad than at home over the past 12 months and belatedly, unconvincingly responding to events as they happen. Political allies like Vargas Lleras and César Gaviria are running away from him, and even a guy like Juan Carlos Pinzón who was his protégé and who owes his entire political career to him has basically betrayed and disowned his mentor.

In terms of 'most natural heir' it depends on what is to be inherited. In terms of political opportunism, todo vale alliances with disreputable caciques, mediocre public policies, marmalade, quotas and nonchalant tolerance towards corruption, the natural heir is Germán Vargas Lleras. Vargas isn't a santista, because no one ever was a santista, but he shares the same attitude towards how Colombian politics work as Santos. If president, Vargas Lleras would be somewhat more right-wing than Santos in policy terms, but the general direction of the government's agenda and its outcome would be quite similar and it would be achieved in the same way.

In terms of defending and protecting what Santos wants to be the cornerstone of his legacy - the peace agreement - and a generally socially liberal and centrist outlook, then the natural heir would be Humberto de la Calle. If president, de la Calle would somewhat more left-leaning than Santos (if he keeps his promises, that is) and as a candidate he has been very critical of clientelism and the traditional ways of doing politics in the country, although those criticisms may ring a bit hollow when he's the candidate of the Liberal Party. De la Calle's running-mate, Clara López, is also a former cabinet minister who broke with her old party (the Polo) to support Santos' peace agenda over and above disagreements on economic policy.

Ironically, there's another presidential candidate who's worked with/for Santos in the past: Iván Duque, who got the early push in his career (in his early 20ies) from Santos, who hired him to work for his 'Fundación Buen Gobierno' and later as his advisor at the finance ministry. It was also Santos who got him his job at the IDB.

FARC is now backing Petro? Wasn't he like the one leftist who legitimately wasn't a crypto-FARCist? A lot of these switches on the left just seem random.

The FARC isn't supporting Petro (at least not officially), and they have more important things to be worried about than giving their unwanted kiss of death endorsement to any candidate. Given the absence of any other left-wing candidate in the absence of Piedad Córdoba and 'Timo', left-wing movements seen as 'sympathetic' to the FARC like the Marcha Patriótica are supporting Petro, but that doesn't mean much. It's not as if any candidate wants to be endorsed by the most unpopular party in the country, especially not in the wake of Santrichgate.

Yes, Petro was, as a Polo senator, very critical of the FARC - more so than his 'colleagues' in the same party - and participated in the 2008 demonstrations against the FARC, when much of the Polo controversially sat out (to instead support a counter-demonstration for 'all victims' including paramilitarism and state violence). He was repeatedly denounced by the FARC for it, and much of the Polo didn't appreciate Petro's grandstanding. For Petro, opposing the FARC was logically part of his opposition to all 'mafias'.

Unfortunately, it seems that you stubbornly insist on understanding the Colombian left through the prism of 'crypto-FARCist', much like Carlos Castaño. This sort of stigmatization of the left is unhelpful and simplistic. While some on the left may have, at one time or another, justified the FARC's actions with reference to paramilitary crimes or whatever, the majority of the contemporary legal, democratic left condemned the FARC's violence (and were quite frustrated by it, seeing as it blocked their own chances of political success) and made it fairly clear that the armed struggle could no longer be justified. Early leaders of the UP in the 1980s were tied to the FARC and willingly part of its political project, but the reality is that the FARC very quickly let the UP out to die, and many victims of the genocide of the UP - like assassinated presidential candidate Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa - had condemned the FARC's violence. Granted, some more contemporary left-wing politicians did engage in unacceptable FARC apologism or whataboutism, and some (Wilson Borja, Gloria Inés Ramírez) were implicated in 'Farcpolítica' (through Raúl Reyes' computer, but Ordóñez's Procuraduría messed around with the evidence). But the Polo politicians who Petro in his day accused of being 'soft' on the FARC were upstanding, respectable and principled men like Carlos Gaviria or Jorge Enrique Robledo who had nothing to do with FARC (moreover, Robledo comes from a faction, the MOIR, which has always been opposed to the armed struggle and consequently was often very critical of guerrillas).

It's also a simplistic way of looking at things, because the Colombian left hasn't revolved entirely around 'la faaaaaaaar' and political collaboration with the FARC (like political collaboration with the paramilitaries) was rarely about ideology or some idealistic belief in 'armed struggle'. Caquetá rep. Luis Fernando Almario, who I very much doubt is a Marxist revolutionary, allied with the FARC to exterminate the rival Turbay Cote clan before allying with the paras.

[Hash]

For those of you interested in candidate match tests or who can't decide between candidates, I like the 'Candidater' test: https://candidater.votematch.net/#intro

Here is a translation and explanation of the 24 questions:
1. Public post-secondary education should be free for everyone.
2. The state will not recognize/pay social security contributions to 'madres comunitarias' (private childcare providers) if the 'fiscal ceiling' (budget golden rule) is affected. Explanation: in 2018, the ConCourt ordered the family welfare agency (ICBF) to pay employers' social security contributions to 88 'madres comunitarias' who sued.
3. Fracking should be allowed.
4. Colombia should break diplomatic relations with Venezuela given the illegal entrance of their troops on the border.
5. Glyphosate is the main solution to eradicate illicit crops.
6. Healthy living/sex ed manuals in high schools should explicitly recognize that the LGBT population can't be discriminated against.
7. Free trade agreements' conditions should not be renegotiated.
8. The health promoting entities (EPS) model should be eliminated from the healthcare system. Explanation: Under Colombia's Obamacare-like healthcare system, EPS are predominantly private insurers and everyone employed in Colombia must be affiliated to one, either in the subsidized or contributory system. The alternative imagined is presumably single-payer universal healthcare.
9. The next government should restrict ex-guerrilleros' political participation.
10. The state should guarantee to public university/college grads the first year of employment in areas related to peace.
11. Foreign military bases should stay in Colombia.
12. The constitution should establish that Colombia is a country of 'agricultural vocation'.
13. Drug use should be legalized.
14. The next government should propose a national constituent assembly to change the constitution.
15. The state should guarantee that there are condom dispensers in HS and universities.
16. The state can decide on the use and purpose of land over the opinion of communities.
17. National security justifies limiting individual liberties
18. Right to water should be recognized as a fundamental right in the constitution.
19. Decision on abortion is not exclusively that of the mother (i.e. are you pro-life?)
20. The state will provide financial support to all young entrepreneurs.
21. Military service should remain compulsory.
22. Family in Colombia is made up of a man and a woman.
23. ICETEX should not charge interests on students. Explanation: ICETEX is the government agency providing student loans.
24. Cruel spectacles with animals should be banned. Explanation: bullfighting is still legal in Colombia, but probably not for very long.

[Velasco]

Matches:

Gustavo Petro 81 per cent
Sergio Fajardo 59
Humberto de la Calle 50
Iván Duque 41
Germán Vargas Lleras 31

[Hash]

I hope my effortposts in this thread have been useful and interesting for readers.

The big day is tomorrow. Here are the candidates' goals, either publicly stated or my own reading:

Duque: Uribistas are bullish and their stated objective is to win outright by the first round, like Uribe did in 2002 and 2006. Given their memories of 2014, uribistas are worried about a runoff if the anti-uribista vote can consolidate. The odds of a first round win, however, have decreased in the past few weeks and it appears quite difficult for Duque to win the votes he would need to be crowned tomorrow night. In the absence of a first round win, I think a result over 40% would be strong and make him difficult to beat in the runoff. A result below 35% would be pretty poor and make him more vulnerable in the runoff.

Petro: He too claims that he can win in the first round, but that is even more unlikely. A first place finish is also very unlikely, although if that came to happen, then the runoff would be very nasty. I think a result above 30% would be very strong, particularly if he is within less than 10% of Duque. A result below 25% would be a disappointment, and anything below the 2006 record of the left (22%) would be bad. If he does not qualify for the runoff, he will probably pull an AMLO 2006 and ruin the chances of the non-Duque candidate.

Fajardo: His campaign are holding out hope that he can somehow qualify for the runoff, although from the polls he is too far out of range for that to be a realistic possibility. Elimination by the first round, therefore, would be seen as a defeat for him, probably regardless of his result (although something over or near 20% would be better than something below 15%).

Vargas Lleras: This will be the real test of how strong a candidate who is disliked by the voto de opinión but who has the strongest machine support can be in a presidential election. Vargas Lleras' goal is also to qualify for the runoff, which would be the ultimate proof that his strategy was the correct one and that Colombian politics still follows the old playbook. Given that, a year ago, Vargas was seen as the candidate to beat, anything else than a spot in the runoff would be seen as a major defeat. However, if Vargas finishes a strong third with a result significantly above his polling average and strong results in regions where he has the most powerful machine support, his bargaining power with Duque will increase substantially and could make him and CR the kingmaker or a decisive player in a future Duque administration.

De la Calle: Just get me out of my misery already. Unlike the other four candidates, de la Calle isn't even bothering to exude optimism about his own chances and is just awaiting the inevitable catastrophe. A result over 10% would be a miracle.


No predictions from me, but I can offer some numerical benchmarks and some comments on what to look out for.

Registered voters: 36,227,267

Low turnout (40%): 14.5 million
Average turnout (45%): 16.0 million - 16.6 million
2018 Congressional turnout (48.8%): 17.8 million
Very high turnout (50%): 18 million and over

Turnout has not been over 50% in any national election in Colombia since 1998. Turnout in the first round four years ago was a low 40%. I have a gut feeling that turnout may be quite high, but I may very well be wrong. It is not entirely clear who benefits from high turnout, but Petro is banking on mobilizing dissatisfied non-voters. In the congressional elections, a major increase in turnout in Bogotá benefited the 'alternative parties' on the centre-left/left like the Greens or the Decents.

First round victory (50%): 7.25 million (low turnout) - 8/8.3 million (average) - 8.9 million (congressional) - 9 million (high turnout)

Duque, therefore, would probably need over 8 million votes to be elected tomorrow.

We can't say what the 'threshold' to qualify for the runoff will be, but in 2010 Mockus qualified with 21.5%, so a candidate will need at least 3.4 million if not 3.7 million to qualify for the runoff.

Some useful comparative benchmarks from past results:

Iván Duque, March 11 primary: 4.04 million
Gustavo Petro, March 11 primary: 2.85 million
Turnout in the right-wing primary: 6.13 million
Turnout in the left-wing primary: 3.53 million

Duque and Petro hope that their votes from the 11-M primaries are their 'floor', although others will hope that it is their ceiling. Past experience shows that both may be true: in some cases, candidates won more votes in the election than in their primaries, although Noemi Sanín in 2010 and Enrique Peñalosa in 2014 both won more votes in their primaries than the actual election. This year, I suspect the former scenario is more likely. Duque in particular also hopes that the 6.1 million who voted in the 11-M right-wing primary will vote for him, particularly since his main rival then (Marta Lucía) is now his running-mate, although this is a bit more tricky since many anti-uribistas voted for her in the primary to block Duque and, of 7 primaries between 2006 and 2014, in four of them total primary turnout exceeded the number of votes won by the selected candidate in the actual election.

In Petro's case, holding all of his 2.85 million votes would be good, but insufficient, particularly if Duque holds all of his 4 million votes, because it would mean that he hasn't reduced the 'left-right' gap since 11-M.

Zuluaga + Marta Lucía, 2014 (R1): 5.76 million

This may be an interesting comparative baseline, since Duque's united right candidacy basically includes the Zuluaga (CD) and Marta Lucía (Cons.) candidacies of 2014. In percentage terms, they won 44.8% of the vote. If turnout is high, the raw vote total may be matched or beat, but if polls are correct, Duque will struggle to match the 45% combined total of both 2014 candidates.

Zuluaga, 2014 (R2): 6.9 million
No, 2016: 6.43 million

Duque will need to exceed Zuluaga's 2014 runoff total by quite a bit if he is to win outright tomorrow night.

Sí, 2016: 6.37 million

Many people will likely check if Petro, Fajardo, Vargas and de la Calle together win over 6.37 million. If they don't, it's very bad news for the 'peace' side because turnout was very low in the plebiscite. The Sí won 49.8%.

Vargas Lleras, 2010: 1.47 million
Pardo, 2010: 638.3 thousand

If Vargas Lleras wins even less votes than he won in 2010 (with 10.1%), then it will have been an absolute humiliation for him. If de la Calle wins even less votes than Rafael Pardo won in 2014 (with 4.4%), it will be an embarrassing rout.

La Silla Vacía has calculated benchmark numbers for each candidate based solely on the number of votes won by the parties and candidates who support their candidacies in the 11-M congressional elections. They do not sell these numbers as a prediction, and in the case of parties/candidates whose votes are from structures/machines, it is said that they can only transfer less than half of their congressional votes to their endorsed candidate. These numbers will be very useful in checking which candidates over/under-perform the hypothetical strength of the partisan/personalist coalitions backing them -- and measuring, for example, how effective Vargas Lleras' todo vale coalition was.

Vargas Lleras: 5,023,684
Duque: 4,548,756
Fajardo: 1,334,388
Petro: 700,220
De la Calle: 633,119

For additional stats, the CD list won 2.5 million votes in the senatorial election in March and the CR list won 2.1 million votes. If Vargas Lleras wins less than what CR won, then his candidacy will have been a disaster. The Liberals won 1.9 million votes, but de la Calle will never match that in a million years.


For those of you only in this for the pretty maps, La Silla Vacía has prepared an interactive map which averages uribista/anti-uribista results in 2014, 2016 and the 11-M primaries: http://lasillavacia.com/el-mapa-en-el-que-se-juegan-las-elecciones-del-domingo-66246. They provide a brief blurb about the outlook in each department.

My additional commentary to give a regional taste:

Bogotá (5.7 million voters): The capital has the single largest electorate and is obviously always a key target. While not a bellwether, it has generally tended to vote with the national trend, but is also fairly significantly to the left of the country and Petro has a strong base in the capital despite leaving office with low approvals in 2015. Mayor Enrique Peñalosa's unpopularity helps Petro (his arch-nemesis). But uribismo is also a major force in the capital. Vargas Lleras is a native boy, but his machine politics aren't as effective and strong in the city and CR was underwhelming on 11-M. Fajardo hopes that the unexpectedly strong mini-green wave in the 11-M elections in Bogotá - with strong results for Antanas Mockus and other Green candidates like Angélica Lozano and Juanita Goebertus - will help him.

Caribbean and San Andrés (7.68 million): The Caribbean was the key to Santos' reelection in 2014, but abysmally low turnout in the plebiscite doomed the Sí. It will be a key region, where both Vargas Lleras and Petro absolutely need to do well. Vargas Lleras has the bulk of the Caribbean's legendarily powerful and decisive clientelist machines, like the all-powerful Char family in Barranquilla but also other groups like the Gnecco clan (Cesar), the Cotes clan (Magdalena), the García Zuccardi clan (Bolívar/Sucre), Daira Galvis (Bolívar) and most of Córdoba's corrupt establishment (among others). He is counting heavily on them. Petro was born in Córdoba and retains a native son appeal throughout the region, which also has a rebellious and populist undercurrent which helps him. Petro did well in the 11-M primaries, except in Magdalena where local favourite son Carlos Caicedo won. Uribismo is weak (except in Cesar), although it does have some deep-pocketed elite support in many departments.

Antioquia (4.7 million voters): The paisa heartland is the uribista heartland, and the right-wing primary turnout here trounced left-wing primary turnout by a landslide margin on 11-M. Duque will need to run up the margins here, while Petro must significantly reduce the gap between him and Duque. Vargas Lleras doesn't have very strong machine support here. This is Fajardo's department, but his own electoral strength in Antioquia is underwhelming.

Valle (3.4 million voters): The Valle is likely to be an important swing region in this election, where all major candidates will want to do well. Uribismo was weak here in 2014, but recent results and the support of much of the Conservative machines here give them reason for optimism. Vargas Lleras has the decisive support of U governor Dilian Francisca Toro, one of the top electoral barons in Colombia. The Greens were pleasantly surprised by their performance here on 11-M, and with a strong voto de opinión in middle-class Cali, Fajardo might have a chance. Petro is likely to perform well in the heavily Afro-Colombian, poor and violent port city of Buenaventura, thanks to support from the 2016 civic strike movements in the city.

Santanderes (2.8 million voters): The departments of Santander and Norte de Santander are the two most important departments of the Eastern Andean region. The former is a 'swing' region, while the latter has, from the 2016 and 2018 results, become an uribista stronghold, perhaps due to the influence of the crisis in neighbouring Venezuela. Duque should win in Nte. de Santander, although Vargas Lleras has strong machine support there. In Santander, Vargas Lleras has both the Aguilar clan and Liberal governor Tavera's networks (among others), but there is a strong voto de opinión in the Bucaramanga metro which may favour Fajardo and Petro. The CD remains fairly weak in Santander.

Altiplano Cundiboyacense (2.8 million voters): The department of Cundinamarca, which surrounds Bogotá, is right-leaning but Vargas Lleras has machine support from the governor and some local structures, while the voto de opinión is strong in Bogotá's affluent overspill suburbia. I can't make heads or tails out of Boyacá, but this is a department where all 4 main candidates may be evenly matched - Duque and Vargas have some machine support, but Fajardo may count on the Green structure of former governor Londoño and Petro may benefit from the electoral strength of the left-wing peasant movement from the 2013 agrarian strikes.

Pacific (2.3 million voters): The departments of Cauca, Chocó and Nariño are among the most anti-uribista departments in the country, and although Duque has some machine support in Chocó and Nariño, it is Petro who - like in March - is expected to do well in this poor region with large indigenous and black communities (both of which are expected to heavily favour Petro, particularly the former). Vargas Lleras has strong machine support, from the old corrupt political structures of Cauca, Chocó and Nariño, so this will also be a test of whether popular enthusiasm can overwhelm traditional clientelism.

Eje Cafetero (2 million voters): One of the most beautiful regions of Colombia is, like Antioquia, also uribista country, although a bit less so. Duque did very well in the primaries in all three departments, and the CD has gotten stronger in all three as well since 2014-5, but Vargas Lleras has machine support in all three departments (but the old CR machines of Quindío are all going to jail soon, so it's not as it once was). Like in Antioquia, Petro needs to reduce the 'left-right' gap here and show that he can win a respectable number of votes in conservative paisa country.

Tolima and Huila (1.87 million voters): Both of these Andean departments are fairly uribista, particularly the latter. Duque should rout opponents in Huila, but Tolima may be closer, given the traditional strength of the Liberals in parts of the department and machine support (including Conservative governor Barreto, a former uribista) for Vargas. One of Petro's old allies, Guillermo Alfonso Jaramillo, is the mayor of Ibagué.

Orinoquía/Amazonia (1.87 million voters): This huge region may probably give both Duque and Petro their best results, in Casanare and Putumayo (or Vaupés) respectively. Cattle, oil and paramilitary heaven Casanare is the most uribista department in the country. Uribismo is also strong in Arauca, Meta and Caquetá (and Vichada and Guaviare), where most votes in this region are to be found, but Vargas Lleras has machine support in these departments and an old left-wing tradition in parts of Arauca, Meta and Caquetá may favour Petro (but it's not the 1980s anymore).

[WMS]

I've enjoyed your effortposts immensely, Hash, even if we probably wouldn't vote for the same people. If it's Duque vs Vargas Lleras, which option is worse?

[EPG]

Thanks great posting. I got Petro/Fajardo tie 58 with Duque at 25, which feels great.

[Hash]

I've enjoyed your effortposts immensely, Hash, even if we probably wouldn't vote for the same people. If it's Duque vs Vargas Lleras, which option is worse?

Always appreciate the positive feedback!

Colombia has an option for a 'blank vote' which counts as a valid vote, but that's a cop-out which lets others decide for you in nearly every single case (although I deliberately invalidated my vote twice last year in France, so I don't really care about that). Neither Duque or Vargas would be good presidents; forced to choose, Duque is the better person, although Vargas' policies would be less objectionable to me, although the outcomes would probably be pretty bad. My hope is that Duque's conservative posturing was a campaign ploy, and that he returns to being his former self and, more importantly, that he distances himself from Uribe at least a bit.

I'd probably vote for Fajardo, because he could be a passably decent president who doesn't burn everything down and because I'm a fan of Claudia López. In a perfect world, de la Calle would make a great president, but it isn't a perfect world so tough. That said, with LSV's quiz matching your personality to that of candidates, I got Duque (twice) so I may need to re-evaluate my personality.

[EPG]

Given our results, are we sure this isn't giving higher points to your LEAST preferred candidate?