Colombian presidential election, June 17 2018

[Hash]

A whole bunch of pretty maps to complete my previous posts.

An ethnic self-identification map based on the 2005 Census.


'Basic needs unsatisified' based on the 2005 Census.


Estimated size of the 'white European' colonizing group.


Absolute number of registered victims of the conflict, as of May 2018.


The data is drawn from the Registro Único de Víctimas, which is the most up-to-date and complete public database on victims of the conflict. 80% of victims are IDPs (7.3 million).

A sloppy, misleading estimate of the relative number of victims as a % of each department's population in 2018. This is misleading because many victims have moved away from the department where they were victimized, but the data I am using refers to 'department of occurrence' rather than registration.



2002 Presidential election. Uribe in blue.


2006 Presidential election. Uribe in blue.


2014 Presidential election. First round. Santos in orange, Zuluaga in blue.


2014 Presidential election. Second round. Same key.


2016 Plebiscite. Sí in green, No in red.


2018 Senate election.


My most recent magnum opus, 2018 Senate election by municipality.


2018 Primaries. Comparison of total left v. total right primary turnout (absolute).


2018 Primaries. Comparison of votes for Duque v. votes for Petro (absolute).

[WMS]

I've enjoyed your effortposts immensely, Hash, even if we probably wouldn't vote for the same people. If it's Duque vs Vargas Lleras, which option is worse?

Always appreciate the positive feedback!

Colombia has an option for a 'blank vote' which counts as a valid vote, but that's a cop-out which lets others decide for you in nearly every single case (although I deliberately invalidated my vote twice last year in France, so I don't really care about that). Neither Duque or Vargas would be good presidents; forced to choose, Duque is the better person, although Vargas' policies would be less objectionable to me, although the outcomes would probably be pretty bad. My hope is that Duque's conservative posturing was a campaign ploy, and that he returns to being his former self and, more importantly, that he distances himself from Uribe at least a bit.

I'd probably vote for Fajardo, because he could be a passably decent president who doesn't burn everything down and because I'm a fan of Claudia López. In a perfect world, de la Calle would make a great president, but it isn't a perfect world so tough. That said, with LSV's quiz matching your personality to that of candidates, I got Duque (twice) so I may need to re-evaluate my personality.

No problem although whenever you have time an update (in your blog if nowhere else) explaining what happened in El Salvador would be much appreciated as well since I could tell something important had happened, but not quite what.

Hmm...in the case of that runoff a reluctant Duque vote from me. In the first round though...

Fajardo/Lopez might have earned my support were I a Colombian voter - real long-time denizens of this forum will recall me as an initial strong Uribe supporter (which I still stand by: for all his many horrible flaws he DID stop the FARC et al in their tracks, and in 2002 that wasn't seen as inevitable) and it's fair to say, especially after reading Hash's earlier works on Colombia, that I gradually would've drifted away into the soft Party of the U type or something as Uribe gradually went off the deep end. But a soft social democrat governing for a term or so might be good for Colombia *now*. Oh well. Looks like it will be the Uribist's turn again.

Yeah a crossover vote for Fajardo/Lopez from me. I'll give the soft left a chance to govern and see how they do. The Chavista left though, I'd rather vote the Uribists in than THEM.

Those are some seriously nice maps

[Hash]

Mixed and contradictory turnout reports. Turnout seems high in Bogotá and especially in Medellín, as well as in Barranquilla and Sta. Marta. The biggest machines for Vargas and Duque are visible in places like Barranquilla and Cúcuta, but don't seem to operating at maximum capacity. In some other places, it is lower than in March (congressional turnout patterns differ from presidential turnout patterns, so this isn't a surprise).

On Friday, the foreign ministry had reported that 'early voting' in the consulates (expats could vote starting on Monday) was 3x higher than in 2014 - 73k v. 18k after five days (with yesterday and today left to vote), so expat turnout will probably be significantly higher than in 2014 (when it was less than 20% in the first round).

Left-wing Twitter is angry that Miss Universe 2015 Paulina Vega tweeted 'DUQUE PRESIDENTE'. She's dead to me.

edit: Green senator-elect Angélica Lozano claims on Twitter that turnout records will be broken today: 20 million votes, 3.5-4 million in Bogotá. Not sure if this is a prediction or an actual substantiated claim. Yuge if true.

[Skye]

Care to throw some last minute predictions?

[Oryxslayer]

Who would high turnout benefit? I suspect low turnout benefits the machinists, but it isn't always obvious where the most lower-propensity voters would go.

[Hash]

Who would high turnout benefit? I suspect low turnout benefits the machinists, but it isn't always obvious where the most lower-propensity voters would go.

Well, turnout was low in 2014 (R1) and 2016 because the machines sat on their hands, particularly in the Caribbean, even as urban turnout in Bogotá and Medellín was strong.

As I wrote on the last page,

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Petro appeals to the indignados and the youth, who typically have very low turnout, so high turnout may benefit him if those who vote around young and/or indignados. Impossible to know if this is actually the case. Petro's support is also highest among low-income voters, whereas Duque and Fajardo polled strongest with the highest socioeconomic strati.

However, if turnout is due to machines operating as they did in 2014 (R2) or local/congressional elections, then this would benefit Vargas and Duque. But it really doesn't seem as if the machines are doing overtime hours today.

I don't think Duque either suffers or benefits from particularly high or low turnout.

[Hash]

Polls closing minutes from now.

Results page: https://presidente2018.registraduria.gov.co/resultados/html/resultados.html

There is also a downloadable app. The bulk of results should be in within an hour/1.5 hours, with final 'pre-count' results within 2-3 hours.

Caracol TV has a livestream, with no geoblock, which is quite good because it lacks annoying talking heads.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jb5bodJOUD0

[Hash]

Registraduría reported 12 million voters at noon/1:30pm, which would tentatively suggest fairly decent turnout comparable to 11-M (48%).

[Oryxslayer]

VERY preliminary results 88/97,663 precincts/counts:

DUQUE - 47%
FAJARDO - 29.5%
PETRO - 16.5%
VARGAS LLERAS - 4%
DE LA CALLE - 1.5%

[Hash]

1.67% reporting and Petro moves into second:

Uribito 42.53
Petro 24.73
Fajardo 19.6
Vargas 9.01
DLC 1.48

Fajardo was in second because the consulates reported quicker.

[Oryxslayer]

4,586/97,663 precincts/counts:

DUQUE - 42.67%
PETRO - 24.47%
FAJARDO - 20.67%
VARGAS LLERAS - 7.65%
 DE LA CALLE - 1.66%

These results are right now dominated by the Consulate vote, which is why Fajardo is high and Vargas Lleras is low

[Hash]

12.3% precincts, so the serious business is starting now.

Duque 42.13
Petro 24.41
Fajardo 21.27
Vargas 7.57
DLC 1.79

Bogotá slower to report (only 2.5% reporting).

Results updates come online every 5 minutes, ftr.

[Hash]

25% reporting

Duque 41.8
Petro 24.11
Fajardo 21.89
Vargas 7.52
De la Calle 1.86

[Oryxslayer]

As I am said on my twitter live report, it looks like the machines really dropped the ball for Vargas Lleras.

[Hash]

42% reporting

Duque 41.29
Petro 24.17
Fajardo 22.46
Vargas 7.38
De la Calle 1.91

In Sucre, a stronghold of corrupt machines, with 57% reporting, Petro has 43.68 vs 36.94 for Duque and only 12.34 for Vargas. Pretty clear that Vargas is dead. CR won over 40% of the vote in Sucre on 11-M.

[Hash]

59.5% reporting:

Duque 40.67
Petro 24.49
Fajardo 22.82
Vargas 7.3
De la Calle 1.95

[BundouYMB]

Bogota is still only 33% in so Duque will fall further, probably to around 38% in the end. Hash, how do you think Fajardo's voters will split in the second round?

[Hash]

74.8% reporting:

Duque 40.1
Petro 24.66
Fajardo 23.26
Vargas 7.24
De la Calle 1.99

Difference of about 193k between second and third. A bit tough but not impossible for Fajardo to make up the difference. Bogotá at 54% reporting has an interesting result: Petro 33.44, Fajardo 31.79, Duque 25.52. Fajardo's hopes for second largely hinge on what happens there.

[Hash]

85% reporting:

Duque 39.72
Petro 24.89
Fajardo 23.4
Vargas 7.24
De la Calle 2.01

Fajardo barely ahead in Bogotá now. But very tough, I think, to surpass Petro.

[Hash]

91.7% reporting

Duque 39.39
Petro 25.02
Fajardo 23.63
Vargas 7.21
De la Calle 2.04

48.5% turnout.

Duque/Petro runoff quasi-certain. Tragic. Fajardo could have defeated Duque... Petro won't.

[Skye]

Wow, where were Fajardo's voters hiding?

[Oryxslayer]

I got a Colombian replying to my Twitter saying Fajardo basically controls who wins the runoff with his endorsement - I don't think this is true but is there anything right about this statement? I suspect the Opinion voters are just going to move to the left or the right depending on their own views.

And are there any rules for recounts in Colombia?

[Hash]

99% reporting

Duque 39.11
Petro 25.1
Fajardo 23.76
Vargas 7.26
De la Calle 2.06

Very high turnout at 53.2%

I got a Colombian replying to my Twitter saying Fajardo basically controls who wins the runoff with his endorsement - I don't think this is true but is there anything right about this statement? I suspect the Opinion voters are just going to move to the left or the right depending on their own views.

And are there any rules for recounts in Colombia?

If Fajardo endorses, it will have significant sway over his voters, but knowing Fajardo's personality, there's a chance he may just equivocate (or maybe not, the stakes are high and his voters are clearly anti-uribista). Given the geographic distribution of much of Fajardo's support, I have trouble seeing them move massively to Petro. I'll have more comments on the fascinating electoral geography of this vote later (with maps).

This is not an official count and has no official value. Official counts begin tomorrow, at which point results can be challenged. But the official count won't significantly differ from this pre-count to matter.

[LimoLiberal]

Hash - correct me if I'm wrong - but it seems like Fajardo lost because of his weakness in the Carribean region. He was unable break 10% in any of the coastal departments NE of Antioquia. What was that the result of?

[Starry Eyed Jagaloon]

Damn. I was hoping for Fajardo. Duque it is :-(

Anecdotally, my friends in Santa Marta were all in for Fajardo, and I thought they might be a better representation of the Carribean than they are. I guess not...