Colombian presidential election, June 17 2018

[Tender Branson]

My prediction for the runoff today:

55.2% Duque
44.8% Petro

Turnout: 56% (high ... for Colombian standards)

The 2-person vote was 56-44 and turnout 53%.

Not a bad prediction after all.

[Hash]

The voto en blanco was the niche of the país nacional if I've ever seen one.

What is the país nacional?

Welp, that should have read 'país político'. My apologies.

It is a reference to Jorge Eliécer Gaitán's famous concept that in Colombia there are 'two countries', the país nacional and the país político. It was part of his populist political oratory, but it is a valid concept which has held true (in my perspective). By país político, Gaitán referred to "other social phenomenons, specific men and systems. In this obscure realm where one doesn't think in the patria but rather in the elections, the candidates ask for collective help to climb the positions which the people grant to the best of their sons, but the mandate, irreplaceable instrument of the democratic will, ends ends precisely when it should start, that is the day after the elections. Work is displaced by intrigue; merits by influences; will or service by the thirst for profit. [etc.]" (1947). In modern usage, the term país político is sometimes extended to mean the whims, interests, opinions, biases and prejudices of politicians but also all those who move in political circles, including media elites, in juxtaposition with the often very different whims, interests, opinions, biases and prejudices of the rest of the people (país nacional)

The voto en blanco was a phenomenon of the país político, because the país nacional obviously didn't care very much for it.
 

[Hash]

My thoughts on the results:

1. Undoubtedly a major victory for Uribismo 2.0, with Iván Duque receiving the clearest (and numerically biggest) mandate for a president-elect, with 10.3 million votes, an all-time record (previously held by Santos in 2010). Duque shatters the traditional barriers of uribismo, which indicates that Uribismo 2.0 - Duquismo? - is a real thing, because Duque's 10.3 million voters are not all devout worshippers of the Eternal President. I have said from the beginning (in December when Duque initially won the CD's The Bachelor: Uribismo Edition 'primary') that Duque would be a tremendously strong candidate who would be tough to beat, particularly if his opponent was as polarizing as Petro. As I wrote after the first round:

"This result confirms Duque's individual strength as a candidate, able to placate the far-right/furibista core with a traditional, conservative message, while also appealing to a centre-right/centrist electorate which isn't necessarily uribista with a more modern, technocratic neoliberal/neoconservative message which emphasizes his youth. The result also confirms that Uribe, even if he may act like a deranged lunatic on Twitter, is one of the smartest politicians out there: he correctly assessed the electorate's mood, and went for a young candidate with no baggage and no direct connection to Uribe's two terms and the tons of scandals associated with them. As I've been saying for months, Duque is the only candidate who has both opinion and machines, and even though the former was more important for him yesterday, the latter shouldn't be underestimated."

Duque is one of the smartest politicians I've seen in quite some time, although I do live in a province which elected Doug Ford so it doesn't take much for me to consider a politician to be smart. He is an intelligent, articulate and charismatic man who absolutely destroyed the 'inexperience' argument, united the entire right behind him (which wasn't a slam-dunk if you were following this last fall), impressively avoided any major missteps or gaffes during the campaign and, to a certain extent, was able to demarcate himself away from Uribe (although Duque wouldn't exist without Uribe). Duque had a breezy runoff campaign, receiving a ton of endorsements (not from the right people) without asking for them, needing them or having to ask for anything in exchange; he avoided a debate, and it didn't matter outside Petrista circles, because the ton of debates in the first round were useless. It also didn't hurt that Duque was supported by the vast majority of Colombia's business elites, major corporations, industrialists and media owners, and that a lot of the media went soft on him - most farcically with La FM Radio/RCN TV (Colombia's FOX News, owned by right-wing industrialist and tycoon Ardila Lülle) asking Petro fake news nonsense while treating Duque as a talent show winner, showing off his football skills or tastes in music.

I genuinely hope that Duque can create a modern, democratic and legal conservative right in Colombia which moves away from the anachronistic far-right of Uribe and criminal paramilitarism, because Colombia needs a modern conservative right. The difficulty is that Duque will need to please a very vocal, visible and politically active enraged furibista base, and he will govern with a Congress which largely remains a nest of rats, with the worse garbage Colombian politics has to offer in between crooks, cynical timeservers, heirs of parapolíticos and other criminals. Or, as Daniel Coronell said last night, Duque's paradox is that he wouldn't exist without Uribe but can't govern with Uribe.

2. A defeat with taste of victory for Gustavo Petro. I've said a lot of things about him, most of them not particularly nice, but he performed much better than anyone could have expected a few months ago. With 8 million votes, he is not only further shattering records for the left, but won more votes than Santos won in the 2014 runoff. Breaking 40%, and losing by around 12 points, he did about as well in the runoff as could have been realistically expected given everything. The total flop of the voto en blanco means that, in the end, voters picked between one of the two useful options and this probably helped Petro a bit more than Duque. Indeed, Petro gained more votes since May 27 than Duque: +3.18 million votes, vs. +2.8 million votes for Duque. Not a massive difference, but a significant and notable success for Petro. The gap between left and right, however, still didn't change very much from May or March: 2.3 million votes in the right's favour, vs. 2.7 million votes in May and 2.6 million in the 11-M primaries. Petro got destroyed in Antioquia, the Eje, Nte. de Santander, much of the Llanos and did poorly in Tolima and Huila, and these regions explain the margin and his defeat.

As Petro said in his concession speech, the left is so used to defeat that this defeat isn't all that bad. He didn't, but only "for now" as he said. Because the 2015 constitutional reform automatically gives a Senate seat to the runner-up in the presidential election (and a House seat to his running-mate), Petro will become a senator and the 'leader of the opposition', further helped by the advantages given the opposition by the new opposition statute adopted last year. Like in 2002-2010, Petro in the Senate - face to face with Uribe - will be the face and voice of the vocal opposition, and this will keep him alive politically until 2022. If he plays his cards right, quits being such a narcissist and can build a bigger coalition around himself... then a victory is possible (you heard it here first). The 2019 local elections will be a first test. Here again, I genuinely hope Petro or somebody else can create a strong, modern, democratic left in Colombia which moves away from the caudillismo and whataboutism on Venezuela, because Colombia needs a strong, modern, democratic left.

3. To toot my own horn, I have been saying for months that Petro was un-electable. I admit that he did much better than I expected, but a Petro victory this year was never a realistic possibility, given current circumstances -- the energized, organized and united right-wing opposition, the difficulties and controversies of the peace process, the Venezuelan crisis and Colombia's conservative lean. As I said after the first round:

He needs to do very little to win, while Petro needs to do a lot and he isn't the right person to do it. Duque is the only candidate with both opinion and machines (let's not pretend that uribismo doesn't do machine politics), and he is the only candidate with substantial support in basically every region of the country (Petro was crushed in paisa country).

4. The voto en blanco was a flop. 800,000 votes or 4.2%, not even 1 million or 5%, barely above the 2014 numbers (and below the 2014 percentage of 6%!). Given how it was supported by two defeated candidates, several leading politicians and so many leading op-ed political columnists and opinion-makers, everyone took it to be something much more significant than it actually was. Every poll (except Invamer) significantly overestimated it. Either undecideds were parking their votes there will making up their mind, or it was really always the thing of the país político (see previous post), the overblown niche views of a bunch of op-ed columnists who aren't all that representative of the país nacional.

5. It was a runoff unlike any other, particularly 2014. It was an election day without the constant details and reports of machines moving their parts and pawns in favour of one or another candidate -- unlike in 2014, when Santos was reelected mostly thanks to the Odebrecht-funded clientelist machines of the Caribbean. No such thing in this runoff. The Char family supported Duque, but they didn't move their machines in Atlántico, and Petro won in Atlántico, particularly in the charista family bulwark of Barranquilla and the low-income suburban municipality of Soledad, usually known for its massive vote buying and electoral fraud. This is why comparisons to 2014, even in terms of maps, are deceptive (even if anti-uribismo is a useful, if simplistic, concept). Santos and Petro both won in Sahagún (Córdoba), but that doesn't mean that the reasons for their victory there are the same. This is one reason why, despite an outcome which I've not personally pleased with, I'm cautiously optimistic: this presidential election was good news for democracy in Colombia, and a beautiful sign that Colombia is becoming a more modern, democratic and peaceful country (I'm not the only anti-uribista with this opinion, fwiw).

6. Related to the above, this election has destroyed the old playbook. Vargas Lleras played by the rules of the old playbook, and he has been AWOL since May 27. I don't think congressional or local elections have changed or will be played by the same playbook, but presidential elections will, and the new playbook is better than the old one. Machines aren't necessarily the unbeatable behemoths they were made out to be, and they alone cannot elect a president.

7. President-elect Iván Duque's speech hammered home the themes of national unity, 'one country' and 'no divisions', devoting a lot of time to emphasize the more 2.0 elements of his new uribista discourse, without forgetting to give due attention to traditional uribista themes like the tres huevitos. I noted that it took him over 20 minutes to even mention Uribe, and he mentioned him only once, in the same sentence as crazy old Andrés Pastrana (sad!), after beginning his speech by thanking God, Colombian voters, his family, children and campaign team. As in the past two election nights this year, Uribe was at his finca in Rionegro (Antioquia), emotionless, and other controversial figures of Duque's coalition like book burner Ordóñez or homophobe Viviane weren't there. He devoted a large portion of his speech to promises to end marmalade, corruption and politicking, which is a bit surprising considering who supported him in the runoff, and which may come back to haunt him when he is inevitably unable to 'end' corruption or marmalade (for historical memory, Uribe's 2002 campaign was also based heavily on 'ending' politicking and corruption, and his 2002-06 government, supported by congressmen elected with paramilitary support, ended up being one of the most criminal and corrupt administrations). Among anti-uribistas, analysis of his speech is split between optimists (who think it shows he is tacking to the centre, going out of his way to reassure voters and adopting themes carried by Petro like exclusion), undecideds (who think it is too early to say what this indicates) and pessimists (who think it was a right-wing speech which doesn't change anything or provide any reason for hope). I am in the second category.

8. Next steps: the new Congress takes office on July 20, which will be preceded by the parties formally declaring themselves to be in opposition or not (a new process) and the typical political deals within the new governing majority to split up the presidency of the Senate and the House for the next 4 years, with the favourite to become the president of the Senate/Congress for the first year of the legislature (2018-19) being Álvaro Uribe. Duque will be inaugurated on August 7, to be preceded by cabinet appointments, the first names already floating (some concerning names, others not so much) with the promise of a young cabinet with gender parity. The anti-corruption referendum, which both Petro and Duque promise to support and campaign for, is scheduled for August 26. Local and regional elections will be held in October 2019, and the campaign for that really begins today.

And the Selección plays tomorrow.

[Tender Branson]

Hash, how do you explain the fact that there were about 550.000 more eligible voters in the 2nd round than in the 1st round of voting (see Wikipedia results section) ?

Does Colombia have a voter registration system like the US, where people have to register themselves to vote - unlike automatic registration ?

[Hash]

Wikipedia is wrong. Using the Registraduría's pages, there were 36,783,940 registered voters in both rounds, although they add as footnote that this number is obtained from "the electoral roll of 36,227,267 eligible citizens plus a theoretical value assigned as a potential of the 936 voting locations abroad from June 11 to June 16", which the reason for confusion. It is unclear what exactly they mean.

However, in any case, it is impossible that anyone who wasn't eligible to vote in the first round was eligible in the runoff. The voter registration update window closed on March 27.

[Hash]

According to Claudia López, 63% of Fajardo's voters went for Petro, 25% for Duque, 10% voted blank and 2% didn't show up. She is a reliable source, and those numbers are in line with what the result was. In the next few days, I'll make maps showing where Petro gained the most support.

In the meantime, here's a map of the expat vote (all 259.5 thousand of them):


Turnout was comically low as always (18.9%), down from 20.3% in the first round. Duque won 69.9% of the expat vote, although he gained just 29,000 votes (Petro gained 35,000). 41.6% of all votes came from the US (107,900) where, unsurprisingly, Duque destroyed Petro with 84.8%. 13% of votes were cast in Venezuela, although turnout among the large Colombian migrant population in Venezuela is always very low (just 11%, or 33k of 300k registered). Duque won 83.3% in the neighbouring country, which is a major shift on 2014, since Santos won Colombians in Venezuela four years ago, so this is undoubtedly the result of living under castrochavismo firsthand. 9.6% of votes came from Spain (24,800), and Duque won 57% with the traditionally right-leaning Colombians in Spain (the MIRA Movement is typically strong there in congressional elections). 5.5% of votes were cast in Canada, where Duque won 56%. The countries with the largest number of voters which Petro won were Argentina (7,600 votes, 73.8% Petro) and France (5,000 votes, 63.1% Petro).

[Antonio the Sixth]

Oh, of course the Uribista stooge won in a landslide.

[Skye]

turnout among the large Colombian migrant population in Venezuela is always very low (just 11%, or 33k of 300k registered).

It was even lower than in 2014, so I'm going to assume it's because most of them have already left the country?

Duque won 83.3% in the neighbouring country, which is a major shift on 2014, since Santos won Colombians in Venezuela four years ago, so this is undoubtedly the result of living under castrochavismo firsthand.

Can confirm living under chavismo will make you despise anything remotely associated with them.

[WMS]

I prefer Petro over Duque/Uribe for obvious reasons. Ideological affinity is an important reason, but not the only one. Uribe and the coalition backing Duque represent reactionary, traditionalist and male chauvinist values that I dislike. I've never been a fan of Chávez, on the other hand. Petro admired him in the past, but distanced later. He has condemned Maduro, maybe too late. I know that Petro awakes fears and concerns among some people who voted for Fajardo in the first round. I know something about his career, virtues and flaws. Just to be clear: preferring Petro does not imply that I'm a big fan or a diehard supporter. I think that Petro is far from being perfect, but he has the support of large social sectors (the young, the poor, Amerindian, Afro-Colombian, etc) and is the undisputed leader of the Colombian left (despite senator Robledo). I don't think that Petro is chavista nowadays and neither is his platform. On the other hand, I never saw Petro as a viable candidate to defeat uribismo in the second round. If Ir was eligible to vote in Colombia, I would have a hard time in the first round choosing between him and Fajardo. I think the latter would have had more chances in the runoff and certainly he was good mayor of Medellín and is a decent person. Tactical vote would have been a possibility.

OK, this is very understandable. It's nice to see leftists who don't fall into the category of excusing Castro or Chavez just to stick it to the U.S. or because they actually believe in it *looks meaningfully over at Justin Trudeau*. Thanks for clearing that up. I bolded that really important sentence because as it turns out...

According to Claudia López, 63% of Fajardo's voters went for Petro, 25% for Duque, 10% voted blank and 2% didn't show up. She is a reliable source, and those numbers are in line with what the result was. In the next few days, I'll make maps showing where Petro gained the most support.

There it is. The missed opportunity to defeat uribismo and with Fajardo get some mild social democracy in Colombia.

Oh, of course the Uribista stooge won in a landslide.

The left should've been smarter then.

Duque won 83.3% in the neighbouring country, which is a major shift on 2014, since Santos won Colombians in Venezuela four years ago, so this is undoubtedly the result of living under castrochavismo firsthand.

Can confirm living under chavismo will make you despise anything remotely associated with them.

Given arguments in years past with leftists on this forum over Chavez and Castro - including with you, if I recall - I take some vindication in opposing them from the start. It is a horrifying dead end for leftist ideology and needs to stop being defended so the left can work on better alternatives to what the right is cooking up.

Superb analysis and commentary, Hash.

I genuinely hope that Duque can create a modern, democratic and legal conservative right in Colombia which moves away from the anachronistic far-right of Uribe and criminal paramilitarism, because Colombia needs a modern conservative right.

Here again, I genuinely hope Petro or somebody else can create a strong, modern, democratic left in Colombia which moves away from the caudillismo and whataboutism on Venezuela, because Colombia needs a strong, modern, democratic left.

I strongly agree with both of these positions. Not just in Colombia, either...

One question for Hash: once you've analyzed everything to your heart's content and have the data you want...could Fajardo have beaten Duque? And how, if so? Genuinely curious here.

[Velasco]

I know that Petro awakes fears and concerns among some people who voted for Fajardo in the first round.

OK, this is very understandable. It's nice to see leftists who don't fall into the category of excusing Castro or Chavez just to stick it to the U.S. or because they actually believe in it *looks meaningfully over at Justin Trudeau*. Thanks for clearing that up. I bolded that really important sentence because as it turns out...

According to Claudia López, 63% of Fajardo's voters went for Petro, 25% for Duque, 10% voted blank and 2% didn't show up. She is a reliable source, and those numbers are in line with what the result was. In the next few days, I'll make maps showing where Petro gained the most support.

There it is. The missed opportunity to defeat uribismo and with Fajardo get some mild social democracy in Colombia.

Oh, of course the Uribista stooge won in a landslide.

The left should've been smarter then.

I'm getting the impression that you have some preconceived notions about leftism and politics in general. There is people in the left that sympathized with Chávez or Castro, there is people who didn't. The "left" is not a monolithic ideological field. I'm not saying this as a rebuke, it's just that I don't like stereotypes very much (especially when someone holds them against me). My opinions are personal and I only represent myself.

I think that chavismo, which is a particular form of eft-wing populism, must be understood in its regional context. It's a phenomenon easy to demonize and caricaturize, furthermore given the collapse of Venezuela under the Maduro regime. However, critics of chavismo tend to ignore the historical context in which Chávez came to power and the causes of his popularity (home and abroad). Don't try to look Latin America with North Amencan or European glasses*. Realize that one of the defining features of Latin American countries is the existence of a gross social inequality. Chávez gave voice to many marginalized people that never benefited from oil revenues. Until he came to power the poorest half of the population (as well the "browns") didn't exist for the Venezuelan elites. That's one of the reasons of his popularity. Also, he implemented social programs aimed at the poor. The dark side is well known: bad economic management, waste of resources, persistence of corruption, polarization and authoritarian tendencies. I think that many people who sympathized with Chávez in the left has taken critical distance, as well as Venezuela has fallen into chaos. It's a logical process.

Back to Colombia, regardless his previous undeniable affinity with Chávez Petro is smart enough to have distanced himself from that. Anyway this relationship and his past guerrilla membership (M-19 is different from the FARC) have been used by uribismo to attack him, predictably. Petro may have defects of character (arrogance, stubbornness and the like), but he's not an idiot. I admit not being particularly fond of him when watching some of his speeches in video. However, he is a smart man with good oratory. As Claudia López puts it: he's a true "popular leader".

As for Sergio Fajardo and his hypothetical chances to defeat Iván Duque, don't take them for granted. Maybe his performance in a runoff could have been slightly better, but his victory would have been uncertain. Hash already put it; Duque has revealed tough to beat. Petro didn't perform so badly, after all. I wonder if he believed blindly in his possibilities this time, or he has been paving the way for another attempt in 2022.

*_{I'm not a big fan, but I have nothing against Justin Trudeau; my PM Pedro Sánchez resembles him a bit and I think he's more handsome} .

[Skye]

However, critics of chavismo tend to ignore the historical context in which Chávez came to power and the causes of his popularity (home and abroad). Don't try to look Latin America with North Amencan or European glasses*. Realize that one of the defining features of Latin American countries is the existence of a gross social inequality. Chávez gave voice to many marginalized people that never benefited from oil revenues. Until he came to power the poorest half of the population (as well the "browns") didn't exist for the Venezuelan elites. That's one of the reasons of his popularity. Also, he implemented social programs aimed at the poor. The dark side is well known: bad economic management, waste of resources, persistence of corruption, polarization and authoritarian tendencies. I think that many people who sympathized with Chávez in the left has taken critical distance, as well as Venezuela has fallen into chaos. It's a logical process.

I know all too well the historical context of Chávez. He used his "Misiones", his social programs that benefited the poor, to implement a cult of personality; one of the reasons he's so popular. He was a smart man, and knew very well how to command rhetoric to promote a class war that has left a deeply negative impact in our society.

And I need to emphasize more that "dark side" you mentioned, because it really is what defines chavismo. The economic management wasn't simply bad, it was absolutely disastrous. They either wasted or stole all the money and now we are suffering because of it. Corruption has reached insane levels you couldn't even imagine, just about everyone in a position of power is infuriatingly corrupt, from police officers to even low level government employees. "Authoritarian tendencies" is just putting it lightly. Chavismo is almost textbook authoritarism.

Maduro is just a continuation of Chávez, just without the carisma. Chávez was an evil man who implemented all the policies that destroyed my country just to look good to the poor, Maduro just happened to arrive at a bad time for the revolution. Which is why I have to flee this garbage hole that has become Venezuela because I earn less than $10 a month. And I'm a Medical Doctor.

[Velasco]

It's your opinion and it's allright, but we shouldn't go deeper in this thread. We should better discuss Colombia, or in any case the relationship between Venezuela and Colombia. Another interesting subject could be discussing the reasons why the Left has been traditionally weak in Colombia. Possibly there are other social and historical causes, but it's obvious that real or alleged links to Chávez and the FARC have been a burden for the Left. I think it's not a coincidence that the best historical result for a leftist candidate in Colombia comes after the Peace Agreement and despite the turmoil in Venezuela. I'm just suggesting topics..

[Hash]

Results in Bogotá by localidad (borough) present a truly fascinating picture of what happened:



A perfect north-south, rich-poor polarization. Duque won in the wealthiest localities in the north of the city, with 60% in Usaquén (the wealthiest) and 56.5% in Chapinero (the second-wealthiest). He also won more narrowly in Suba, Barrios Unidos and Teusaquillo -- all of which voted for Fajardo in R1 (with Duque a strong second) and which are relatively well off. On the assumption that patterns were similar to the first round, in Suba Duque likely destroyed Petro in the wealthiest neighbourhoods like Niza while Petro won strata 2-3 areas which aren't as wealthy. That being said, Petro pulling 31.8% in Usaquén and 35.1% in Chapinero is still quite notable, as he won less than 15% of the vote in both localities three weeks ago, showing that many, probably most, Fajardo voters even from upper middle-class backgrounds voted for him.

On the other hand, Petro dominated by massive margins in the poor areas in the south of the city, where he had already won over 45% three weeks ago. In Usme, he won 70%, his best result in the city with the obvious exception of Sumapaz (79.8%). He won 68.6% in San Cristobal, 66% in Bosa and 68% in Cd. Bolívar -- the poorest strata 1-2 localities of the city. He also won 64% in Santa Fe, which has both poor areas and more downtown bohemian/student-y areas, 64% in La Candelaria (the small historical core which has only a small resident population, with many young people, students and low-income residents), 63.8% in Rafael Uribe Uribe and 60.8% in Tunjuelito (which both include poorer residential areas).

As I have said in all of my posts analyzing results within cities, elections in urban Colombia are decided by the middle-class strata 3. Fajardo's victory in the first round in Bogotá was in large part due to his very strong numbers in strata 3 localities like Engativá and Fontibón (as well as in Kennedy, the largest locality). In the runoff, Petro easily won in Kennedy - which has a large lower-income strata 2 population as well - with 57%, but also - crucially - defeated Duque by narrower margins in both Fontibón (49.9-43.3) and Engativá (51.1-42.3), where Fajardo won over 40%.

Unlike in the first round and most other elections, the voto en blanco was not highest in lower-income areas, but rather in the affluent north (7.9% in Usaquén and 8.5% in Chapinero) and, unsurprisingly, in other localities where Fajardo had done well.

[kireev]

I could not find the results by locality here https://presidente2018.registraduria.gov.co/resultados/2html/resultados.html Where did you find them?

Results in Bogotá by localidad (borough) present a truly fascinating picture of what happened:



A perfect north-south, rich-poor polarization. Duque won in the wealthiest localities in the north of the city, with 60% in Usaquén (the wealthiest) and 56.5% in Chapinero (the second-wealthiest). He also won more narrowly in Suba, Barrios Unidos and Teusaquillo -- all of which voted for Fajardo in R1 (with Duque a strong second) and which are relatively well off. On the assumption that patterns were similar to the first round, in Suba Duque likely destroyed Petro in the wealthiest neighbourhoods like Niza while Petro won strata 2-3 areas which aren't as wealthy. That being said, Petro pulling 31.8% in Usaquén and 35.1% in Chapinero is still quite notable, as he won less than 15% of the vote in both localities three weeks ago, showing that many, probably most, Fajardo voters even from upper middle-class backgrounds voted for him.

On the other hand, Petro dominated by massive margins in the poor areas in the south of the city, where he had already won over 45% three weeks ago. In Usme, he won 70%, his best result in the city with the obvious exception of Sumapaz (79.8%). He won 68.6% in San Cristobal, 66% in Bosa and 68% in Cd. Bolívar -- the poorest strata 1-2 localities of the city. He also won 64% in Santa Fe, which has both poor areas and more downtown bohemian/student-y areas, 64% in La Candelaria (the small historical core which has only a small resident population, with many young people, students and low-income residents), 63.8% in Rafael Uribe Uribe and 60.8% in Tunjuelito (which both include poorer residential areas).

As I have said in all of my posts analyzing results within cities, elections in urban Colombia are decided by the middle-class strata 3. Fajardo's victory in the first round in Bogotá was in large part due to his very strong numbers in strata 3 localities like Engativá and Fontibón (as well as in Kennedy, the largest locality). In the runoff, Petro easily won in Kennedy - which has a large lower-income strata 2 population as well - with 57%, but also - crucially - defeated Duque by narrower margins in both Fontibón (49.9-43.3) and Engativá (51.1-42.3), where Fajardo won over 40%.

Unlike in the first round and most other elections, the voto en blanco was not highest in lower-income areas, but rather in the affluent north (7.9% in Usaquén and 8.5% in Chapinero) and, unsurprisingly, in other localities where Fajardo had done well.

[Hash]

I've calculated the results myself on the basis of the official 'escrutinio' results (E-24 and E-26 files), which are published as individual PDF files online: https://publicacion2.procesoselectorales.com/.

[Hash]

Comuna results in Cali:



On the back of his decisive victory in Cali, Petro won all but 4 of the city's 22 comunas. Duque only won the wealthiest comunas of the city - 2 (51%), 17 (48%), 19 (50.4%) and 22 (69.3%). He came within 1.9 in downtown comuna 3 and within 3.3 in comuna 9, neither of which are particularly wealthy (the latter is actually kind of a dump), as I explained in my post on first round results in Cali.

Petro won over 55% in all comunas in the district of Aguablanca, a large impoverished and violent area with a significant Afro-Colombian population and many IDPs. He broke 60% in comunas 7 and 21, where he had done best in the first round, with over 32% of the vote already.

Duque won all comunas in Medellín, Bucaramanga, Cúcuta and Manizales. I may do maps of these cities later to show any differences between comunas, but they'll be very monochromatic.

[Hash]

The map below shows the percentage increase in Petro's votes (absolute/raw rather than relative/percentages) from R1 to R2:



The departments with the biggest % increase were:

Caldas: +250.14% -- 34,694 (7.8%) to 121,476 (28.1%)
Quindío: +157.18% -- 30,357 (11.7%) to 78,071 (31.2%)
Risaralda: +152.08% -- 54,207 (12.5%) to 136,646 (32.7%)
Antioquia: +134.24% -- 238,440 (9.3%) to 558,514 (22%)
San Andrés y Providencia: +123.72% -- 2,361 (18.6%) to 5,282 (34.8%)
Expats: +102.23% -- 34,395 (12.3%) to 69,558 (26.9%)
Santander: +100.94% -- 171,806 (17.3%) to 345,224 (35.2%)
Nte. de Santander: +97.89% -- 56,848 (9.2%) to 112,496 (18%)

The departments with the smallest % increase were:

Sucre: +16% -- 154,208 (44.2%) to 178,934 (50.4%)
Córdoba: +19.9% -- 249,303 (42.3%) to 298,944 (48.3%)
La Guajira: +21.3% -- 85,149 (43.1%) to 103,271 (48.5%)
Cesar: +23.1% -- 141,502 (35.9%) to 174,175 (43.6%)
Putumayo: +27.6% -- 60,520 (59.7%) to 77,220 (69.6%)
Bolívar: +30.7% -- 242,378 (38.3%) to 316,670 (46.9%)
Atlántico: +32.7% -- 331,687 (38.5%) to 440,103 (55%)

Petro's largest gains all came from the Eje Cafetero, where Fajardo had done strikingly well in the first round, particularly in the cities. In the runoff, Petro still lost all cities which had voted for Fajardo, including Manizales (nearly 50% for Fajardo), but his number of votes still increased massively from very low levels in the first round thanks to good transfers from Fajardo. Fajardo's voters also explain his strong gains in Antioquia, Santander, Nte. de Santander and the expat vote. San Andrés seems to be thanks largely to increased turnout. Despite making up a lot of ground in the Eje Cafetero and Antioquia, Petro was still unable to really eat into Duque's mega-margins, particularly in Antioquia where Duque won by a massive margin of 1.28 million votes (vs. a margin of about 437,000 in Bogotá for Petro). I think that this shows just how tough, quasi-impossible, it was for Petro to win: despite increasing his vote in these regions by so much, he was still miles away.

Petro's weakest gains all came from the Caribbean (except San Andrés which is tiny and doesn't bother to vote much) and Putumayo, that is in departments where he was already first or a strong second in the first round. The reason is pretty straightforward: he was already nearly maxed out in the first round, there were less votes to gain in the second round because eliminated candidates had done poorly in those places and a lot of the leftover 'orphaned' votes in the Caribbean were Vargas Lleras, who heavily backed Duque in the runoff (either out of shared right-wing convictions or, more likely, the machine they belonged too supporting Duque).

I have lots more to say, but I'm not quite sure where to take this or if people have moved on to other things. Is there anything, or any particular region, you'd like me to do some analysis/commentary for?

[Lord Halifax]

I have lots more to say, but I'm not quite sure where to take this or if people have moved on to other things. Is there anything, or any particular region, you'd like me to do some analysis/commentary for?

Please continue. It's very interesting.

[Starry Eyed Jagaloon]

I have lots more to say, but I'm not quite sure where to take this or if people have moved on to other things. Is there anything, or any particular region, you'd like me to do some analysis/commentary for?

Please continue. It's very interesting.

[Leading Political Consultant Ma Anand Sheela]

I have lots more to say, but I'm not quite sure where to take this or if people have moved on to other things. Is there anything, or any particular region, you'd like me to do some analysis/commentary for?

Please continue. It's very interesting.

[WMS]

I have lots more to say, but I'm not quite sure where to take this or if people have moved on to other things. Is there anything, or any particular region, you'd like me to do some analysis/commentary for?

Please continue. It's very interesting.

I even promise not to argue with Velasco in your thread about Venezuela.

[Sir John Johns]

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Could you please elaborate a bit on the indigenous vote in Colombia? You previously mentioned that, in the first round, indigenous mostly voted for Petro in Amazonia, Cauca and Nariño due to well-established indigenous/left-wing activism in these areas, while in La Guajira indigenous communities, which are politically unorganized, didn’t turn out. I would be interested to know the reasons of such a political apathy of indigenous voters in La Guajira. If there is data on the topic, I would also like to know about the electoral behavior of the main indigenous communities (including, if miraculously there is data available, indigenous people who live also in Ecuador: Awá, Siona and Cofán).

During the legislative elections, I remember that there was a large number of lists running in the indigenous constituencies. Is it an indicator of the extreme fragmentation of Colombian indigenous political movement or are there other reasons explaining such a high number of lists? To which extent are these lists representatives of the indigenous communities and to which extent are they truly indigenous or, like for the Afro constituencies, political scam? Are there nationwide relevant or half-relevant indigenous political parties or organizations in Colombia?

More broadly, I would be interested into knowing the factors explaining why some Colombian indigenous communities are politically organized and others aren’t and, more specifically, if religious organizations (Catholic religious orders, liberation theologians, Evangelical missionaries) have played in recent decades a role in the development or the deletion of indigenous’ politico-cultural identity in Colombia (I’m thinking there about situation in Ecuador where the Salesian order played a key role in the cultural organization of the Shuar or, conversely, where the Summer Institute of Linguistics had been routinely accused of uprooting and breaking down indigenous communities in northern Amazonia).

[Hash]

Thanks guys. I'll put up some more maps, analysis and answer your questions once I get back from vacation in a few days time (next week).

[Hash]

Could you please elaborate a bit on the indigenous vote in Colombia? You previously mentioned that, in the first round, indigenous mostly voted for Petro in Amazonia, Cauca and Nariño due to well-established indigenous/left-wing activism in these areas, while in La Guajira indigenous communities, which are politically unorganized, didn’t turn out. I would be interested to know the reasons of such a political apathy of indigenous voters in La Guajira. If there is data on the topic, I would also like to know about the electoral behavior of the main indigenous communities (including, if miraculously there is data available, indigenous people who live also in Ecuador: Awá, Siona and Cofán).

More broadly, I would be interested into knowing the factors explaining why some Colombian indigenous communities are politically organized and others aren’t and, more specifically, if religious organizations (Catholic religious orders, liberation theologians, Evangelical missionaries) have played in recent decades a role in the development or the deletion of indigenous’ politico-cultural identity in Colombia,

The Cauca is a famous case-study (and popular cause célèbre) for indigenous political and cultural activism, mobilization and resistance in Colombia, in the face of the armed conflict in what remains one of the most violent regions ravaged by the conflict in the country. There is a strong sense of indigenous collective identity and 'ethnic' consciousness in the Cauca, built on a long tradition of violent and civil (since 1991) resistance to external threats - the state, but also guerrillas and paramilitaries. The main causes defended over decades by the indigenous movement in the Cauca have been the defence of indigenous lands (against white latifundistas in the Cauca river valley), including collective landholdings; protection of indigenous self-government and autonomy (resguardos [reserves], cabildos and self-defence indigenous guards); and resistance to external interference and invasions of their lands and communities (many indigenous communities have promoted 'peace communities' strongly rejecting the presence of any armed actor). The indigenous movement in the Cauca has been characterized by its relative political unity and its strong organization. Between 1984 and 1991, the Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame - sometimes called Latin America's first indigenous guerrilla - was an indigenous defensive (rather than offensive) armed group, built on the premise that external violence (from guerrillas, the state etc.) against indigenous communities and their lands needed to be met with an 'armed voice'. It demobilized in 1991, partly with the significant benefits gained by indigenous communities in the 1991 Constitution, which recognizes the multi-ethnic pluralism of Colombia and guarantees indigenous self-government and political participation.

The Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca (CRIC), the first indigenous organization, was created in 1971 and served as the basis for the foundation of the Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia (ONIC), a national confederation of over 40 indigenous groups/associations, in the 1980s. Since they abandoned armed resistance and moved towards civil resistance in 1991, Cauca's indigenous communities have enjoyed substantial electoral success, most notably the election of the first indigenous governor, Floro Tunubalá (of the Guambiano/Misak people), in 2000.

This article (in Spanish) does a far better job at explaining the strength and historical roots of indigenous resistance in the Cauca: http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0122-44092006000100007

On the other hand, the Wayúu in La Guajira -- the largest indigenous group in Colombia (and, I think, in Venezuela) at over 270,000 -- are a nomadic people who live in the very inhospitable, desolate and isolated arid desert, mountains and plains of Upper Guajira (Uribia municipality). Many Wayúu in Uribia do not speak Spanish. There are very few roads and very little infrastructure in a region largely abandoned by the state, which makes access to voting locations (among other things) exceedingly difficult, and, besides, the Wayúu have far more pressing concerns than voting: prolonged droughts, massive child malnutrition (over 4000 children have died in La Guajira in recent years, with the crisis compared to Rwanda and Ethiopia), criminality and levels of political corruption and criminality which make the rest of Colombia look like Norway. For the past two decades, the main Wayúu political (and criminal) leader has been the cacica Cielo Redondo, a former two-term mayor of Uribia accused of being the political leader of the AUC's Frente Contrainsurgencia Wayúu. Her son is the current Liberal mayor of Uribia since 2016, and although she's now under house arrest, she remains a major political operator and supported Iván Duque in the runoff. Turnout in Uribia was 19.4% in the runoff (and 21.7% in Manaure, a slightly less isolated and more developed municipality with a predominantly Wayúu population).

The other major indigenous community of the Caribbean region, the Zenú people in San Andrés de Sotavento and Tuchín (Córdoba), has also been dominated by a more 'traditional' (i.e. corrupt) political group, led by Pedro 'El Indio' Pestana. 'El Indio' Pestana was convicted for parapolítica but allowed to serve his sentence in a fake 'indigenous jail' (and is a de facto fugitive since he remains in his fake jail despite the ConCourt ordering he be sent to a real jail in 2016). The base of his political power was the indigenous EPS (health insurance company) Manexka, which insured over 210,000 indigenous Zenú, until it was liquidated by the authorities in 2017 for embezzling millions in public funds (some of it went to the paramilitaries). His little-known sister, Yamina Pestana, despite lacking any sort of political experience or trajectory, was elected to the Senate (with the Conservatives) in 2014 with 85,000 votes; he has also placed two other sisters in the departmental assembly in Sucre since 2011, his brother Eligio was the first mayor of Tuchín (a municipality created in 2008 under Pestana's auspices) and his group controls the administrations in both San Andrés de Sotavento and Tuchín. In 2018, Yamina Pestana, seeing her brother's political strength weakened by the liquidation of his EPS, did not seek reelection and instead supported CR candidate Carlos Gómez, who wasn't elected despite doing very well in Pestana's indigenous strongholds. Yamina Pestana has been under investigation by the Procuraduría since last year for illicit campaign financing through the EPS Manexka and, just a few days ago, the Supreme Court opened an investigation against her for 'constraining voters' in the 2014 elections (undue pressure on EPS Manexka employees and affiliates). Duque won both Tuchín and San Andrés de Sotavento in the runoff, although Petro won over 49% in San Andrés de Sotavento, which may speak to the weakness of machines in this presidential election (in the first round, Vargas Lleras, who was supported by Pestana, finished a 'strong' third in both municipalities with over 25%).

Unfortunately, new religious movement and indigenous politics aren't my primary areas of research, so I can't competently speak to the role of religious organizations, although there is definitely something to be said about both Catholic orders and evangelical/Protestant missionaries among indigenous communities. I can only recommend this article, also in Spanish: https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/recs/article/viewFile/27816/28059

There is, to my knowledge, no real data about the electoral behaviour and political preferences of different indigenous communities in Colombia, which is a pity. I think I have said what can be said on the topic in my comments above.

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Well, the current electoral system for the two indigenous seats in the Senate (and the lone seat in the House) does favour the proliferation of lists, since one stands a higher chance of winning a seat on a separate list rather than running with a larger list, given that it is very unlikely that a single list will win both seats. However, the indigenous movement has indeed been extremely fragmented since the beginning of active electoral participation by indigenous groups in 1990/1991. By the late 1970s, the CRIC/ONIC was challenged by the Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia (AICO), founded by the Guambiano and Pasto peoples of Cauca and Nariño, which competed electorally with the ONIC in the elections to the constituent assembly in 1991 (in which both AICO and ONIC obtained a seat). In 1991, the Alianza Social Indígena (ASI) - now Alianza Social Independiente - was founded by dissidents in the ONIC, and has run lists both in the indigenous constituencies and supported non-indigenous 'white' candidates for other public offices, like Sergio Fajardo in Medellín in 2003 (and his successor, Alonso Salazar, in 2007) or Antanas Mockus in the 2006 presidential election. The ONIC withdrew from electoral competition in the 1990s, leaving the ASI and AICO as the main competitors in the indigenous Senate constituency - although many lists, representing specific regional organizations and communities also ran. The vast majority of elected indigenous senators (and representatives) have been from southwestern Colombia (Cauca and Nariño), which further demonstrates the strength of indigenous political movements in that region -- although the Polo did elect a Wayúu representative in 2006 (but those elections were kind of a joke, since the blank vote actually won, and she got most of her votes in urban areas from non-Wayúu voters).

The left-wing Movimiento Alternativo Indígena y Social (MAIS) was founded in 2013 by the ONIC, and it has won one of the two indigenous senatorial seats in the last two senatorial elections (2014 and 2018), with Luis Evelis Andrade in 2014 (an Embera indigenous leader from Riosucio, Chocó) and Feliciano Valencia in 2018 (a famous Nasa leader, arrested in 2015 for 'kidnapping' a soldier but released in 2017 when the Supreme Court annulled the lower court's ruling, becoming a 'martyr' for many indigenous communities as his case touched on major issues like indigenous justice, the right to protest etc.). The MAIS has also endorsed non-indigenous candidates and lists, like César Pachón (peasant leader and leading figure of the 2013 agrarian protests, elected to the House from Boyacá this year) and, most famously now, Gustavo Petro's presidential candidacy. The other indigenous seat in 2014 narrowly went to Marco Aníbal Avirama (ASI), from Cauca; in 2018, the other seat went to Manuel Bitervo Palchucan (AICO), from Nariño (Pastos people). In 2018, the ASI's top-voted candidate for Senate (with roughly 7000 votes) was Ati Quigua, an Arhuaco leader from the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and former two-term Bogotá city councillor, but she obtained very, very few votes from her native Sierra Nevada (granted, her family was displaced).

I would say that parties like MAIS and AICO are fairly legitimate and relevant indigenous parties/organizations, although they represent only a small fragment of the overall indigenous population and their electoral success in the indigenous constituency is concentrated in the southwest (Cauca, Nariño) and dependent on the personal, regional appeal of their candidates. Their senators are elected with few votes and electoral outcomes can be decided by few votes. 'Indigenous parties' like the MAIS, AICO and ASI have also all endorsed non-indigenous candidates in other elections, and sometimes not the most reputable of candidates. Because of the special status of indigenous and Afro parties, they all kind of work as 'endorsements factories', but the indigenous parties aren't scams like the 'Afro parties', perhaps because the constitution and the law requires indigenous candidates to be locally-recognized indigenous leaders (while Afro parties, under a vague and unclear law, basically depend on the interior ministry and its political decisions). The blank vote won a majority of votes in the indigenous constituency (Senate) in 2006 and again in 2018, which may either reflect certain indigenous voters' frustration with the state of indigenous political representation or (more likely) the result of Colombia's insanely confusing congressional ballot (seemingly deliberately designed to confuse and trick voters). Once again, there is now a legal debate over whether the election should be re-run for the indigenous constituency or not -- it wasn't in 2006, and given how a re-run election would basically be a ridiculous waste of money, probably won't be.

Gustavo Petro was supported by the ONIC, CRIC, MAIS, AICO but also the OPIAC (the main organization of indigenous peoples of Amazonia), which further helps explain why he did so well with indigenous voters in Amazonia, Cauca and Nariño. The main organization of the indigenous peoples in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta did not endorse any candidate.

This journal article (also in Spanish) is probably the best outline of indigenous electoral politics between 1990 and 2006 in Colombia: http://centromemoria.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/DUQUE-J.pdf

[Sir John Johns]

Thank you very much for your very elaborate answer. Shamefully, I wasn’t aware at all of the tragedies suffered by the Wayúu people; this is truly sickening.