Elections and politics in Hong Kong: megathread

[MoreThanPolitics]

Interview: Now Macau’s pro-democracy politicians face a Hong Kong-style crackdown (Hong Kong Free Press, July 13, 2021)

After almost 30 years as one of Macau’s token few pro-democracy lawmakers, Ng Kuok-cheong finally faces the end of the road – barred from standing in the casino city’s upcoming legislative election in September.

Announced last Friday, the Macau electoral commission’s sweeping decision to remove all 21 pro-democracy contenders from the race came without warning.

They were deemed ineligible because they had allegedly failed to uphold the Basic Law and bear allegiance to Macau, Hong Kong’s sister Special Administrative Region of China, based on evidence presented by police.

Macau electoral officials who made the announcement did not give details of the evidence. The legislative hopefuls, from six electoral tickets, were notified of their disqualification on Friday.

For the first time ever, authorities in Southeast Zhuhai Macau decided to disqualify 21 pro-democracy candidates, including two incumbent legislators, from running in September's Legislative Assembly elections based on their "criticism" of the CCP (yeah, you read this right). You know what's ironic? Macau's legislature would have a larger proportion of directly-elected seats than Hong Kong come 2022.

Even being ever-obedient doesn't stop Winnie the Pooh from going berserk.

[MoreThanPolitics]

After a wave of resignations, the remaining district councilors from Hong Kong Island (24 out of 80 elected in 2019) took their patriotic oaths last Friday. The same night, 7 pro-democratic councilors were accused of failing to uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the regime, and were asked by the government to provide "evidence" to prove their "patriotism".

However, there is one problem: all of them either ran in last year's LegCo primary and/or borrowed their offices as polling stations. No matter how hard you try to defend yourself, you always end up getting disqualified.

https://twitter.com/alvinllum/status/1438097764701724673

[MoreThanPolitics]

October 23, 2021 update:

After four rounds of oath-taking ceremonies (a.k.a. disqualifications), a total of 47* pro-democratic district councilors were ousted from office over "unpatriotic" oaths. Of the 389 pro-democrats elected in the 2019 wave, only 62 (16%) still remain in office. More than 260 councilors have already resigned from their jobs back in July, when the regime threatened to disqualify them and recoup all their salaries and benefits.

Now watch how many of the remaining democrats surrender to the pro-Beijing camp.

*Hong Kong Island: 7; Kowloon: 10; New Territories East: 14; New Territories West: 16

[2952-0-0]

The electoral-type event is scheduled for this Sunday, December 19. Turnout is expected to be low, since all pro-democratic candidates have either been jailed, exiled, or cowed into silence.

Carrie Lam says that's no problem, since low turnout means people might actually be content with the state of affairs.

https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/09/it-does-not-mean-anything-hong-kongs-carrie-lam-says-low-election-turnout-may-mean-govt-is-credible-and-doing-well/

Bus and rail companies have also offered free rides on election day, by complete coincidence, and by no means under political pressure.

https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/10/free-mtr-tram-and-bus-travel-during-patriots-only-election-as-officials-urge-hongkongers-to-vote/

PORI, one of Hong Kong's main pollsters, had asked whether voters would vote at all, or cast spoiled ballots. The People's Daily then dutifully accused it of manipulating public opinion in collusion with foreign anti-China forces.
https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/10/hong-kong-pollster-vows-to-press-on-with-surveys-after-chinas-party-mouthpiece-accuses-it-of-influencing-election-turnout/

[Joseph Cao]

The electoral-type event is scheduled for this Sunday, December 19. Turnout is expected to be low, since all pro-democratic candidates have either been jailed, exiled, or cowed into silence.

Carrie Lam says that's no problem, since low turnout means people might actually be content with the state of affairs.

https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/09/it-does-not-mean-anything-hong-kongs-carrie-lam-says-low-election-turnout-may-mean-govt-is-credible-and-doing-well/

Don't forget, though, according to her No. 2 John Lee, if you express your contentment by not voting you’re actually aiding and abetting the nefarious foreign agents who somehow remain embedded in all areas of Hong Kong life:

https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3159321/hong-kong-elections-covert-foreign-agents-city-could

[2952-0-0]

The electoral-type event is scheduled for this Sunday, December 19. Turnout is expected to be low, since all pro-democratic candidates have either been jailed, exiled, or cowed into silence.

Carrie Lam says that's no problem, since low turnout means people might actually be content with the state of affairs.

https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/09/it-does-not-mean-anything-hong-kongs-carrie-lam-says-low-election-turnout-may-mean-govt-is-credible-and-doing-well/

Don't forget, though, according to her No. 2 John Lee, if you express your contentment by not voting you’re actually aiding and abetting the nefarious foreign agents who somehow remain embedded in all areas of Hong Kong life:

https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3159321/hong-kong-elections-covert-foreign-agents-city-could

So the government is doing a great job if foreign agents are running amok, got it.

Here's the real-time voter turnout, as compared to the previous two elections. You'll see it's already on track for a record low.

https://www.elections.gov.hk/legco2021/eng/charts/tt_gc_GC.html

[jaichind]

Turnout as of 7:30 PM 26.49%.  The same number in 2016 was 43.60% and in 2012 39.96%.  This is a bit higher than I expected.  Using the 55-45 ratio between anti-establishment and pro-establishment ratio and the fact that most of the Anti-Establishment voters from 2012 and 2016 would not show up I would have expected turnout to be something like low 20s.  Some "centrist" candidates which are not directly aligned with either bloc are running and their supporters coming out might be pushing up the turnout higher than what  I would expect.

[jaichind]

Turnout will most likely end up in the low 30s.  Very similar to the turnout in the 1995 LegCo election.  The 1995 LegCo system that Patten put in place is fairly similar to the one we have now: some geographic seats, very functional seat heavy, and a bunch of seat elections by some committee.  I guess if the geographic seat weight is low in 2021 just as in 1995 the turnout will be similar.

[xelas81]

Is there any internal power struggle within pro-Beijing block over seats since there is no longer chance of pro-democracy block winning?

[jaichind]

Some initial results coming out in some seats.  It seems going by prelim vote share the  Anti-Establishment vote did not come out at all with a couple of  Anti-Establishment independents getting a very low vote share.  Within the pro-Establishment bloc, it seems the pro-Beijing economic left/old labor vote came out in force and at a higher rate than the economic right.  This is prelim and the picture will be more clear as results in other seats start coming out.

[jaichind]

Is there any internal power struggle within pro-Beijing block over seats since there is no longer chance of pro-democracy block winning?

Most likely on the 40 seats elected by the electoral committee.  All 51 candidates fighting for the 40 seats are from the pro-Establishment bloc.  There will be a battle there between the Economic Right, pro-Beijing economic left/old labor, and centrists.

In the geographic seats since in every seat, there is one or two centrist or anti-Establishment independent running, the pro-Establishment bloc only nominated 2 candidates to ensure they win both. 

[jaichind]

Not all the votes are counted but so far the geographic district results for 20 seats (10 2- member districts)
                                  
                                 Contest       Win     Vote share
Pro-Establishment           21           19          90.27%
  Center-Right                  16           15           72.52%
  Pro-Beijing                      3             3           13.34%
  Regional                          2            1              4.42%

Centrist                           5             1           4.57%

Anti-Establishment            9             0          5.20%

Most of the Centrist candidates can really be described as mostly pro-establishment in terms of ideology but have no real connections to the pro-Establishment camp.

In one of the 10 districts, the Pro-Establishment bloc nominated 3 candidates.  In another, a Centrist candidate who seems pro-Beijing overall but has no links to the Pro-Establishment bloc beat out a Pro-Establishemt Regional candidate.

In terms of raw vote in 2016 LegCo election, the pro-Establishment bloc won around 940K votes in the geographical seats.  This time their total vote is already 1051K votes and there are some more to come.  It is clear the pro-Establishment bloc voters mostly came out and perhaps a bit more and the anti-Establishment bloc mostly abstained from voting.

[jaichind]

From a raw vote point of view, this election is a victory for the Pro-Establishment.  Everyone, including pro-Beijing hacks like me, agrees that the election rules are rigged against the anti-Establishment bloc which makes it very uncompetitive.  In that situation, it is clear that most of the anti-Establishment vote will abstain and it is hard to get the entire Pro-Establishment vote to come out.

But the raw Pro-Establishment vote is already up to 1103K when compared to around 940K in 2016 for the Pro-Establishment bloc.  2016 was a high turnout year and the 2016 Pro-Establishment base came out if not more.

[jaichind]

A look at where the pro-establishment total vote surge relative to 2016 came produced an expected result.  The largest pro-establishment surge came in blue-collar working-class Kowloon while the elite HK Island and middle-class New Territories saw a much smaller jump in total jump in the total vote for the pro-establishment bloc.  This has been the trend since the early 2010s and it is continuing.

[jaichind]

There are still another 100K votes to be counted in the geographic districts but I guess they will be counted tomorrow.  So far it is

                                 Contest       Win     Vote share
Pro-Establishment           21           19          90.09%
  Center-Right                  16           15           71.57%
  Pro-Beijing                      3             3           14.18%
  Regional                          2            1              4.34%

Centrist                           5             1           4.64%

Anti-Establishment            9             0          5.27%

Total Pro-Establishment vote at 1103K vs 940K in 2016.

I think the 30 functional seat counting is even slower and for sure will be tomorrow

[2952-0-0]

Turnout will most likely end up in the low 30s.  Very similar to the turnout in the 1995 LegCo election.  The 1995 LegCo system that Patten put in place is fairly similar to the one we have now: some geographic seats, very functional seat heavy, and a bunch of seat elections by some committee.  I guess if the geographic seat weight is low in 2021 just as in 1995 the turnout will be similar.

This apologism is so pathetic that even Carrie Lam has abandoned making excuses for the low turnout.

[jaichind]

All votes in.  For geographical seats, Wikipedia had a different classification for a few of the candidates than I did where some explicit pro-Establishment platform Centrist is categorized as part of the pro-Establishment bloc.  A couple of candidates with Anti-Establishment backgrounds but ran on a centrist platform are categorized as centrists.  I defer to them.

                                 Contest       Win     Vote share
Pro-Establishment           23           20          93.15%
  Center-Right                  14           13           65.80%
  Pro-Beijing                      3             3           14.53%
  Regional                         3             2             6.83%
  Moderates                       3            2             5.99%

Centrist                           8             0           4.16%

Anti-Establishment            4             0          2.69%

(a bunch of the Center-Right candidates is really joint Center-Right/Regional candidates while one Regional candidate is explicitly associated with a Center-Right party)

The pro-Establishment total vote surges to 1233K which is about the same as the pro-Establishment total vote in extremely polarized 2019 local elections where turnout surged to 71% and is way up from the 940K it got in the 2016 LegCo elections.

So this election is really about the pro-establishment vote turning out like it was 2019 at 71% at the height of the polarization over the protests while the anti-Establishment vote is turning out in low single digits.  Again I assert this is a massive turnout victory for the pro-Establishment bloc that it was able to maintain the frenzied turnout of 2019 despite the election being a foregone conclusion.  It is a testament to the pro-Establishment turnout machine.

As mentioned before, relative to the 2016 LegCo elections the pro-establishment surged differently by location.

HK Island  +18.5% (the wealthy)
Kowloon  +95.7% (the working class)
New Territories +27.6% (the middle class)

The Kowloon pro-establishment surge since 2016 is just massive.  It plays into the narrative that the level of economic development of the rest of the PRC means it is the middle class and wealthy in HK that feels the threat of economic competition from HK's economic integration with the rest of PRC.  The working class got hit already back in the 1990s from the first wave of PRC-HK economic integration and at this stage most likely welcomes PRC-HK economic integration by shifting their votes to the pro-establishment bloc.

In the 30 functional seats, it seems one centrist won and the other 29 were captured by the pro-establishment bloc.

[jaichind]

A deeper look at the pro-establishment vote by region

                                2016 LegCo          2019 Local              2021 LegCo
HK Island                      184K                   204K                      217K
Kowloon                        253K                   370K                      495K
New Territories              503K                   666K                       520K
Total                             940K                 1240K                     1233K

2019 saw record turnout due to extreme polarization brought on by the 2019 protests.  2021 which is pretty much non-competitive due to rule changes and the boycott by the anti-establishment bloc show has seen a demobilization of the pro-establishment vote as well.  But instead, the pro-establishment vote maintained itself in elite HK Island and actually surged significantly more in non-college-educated working-class Kowloon.  Only in college-educated middle-class New Territories did the pro-establishment vote fall to around 2016 levels which would be what one would expect.

The 2021  pro-establishment surge in Kowloon was so massive that the 495K votes it got exceeded the 2019 anti-establishment vote in Kowloon of 471K which implies that in Kowloon the pro-establishment bloc might be now ahead of the anti-establishment bloc in terms of support which is a massive realignment from the 1990s when Kowloon was the most anti-establishment of all the regions.

As mentioned before this is part of the bigger shift of the impact of HK economic integration with the rest of Guangdong. At this stage, there is not much separating the productively of HK college-educated middle-class workers and their Guangdong counterparts.  Only in very high-end services like top-tier legal and financial services does HK still have a competitive edge over the rest of Guangdong.  The HK working class also bore the brunt of economic impact in the 1990s due to economic integration with the PRC.  At this stage, further economic integration with Guangdong might actually drive up the relative wages of the HK non-college-educated working-class relative to their HK college-educated middle-class counterparts.   These economic trends are showing up in the total vote the pro-establishment bloc is getting as the pro-establishment bloc coalition is becoming an alliance of the elite and non-college educated working-class at the exclusion of the large middle class in between.

[Joseph Cao]

Somewhat old news… but Boris Johnson isn't the only senior government official who can attend COVID-rulebreaking birthday parties.

170-odd guests who attended a birthday party for a Hong Kong delegate to China’s top legislature are to be sent to quarantine for 21 days at Penny’s Bay, after a second person tested preliminary positive for the COVID-19 virus.

At least 13 senior government officials and 19 lawmakers attended Monday’s birthday party for Witman Hung, Hong Kong’s delegate to the National People’s Congress. They included police chief Raymond Siu, immigration chief Au Ka-wang, Home Affairs Secretary Caspar Tsui and Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Christopher Hui. The party was held at Spanish restaurant Reserva Ibérica in Wan Chai, local media reported.

Initially, only seven senior officials and lawmakers who were present at the same time as the first identified patient were required to undergo compulsory quarantine. But the discovery of a second patient means that the list of people to be quarantined will now include all guests, according to Centre for Health Protection chief Dr Chuang Shuk-kwan.

One of the attendees – legislator Junius Ho – met Beijing’s top official on Hong Kong affairs Xia Baolong during a Shenzhen meeting with other lawmakers two days after the party, Legislative Council’s president Andrew Leung said on Friday. However, everyone had tested negative before meeting him.

It is mandated by law that any person entering restaurants must check-in using the government’s LeaveHomeSafe contact-tracing app, which records the time they arrived at – or departed from – a venue.

However, Au, the chief of immigration, was not yet able to supply proof that he left the event before the COVID-19 patient arrived at the banquet, Chief Executive Carrie Lam said on Thursday. She did not answer questions as to whether the official used the app as the law requires.

Among the government officials in attendance was Au and former customs and excise commissioner Hermes Tang. In March, both were given a HK$5,000 penalty ticket for breaching COVID-19 rules when attending a 9-person hotpot dinner at a private club to farewell a departing Chinese official. The incident was first revealed in July by now-defunct news outlet Stand News as well as Ming Pao. Lam compared the officials’ penalty to a parking ticket at the time, and said she hoped “the matter could be put to rest”.

Images published by digital media platform Channel C appeared to show Monday’s birthday party host Witman Hung – an election committee member – holding a microphone as well as another election committee member, Ellen Tsang. None of the nine people shown in the photo wore masks.

Around 180 people – including officials and lawmakers – were to be sent into mandatory quarantine at Penny’s Bay on Friday evening after a 37-year-old woman in attendance was confirmed to have COVID-19, as a second woman aged 53 tested preliminary positive.

However most of the guests were released from quarantine at around midnight Saturday, after officials determined that the 53-year-old’s case was a false positive, HK01 reported. Her coronavirus test was conducted by her doctor husband, and was “likely contaminated” by vaccines administered at the clinic he operated, government expert Yuen Kwok-yung said.

Eleven officials will now see out their remaining quarantine period at home, by order of the chief executive, according to a Sunday press release.

The latest guest who tested preliminary positive attended the party together with the first patient, said Chuang Shuk-kwan of the Centre for Health Protection during a press briefing on Sunday. The party’s guest list included 192 people in all, although only 181 were found through contract-tracing.

Around 80 guests had their stays at Penny’s Bay halted. However, 92 people who attended the party after the first patient arrived at 9:30 p.m. will remain at at the centre on Lantau for the full 21 days of quarantine.

The investigation into whether 15 government officials who attended Chinese official Witman Hung’s now infamous birthday party violated COVID-19 rules is “ongoing” and will not be “left unresolved,” Chief Executive Carrie Lam said on Tuesday, after two top officials left Penny’s Bay.

Secretary for Home Affairs Caspar Tsui and Director of Immigration Au Ka-wang left the government quarantine facility on Monday after completing 14 days of isolation. They were among several officials and lawmakers sent to Penny’s Bay after a guest at the birthday party was later confirmed to be infected with the coronavirus.

The chief executive said that the pair would not return to their duties next Monday at the earliest, as they still have to undergo another seven days of self-monitoring at home.

[Joseph Cao]

As anticipated, Carrie Lam is stepping down and will make way for her successor following CE "elections" next month. The old family excuse for stepping aside.

New boss, same as the old boss and probably worse:

The coming chief executive election in Hong Kong is likely to be a “one-person show”, an adviser to the city’s incumbent leader has said.

Ip Kwok-him made the remarks a day after Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor announced she would not seek re-election. Her departure leaves Chief Secretary John Lee Ka-chiu, Hong Kong’s No 2 official, as the sole heavyweight tipped to contest next month’s race.

[jaichind]

Just arrived in HK a couple of days ago as a part of a business trip in APAC.  I have not been in HK since 2019.  On the surface not much has changed but one trend I have already noticed is the continued acceleration of the "Mandrainization" of HK.  Ever since I started to visit HK in the 1980s I always took to speaking English versus Chinese Mandarin to get "better treatment" due to clear local resentment and fear of Mandarin.  Cantonese is the best I can only understand around 20% of Cantonese and I can barely speak a dozen phrases in Cantonese so that is a no-go  (some of my relatives that used to do a lot of business in HK speak passable Cantonese but that is clearly not me.)  During this trip, I already noticed that more people are speaking to me voluntarily in Mandarin.   I am close to switching my default language from English to Mandarin to get "better treatment."  This trend has been going on since the early 2000s but has taken a big jump since 2019.

2019 HK protests were about many things but one of them was the disappearance of a Cantonese HK.  We are far from that but the trend has accelerated since 2019 so the 2019 protests most likely backfired on that front.

[支持核绿派 (Greens4Nuclear)]

As mentioned before, relative to the 2016 LegCo elections the pro-establishment surged differently by location.

HK Island  +18.5% (the wealthy)
Kowloon  +95.7% (the working class)
New Territories +27.6% (the middle class)

The Kowloon pro-establishment surge since 2016 is just massive.  It plays into the narrative that the level of economic development of the rest of the PRC means it is the middle class and wealthy in HK that feels the threat of economic competition from HK's economic integration with the rest of PRC.  The working class got hit already back in the 1990s from the first wave of PRC-HK economic integration and at this stage most likely welcomes PRC-HK economic integration by shifting their votes to the pro-establishment bloc.

In the 30 functional seats, it seems one centrist won and the other 29 were captured by the pro-establishment bloc.

As mentioned before this is part of the bigger shift of the impact of HK economic integration with the rest of Guangdong. At this stage, there is not much separating the productively of HK college-educated middle-class workers and their Guangdong counterparts.  Only in very high-end services like top-tier legal and financial services does HK still have a competitive edge over the rest of Guangdong.  The HK working class also bore the brunt of economic impact in the 1990s due to economic integration with the PRC.  At this stage, further economic integration with Guangdong might actually drive up the relative wages of the HK non-college-educated working-class relative to their HK college-educated middle-class counterparts.   These economic trends are showing up in the total vote the pro-establishment bloc is getting as the pro-establishment bloc coalition is becoming an alliance of the elite and non-college educated working-class at the exclusion of the large middle class in between.

This is reminiscent of a first-half-of-2019 blog post I saw on the electoral coalitions of pre-protests Hong Kong. In terms of class composition there are also some striking parallels between the post-2016 US Dem and US GOP coalitions.

The majority of Hong Kongers are undoubtedly either Pro-Beijing (or at least not as rabidly anti-China to the extent that the international media makes them out to be)... Allow me to, as a Hong Konger, give you the full breakdown of genuine political positions/opinions one can hold in Hong Kong. And I’m going to simplify this by segregating the Hong Kong population into six separate distinct categories based on their political opinions/positions.

1. Pro-Beijing
These people unequivocally identify themselves as Chinese, and align themselves with both the People’s Republic of China on the mainland, and the incumbent Pro-Beijing Hong Kong government. They view the Chinese Communist Party as a benevolent benefactor, patron, and ruler in both Hong Kong, and on the mainland. They are the city’s silent majority. Furthermore, with regards to social class. Both the majority of the city’s poor and rich fall within this political bracket.

2. Pro-Democracy (Liberals)
Also known, as “Pan-Democrats” or “Pan-dems”. These people identify as Chinese, but generally oppose the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party and wish to pursue democratic reform in both Hong Kong and on the mainland. Frequently fraternising with other Chinese identifying pro-democracy activists and liberals, both in Taiwan and on the mainland, they view themselves as fellow travellers to those who were killed during the 4th of June, 1989 over the course of the Tiananmen Square protests. They also happen to be the main opposition to the Pro-Beijing group, and the second largest political cleavage in the city (though even then, they are still eclipsed in both electoral numbers and influence by Pro-Beijing parties)... Adherents to this political position tend to be primarily middle to upper class.

3. Pro-Democracy (Socialists and Social-Democrats)
While these people might identify as Chinese, they absolutely loathe the central government in Beijing, and those they perceive to be its local lackeys in Hong Kong. Over the last ten-fifteen years social-democrats, and left-leaning democrats split from the generally liberal dominated Pro-Democracy movement. Believing in a radical form of direct social democracy, they tend to be virulently and openly anti-CCP and Beijing. They generally don’t seek out compromise or attempt to work with the Pro-Beijing group, and consider the liberal Pro-Democracy camp to be “too soft” on Beijing and the CCP.

They often draw most of their stock from young middle class voters and students, and are the third largest group in Hong Kong (although they pale in numbers compared to both liberal Pro-Democracy and Pro-Beijing voters)

[jaichind]

HK had local elections a couple of weeks back.  Since the election rules and anti-establishment boycott made this an all-Establishment bloc affair one can measure the support of the  Establishment bloc by looking at the raw votes by region.

Traditionally Local election turnout is low but in 2019 it became a proxy vote by the 2019-2020 protest movement with 2019 having an ultra high turnout.  2021 LegCo and now 2023 Local are now  Establishment bloc mobilization efforts.  In many ways, 2023 Local is like LegCo elections mobilization for the  Establishment bloc with the total  Establishment bloc vote in 2023 exceeding the 2016  Establishment bloc vote in an election in 2016 with a fairly high turnout.


                      2016 LegCo      2019 Local          2021 LegCo     2023 Local
HK Islaand           184K               204K                 217K              183K
Kowloon               253K              370K                  495K              356K
New Territories     503K               666K                 520K              634K
Total                    940K             1240K               1233K            1172K

The trend of 2021 is the relative Establishment bloc surge in Kowloon which used to be the stronghold of the anti-Establishment bloc.  But recently due to the rise of the PRC in the technology chain, it is now the middle class in HK (mostly in New Territories) that is getting hurt by economic integration with the PRC versus the working class (Kowloon) back in the 1990s.

The  Establishment Bloc vote in 2023 seems a bit of a reversion to the mean but signs of that churn are still there when compared to 2016.

A recent Pew poll in HK on identity tells the same story.  The higher educated tend to have a higher HK identity vs Chinese identity when compared to those with lower education.