Ivory Coast presidential election - October 25, 2015

[politicus]

Ivory Coast will be holding a Presidential election on October 25. It will be the first one since their latest civil war in 2010-11 (the second since the implementation of multiparty politics in 1990). Their economy is booming, but the wealth isn't shared and dissent growing (this could currently describe around 40% of all African countries).

http://election2015.akody.com/candidates/

The main players will be the incumbent President Alassane Ouattara at the head of a broad Conservative alliance called RHDP including both the main parties claiming to carry on the legacy of founding father Felix Houphouët-Boigny, who ruled until his death in 1993 (well, weakened the last couple of years - so de facto to late 1991/early 1992). The difference between the two parties being mainly regionalist/religious. Ouattara is from the Muslim north and his party RDR is (very) nominally Liberal, while the mainly Catholic and southern based continuation of Felix Houphouët-Boignys old PDCI party more accurately calls itself Conservative. Both parties are SoCon and business friendly with a Nationalist and Populist appeal.

(Ivory Coast is about 37-38% Christian/Muslim (with Catholics and Sunnis making up 35/35 or so) and 25% animistic.)

The main opposition group is a (nominally at least) leftists alliance headed by the Ivorian Popular Front, the party of deposed former Laurent Gbagbo (close ally of likewise deposed colleague Blaise Compaoré from Burkina Faso), who is currently awaiting trial in Haag after being deposed by Tuatara with French military assistance. Their candidate is Pascal Affi N'Guessan from FPIs moderate wing, but it also contains "ultras", who do not recognize the legitimacy of the current President.

Since 1995 the country has had one of those xenophobic African constitutional clauses saying both your parents have to be born in the country for you to run for President. Since a large part of Ivorians are immigrants or descendants of immigrants this gives problems. Ouattara is descended from the main royal family of neighbouring Burkina Faso, and his opponents claim he isn't a real Ivorian and ineligible to run.

(I will return to the parties later)

[politicus]

The coalition behind Ouattara:

Le Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP)

Which claims to be united by Houphouétism, the ideology of Félix Houphouët-Boigny.

- Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) led by former President Henri Konan Bédié is the old party of Felix H-B, now only strong in the south.

- Rassemblement des républicains (RDR), is the 1994 northern/Muslim split-off, led by President Alassane Ouattara.

They have three minor partners:

- Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI) under Albert Mabri Toikeusse

- Mouvement des forces d’avenir (MFA) under Moutayé Anzoumana

- Union pour la Côte d’Ivoire (UCI) under Gnamien Konan

[politicus]

The opposition consists of two main coalitions:

L'alliance des forces démocratiques (AFD) was founded in March last year as a centre-left alliance between FPI under Pascal Affi N'Guessan and the smaller Parti ivoirien des travailleurs (PIT), under Daniel Akoi Ahizi together with no less than 10 minuscule parties.

La Coalition nationale pour le changement (CNC) is an attempt to create a third force untainted by the civil wars out of small parties and several defectors from the bigger ones + independent "personalities". Most parties claiming to be Liberal or progressive. It was formed in May and so far no less than 5 guys claim to be their Presidential candidate.

Their main (official) goals are electoral reform, transparency and national reconciliation.

Parties:

Substantial parties:
LIDER led by former Speaker Mamadou Koulibaly
L’Union pour le développement et les libertés (UDL) founded by academic Martial Ahipeaud

Micro parties:
L’Alliance des sociaux-démocrates (ASD) founded by Emmanuel Bah Soumalo
Pour la Côte d’Ivoire (PCI) founded by Jean-Jacques Béchio
La coalition des indignés de Côte d’Ivoire (CICI) led by David Samba
Congrès du peuple pour le développement de la liberté (CPDL) led by Théophile Soko Waza
Congrès pour la renaissance ivoirienne (CRI) led by Bah Enoch

[Simfan34]

And here I was thinking they were still using the old-fashioned seven year term. How did I overlook this?

[politicus]

10 candidates are running:


Main candidates:

Alassane Ouattara (73), RHDP (RDR, majority of PDCI, UDPCI, MFA and UCI)

Pascal Affi N'Guessan (62), AFD (FPI, PIT etc.)


Official CNC candidate:

Mamadou Koulibaly (58) (LIDER), former Minister of Finance, Speaker 2001-11


Other CNC candidates:

Kouadio Konan Bertin (46), leader of the (militant) PDCI youth wing JPDCI (Jeunesse du PDCI)

Charles Konan Banny (73), dissident PDCI, economist, Prime Minister 2005-07, President of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission and chairman of CNC.


Others:

Essy Amara, dissident PDCI (70), former Foreign Minister

Henriette Lagou Adjoua (c. 50), coalition of four micro parties, former Minister

Jaqueline-Claire Kouangoua (44), independent

Konan Kouadio Simeon (51), independent

Gnangbo Kacou (53), independent

[politicus]

And here I was thinking they were still using the old-fashioned seven year term. How did I overlook this?

They had Presidential elections in 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 and 2010. CdI has never used 7 year terms.

[politicus]

FPI is torn between "pragmatists" led by Pascal Affi N'Guessan, and "ultras" led by Aboudramane Sangaré, who contest the legitimacy of N'Guessan as party chairman.

Pascal Affi N'Guessan has the support of Marcel Gossio, former director the Free Port of Abidjan ( lucrative position..). They have initiated a process of revitalization of the party, and resumed dialogue with the government and President, leading the ultras to accuse N'Guessan of treason aimed to push Gbagbo out of the Ivorian political scene.

The Ultras don't recognize the presidency of Alassane Ouattara nor his government, and consider him a dictator installed in 2011 by France and the UN. They still consider Gbagbo as having being rightfully elected at the 2010 presidential election, and wanted him to be a candidate in party primaries for the Presidential elections in October, despite his imprisonment. They also refuse any participation in any election without the release of Gbagbo.

In December the Ivorian chief justice invalidated the candidacy of Gbagbo, following a complaint by Affi N'Guessan, making him a collaborator in the eyes of ultras.

In April 3, 2015, the Ivorian Ministry of Justice confirmed Pascal Affi N'Guessan as chairman of FPI in and forbade Aboudramane Sangare and his supporters (among them former first lady Simone Gbagbo) to use the name and logo of the party. This schism means FPI is weakened considerably.

[politicus]

PDCI is also split. The leader of their militant youth wing PDCI (Jeunesse du PDCI) Kouadio Konan Bertin mobilized a wave of Southern discontent against the former HoS and party president Henri Konan Bédié and his decision to enter into alliance with Alassane Ouattaras RDR in the RHDP coalition. Bertin Kouadio Konan and his supporters joined CNC, an "anti-Ouattara coalition", with Mamadou Koulibalys LIDER, some small parties and defectors from FPI.

This leaves RDR as the all dominant force in RHDP, but also weakened outside of the north.

[politicus]

So before the polls observers see a couple of major obstacles for avoiding a repetition of the bloodshed in 2010 (3,000 death) and move on with reconciliation:

Failed reconciliation and "political prisoners"
The "Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission" which was supposed to forge unity and resolve political and ethnic divisions, is currently one of the country's most unpopular institutions and Ouattara is accused of presiding over "victor's justice"

The detention of 700 political prisoners. Supporters of Gbagbo demand their release, but the Presidents supporters say they are criminals and justice must be served "reconciliation, but not a lawless country."

The sentencing in March of former first lady Simone Gbagbo and two co-accused to 20 years in prison for "undermining state security"  65 others supporters of her husband to shorter terms confirmed the opponents of Ouattara in their view if this as a lop-sided justice process.

Both sides committed massacres on civilian in 2010-11, but only those allied to the former president have been convicted of any crimes.

Refugees
Côte d'Ivoire's constitution says no citizen can be forced into exile, but nearly 50,000 Ivoirians, including political and military top dogs, who fled to Liberia, Ghana, Togo and other West African countries during the 2010-11 war, still cannot or wont return home, according to UNHCR.

Ouattara has pleaded for them to come back, but many fear ending up in jail or being persecuted if they do. There just isn't the necessary trust and Ouattara going after the former first lady increased this. Many were also in the Young Patriots - a pro-Gbagbo youth movement - that were responsible for a lot of human rights abuse and killings.

The opposition is also demanding the return of its leaders, including Gbagbo and the former head of the Young Patriots Charles Blé Goudé, who are both awaiting trial by the ICC for human rights violations. The pro-Gbagbo part of the opposition plans to boycott the October elections if its demands aren't met.

So a tense atmosphere and reports of ongoing low level violence, which may escalate.

Despite this it is not expected to be a pure electoral type event - just a lopsided election. The people convicted by Ouattara are generally deemed to be guilty, it is just that Ouattara has "forgotten" to put his own supporters to justice for similar crimes and might reasonably have pardoned more opponents in order to secure reconciliation.

[politicus]

Main candidates:

Alassane Ouattara (73) is of Burkinabe royal lineage on his fathers side and a Muslim, holds a PhD in Economics from Penn and had a high profile career in international financial institutions (IMF and the Central Bank of West African States, BCEAO) before the IMF imposed him as Prime Minister in 1990 to stabilize a country nearly bankrupted by falling cacao prices and Félix Houphouët-Boignys excesses. Quickly established his own power base and has afterwards been a major player in Ivorian politics.



He de facto ruled the country during Houphouët-Boignys illness and when he died in 1993 Ouattarra unconstitutionally tried to push the Speaker Henri Konan Bédié aside and assume the Presidency, but lost the power struggle and returned to Washington as IMF Deputy Managing Director.

In 1994 the mainly northern and Muslim Rally of the Republicans (RDR) had split from the increasingly southern dominated (well, it was always southern dominated, but at least H-B tried to give some spoils to northern elites) ruling PDCI and tried to draft Ouattara, but the National Assembly  approved a Lex Outtara stating that candidates with either parent being of foreign nationality or not living in Côte d'Ivoire for the preceding five years were barred. Ouattara had lived in the US since 1990 and his father was . rumoured to have been born in Burkina Faso, so they were going for a double whammy. RDR then boycotted the election, along with Gbagbos FPI giving President Henri Konan Bédié an easy victory.

After leaving the IMF in July 1999 Ouattarra was elected President of the RDR and became its candidate for the 2000 presidential election presenting documents stating that he and his parents were of Ivorian birth. He was then accused of forgery and an arrest warrant was issued. On Christmas eve the military seized power and ousted Bédié. Ouattara returned to Ivory Coast hailing "the revolution", but was again barred from running. As the last man standing Gbagbo won the election and became President after a popular uprising in Abidjan forced the coup leaders to step down.

Civil war broke out in 2002 when northern soldiers rebelled and quickly got control of half the country. It ended with a ceasefire in 2007. Gbagbo promised Ouattarra he could stand in the next election, which he subsequently pushed to 2010. Ouattara then invited the former rebels in the New Forces to team up with RDR and thereby controlled the north.

He also formed an alliance known as Rally of Houphouëtistes (RHDP) with his old rival, the southerner Bédié. They agreed to support whoever made it to the second round, which became Ouattarra. The Electoral Commission announced Ouattarra had won, but the ruling FPI claimed massive fraud in the northern departments controlled by the rebels (a claim said to be bogus by international observers). A Constitutional Council made up of Gbagbo supporters declared the results in the north unlawful and Gbagbo the winner. Ouattara was recognized as the winner by most countries and the UN, and organized an alternative inauguration. The UN Security Council adopted a common resolution recognising Alassane Ouattara as winner of the elections, based on the position of ECOWAS. Ouattara loyalists seized control of most of the country, with Gbagbo entrenched in Abidjan and Gbagbo was taken into custody after a raid into his residence (which was probably done by French special forces, but both Ouattarra and France denies this) making Ouattrra the President. He has stabilized the economy and presided over impressive growth, but as earlier mentioned it doesn't benefit the poor much and reconciliation is going badly. His most controversial move was sacking his own PDCI led government in 2012 over a marriage law allowing wives (incl. those in polygamous marriages) to be joint household heads with men - the Catholic south and most of PDCI loathed it, and Ouattarra switched to a less independent PM (still from PDCI) and has since kept his government on a tight line ever since. At 73 he is in excellent health and his enormous working capacity is said to be fully intact.

In 1991 Ouattara was married Algerian born Franco-Jewish businesswoman Dominique Nouvian (later converted to Catholicism), at a  wedding ceremony presided over by the Mayor of Neuilly, one Nicolas Sarkozy, and his contacts to the French elite are said to be unrivaled among African leaders. His Ivy League education and long time in Washington has also provided him with excellent US contacts.

[politicus]

The challenger:

Pascal Affi N'Guessan (62) is a Catholic from the SE. He is an engineer and started out in local politics before he entered the national stage during the 2000 military regime. Is on the moderate wing of FPI and known as a competent administrator.



He joined FPI back in 1986. After the introduction of multiparty politics in 1990 he became Mayor of his home municipality Bongouanou 1990-96 and was simultaneously VP of the municipal association (UVICOCI) from 1990-95 and employed in the party secretariat. In 1994 he became Deputy SG of FPI. After working some years in the private sector the military regime of Robert Gueï made him Minister of Industry and Tourism. He was Gbagbos campaign manager under the presidential election and and after the victory rewarded by being appointed Prime Minister.

Since Gbagbo was barred from leading a party while in office N'Guessan was elected President of FPI in 2001 and was also VP of Socialist International from 2003 until FPI was kicked out in 2011 during the Second Civil War. Shortly arrested and detained by Ouattaras forces afterwards. He orchestrated the boycott of the parliamentary elections in 2011 due to the New Forces not being disarmed, Army harassment against FPI supporters and a biased Electoral Commission, but has since argued IPF needs to "stay in the game" to remain a viable political force and fought extremists in his party. He was chosen as Presidential candidate in August at a conference boycotted by his opponents.

Is unlikely to win, but should he succeed despite the odds being stacked against him, he would likely be a decent President. He is known as an efficient administrator, has in depth knowledge of economy and technology, is pragmatic and probably more genuinely Social Democratic than most African politicians claiming to be SDs (low bar, I know).

While being the former right hand man of Gbagbo and advocating his return, I think N'Guessan would be quite pleased with his former boss staying behind bars in Hague. He seems more interested in the future than settling old scores, but a lot of his party would want revenge if they were to win. So the issue is whether he could control them.

[politicus]

I should add that FPI was modeled on PS while Laurent Gbagbo was exiled in France after having been one of the main organizers of the 1982 teachers union strike (he was a history professor and a leading member of the university teachers branch). So founded shortly after Mitterrand was inaugurated and in the early phase of his presidency (1981-83), when they tried do something actually leftist. The FPI top had close contacts with PS until the 2010-11 "crisis". Generally the Ivorian elite is among the most francophile in Francophone Africa - and that goes for all sides. Even those that consider France neoimperialist.

[politicus]

The 5 CNC candidate is LIDER leader Mamadou Koulibaly (58). A major player in Ivorian politics for the last 15 years.



He is a northern Muslim and trained as an economist in France and Abidjan becoming a Professor of Economics. When the military regime of  Robert Guéï needed a capable economist to run the Budget Ministry  in 2000 the generals picked Koulibaly and that became his ticket to national politics. He was soon promoted to Finance and Economics and when Gbagbo won the 2000 presidential election he kept Koulibaly in that capacity and made him government spokesman. He was subsequently elected as an MP in 2001 and became President of the National Assembly. During the civil war he was known as hardliner refusing negotiate with the rebels and despising Ouattara. He was a close ally of Gbagbo's wife, who chaired FPI Parliamentary Group. He distanced himself from Gbagbo from around 2008 after he had failed to support him in a power struggle with the Minister of the Interior and during the crisis following the Presidential election in 2010 he tried to mediate and argued for a  national unity government. When the civil war between Gbagbo and Outtaras followers erupted he remained neutral and went into exile in Ghana. After the war he negotiated a compromise with Ouattara, where the existing PFI dominated National Assembly was allowed to continue after he acknowledged Outtara as President and swore him in. Also trier to stop persecution of FPI members and attacks on Gbagbo's Bété tribe.

After FPI president Pascal Affi N'Guessan was arrested Koulibaly took over the party leadership as Acting President, but resigned in 2011 after getting fed up with party hardliners unwillingness to accept Ouattara's victory become a credible political opposition party. He then founded officially "Liberal" and humanist LIDER in mid 2011, which is a centre-right version of FPI. He has allied with various other independent progressives, incl. some union leaders + defectors from FPI and PDCI and formed the "Third Force" CNC, but it never became an effective alliance and 4 other guys are running on their ticket, which will likely make it impossible for Koulibaly to reach the second round, but he might cut Ouattaras numbers in the Muslim world significantly (which might then tempt local officials to rig polls..). Despite his earlier reconciliatory stance he is a sharp critic of Ouattara and the Presidents human rights record today.

[Simfan34]

And here I was thinking they were still using the old-fashioned seven year term. How did I overlook this?

They had Presidential elections in 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 and 2010. CdI has never used 7 year terms.

Hmm. I feel like I knew this but forgot for some reason.

Really excellent work with this thread, though, Politicus. I'd genuinely like to give you some kind of medal for it. A very thorough recap of the candidates and alliances. I'd only say a little bit more historic background was in order (although I'll probably repeat some of what you've already said).

For decades the dominant figure in the Ivory Coast was Le Vieux Houphouët: Felix Houphouët-Boigny, its President from 1960 until, as you said, his death in 1993. From 1960 to 1990 the Ivory Coast, as was typical in Africa in those days, was a one party state under the PDCI, but, unlike most other African leaders in those days, and especially unlike most in former French colonies, Houphouët-Boigny maintained a close relationship with the West, especially France, often serving as accessory to the scheming done in the name of Françafrique.

In the days before independence, FHB, as a member of the National Assembly, had advocated autonomy for French West Africa but opposed full independence. His bitter rival in the Assembly was none other than Léopold Sédar-Senghor, who of course would go on to become President of Senegal. Senghor was in favor of an independence for French West Africa as a single federation (dominated by Senegal). Both the French Union supported by Houphouët-Boigny and the Mali Federation supported by Senghor were defunct by 1960 and the Ivory Coast became independent.

In the decades following independence, the Ivory Coast became one of the wealthiest countries in Africa. The economy was (and still is) primarily based on cocoa and coffee exports, but unlike most other African commodity exporters of the period, the Ivorians shunned state socialism and large-scale "Africanisation" of foreign firms, meaning that foreign investors flocked to the country, and foreign entrepreneurs-- particularly Lebanese and Greeks-- opened new firms, propelling the Ivory Coast past other countries whose expropriated private sectors were atrophying under cronyism and mismanagement. People spoke glowingly of the "Ivorian Miracle", and Western governments held Le Vieux Houphouët in the highest regard.

But this would not last. Cocoa and coffee prices, which had been on a continuously upwards trend since independence, stopped their rise in 1979 and plummeted in the 1980s, bringing the "Ivorian Miracle" to an immediate halt. Besides money-draining import-substitution firms, the Ivorian government, to its credit, had tried to diversify and cultivate an export-oriented manufacturing sector, but the products most firms hoped to produce were beyond their comparative advantage, with the cost of importing the needed machinery far exceeding any money made. The Ivorians lacked the means to prop up the small manufacturing sector, most spare money going to keep cocoa farmers afloat by buying their crop at inflated prices, and, increasingly time went on, debt service. Foreign businessmen left the country in droves, taking with them their firms and their money. The fact that Houphouët-Boigny, chose to start construction on a new capital city in his home village, Yamoussoukro--(in)famously home to what is claimed to be the world's largest church-- did nothing to help matters.

By the end of the decade the country was poorer than it had been 10 years before, deeply in debt, and showed no signs of turning things around anytime soon. Things would only be downhill from there-- Politicus has told us that part of the story. My only postscript would be to add that, 36 years later, Ivorian GDP per capita, when adjusted for inflation, remains below what it was at its peak in 1979.

[Simfan34]

But anyway, there's more candidates than I would have expected. Particularly Amara Essy-- I've thought him a decent figure, but I would have expected him to cast his lot in with the RDR, or one of the Houphouëtist groups, particularly if they're running together in a single bloc. Which I'm surprised they actually managed to pull off, considering all the personalities involved. I'd suspect, considering Houphouët's legacy (if one can call it that), a fully reconstituted PCDI would be in a position to dominate Ivorian politics by simply playing off nostalgia for the "good old days"--which, as we saw in Nigeria, people don't necessary need to have lived through to be nostalgic for-- and the credibility having been in power back then confers. The election is certainly Ouattara's to lose; the question is what happens in the next election.

Is the CDC just going to have five candidates on the ballot... what is the point of that? Did they not have a primary or convention or something of that sort, and if they did (presuming a dispute over the outcome), how did they manage to have the Electoral Commission accept them on the ballot?

[Famous Mortimer]

I should add that FPI was modeled on PS while Laurent Gbagbo was exiled in France after having been one of the main organizers of the 1982 teachers union strike (he was a history professor and a leading member of the university teachers branch). So founded shortly after Mitterrand was inaugurated and in the early phase of his presidency (1981-83), when they tried do something actually leftist. The FPI top had close contacts with PS until the 2010-11 "crisis". Generally the Ivorian elite is among the most francophile in Francophone Africa - and that goes for all sides. Even those that consider France neoimperialist.

All the parties in Ivory Coast have a French fetish. Rally of the Republicans was formed at a time when the main centre right party in France was Rally for the Republic.

[politicus]

Well, the list I saw on French wiki was flawed (got suspicious when I saw there should be two women among the 10 candidates) but the major candidates are the same:

The three I portrayed, KKB (the militant youth wing leader), former PM Charles Konane Banny and former Foreign Minister etc. Amara Essy (who were both on my list) In addition four minor candidates, two women among them:
Former minister Henriette Lagou Adjoua (PDCI dissident), Jaqueline-Claire Kongoua (independent), Konan Kouadio Simeon (independent) and Gnangbo Kacou (independent).

The Constitutional Council rejected 23 applications from the provisional list of 33 candidates for incomplete filing or missing the deposit of 20 million CFA ($34,000) - mostly the latter. They did not demand one candidate running per party, so several will be listed as PDCI.

(I will update this tomorrow with a bit of info on all the candidates - but the major ones and second tier are the same, it is just the also rans, that are slightly different. KKB should be considered second tier). I will also try to answer the remaining questions.



[politicus]

Campaigning isn't allowed before October 9 and ends on October 24. The short campaign is officially for security reasons given the risk of violent clashes, but of course benefits the most well known candidates.

[politicus]

Minor candidates

Dissident PDCI:

In CNC

Charles Konan Banny (73) is a Catholic economist from Ivo in the South. He joined the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) in 1976 rising to Special Advisor to then BCEAO Governor Alassane Ouattara in 1988. When Ouattara became PM in 1990 Banny was appointed Interim Governor and became Governor in 1994. As an accomplished technocrat he was selected by Gbagbo as PM 2005 and held the position to  2007, when the civil war ended and the rebel group New Forces leader Guillaume Soro replaced him as part of the peace deal. Currently chairs the (unpopular) Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Kouadio "KKB" Konan Bertin (46), is a farmer from Lakota in the far south, passed teachers degree from local college and claims to have been awarded a PhD scholarship in Corporate Communication in Germany from the University of Abidjan (apparently waiting for him since 1995..). MP for Port-Bouet and Deputy Speaker since 2011. Member of the Political Bureau and Secretariat of the PDCI and the leader of the militant PDCI youth wing JPDCI (Jeunesse du PDCI). He recently visited Gbagbo in prison and advocates reconciliation and common resistance to the tyrant Ouattara. Is otherwise running on a populist "champion of the poor" and "saviour of the nation and the legacy of Houphouët-Boigny"-message.


Outside CNC

Amara Essy (70) is a Muslim former diplomat and Foreign Minister from Bouake in the Central. Master degrees in public law and international law. In the foreign service from 1970 and working exclusively in UN related positions from 1973 onward. UN Ambassador 1981-90, President of the UN Security Council in 1990, was called home as Minister of Foreign Affairs 1990 to the Christmas coup in 1999, also President of the UN General Assembl 1994-95. SG of OAU 2001-02, interim Chairman of the Commission of the African Union 2002-03. Married to a Catholic.


RPC-Paix, PIA, PDR and CNPCI:

Henriette Lagou Adjoua (ca. 50), is a Catholic from Dadiékro in the East-Central (hometown of former President Henri Konan Bédié) and goddaughter of former First Lady Henriette Koinzan Bédié. She was a Minister in the 2000-03 government of Pascal Affi N'Guessan and despite her family ties belonged to the pro-Gbagbo wing of PDCI, was a leading member of the 2006 pro-Gbagbo alliance Congrès national de la résistance pour la démocratie (CNRD) and founder of the womens movement "Deux millions de filles pour Gbagbo". She currently has her own micro party Renouveau pour la paix et la concorde (RPC-Paix) and is backed by three other micro parties: Parti ivoirien des agriculteurs (PIA), le parti des démocrates républicains (PDR), le Congrès national du peuple de Côte d'Ivoire (CNPCI). She is the chairman of the board of Air Ivoire.


Indies:

Gnangbo Kacou (53) is a Catholic French educated banker from the SE near the Ghana border, MP for the Adiake, Assini and Etuéboué constituency since 2011 and 4th Vice President of the South Comoé Regional Council. This "impressive" background should leave him no chance, but he seems to have private money, so maybe he doesn't care.

Kouadio Konan Simeon (51) is a Catholic businessman from Toumodi in the East-Central, who also ran in the first round in 2010, getting a whooping 12,357 votes (0,27%).   

Jacqueline-Claire Kouangoua (44), is a Catholic printer. It seems she has trade union ties and is from Abidjan, but not sure.


Short (often very short) bios to both current and deselected candidates: http://election2015.akody.com/candidates/

[Famous Mortimer]

Amara Essey was nominated to be UN Secretary General at one point.

[politicus]

But anyway, there's more candidates than I would have expected. Particularly Amara Essy-- I've thought him a decent figure, but I would have expected him to cast his lot in with the RDR, or one of the Houphouëtist groups, particularly if they're running together in a single bloc. Which I'm surprised they actually managed to pull off, considering all the personalities involved. I'd suspect, considering Houphouët's legacy (if one can call it that), a fully reconstituted PCDI would be in a position to dominate Ivorian politics by simply playing off nostalgia for the "good old days"--which, as we saw in Nigeria, people don't necessary need to have lived through to be nostalgic for-- and the credibility having been in power back then confers. The election is certainly Ouattara's to lose; the question is what happens in the next election.

Henri Konan Bédié chose to back Ouattara in the second round of the Presidential election in 2011 and PDCI got to replace the New Forces rebel leader Guillaume Soro as PM in March 2012 (Soro was made Speaker, so still a political player), but already in November it was sacked because (most of) PDCI couldn't accept wifes being made joint heads of households. There is a new PDCI led government under Daniel Kablan Duncan (72), who is also Minister of Finance and Economy, but many sided with the ousted PM Jeannot Ahoussou-Kouadio (who got a lesser portfolio in 2013, but was out for a while), so there was already some disintegration then.

Ouattara has also been fairly authoritarian and there is a strong rift between the pro-Ouattara part of PDCI and the anti-Ouattara part, which is then led by different figures. Party president Henri Konan Bédiés decision to keep the alliance with Ouattara this time instead of trying to oust him alienated many.

Yes, it is Ouatttaras election to lose, but he has increased the stakes by declaring he expects to win in the first round. This would be the safest because most of his opponents will most likely get behind any of the potential challengers, but it will also mean it is a major loss of prestige if he needs a second round.

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As you can see above, there is no formal requirement to only have one candidate per party. There will "only" be three CNC candidates - KKB for the militant anti-Ouattara JPDCI crowd (but apparently also trying to play moderate, which is odd), Banny, who is the chairman and Koulibaly, who is a co-founder and leads the strongest party in the alliance. I suppose Koulibaly and his allies could not control the PDCI dissidents and make them get behind him. Koulibaly is ex-FPI and his allies mostly come from the left and the others are Conservatives and it seems the left/right divide matters a bit in Ivory Coast.

All the major anti-Ouattara players in PDCI are basically running - I guess their egos were too big to get behind one of them, but there is also a big difference in style between a shameless populist like KKB and someone like Essy. And then of course the matter of whether they should ally with the ex-leftists in CNC.

[Sir John Johns]

In recent days, no less than three candidates (Amara Essy, Mamadou Koulibaly, and Charles Konan Banny) have withdrawn their candidacies raising concerns over a significant fall in turnout today. The three candidates are withdrawing to protest over the conditions in which the election campaign took place. Most notably, they claimed that the Electoral Commission isn't a truly independent body and does nothing to prevent Ouattara's alleged violations of the electoral law (illegal use of the national colors in Ouattara's electoral propaganda; Ouattara's name appearing in first position on ballot paper while the ranking of the candidates should have been determined by drawing lots). Others complaints include the pro-Ouattara bias of the public-owned television, the use of the state resources by the incumbent president, and the composition of the electoral roll with claims by Koulibaly that 3 million of voters aren't registered.

For his part, Ouattara has promised that, if reelected, he would pass a new constitution and scrap the controversial provisions stipulating that a presidential candidate is required to be born in Ivory Coast of two Ivory Coast-born Ivorian parents. For what it's worth, he also promised he would not run for reelection in 2020.

[Sir John Johns]

Ouattara is reelected in a landslide:

Alassane Ouattara 83.66%
Pascal Affi N'Guessan 9.29%
Konan Bertin Kouadio 3.88%
Adjoua Henriette Lahou 0.89%
Kouadio Siméon Konan 0.71%
Kacou Gnangbo 0.6%
Jacqueline-Claire Kouangoua 0.4%
Charles Konan Banny* 0.28%
Amara Essy* 0.2%
Mamadou Koulibaly* 0.11%

* withdrawn their candidacies

Turnout: 54.63% (compared to 83.73% back in 2010)

The results have been rejected by the hardliners of the FPI (who have boycotted the election) who claim that the turnout was actually 11%. For its parts, the CNC opposition alliance claimed that turnout was between 15% and 18%. This is however contradicted by reports from an independent NGO which estimated the turnout was 53%, so in line with the results gave by the Electoral Commission.

[Simfan34]

Well the question is, who exactly is this NGO that confirmed the electoral commission's turnout figures? That, and the question of who exactly these FPI hardliners who boycotted the election were. If they were able to influence a sufficient amount of "FPIstes" (This is a word), it is possible that they've been the cause of their own problem--that N'Guessan's poor showing is the result of his would-be supporters heeding the call for a boycott and staying home.

Ouattara's result is consistent with what would have been expected in the case of an opposition boycott; the provisional results have him receiving 2.62 million votes, which is not that much more than the 2.48 million second-round votes he won in 2010. It's essentially the same as the combined totals of Ouattara and Konan Bédié in the first-round in 2010, which was 2.64 million.

Essy and Konan Banny were houphouëtiste career civil servants whose campaigns seem unlikely to have had any dedicated constituency, ethnic or otherwise, and Koulibaly was always in the awkward position of having been a Gbagbo ally who came from the same region as Ouattara; it's not improbable that whatever voters they would have had, voted for Ouattara instead.

I'd like to see a regional breakdown of the results, which would indicate ethnic voting patterns, but all in all these results do not strike me as implausible. Now to see if he'll try to linger on past the next election like his predecessor...

[Sir John Johns]

Well the question is, who exactly is this NGO that confirmed the electoral commission's turnout figures?

The NGO is the Platform of Civil Society Organizations for Election Observation in Ivory Coast (POEC), an umbrella organization that gathers delegates from human rights and anti-corruption organizations, trade-unionists, and civic and religious leaders. From what I have seen it's independent from Ouattara with some of its members being critical of the president. Still, some results, notably in the northern part of the country, are unbelievable: in the Gbeleban Department, Ouattara won 100% of the votes with a turnout of 98.96%. However, the frauds presumably don't change the general outcome of the vote. Affi N'Guessan, while having denounced presumed frauds in the North, has conceded defeat thus recognizing Ouattara as the legitimate president.

Here some maps of my own, using numbers from this website.











Ouattara got his best results in the Northwestern departments, home to the Malinke and Senoufo ethnic groups, where he won over 95% with a very high turnout (over 75%). He also won over 85% in most of the center-east departments, home to the Baoule ethnic group, thanks to his alliance with Konan Bédié (himself a Baoule). Ouattaro also won the Gagnoa department (Gbagbo's homeland) with 87.9% with a very low turnout of 35.4%, the third lowest one in the country. According to this article, turnout in Mama village, Gbagbo's birthplace, was only 5.1% with 24 electors going to vote.

More generally, turnout was lower in the southern part of the country being under 50% in the majority of southern departments. This is certainly one of the explanations of Affi N'Guessan's poor results. He only top the polls in the Agni-populated departments (he is himself an Agni) receiving his best result (57.2%) in his native Bongouano department. Affi N'Guessan's candidacy was hurt by the call for election boycott by the closes allies of the Gbagbos who never accepted Affi N'Guessan's strategy of taking part into the election and accepting Ouattara as the legitimate president. As a consequence, the position of Affi N'Guessan at the head of the FPI is seriously weakened.

This article from Jeune Afrique, written before the election, provides additional explanations to Affi N'Guessan's bad results: lack of financial ressources and lack of media coverage; the boycott by the FPI of the 2013 local elections which permitted Ouattara's party to win mayoralties in pro-Gbagbo prefectures and build there political machines; Ouattara's policy of building infrastructure (like a road between Gagnoa and Abidjan) in some pro-FPI areas which actually benefited little from the Ggagbo administration (granted, civil war didn't help). According to the words of an Ivorian political scientist, many voters no longer vote according to ethnic cleavage but instead vote in favor of the candidate - Ouattara - who has improve their daily lives.