The Myth of the French During WWII

[12th Doctor]

One of those common moments that one just loaths happened to me last night.  I was having a serious conversation about geopolitics with someone, when the conversation turned to the French and then as these conversations tend to do, it turned to how the French were "stupid pussies" during the war, because they "surrendered so easily", "spent all there money on that stupid Line" and "didn't spend enough on the rest of their military, letting the German military get far larger than their own.

Whenever I hear this, I just want to laugh.  One thing that I can't stand is how wrong people are about the history regarding the circumstances leading up to WWII, and thus, don't take away the true lessons that the situation has to offer us.

One of the biggest lies about the lead up to the war (next to the one about Pope Pius' love of the Nazis) is that the French were ill prepared for the war, believing in a niave peace and putting all their faith in the Maginot Line while neglecting their regular forces.  This is untrue on all counts and, quite frankly, Americans sound like jackasses when we say this.

Myth #1: "The French weren't prepared to fight"

At the time, the French acctually had a larger military that was better equiped and better trained than the German military.  They had better infantry forces.  Better weapons.  More and better tanks.  I might be wrong about this, but I think that the only area where the Germans had the advantage was in the comparitive strength of their air power.

The Germans did, however, have far superior tactics.  There tank formations, concept of the proper use of infantry and the over-all concentrated power of the blitzkrieg were well ahead of French thinking on tactics.

Myth #2:  "The French hung back.  Thus allowing the Germans the initiative"

Acctually, it was the French who attacked the Germans first.  After the invasion of Poland, the Frech sent several expedition forces into Germany.  The Germans often pulled back, rather than fighting and the French did not have the logistical capabilities to take the fight deep into Germany, thus no large battles were fought.  This was acctually called the "Phoney War".

Logistics, not initiative, or the size of forces, proved to be the true enemy of the French, here.  They simply didn't have the logistic capability, as the Germans did, to launch into a prolonged campaign in the enemies homeland.

Myth #3:  "The Maginot Line was a stupid idea.  It was easily over taken by the Germans and the French, who had put all their faith in it were easily overcome"

As I mentioned before, the French military was strong, powerful and well-trained.  They did not put all their stock into the Line, as was evidenced my the fact they they possitioned a large amount of their force behind the it, waiting for the Germans to breach it.  This was stupid on the part of the Frech, who acctually should have put more stock in the Line.

It is a fact that the Nazis were terrified of attacking the fortification, as they believed that the Line alone was capable of repeling even the best coordinated and most determined assult by their forces.  Thus, they looked for other options.

The French did not possition troops in the region of the Ardennes Forrest because they believed that no modern army would be capable of moving through it in a cooridinated fasion.  That is why the Germans spent months determining the best way that they could get their forces through the forrest.

When they did so, French military planers were caught completely by suprise.  The Germans then moved to strike the British expeditionary force, which, in contrast to the French military, was weak, poorly equipt, had few tanks and was very poorly trained.

Once they had isolated the British, the entire Northern Front was open for the Nazis to roll right through.  The Germans then proceded to take Paris and hit the French Army and the Line from the back.  It was not long before the French realized that, cut from their main supply centers (most of which were in the hands of the enemy) without a continuous supply of gas, ammunition and food, and with the British army unable to give assistance, they would be slaughtered.  And so, with most French soldiers never even having fired a shot and with the Nazis never once having attacked the Line, the French generals surrendered.

The French did not lose because they were "pussies" or "ill-prepared".  They lost because they underestimated their own strengths and underestimated the capabilites of their enemy.  It also shows how, even an inferior force, using superior tactics and superior strategy can beat a superior force.  And that is the true lesson that should be taken away from this.

Any thoughts.

[PBrunsel]

The Maginot Line was a stupid idea Soulty. I mean, why did the French not think the Germans would attack through Belgium. They did durring WWI.

If the Midinot Line has been able to go through Belgium it would have been great for defense in my opinion.

[12th Doctor]

The Maginot Line was a stupid idea Soulty. I mean, why did the French not think the Germans would attack through Belgium. They did durring WWI.

If the Midinot Line has been able to go through Belgium it would have been great for defense in my opinion.

No, the Germans main assult was through the Ardennes.  Which is not where they had attacked through in WWI.  If you had ever been to that area, you might understand, even today, why one might think that no army could attack thorugh there.

[12th Doctor]

Had the Germans used the same rout they used in WWI, then they would have run right smack into the British expeditionary force.

Instead, they were able to turn the flank of the entire British Army and force them to the sea.

[PBrunsel]

The Maginot Line was a stupid idea Soulty. I mean, why did the French not think the Germans would attack through Belgium. They did durring WWI.

If the Midinot Line has been able to go through Belgium it would have been great for defense in my opinion.

No, the Germans main assult was through the Ardennes.  Which is not where they had attacked through in WWI.  If you had ever been to that area, you might understand, even today, why one might think that no army could attack thorugh there.

Good point. I forgot the main assault was through the Ardennes. Being a guy who reads about Hoover a lot, I always read abaout the German assalut throught Belgium and believed that thr Belgian Front was their main assault.

BTW, your analyisis was very well thought out and quite interesting.

[Banana Republic]

There are plenty of reasons to loathe the French, but they certainly aren't sissies.

[ATFFL]

The French are very, very good at fighting the last war.  They are very rarely prepared for the next war.

[12th Doctor]

The French are very, very good at fighting the last war.  They are very rarely prepared for the next war.

One could say the same of the US, until after Vietnam.

[ATFFL]

The French are very, very good at fighting the last war.  They are very rarely prepared for the next war.

One could say the same of the US, until after Vietnam.

Really?  We prepared for WWII expecting it to be exactly like WWI?

The US was actually ahead of the curve in war planning for most of its existence.  The US kept war plans drawn up for all likely opponents since the War of 1812.  When the Spanish American War broke out the US plans were already formed and ready to be implemented.  The same was true for all US Mexican conflicts.

After the War the US prepared war plans for each major power that was considered a threat.  The most famous of these are War Plan Orange for the Japanese and War Plan Red for the British.  These plans were continually updated until WWI broke out.  They were then updated for the post war world and updated unitl WWII broke out.

The US maintains this tradition to this day.

[12th Doctor]

The French are very, very good at fighting the last war.  They are very rarely prepared for the next war.

One could say the same of the US, until after Vietnam.

Really?  We prepared for WWII expecting it to be exactly like WWI?

The US was actually ahead of the curve in war planning for most of its existence.  The US kept war plans drawn up for all likely opponents since the War of 1812.  When the Spanish American War broke out the US plans were already formed and ready to be implemented.  The same was true for all US Mexican conflicts.

After the War the US prepared war plans for each major power that was considered a threat.  The most famous of these are War Plan Orange for the Japanese and War Plan Red for the British.  These plans were continually updated until WWI broke out.  They were then updated for the post war world and updated unitl WWII broke out.

The US maintains this tradition to this day.

I was talking about the tactics and weapons that are used by the U.S.  Usually, at the start of each war, they are quite inferior.

[Lunar]

That doesn't mean that the US is always fighting the last war.  It just means that we aren't always in a perfect state of readiness.  The US has been consistantly fairly revolutionary in many of its tactics from Island Hopping to Shock and Awe.

France does [did?] seem to base its entire military strategy assuming that the next war will be like the previous one.  That's an interesting thought.

[J. J.]

The Maginot Line was a stupid idea Soulty. I mean, why did the French not think the Germans would attack through Belgium. They did durring WWI.

If the Midinot Line has been able to go through Belgium it would have been great for defense in my opinion.

No, the Germans main assult was through the Ardennes.  Which is not where they had attacked through in WWI.  If you had ever been to that area, you might understand, even today, why one might think that no army could attack thorugh there.

Actually, the Germans attacked accross a large front sending von Kluck's and Bulow's Armies through the Ardennes.  While not the "main assault," it was the most successful.  

The Maginot Line was successful to the extent that it wasn't "breeched," at least until the end of June, but the troops holding it were not mobile enough to move north to block the German Panzer assault.

There were some othe problems.  The Germans used the Stuka dive bomber as basically mobile artillery against the French and British opposite. They also used armor as a massed formation, while the Allies used them as infantry support.  The Germans were never fully mechanized as a force (and still using cavalry), but had divisions solely of armor and mechanized forces.  It was these units that exploited the breakout.

Also, the Germans didn't make the same mistake that they did in WWI.  The drove to the sea first, in order to cut the Allies in two, then they swung south.  

I often what would have happened in WWI if von Kluck had been ordered to reach the sea before turning on Paris.  After Mons, the British reteated south toward Paris.  The Germans might have been able to reach the Channel, and completely cut of the Begium and some British forces.

[Erc]

The French were preparing to fight WWI over again...as were most of the Germans, for that matter.

They were expecting that the Germans would pull off a repeat of the Schleiffen plan, swinging through Belgium, let the last man on the right brush the channel with his sleeve, and all that.

To that end, they built the Maginot line, extending from the Swiss to the Belgian border, to create an impenetrable defense against a direct frontal assault (in case the
Germans tried to get tricky)...and to free up troops for the rest of the army.

Most of the French army was concentrated along the Belgian border, and in the event of a German invasion of Belgium, was to advance to the Dyle and Scheldt and fortify there.

Now, there were several problems with this plan.  First, the amount of time the French had to fortify the area would be a matter of days, not a matter of years (as in the case of the Maginot Line).  Why didn't they build a Maginot line behind the Belgian border?  Not the best defensive territory.  Why didn't they cooperate the Belgians to build Maginot-like defenses behind the Dyle?  Because the Belgians, after all that had happened in WWI, still believed that their neutrality would save them--so they refused to enter the military plans of the French and British.

Of course, the Germans didn't attack across the Dyle--they attacked through the Ardennes, which the French (again, still thinking in WWI terms) thought were impenetrable...so they put few and weak troops here.  Combine this with the fact that most French soldiers, remembering (or having learned about) the terrors of WWI, were not nearly as enthusiastic about this war as the last--they simply wanted to go home...and we're set for disaster.

The Germans attack through the Ardennes, encounter troops who were not expecting to be attacked...they give up the bridges easily, and the Germans are out in the open.

The French generals are taken aback and really don't know what to do about it.  No plan survives contact with the enemy, and the French generals were not quick on their feet.  The Germans reach the Atlantic, and the French attempt to relieve the pocket fails against German might.

French troops, already not at the best of morale to begin with, lose all faith in their commanders, and, in a state of collective shock, stop fighting.

Not to say that there weren't individual efforts of bravery and intelligence--many French generals valiantly attempted to reorganize their men, but found that they considered the war already lost.  And the French trapped at Dunkirk with the British--the ones with no hope of evacuation--fought bravely for days to make sure the British could get out safely, before finally surrendering themselves.

Ultimately, the entrenched philosophy of the French military and the uninterestedness of the French troops ran up to the genius of Guderian and the spirit of Germans out for revenge.

Guderian won.

[dazzleman]

Supersoulty, I think you said it all when you said that the French didn't have the logistical capabilities to extend much into Germany.  They attacked German soldiers at the border, and then didn't advance.  How could you say they were prepared to fight when this was the case?  It was a pathetic performance.

The British and French should have attacked Germany when they were invading Poland, and pushed through to Berlin.  If they were incapable of making any real advances into Germany while the entire German army was occupied with Poland, they had no shot of winning the war.

It was also unpardonably stupid that the French and British didn't act against Germany earlier, when they could have been successful with little military effort.  The time of the Rhineland militarization in 1936 would have been a perfect time to confront Germany.  They waited until Germany had grown into Frankenstein's monster to confront it, when they had much better opportunities earlier.

Neither the British nor the French wanted to fight the war, and that fact was reflected in their military planning, or lack thereof, as well as the lackluster efforts of their soldiers.  As it was, the British rallied better at the last minute, but they of course had the advantage of being separated from the Germans by the English Channel, while the French had no such advantage.

Having said all this, and as much as I despise the French, I'm not sure the US is in a position to be too critical of the French on this one.  In 1940, we had the weakest possible military, incapable of handling anything other than maybe a small Latin American intervention.  We had a tiny standing army, almost no air power, and even our guns were left over from World War I.  Except for the navy, in which we invested modestly, the US put almost nothing into the military during the interwar years.  Had we been able to offer effective help earlier in the war, or even the credible threat of intervention with some force in the early stages, the war may have been prevented, or been a lot shorter.

One little known fact about the French situation in 1940 extends all the way back to the Versailles Treaty.  The Versailles Treaty was a compromise between a much stricter treaty that the French wanted, and more lenient proposals by the Americans and British.  It turned out to be a disaster, because it struck just the wrong note.  It was strict enough and painful enough to anger and humiliate the Germans, but it still left compliance largely to German initiative, and didn't really contain their capabilities in the long run.  Germany was cheating on the treaty almost from Day 1, and the will to enforce the provisions of the treaty (which required an all-volunteer army, no air power, etc.) dissipated as the postwar years advanced. 

But the French were induced to accept Versailles, rather than a stricter approach, by an American guaranty of French security against a German invasion given by President Wilson.  After the French agreed to this and accepted the Versailles Treaty, the US Congress rejected the guaranty, along with the Versailles Treaty.  In any case, the US didn't maintain the military capability to give any real effect to the guaranty, even if it had remained in effect, and the US stood by while the French went down to defeat in 1940.

So while I am quite critical of the French performance during this period, I think the US was similar in its unpreparedness for World War II.  But we had the advantage of being 3,000 miles away, and got enough time, by just a hair, to mobilize ourselves to be strong enough to meet the challenge.  Without this luxury, the French should never have let themselves slip to the point that they did.

[Lunar]

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Indeed, several top people within the German government were pushing for acceptance of this treaty solely because of how easy it would be to break.  Germany still had a mostly-intact army when they signed the treaty, they were just worried about even harsher conditions coming  if they held out longer.

[dazzleman]

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Indeed, several top people within the German government were pushing for acceptance of this treaty solely because of how easy it would be to break.  Germany still had a mostly-intact army when they signed the treaty, they were just worried about even harsher conditions coming  if they held out longer.

That's exactly right.  The allies were keeping up the pressure on the Germans through the blockade, but the strategic situation was that the Germans had surrendered in Nov. 1918 with their armies occupying foreign territory and largely intact.  They knew they could not win, and sought an early exit from the war, and thought they would get better peace terms if they surrendered while they still had something left to negotiate with.

As it turned out, they were deeply upset by the ultimate Versailles Treaty, because they expected a peace along the lines of Wilson's Fourteen Points.  Still, their later behavior was their own responsibility and choice.  They could have lived in peace with their neighbors, and reversed all the bad points of Versailles, had they wanted to in the 1930s.  They chose war.

But Versailles was a very bad strategy on the part of the allies, and I think this was one case where a more extreme solution - either way - would have been better than a middle of the road compromise without teeth.  It would have been better to more strictly limit the Germans, or to go the other way and make them a friend, rather than to slap ineffective sanctions on them that would anger them without restraining them in the long run.  And in fairness to the French, it was not they who advocated that policy.  And it was also the French who had to live most closely with the German threat.

Still, the French performance in World War was shockingly bad, and removed any pretense that remained that the French were a world power.  They still have not gotten the message.

[Blue Rectangle]

I have to agree with the others that the Maginot Line was a stupid idea.  A static defense only ensures that you will delay your defeat.  The resources used to build and maintain the Line would have been better spent on mobile units that could attack and defend.

A few years later, the Nazis committed the same error when their coastal defenses were rendered useless--the Normandy invasion simply went between them and cut them off.

[Beet]

The Ardennes Forest at the river Meuse (above).

The allied reasoning:

"More and more Gamelin became convinced that the Germans would try to attempt a breakthrough by concentrating their mechanized forces. They could hardly hope to break the Maginot Line on his right flank or to overcome the allied concentration of forces on the left flank. That only left the centre. But most of the centre was covered by the river Meuse. Tanks were useless in defeating fortified river positions. However at Namur the river made a sharp turn to the east, creating a hiatus between itself and the river Dyle. This Gembloux Gap, ideal for mechanized warfare, was a very dangerous weak spot. Gamelin decided to concentrate half of his armoured reserves there. Of course the Germans might try to overcome the Meuse position by using infantry. But that could only be achieved by massive artillery support, the build-up of which would give Gamelin ample warning."

What really happened:

"Instead of slowly massing artillery, the Germans used the full might of their bomber force to punch a hole in the French lines by carpet bombing (punctuated by dive bombing) a narrow sector. The French infantry units there (of 55th Infantry Division) were routed after many hours of the heaviest air bombardment the world had yet witnessed. Even then the German elite infantry units that pushed them out lost up to 75% of their effective strength. The next morning, on the 14th, two French tank battalions tried to counter-attack but were repulsed by suicidal attacks with satchel charges by fanatical German combat engineers. The tanks reported to have made contact with the first German tanks that had crossed the river on pontoon bridges. Like a wildfire this news spread through the adjoining French 71st Infantry Division. It panicked and a general rout followed. That afternoon every available allied light bomber was employed to destroy the bridges but, despite incurring the highest losses in the entire history of the British and French air forces, failed to do so."

[12th Doctor]

Most of the French army was concentrated along the Belgian border, and in the event of a German invasion of Belgium, was to advance to the Dyle and Scheldt and fortify there.

Ummm... your wrong.  Look at a map.  Most of the French Army was concentrated behind the Maginot Line.  Most of the British "Army" was concentrated on the Belgian boarder.

[12th Doctor]

The Maginot Line did precisly what is was meant to do.  Because of it, the Germans never attacked through the Alsesse-Lorain region, which would have put the French at quite a disadvantage, as the region was highly rich in industrial resources.

[dazzleman]

The Maginot Line did precisly what is was meant to do.  Because of it, the Germans never attacked through the Alsesse-Lorain region, which would have put the French at quite a disadvantage, as the region was highly rich in industrial resources.

What difference does that make, when they lost the whole country?  How much worse of a disadvantage could you have than that?

The Maginot Line didn't go far enough, so it was useless.  In World War I, the Germans attacked through Belgium, and the Maginot Line would have done nothing to prevent this, even if the Germans had reused the Schleifflin Plan, because it ended before the Belgian border.

Prior to 1937, this was partially remedied by an alliance with Belgium, which allowed the French military to take forward positions within Belgium, in areas more defensible than the plains on the French side of the border.  But the Belgians were spooked by the weak French reaction to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, so they decided to appease the Germans and abandoned their alliance with the French in 1937.  This meant that the French had to remain behind the border with Belgium until it was too late.

You can't look at a defense plan in isolated components.  Just because the Germans didn't come through the Maginot Line doesn't mean that it served its intended purpose.  In the end, France was conquered, despite the impregnable Maginot Line.

[12th Doctor]

The Maginot Line did precisly what is was meant to do.  Because of it, the Germans never attacked through the Alsesse-Lorain region, which would have put the French at quite a disadvantage, as the region was highly rich in industrial resources.

What difference does that make, when they lost the whole country?  How much worse of a disadvantage could you have than that?

The Maginot Line didn't go far enough, so it was useless.  In World War I, the Germans attacked through Belgium, and the Maginot Line would have done nothing to prevent this, even if the Germans had reused the Schleifflin Plan, because it ended before the Belgian border.

Prior to 1937, this was partially remedied by an alliance with Belgium, which allowed the French military to take forward positions within Belgium, in areas more defensible than the plains on the French side of the border.  But the Belgians were spooked by the weak French reaction to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, so they decided to appease the Germans and abandoned their alliance with the French in 1937.  This meant that the French had to remain behind the border with Belgium until it was too late.

You can't look at a defense plan in isolated components.  Just because the Germans didn't come through the Maginot Line doesn't mean that it served its intended purpose.  In the end, France was conquered, despite the impregnable Maginot Line.

I don't think you understand my point.  The French acctually underestimated the Maginot Line.  There mistake was piling all their troops up behind the line, waiting for it to be breeched.  It was unbreechable.  The Germans even recongnized that.  The French should have put more stock in the line and moved their troops north to cover the Belgian boarder.

[dazzleman]

I don't think you understand my point.  The French acctually underestimated the Maginot Line.  There mistake was piling all their troops up behind the line, waiting for it to be breeched.  It was unbreechable.  The Germans even recongnized that.  The French should have put more stock in the line and moved their troops north to cover the Belgian boarder.

You're right.  The Germans didn't even try to breach the Maginot Line.  Why would they, when they could so easily go around it.  Invading through the industrial areas is something they probably wouldn't have done even without the Maginot Line.

The main issue is that a country that purports to be a great power, which the French did at the time (and still deludedly do), cannot be in a defensive posture militarily.  A country that has guaranteed the security of countries that do not border it must be capable of taking offensive military action, or its power will evaporate.

The Maginot Line mentality was a sign that the French were no longer a great power, though they had a larger army than the Germans at the outset of World War II.  They just didn't have the will or brains to use it properly, and ended up a "raped old bag" at the hands of the Germans.

[12th Doctor]

I don't think you understand my point.  The French acctually underestimated the Maginot Line.  There mistake was piling all their troops up behind the line, waiting for it to be breeched.  It was unbreechable.  The Germans even recongnized that.  The French should have put more stock in the line and moved their troops north to cover the Belgian boarder.

You're right.  The Germans didn't even try to breach the Maginot Line.  Why would they, when they could so easily go around it.  Invading through the industrial areas is something they probably wouldn't have done even without the Maginot Line.

The main issue is that a country that purports to be a great power, which the French did at the time (and still deludedly do), cannot be in a defensive posture militarily.  A country that has guaranteed the security of countries that do not border it must be capable of taking offensive military action, or its power will evaporate.

The Maginot Line mentality was a sign that the French were no longer a great power, though they had a larger army than the Germans at the outset of World War II.  They just didn't have the will or brains to use it properly, and ended up a "raped old bag" at the hands of the Germans.

I agree with you there.  As I noted, the French clearly had the capability to assume the offensive against Germany, but, as you said, lacked the will and, as I mentioned, the logistical capability to do so.

That was not the fault of the Line, though.  They could have done this without the line, by doing exactly what the Germans did, use the Line as a stoping point for the other side, will engaging in a braod sweep into Germany, from Belgium.

[dazzleman]

I don't think you understand my point.  The French acctually underestimated the Maginot Line.  There mistake was piling all their troops up behind the line, waiting for it to be breeched.  It was unbreechable.  The Germans even recongnized that.  The French should have put more stock in the line and moved their troops north to cover the Belgian boarder.

You're right.  The Germans didn't even try to breach the Maginot Line.  Why would they, when they could so easily go around it.  Invading through the industrial areas is something they probably wouldn't have done even without the Maginot Line.

The main issue is that a country that purports to be a great power, which the French did at the time (and still deludedly do), cannot be in a defensive posture militarily.  A country that has guaranteed the security of countries that do not border it must be capable of taking offensive military action, or its power will evaporate.

The Maginot Line mentality was a sign that the French were no longer a great power, though they had a larger army than the Germans at the outset of World War II.  They just didn't have the will or brains to use it properly, and ended up a "raped old bag" at the hands of the Germans.

I agree with you there.  As I noted, the French clearly had the capability to assume the offensive against Germany, but, as you said, lacked the will and, as I mentioned, the logistical capability to do so.

That was not the fault of the Line, though.  They could have done this without the line, by doing exactly what the Germans did, use the Line as a stoping point for the other side, will engaging in a braod sweep into Germany, from Belgium.

But the Maginot Line was a sign of their defensive mentality.  How could they go after the Germans if they were hiding behind the Magionot Line?  Did the Maginot Line even give them the capability for offensive actions, or as I suspect, would they have had to go around it?  That would have been a highly clumsy maneuver, giving the Germans plenty of notice.

Their lack of logistical capability to go on the offensive against a strong and determined enemy that they knew, or should have known, that they would have to fight is part and parcel of their defensive Maginot mentality.  The Germans sure didn't lack the logistical capability to go on the attack against the French.  If you want to win a war, you have to outwit and outmatch your opponent.