2013 Elections in Germany

[Tender Branson]

Comparison of CSU share and 2008-2013 changes, with the August unemployment rates:



The district on the map where the "3,8" is situated in Bavaria, Eichstätt, has the lowest unemployment in Germany with 1.4% and is just north to the city of Ingolstadt, where the Audi is produced.

The Ingolstadt area in general has a very high CSU share and also the highest gain vs. 2008.

[minionofmidas]

Seehofer is, of course, from Ingolstadt (once memorably described to me as "imagine if Wolfsburg had a small old city at its core".)
Similarly, Beckstein, Ude, and Daxenberger factors are all quite visible in these results.

The Green and FW strength maps are fascinating, of course.

[Tender Branson]

Seehofer is, of course, from Ingolstadt (once memorably described to me as "imagine if Wolfsburg had a small old city at its core".)
Similarly, Beckstein, Ude, and Daxenberger factors are all quite visible in these results.

The Green and FW strength maps are fascinating, of course.

Seehofer is from Ingolstadt ? That explains something ...

Also, I wonder why the Greens are not as strong on the Tyrolian border just north of Innsbruck. They have better results just east and west of the Tyrolian border.

[Franknburger]

Also, I wonder why the Greens are not as strong on the Tyrolian border just north of Innsbruck. They have better results just east and west of the Tyrolian border.

Firstly, I think their opposition to the Munich (Garmisch-Partenkirchen) application for the 2018 winter Olympics may have hurt them quite a bit in the skiing areas.
Secondly, the Lindau-Memmingen area is quite techy and has seen a lot of recent immigration. And Berchtesgadener Land is, as you probably know, almost a suburb of Salzburg. In comparison, the Tyrolean border is rather rural / small-town - not the best terrain for the Greens.
And finally, the Ude effect that is pretty obvious for Munich may also have reached to the Alpine exurbia, which otherwise might have given a few more votes to the Greens.

Interestingly, the Green loss is not as dramatic as it appeared first. They have continued to gain in the Nuremberg metro, in and around Augsburg, Ulm, Wurzburg, Aschaffenburg and Regensburg, as well as in smaller towns such as Bamberg, Coburg, Schweinfurt and Passau. Not as much as in recent state elections /Lower-Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein), but still. What killed them was the Ude effect in Munich (combined with the special Bavarian vote system), and poor performance in the "motor diamond" (Munich -Ingolstadt-Regensburg-Landshut), and the skiing areas.

[Yeahsayyeah]

As almost all of the Green loss was in Upper Bavaria ist might also be a factor that Sepp Daxenberger is not around anymore.

What is the reason of the Freie Wähler surge in Lower Bavaria?

[palandio]

Nice maps!

Looking on the map of the Greens' gains/losses you can clearly detect the border of Upper Bavaria. The second vote in Bavaria is personalized and limited to each of the seven Bezirke. That is, you have the possibility to give your second vote to Christian Ude if and only if you live in Upper Bavaria. Because of the electoral system these type of effects does not fade out slowly but it halts at province borders. I think that this Ude effect accounts for many of the regional differences.

Heavy Green losses in South-Eastern Bavaria mainly come from some reverse Daxenberger effect, while relative strength in the same regions can partially be explained by some kind of residual Daxenberger effect.
The Greens' losses are mostly due to rising turnout. They have actually gained 20.000 votes compared to 2008. In Upper Bavaria they lost 1000 first votes, but 64.000 second votes (mainly Ude effect and partially reverse Daxenberger effect).
But I agree that some regional effects are difficult to explain. For example in the places where not everybody can afford to live. In some places like the Tegernsee valley (district of Miesbach, south of Munich) the Greens are not so succesful, FDP and CSU on the other hand yes. In the Ammersee region both FDP and Greens are very succesful. And in places like Breitbrunn (north-western shore of the Chiemsee, district of Rosenheim, almost Traunstein) both FDP and Greens are strong as well. Maybe this trend in South-Eastern Upper Bavaria is more recent than in the Oberland (Tegernsee etc.)

The Freie Wähler surge in Lower Bavaria? Maybe some combination of effects:
- The FW have become more concentrated on chairman Hubert Aiwanger who is from Lower Bavaria. As with Ude in Upper Bavaria, it was possible to vote Aiwanger with your second vote if and only if you vote in Lower Bavaria.
- The Ude effect in Upper Bavaria may have drained the anti-CSU vote there and sharpened the Upper/Lower Bavarian border.
- Ude was good in relating to people in the SPD "strongholds" (if you can say that in Bavaria), maybe not so good in the Eastern Bavarian countryside.

[minionofmidas]

This pattern of the poshest of the suburbs (or in this case, quasi-rural exurbs) being subpar Green territory exists in Hesse as well. The difference being that in our case, these are fairly 'old' suburbs in the Taunus.

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

So I'm a little confused about if any electoral reforms were made or what's happening with the system. It seems the electoral system had a quirk in it that allowed it to be possible for votes cast for a party in certain states to actually result in less seats for that party because of the overhangs, which in 2011 the German Constitutional Court rightfully declared unconstitutional, but a new system wasn't set up in time. So is this election under the old declared unconstitutional system? That seems pretty odd. Would it be possible for the results ever to be invalidated because of them system and a new election forced?

[palandio]

The interesting phenomenon is that even within the same metropolitan area (Munich, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Stuttgart) some posh suburbs are rather green and others not.

After the first proposal was declared unconstitutional, the federal electoral law has been changed in a way that all overhangs are compensated by additional seats, not only to preserve proportionality between the parties within one Land, but also proportionality between the Länder. (This is what I understood...) This may inflate the size of our parliament heavily, particularly if CDU/CSU get a relatively low proportional result due to loan votes for the FDP. I think that this has been discussed already some days/weeks before.

[Franknburger]

The interesting phenomenon is that even within the same metropolitan area (Munich, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Stuttgart) some posh suburbs are rather green and others not.

Unlike the Munich, Stuttgart and Frankfurt metros, the posh Hamburg suburbs are inside the city (state) limits (Elbvororte, Walddörfer).This can be seen on this older (2007), but fairly detailed map of house prices (larger version, PDF)

Those suburbs are indeed the places where the Hamburg FDP does best. Everything outside the city limits is upper middle class at maximum. If you look at my maps on this spring's (Schleswig-)Holstein local elections, you will see that the more prestigious suburbs (Ahrensburg, Wentorf, Wohltorf etc.) are green strongholds with a slightly elevated FDP share that however, tends to remain below 10%.


The real FDP strongholds around Hamburg are small towns in quite some distance from the city, such as Bad Bramstedt, Glückstadt, Trittau and Schwarzenbek . The FDP small-town pattern sets forth into places like Brunsbüttel, Oldenburg/Holstein, Meldorf etc.. I also noted elevated FDP shares in certain tourism areas (Grömitz, Aukrug), as well as close to (former) army camps. Whether that is the pub owners', or the pensioners' vote, or both, I can't tell.

But I agree that some regional effects are difficult to explain. For example in the places where not everybody can afford to live. In some places like the Tegernsee valley (district of Miesbach, south of Munich) the Greens are not so successful, FDP and CSU on the other hand yes. In the Ammersee region both FDP and Greens are very succesful. And in places like Breitbrunn (north-western shore of the Chiemsee, district of Rosenheim, almost Traunstein) both FDP and Greens are strong as well. Maybe this trend in South-Eastern Upper Bavaria is more recent than in the Oberland (Tegernsee etc.)

In the Hamburg exurbs, the green strength comes from the eco-farming community (which of course thrives close to large, wealthy cities), and academics that have bought nice, historic houses where they are still affordable (myself being one of them). The Ammersee and Chiemsee areas fit these criteria (in fact, former neighbours of ours, both social psychologists working with mentally handicapped kids, have a few years ago moved to an old farmhouse east of Rosenheim). Terrain-wise, the Tegernsee valley should be less conducive to eco-farming, and might also have less old farmhouses available, as many of them have been turned into hotels. And real estate prices have, of course, already for some time been pretty high there (look at the map above).
As to the FDP vote in Green exurban strongholds - tourism business, pensioners, small business owners, especially from construction? Remember, the FDP is often caled "Partei der Makler und Malermeister" (party of real estate agents and wall painters)...

[palandio]

Thank you for the maps and the description of the situation in Hamburg.

Your explanation for the Upper Bavarian phenomenon is really good. This fits almost exactly the image of the places that I have. Regarding the FDP voters in Green exurban strongholds this is maybe similar to gentrification processes in the inner cities: Munich green strongholds like the Gärtnerplatzviertel have seen a rise in the FDP vote recently. Not only social psychologists like old houses with a lake nearby, but also attorneys, dentists etc. (often after they retire, as you pointed out).

[Franknburger]

Thank you for the maps and the description of the situation in Hamburg.

Your explanation for the Upper Bavarian phenomenon is really good. This fits almost exactly the image of the places that I have. Regarding the FDP voters in Green exurban strongholds this is maybe similar to gentrification processes in the inner cities: Munich green strongholds like the Gärtnerplatzviertel have seen a rise in the FDP vote recently. Not only social psychologists like old houses with a lake nearby, but also attorneys, dentists etc. (often after they retire, as you pointed out).

The interesting thing is that (at least around Hamburg) the FDP is not that strong in county capitals (where you have the local courts and, accordingly, most lawyers). They are doing decently there, especially in relation to most of the countryside, but their best places are the small towns. I agree for the dentists, and would also add pharmacy owners, car retail etc.  
There is quite a FDP<-> Green swing potential (lawyers, doctors etc.). For example, a friend of a friend, owner of a small workshop for orthopaedic shoes, voted FDP for the first time in 2009 as a sign against bureaucratic overburdening. Being an anti-nuclear activist since his youth, he had always voted Green before. You can imagine his shock when the black-yellow coalition took the first U-turn on nuclear energy - I doubt that he will ever vote FDP again (probably he'll go to the Pirates). In Bavaria, he would probably support FW.

[Hifly]

Don't forget the newly developed Hafencity as a FDP stronghold in the centre of Hamburg.

[Yeahsayyeah]

Wow, that SPD poster from 1949 claiming a "free Germany" in the borders of 1914 really hurts the eye. Underlines the impression of Schumacher's party as wannabe nationalists more national than all others. Even the CDU had the borders of 1937 in their famous "It's ought to be the whole Germany" ("Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein").

[Yeahsayyeah]

Now the real mud throwing begins. The CDU is starting one last desperate attempt to capitalize on the "green pedophelia" thing, claiming Trittin's personal responsibility for a Green election platform for the Göttingen muncipal elections of 1981 that contained a passus advocating to punish only unconsensusal, violent sexual acts, which also implicits that 'consensual acts between adults and children' should be legal.

In my opinion, the funny thing is, that noone cared about the Green blurred positions towards the 1970s/1980s pedophelia groups and the appeal these positions had in parts of the homosexual movement, when that actually occured.

[Franknburger]

Wow, that SPD poster from 1949 claiming a "free Germany" in the borders of 1914 really hurts the eye. Underlines the impression of Schumacher's party as wannabe nationalists more national than all others. Even the CDU had the borders of 1937 in their famous "It's ought to be the whole Germany" ("Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein").

The 1937 borders wouldn't have East Prussia look like a fist. 

Optically, they are reaching out to the East, unlike the CDU, that was even giving up on Sweden:
 

[Yeahsayyeah]

It seems as if they wanted to reunite Dalmatia with Italy, though. Late reward for the staunch ally? ;-)

[Tender Branson]

Wow, that SPD poster from 1949 claiming a "free Germany" in the borders of 1914 really hurts the eye. Underlines the impression of Schumacher's party as wannabe nationalists more national than all others. Even the CDU had the borders of 1937 in their famous "It's ought to be the whole Germany" ("Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein").

The 1937 borders wouldn't have East Prussia look like a fist. 

Optically, they are reaching out to the East, unlike the CDU, that was even giving up on Sweden:
 

I have one too, also from 1949 just like the CDU one:

[Middle-aged Europe]

Now the real mud throwing begins. The CDU is starting one last desperate attempt to capitalize on the "green pedophelia" thing, claiming Trittin's personal responsibility for a Green election platform for the Göttingen muncipal elections of 1981 that contained a passus advocating to punish only unconsensusal, violent sexual acts, which also implicits that 'consensual acts between adults and children' should be legal.

In my opinion, the funny thing is, that noone cared about the Green blurred positions towards the 1970s/1980s pedophelia groups and the appeal these positions had in parts of the homosexual movement, when that actually occured.

This really is the Greens' worst campaign since at least 1998. The Greens could get a result just like in 1998 too (6.7%).

[ERvND]

Underlines the impression of Schumacher's party as wannabe nationalists more national than all others. Even the CDU had the borders of 1937 in their famous "It's ought to be the whole Germany" ("Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein").

Why "wannabe"? In these days, the SPD was really more nationalistic than the CDU, by far.

Things can change. Sometimes, they do.

[RogueBeaver]

Could Merkel be too boring? I disagree with this premise.

[Beet]

Could Merkel be too boring? I disagree with this premise.

What's wrong with boring?
I don't know much about German politics, but I do know about Merkel's leadership during the Euro crisis, and it has been quite good, particularly from the German perspective.

[You kip if you want to...]

Could Merkel be too boring? I disagree with this premise.

What's wrong with boring?
I don't know much about German politics, but I do know about Merkel's leadership during the Euro crisis, and it has been quite good, particularly from the German perspective.

Boring's easily spun as competent, calm and clever if you're a good politician, which Merkel obviously is.

[Franknburger]

Could Merkel be too boring? I disagree with this premise.

What's wrong with boring?
I don't know much about German politics, but I do know about Merkel's leadership during the Euro crisis, and it has been quite good, particularly from the German perspective.

Actually, it hasn't (though I doubt another government would have done much better). Essentially, the approach was like "You are autonomous states, we don't get involved in your internal affairs, we define certain conditions for lending, while you decide how to achieve them". That approach is fair and has worked in certain cases, such as Ireland, probably also Spain, where the crisis was mostly caused by problems in the financial system.

Greece, however, suffers from substantial governance problems: Inefficient and overstaffed public sector, substantial corruption and nepotism, low tax morale and collection, etc. These problems were recognised, discussed publicly, but hardly reflected in the assistance packages. I don't know enough about Greek domestic policies for a statement whether there is sufficient willingness for substantial reform, but it has become pretty obvious that they decided for the seemingly quick and easy way, namely cutting public spending outside the state apparatus (instead of internal reform), and developing new revenue sources, without closing possibilities for evasion, especially through corruption. Turns out that this way was neither quick nor easy, but has triggered a downward spiral of decreasing consumption and tax revenue, leading into the next spending cut.
A few weeks ago, Finance Minister Schäuble accidentally disclosed that after 2014 most likely another, third support package for Greece will be needed. Most likely, this time it will not only be guarantees, plus bond purchase by the European Central Bank (in which Germany holds around 30% share),but substantial money transfer at the expense of the German taxpayer (guess why the Euro-sceptic AfD is gradually rising in the polls).

Alternatives? The EU, as well as Germany, did not shy away from demanding substantial structural reforms, and providing related technical assistance to Central European applicant countries. Linke leader Gysi, e.g., asked in the "smaller parties" TV debate why Germany did not offer Greece assistance in building up a functioning land cadastre and land tax collection system. [The company I am working for has successfully implemented such systems in several countries, including Georgia, the Philippines and some Latin American countries, and is currently assisting Bosnia-Herzegovina.]   Privatisation has only progressed slowly, and so far only included the easy deals (Telecom, state lottery etc.). If the German taxpayer will anyway have to shoulder part of Greece's debt, why not take over some of the more problematic assets  (there are, e.g., something like thirty state-owned airports in Greece), even at an elevated price, restructure and sell them out?

Essentially, there are standard practices how to deal with structural, governance-related problems, that are well known to all actors in the development community, from the World Bank to the EU and German actors such as the KfW development bank. Unfortunately, however, finance instead of development experts took the lead on the Greek case, and looked at it as a kind of underfinanced bank, instead of a candidate for structural reform.

[minionofmidas]

You can imagine his shock when the black-yellow coalition took the first U-turn on nuclear energy.

It's not as if they'd been secretive about those plans.