Are you a compatibilist or an incompatibilist?

[Okay, maybe Mike Johnson is a competent parliamentarian.]

Essentially, a compatibilist believes that some form of determinism and some form of free will are, well, compatible (belief in a God Who has foreknowledge of one's decisions but doesn't directly compel one to make them helps with this, although there are atheist compatibilists as well), whereas an incompatibilist (who might be either a determinist or a libertarian) does not believe this.

Personally, I'm a compatibilist, leaning towards Molinism, although I don't understand that specific position quite well enough to formally adopt it.

[DC Al Fine]

By definition, Reformed Protestants are compatibilists.

I think the vast majority of Christians (except maybe the red letter folks?) ought to be compatibilist to to be intellectually consistent. Obviously we believe in free will, but there's too much predestination talk in Paul (and even a little in the Old Testament come to think of it) to hand wave away some sort of determinism.

[Lechasseur]

Compatibilist

[TJ in Oregon]

Incompatibilist/Libertarian

[°Leprechaun]

I don't know, but I would say that we are condemned to be free, but I don't know if that's such a good thing or not.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Compatibilist. Molinism is not really relevant to my own thinking of this since the nature of the contradiction we're trying to reconcile is slightly different (while I admit to the possibility of an omniscient personal God, mere possibility is not enough to build a philosophical framework around it). It does strike me as a very elegant formulation for the purposes of Christian theology, though.

For me, the two propositions that need to be reconciled are the following:
- The laws of causality are universal and admit no exception.
- Individuals ought to be held (and hold themselves) accountable for their actions.

These are both postulates that can't be renounced, since our entire understanding of the world and ourselves is based on them. Without the former, there can be no hope of understanding material reality to even the roughest degree (this is why the radical interpretations of quantum physics that keep popping around in vulgarizing world have always struck me as dangerous nonsense, even before I got conformation that physicists themselves have long backed down from them). Even one exception to the mechanic of cause and effect is enough to unravel the entire fabric of reality. If a person's action is not determined, if it's an "unmoved mover" floating around in an otherwise causal universe, then what do we make of all the consequences of this action? How does this one non-caused event interact with all the other events that we know to be determined? Soon enough, by virtue of the butterfly effect, this means that nothing happening in the world can be made sense of by linking cause and consequence. In other words, nothing about the world is actually worth saying beyond "stuff happens". One is tempted to say that abstract natural laws can be salvaged, but abstract natural laws, by their very workings, are supposed to apply universally, meaning that they should have a direct impact even on human actions so that, if we knew the implications of those laws perfectly, we would be able to predict everything. To create an exemption for human actions means downgrading these laws to mere guidelines, with the same outcome.

The second proposition is just as important, but for different reasons. The traditional spin on it is typically something to the effect of "well, if we truly believed in determinism, we really shouldn't punish criminals, since it's not really their fault." However, that's actually not my issue with it. Determinism only undermines the existence of a justice system if its purpose is intended as retributive - ie, if its purpose is to punish. In this case, yes, punishing people for something they had no true means to avoid seems unjust. However, the deterrent and rehabilitative purposes of justice make perfect sense in a deterministic world - in fact, their logic itself is predicated on determinism. A deterrent view of justice requires a belief that knowledge of the sanction incurred will causally affect a would-be criminal's behavior, while rehabilitative justice requires a belief that the sanction itself will causally affect the criminal's future behavior.

So, if determinism doesn't lead us to lawlessness, what exactly is the problem with it? Well, the problem is not in our relationship to others, but in our relationship to ourselves. Fully accepting determinism means renouncing to our own free will, which in turn can lead us to let ourselves off the hook for anything we do or fail to do: what is the point of feeling guilt, shame, remorse, or even pride for our actions? It's not like we truly had a choice. And therefore, why even bother do anything, especially something that seems to require effort? It's easy to imagine this train of thought leading one down the path to nihilism. This is probably why the purest anti-deterministic philosophy, existentialism, arose in the middle of one of the darkest times in human history: because this time, more than any other, was a time where people needed to actively challenge the world they lived in, rebel against it and overturn it. Radical freedom might not hold up to scrutiny, but, unlike determinism, it can convince people to pick up a rifle and join a resistance movement.

So, we have one proposition that is logically necessary for us to be able to say anything reasonable about the universe, and another that is morally necessary to motivate us to action. What do we make of them? The easy answer is to interpret the second proposition as a Platonic "noble lie" - something false that we choose to believe because it stirs society in the right direction. While I think there is value to this approach, I think there is a slightly stronger case to be made in favor of free will. It goes as follows. First, our will (that is, the force that drives our "free" actions) is part of the same broader system that determines our ability to understand cause and effect: both are the product of thoughts (whether conscious or unconscious). From this, it follows that in order to understand how our will is determined, we need to fully understand our own thoughts. However, since understanding = thinking, our understanding of our own thoughts itself generates new thoughts that, in turn, have a causal impact on our will. This is why we have psychologists to help us figure out why we have certain behaviors or tendency: because once with understanding comes the power to change our behavior.

However, the new thoughts generated by this gained awareness are not, themselves, part of this awareness. Even if I somehow manage to perfectly understand how my t-1 self to the point that I could have predicted exactly how that t-1 self would have acted in any situation, this knowledge has transformed me in such a way that I still can't predict how my t self would act now. This is a fundamental, ontological barrier that can never be overcome. Even if we found a way to augment our intelligence to levels unfathomable today, it would not change. From this it follows that from my own perspective, I do have free will in the sense that I can never deterministically predict my own behavior. This might be cold comfort, since it doesn't mean that someone else can't predict my behavior and use it to manipulate me like a puppet. Still, that possibility is remote enough that I doubt most people would let it dictate their actions, just like most people don't buy into the idea of the Basilisk AI.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

The trouble with compatibilism with respect to religion is that while it reconciles free will and the omniscience usually attributed to the Divine, it ignores the effect of omnipotence and omnibenevolence on free will. If the Divine uses the three omnis to ensure the best of all possible worlds, does free will still have meaning?

For example, suppose the Divine were to use its abilities to choose between two possible realities, the one we exist in and another in which Simon betrays Jesus to the Romans and Judas Peter is the rock upon which the Church is built. Does that mean that either Judas or Simon have the requisite free will to be justly condemned or exalted by the Divine?

Compatibilism only works as a belief system religiously if the Divine is constrained to choosing between a set of possibilities that does not alter our essential nature's. Thus the Divine could have chosen to have an Andrew Peter instead of a Simon Peter, but never a Judas Peter.

[TJ in Oregon]

For me, the two propositions that need to be reconciled are the following:
- The laws of causality are universal and admit no exception.
- Individuals ought to be held (and hold themselves) accountable for their actions.

I think these two statements can be reconciled without two much trouble under each of the three main views here: (incompatibilist) determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism.

A determinist could still believe that holding individuals accountable leads to a variety of social benefits, albeit without the possibility of retributive justice (which IMO is a rather desiccated view of justice, but by no means logically impossible to hold).

A compatibilist would accept individual 'free will' in some sense to preserve the latter. I would say, though, that free will without the real power to have chosen something different isn't really free will IMO. I think this definition of free will more or less precludes compatibilism outright, or at the very least requires a stripped-down notion of determinism that isn't what most people would probably understand by the word.

I reconcile them with the view that the material universe does not have causal closure and that there exists an immaterial human mind. This obviously requires denial of materialism, although I think it very hard to really hold to materialism and believe in free will as the ability to have made a different choice. I think our experience of free will is itself a reason to deny materialism, but that there are better reasons such as the existence of intentionality that are harder for the materialist to defend, so free will is perhaps not an argument I think about as much as some others.

[TJ in Oregon]

By definition, Reformed Protestants are compatibilists.

I think the vast majority of Christians (except maybe the red letter folks?) ought to be compatibilist to to be intellectually consistent. Obviously we believe in free will, but there's too much predestination talk in Paul (and even a little in the Old Testament come to think of it) to hand wave away some sort of determinism.

IMO compatibilism is self-contradictory given a definition of free will as the real ability to choose to do otherwise, and determinism as the position that all events are externally caused. That God determines some things without regard to human agency doesn't imply that he decides all things without regard to human agency. I mean, the Bible also refers to choices in various places too, which seemingly eliminates determinism, at least the definition of it I gave.

[Antonio the Sixth]

A determinist could still believe that holding individuals accountable leads to a variety of social benefits, albeit without the possibility of retributive justice (which IMO is a rather desiccated view of justice, but by no means logically impossible to hold).

If you read further in my post (which I don't blame you for not reading in full, it is a pretty ridiculous wall of text tbh ), you'll find that I conceded everything you say here and explained that I was going for something different with that statement.

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The problem with these discussions is that they very often end up revolving around semantics. I don't think "the power to have chosen something different" is a notion that makes philosophical sense, since the only coherent definitions of the concepts of "power" imply a relationship - you hold power over something meaning that your actions can affect what happens to that something. Now, if you define free will as "having power over oneself", all we end up doing is entering an infinite recursion, since, by definition, what I do affects myself. There is another way in which I have power over myself - that's the argument I develop at the end of my post - and it's that I can never see myself as being determined, and thus relative to the knowledge I have I always retain the ability to act in an indeterminate way.

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I'm an idealist myself, so no disagreement here. I don't think any of this is inconsistent with the existence of causality, though. Causality itself is after all a product of a priori knowledge, not something that can itself be deduced empirically (since deduction itself requires an understanding of causality).

[DC Al Fine]

By definition, Reformed Protestants are compatibilists.

I think the vast majority of Christians (except maybe the red letter folks?) ought to be compatibilist to to be intellectually consistent. Obviously we believe in free will, but there's too much predestination talk in Paul (and even a little in the Old Testament come to think of it) to hand wave away some sort of determinism.

IMO compatibilism is self-contradictory given a definition of free will as the real ability to choose to do otherwise, and determinism as the position that all events are externally caused. That God determines some things without regard to human agency doesn't imply that he decides all things without regard to human agency. I mean, the Bible also refers to choices in various places too, which seemingly eliminates determinism, at least the definition of it I gave.

I'm not sure I follow your position. My reading is that you are asserting:

1) God predestines some things to happen in the realm of human decision making (that is, beyond merely predestining things to happen to humanity)
2) People have free will
3) Predestination/determinism and free will are mutually exclusive

It seems like you can only have any two of those options but not all three. What am I missing?

[TJ in Oregon]

By definition, Reformed Protestants are compatibilists.

I think the vast majority of Christians (except maybe the red letter folks?) ought to be compatibilist to to be intellectually consistent. Obviously we believe in free will, but there's too much predestination talk in Paul (and even a little in the Old Testament come to think of it) to hand wave away some sort of determinism.

IMO compatibilism is self-contradictory given a definition of free will as the real ability to choose to do otherwise, and determinism as the position that all events are externally caused. That God determines some things without regard to human agency doesn't imply that he decides all things without regard to human agency. I mean, the Bible also refers to choices in various places too, which seemingly eliminates determinism, at least the definition of it I gave.

I'm not sure I follow your position. My reading is that you are asserting:

1) God predestines some things to happen in the realm of human decision making (that is, beyond merely predestining things to happen to humanity)
2) People have free will
3) Predestination/determinism and free will are mutually exclusive

It seems like you can only have any two of those options but not all three. What am I missing?

Point (1) isn't determinism. Determinism would be: "God predestines all things to happen in the realm of human decision making". These three statements can all be consistent if one holds that not all human decision making is free, but some (most?) is.

[TJ in Oregon]

A determinist could still believe that holding individuals accountable leads to a variety of social benefits, albeit without the possibility of retributive justice (which IMO is a rather desiccated view of justice, but by no means logically impossible to hold).

If you read further in my post (which I don't blame you for not reading in full, it is a pretty ridiculous wall of text tbh ), you'll find that I conceded everything you say here and explained that I was going for something different with that statement.

I actually did read it! I just forgot what exactly I was responding to by the time I typed that (I had originally written the last part of my first and then added the sections above, by that point forgetting we're in agreement anyway).

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The problem with these discussions is that they very often end up revolving around semantics. I don't think "the power to have chosen something different" is a notion that makes philosophical sense, since the only coherent definitions of the concepts of "power" imply a relationship - you hold power over something meaning that your actions can affect what happens to that something. [/quote]

I don't see why having the power over something means I cannot have chosen to do something different. For instance, I set my water bottle down to the right of my computer when typing this. I could have also chosen to set it down to the left of my computer. That seems, to be anyway, to be coherent.

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Here, we can avoid an infinite recursion by pointing out that this process requires acting in time. For example, I have the power over my arm, but in order for the status of my arm to have changed me, I have to actually move it, or else suspend it against resistance, etc. I think that brain states and thought likely have a similar relationship. Yes, thinking changes yourself, but in order to actually change yourself, some amount of physical change has taken place within your brain.

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I'm an idealist myself, so no disagreement here. I don't think any of this is inconsistent with the existence of causality, though. Causality itself is after all a product of a priori knowledge, not something that can itself be deduced empirically (since deduction itself requires an understanding of causality).
[/quote]

I'm not arguing that it is inconsistent with causality, only that it is inconsistent with determinism.

[Farmlands]

Incompatibilist. I believe the course of the Universe is set, doesn't mean I know what it is or that I can't enjoy the time I have to wonder about it.