Chile Constitutional Referendum, October 25th 2020

[Lumine]

We have our first polls (Cadem and Activa Research). It's fairly safe to asume there will be an overwhelming triumph for the YES side (perhaps even like in the 1989 Constitutional Reform Referendum, in which YES won with 91%), and I would be shocked if NO managed to obtain more than 25%.

Logic would dictate the 100% elected Constitutional Convention will also win easily, though it appears the Mixed alternative does have some degree of support. I'd bet for 65 to 70% in favor of the first option being the end result.

Cadem:

In General:

Do you support the political accord?
YES 67% / NO 28%

Presidential Approval:
17% / 77%

Referendum:

Should the Constitution be changed?
YES 82% / NO 16%

And via which mechanism?
Constitutional Convention 60% / Mixed Constitutional Convention 35%

Will you vote on the referendum?
YES 78% / NO 7%

Activa Research:

In General:
Will changing the Constitution help solve the crisis?
YES 65% / NO 15%

Do you support the political accord?
YES 58% / NO 15%

Presidential Approval:
10% / 85%

Referendum:

Should the Constitution be changed?
YES 81% / NO 8%

And via which mechanism?
Constitutional Convention 64% / Mixed Constitutional Convention 24%

Will you vote on the referendum?
YES 78% / NO 7%

[Lumine]

I was hoping for a shorter timetable. 5 months might be too long to sustain the popular mobilization necessary to make this a true watershed in Chilean history. And another 7 months after that to actually elect the constituent assembly puts us in completely uncharted territory. I hope I'm wrong, but I'd feel a lot better if the constituent assembly was set to be elected, say, in February or March. There's the real possibility of it ending up like Iceland's constitutional debacle a decade ago.

Still, I don't want to be a killjoy. That this is even being seriously considered is fantastic news and would have been unhoped for even a month ago.

The Electoral Service needs time to conduct a proper process and the Constitution itself must be amended via Congress in order to have an actual binding referendum, hence the delay. Although a YES victory appears the more than obvious outcome, there still needs to be a serious campaign and a proper environment to conduct the referendum without violence (and to ensure a 100% legitimate and transparent result), so if anything it is the responsible choice. Plus, it may (emphasis in may) allow for the political climate to be just a bit less poisonous than it is right now, which wouldn't be a bad thing.

I do agree that the elections for delegates have been pushed back too far, and that will probably turn out to be a mistake. Reasonable as the accord is, it would have made far more sense to hold them earlier indeed.

[Lumine]

Piñera has seen a curious increase in approval ratings, though Cadem (flawed and all) suggests it is mostly center-right and right voters coming back for the time being (some self-described "centrists" as well, but not many). It's obviously difficult to predict what comes next and whether he'll end up in single digits again (certainly not impossible), though it's fair to say he's not ever becoming reasonably popular again (or climbing above 35%) barring some sort of miracle.

One would expect the center-right to be headed towards electoral oblivion worse than 2013 simply by accounting for what took place since October, but tellingly enough the opposition has been remarkably unsuccessful in capitalizing from the government's glaring mistakes. Not only are they still way too divided (and in petty ways too) amongst each other and within their parties, their approval ratings are also mediocre. Not to mention that there's a glaring lack of presidential candidates at the moment which are both credible and popular, and to their credit Chile Vamos does seem to have a larger, more capable presidential bench.

So, amazingly enough, the Chilean right can't quite be counted out yet, though I don't think they'll actually be able to win barring the opposition really screwing it up (and badly).

Gun to my head I'd say the left will eventually find a semi-competent presidential candidate (probably not someone currently in elected office), he/she will take off in the polls, and they'll eventually prevail by reuniting in the second round against the eventual CV nominee in a fairly convincing victory. Or, alternatively, we will get a godawful vaguely (or strongly) left-wing populist that will sweep the elections in an insurgent wave or something of the sort.

[Lumine]

Juaquin Lavin, main presidential hopeful of the right, however, is full for Approve, because he doesn't want anything to do with the sinking ship that is "Reject the new constitution".

And here I was hoping for someone who isn't a washed-up apparatchik from twenty years ago -_- Chile seems to be getting to a Peru level of politicians refusing to stop running for President (wasn't Piñera supposed to run in 1989 before he got hit with some scandal?)

Indeed, there's a reluctance on behalf of a select group (mostly former Presidents) to stop running, which in turn prevents some of the younger, fresher alternatives from taking a shot. It's greatly reinforced due to the lack of immediate reelection, pushing former Presidents to run again later on (with several successful 20th century precedents), and perhaps by the acceptance of the idea that it's proper for a candidate to have more than one shot (Allende, after all, failed three times before his 1970 victory).

In the current context, one can single out pretty much the entire set of living Presidents/former Presidents (Frei, Lagos, Piñera and Bachelet), and a couple of failed challengers (including Lavin).

Post-1990 ranking:

Sebastian Piñera: Ran 5 times
1993: Aborted run due to "Piñeragate".
1999-2000: Aborted run due to lack of support against Lavin.
2005-2006: Defeats Lavin on 1st round to become center-right candidate, defeated by Bachelet on 2nd round.
2009-2010: Defeats Frei on 2nd round, becomes President.
2017: Defeats Guiller on 2nd round, becomes President.

Ricardo Lagos: Ran 4 times, almost 5.
1989: Aborted run due to lack of support against Aylwin.
1993: Defeated on national primary against Frei.
1999-2000: Defeats Lavin on 2nd round, becomes President.
2009-2010: Toys with a run until the last minute (which in turn derails other candidates), does not run.
2017: Run collapses after PS nominates Guiller.

Eduardo Frei: Ran 4 times.
1989: Internal run unsuccessful against Aylwin.
1993: Defeats Alessandri on 1st round, becomes President.
2005-2006: Internal run unsuccessful due to lack of support.
2009-2010: Defeated by Piñera on 2nd round.

Marco-Enriquez Ominami: Ran 3 times.
2009-2010: Comes third on 1st round (20%).
2013: Comes third on 1st round (10%).
2017: Comes sixth on 1st round (5%).

Michelle Bachelet: Ran 2 times.
2005-2006: Defeats Piñera on 2nd round, becomes President.
2013: Defeats Matthei on 2nd round, becomes President.

Joaquin Lavin: Ran 2 times.
1999-2000: Defeated on 2nd round by Lagos.
2005-2006: Comes third on 1st round (23%).

Tomás Hirsch: Ran 2 times.
1999-2000: Comes fourth on 1st round (0,5%).
2005-2006: Comes fourth on 1st round (5%).

If Bachelet keeps her word not to run again - which I was cynical towards, but it seems she won't run after all -, most of the usual suspects would be removed from the board for good due to age or unpopularity, though several 2017 candidates and precandidates are extremely likely to try again for the second time (J. A. Kast, F. Kast, Ossandón, Beatriz Sánchez).

[Lumine]

Why would she run again? She has a better thing to do at the ONU and I don't think she has much interest in saving the parties that were so unloyal to her in the first place. Besides, she may govern as a moderate because she understands how to get the things done

Probably because she's the obvious road to something resembling a "unity candidacy" from the left, the sheer insistence of her allies, and the potential to enact her unsuccessful reforms left over from the 2nd term, which I though might - just might -outweight other concerns.

As things are right now, I do agree that she doesn't seem to have personal incentives to run (it's not like she enjoyed that 2nd term) and the other reasons won't sway her, which is on the whole best for her personally and - in my opinion - for the country as well. I'm beyond sick of the whole concept of switching Piñera and Bachelet around every four years, and it wouldn't hurt to have someone else - ideally a skilled politician and not some sort of technocrat, populist or raving ideologue - running the show.

but if push comes to shove I don't doubt for a second she would very happily vote for and support Jadue, so there won't be any desperate "stop the commie" run.

Why would anyone doubt she'd vote for or support Jadue? Seems obvious to me she would (and if anyone's suggesting she'd present herself as a stop Jadue candidate, they're delusional).

I do wonder what will happen if PS+PPD+PR prove unable to stop Jadue from taking off, which is a distinct possibility in light of the alternatives (Montes and Muñoz are capable men, but they don't strike me as having much electoral potential / Vidal is almost a cartoon of a partisan hack). I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if they proved unable to come up with a viable candidate, and were left behind for good at the 1st round with whoever they run.

The whole "the communist can't win" concept is overrated and people will make a serious mistake if they assume Lavin v. Jadue is an automatic victory for the right, but it is interesting to wonder whether the supposed center-left resistance to a Jadue candidacy will be real (and result in significant numbers of people voting Lavin even if they don't admit it), or more of a theatrical performance on behalf of the self-described "social democrat" world (which seems increasingly conscious of itself), mostly to avoid blame for any given outcome.

[Lumine]

Not the first time Lavin chooses an odd term to reinvent himself (he did it in 2007 by expressing support for Bachelet, infamously self-describing as "Bacheletista-Alliancista"), and I suspect it won't be the last.

It is an interesting blunder though, in the sense that it's widely percieved as a step too far in terms of his colleagues (and which indeed has drawn up this new challenge from Matthei) and it's just a silly thing to do because he not only needs to appeal to the center, he needs to keep the center-right base on board; but it may not really have an impact in the polls. It will be interesting to see if the voters he's appealing to thus far actually disbelieve him or whether they don't mind it.

All in all, a self-inflicted wound as it will make it harder for Lavin to win a primary, and because it provides José Antonio Kast with substantial ammunition to expand the Partido Republicano vote at UDI's expense.

[Lumine]

Leftist voters overall put themselves at a 3 in a 1-10 left-right scale. More interesting is that they see the Socialist Party (PS) at 3,2 as more leftist than every Broad Front (FA) party, despite that the Broad Front clearly markets itself as more leftwing than the traditional parties. This is curious but is actually consistent with previous polls dating back to 2013 and 2009. I mean, I get that people mostly blame the Christian Democracy as the cause of the Concertación not being leftist enough (The DC is absolutely loathed BTW, 2.9 in a 1-7 scale of approval and 5.9 in the left-right scale), but is not like the PS itself has any shortage of Third-Way technocrats within its ranks.

It is indeed a curious result, but I think I can see why it happens. The PS has this long post-1990 history of moderating itself while in power, whilst being more radical and positively aggressive in opposition - particularly in rhetorical terms, and in my opinion to the point of irresponsibility -, so it's not surprising some people could percieve them as more determined than the Broad Front in light of its internal division, missteps and u-turns. Plus the Broad Front has moderated itself somewhat after losing some of their most radical characters, particularly the Humanists.

[Lumine]

At the rate things are shaping up I rather doubt they'll be able to stop Jadue in a primary ("they" meaning, in this case, most of the PDC and the leadership of the Convergencia Progresista parties), which lends weight to a potential scenario in which at least one "center-left" candidate makes a separate run for the first round as opposed to broad, unitary primaries (particularly after Jadue's comments concerning the final platform for the candidate being based on the platform of the winner, which really didn't go down well).

In the end I suspect the opposition will be able to sign quite a few pacts and slowly improve their lack of election cooperation, but it wouldn't be surprising in the least if they damage themselves by not going to a large primary and fighting the first round with several candidates.

As to Chile Vamos, it really is shaping up to be a Lavin v. Matthei primary fight with J. A. Kast watching from outside to try and (unsuccessfully) take on the victor on the first round. Not impossible PRI and Evopoli end up fielding primary candidates of their own and there's still some would-be candidates left in RN (Ossandón, Chahuán, etc.), but the first two seem very likely to be the truly competitive candidates in the primary. Lavin is certainly doubling down on his rhetorical strategy to appeal to non-partisan voters and he's already open up a major flank after the "social-democrat" debacle, so he's certainly vulnerable against Matthei.

It's weird though. It's almost a year since the events of October and, even though the right should be dead in the water in electoral terms due to Piñera dragging it down to hell, the whole thing still feels like it could be competitive (even winnable in a scenario of left-wing division and a damaged Jadue as the final opposition candidate). I suppose we'll see how much truth there is in that and whether Chile Vamos can preserve at least a third of the vote in the upcoming contests to serve as a base, but it would really be a testament to incompetence if the Chilean left managed to blow the presidential election.

[Lumine]

Both campaigns are certainly doing an excellent work of persuading people to vote for the other option. Still, even if the "Approve" ads are cringy as hell (at times inappropiate as well), the "Reject" campaign isn't even attempting to put forward a semi-coherent argument. Increasingly confident I'm not going to regret voting "Approve" next month.

We also have two new (hopeless) presidential candidates: former Minister Alberto Undurraga (PDC), who will spearhead a pointless attempt at becoming the Christian Democrat nominee, and Senator Francisco Chahuán (RN), who is probably one of the politicians you can tell the most is desperate to be President. Chahuán may actually manage to wrestle the RN nomination for the primaries if Senator Ossandón - at this point the last credible party candidate standing - is unable to run, but he'll get nowhere.

[Lumine]

-RN president, Mario Desbordes, is facing an internal challenge from old guard Carlos Larraín, which could end in an anticipated internal election this year. Larraín says that Desbordes has taken RN too far to the left and is dismayed at how "someone so pinochetist like him could want to change the constitution" (Desbordes is personally for Approve). I'm not an expert in the Right internal factions (Lumine could help here) but It appears to me that RN is divided between a "social right" factions (which is more economically populist and slightly more moderate socially) and a hardline conservative faction which is indistinguishable from UDI (Well, RN and UDI are separate parties in the first place due to petty internal infighting from the '80s but that's another story)

RN is a really weird party to describe in ideological terms, even after many of the smaller factions - particularly the economically and socially liberal wing - were purged or left during the last few years. I think that's a fair assessment though, both wings are for the most part socially conservative, but the "social right" (the term "Social Christian" is also used, which has historical precedents) are indeed substantially more populist and open to a more "statist" and less laissez faire - for lack of another term - approach, as well as in favor of the constituent process.

Personality does play a critical factor there though, it's not just a straightforward fight of ideals. RN has always suffered from having too many prominent personalities perfectly willing to tear each other to pieces in public and then craft temporary alliances to take on someone else (unlike, say, the usually firm discipline of UDI, which has only broken down in recent years). And indeed, Desbordes v. Larrain (the sequel to Desbordes v. Allamand) is a good example of that.

[Lumine]

We also have two new (hopeless) presidential candidates: former Minister Alberto Undurraga (PDC), who will spearhead a pointless attempt at becoming the Christian Democrat nominee, and Senator Francisco Chahuán (RN), who is probably one of the politicians you can tell the most is desperate to be President. Chahuán may actually manage to wrestle the RN nomination for the primaries if Senator Ossandón - at this point the last credible party candidate standing - is unable to run, but he'll get nowhere.

The title of most desperate to be president belongs to Jorge Tarud (PPD), which said in 2018! that he was open to run.

Also, Undurraga belongs to the conservative wing of the DC, so it could end up facing Ximena Rincon in an internal which at least could be interesting in showing the strength of the two souls of the party, especially given that many conservatives like Mariana Aylwin and Soledad Alvear have left the party. Or if the division even exists anymore because Goic used to be on the leftist faction and infamously ended up leading the DC al camino propio.

Oddly enough, I'd actually give the title to Máximo Pacheco, who's also been trying since then. Tarud at least can claim some degree of visibility - at least due to his mandatory comments whenever Boliva does something annoying -, whereas Pacheco was about as far away as possible from being a "candidate" with popular or even partisan support. It was actually said reading about him trying to tour the country to try and raise his still nonexistent profile.

[Lumine]

Right, quite a few things to address:

It's also pretty funny to see Evópoli, a party I'd expect to be full of muh liberal anti-populist technocracy types literally start their ads with "la política es una mierda" lol.

But then my expectations were probably wrong. I'm increasingly confused by the structure of Chilean right - I always assumed that there are starker differences between the two main parties. I thought that RN is a "standard Western conservative party", if quite a bit more right-wing than usual, and UDI is a weird combination of semi-open Pinochetistas and "hello fellow working class weones" people - to use an extremely silly comparision, RN = Romney and UDI = Trump.

Could you explain what are the dividing lines between them?

Evópoli tries, but there's a tendency to try to come up with slogans or powerful phrases that don't hit the mark or are cringe-worthy (that being an excellent example of it). It's original use was actually effective - the context being a campaign to recruit potential candidates who, while having a strong social work background, weren't actively into politics -, but when put in context of the campaign to get a Constituent Assembly which includes sitting members of Congress it clearly ends up being just silly.

As to the Chilean right, it's really difficult to explain because the sector itself has often been unable to understand its own history, let alone express it in coherent terms. The crux of the problem is that the Chilean right has multiple wings and far more diversity than it is generally believed (the difference being that, unlike the left, the right doesn't create a new party every five seconds, it prefers larger parties), and because that diversity entails points of view that are often contradictory, the right is forced to focus on a handful of points in which there's some degree of agreement. To name a few, the Chilean right contains, among others, liberals, conservatives, nationalists and social christians.

This, in turn, dilutes the political and ideological diversity, which is tragically mixed with the fact that the two democratically elected center-right Presidents of the last 60 years (Jorge Alessandri and Sebastian Piñera) were/are technocrats who, while politically inflexible in many aspects, are not truly ideological people at heart (with a clear cut political vision of their own), they're technocrats. Many diverse elements in the Chilean right before 1973 were marginalized or made bids for political control which failed, leading to their departure (the original Christian Democrats, after all, came from the Conservative Party youth), and after 1988 the right had to focus on the few things that appeared to "unite" the sector: free market principles, a defence of Pinochet's legacy (which is still a thing in UDI, some RN conservatives and particularly in J. A. Kast's new party), and so on.

The last decade has seen the revival of some of that ideological diversity both in terms of party factions and in new parties themselves (Partido Republicano, Evópoli, the defunct Amplitud, the PRI as a new ally of the right, some of the groups from Christian Democrat dissidents, etc.), which can make it hard to describe what the right ultimately stands for because it's becoming difficult to find a single principle every single party and factor adheres to. That's one challenge the sector will have to address, because even if they've proven capable to win elections within a specific set of circumstances, it's ultimately pointless if there isn't a political vision with which to govern the country (as Piñera has clearly shown, technocracy should no longer do).

But in general terms:

PRI: PRI is a strange party in that it originated as a Christian Democrat splinter, which has gravitated into a center to center-right point of view. The party explicitly champions regionalism and decentralization, appears to be relatively social conservative, as is clearly more into economic populism. You could describe it as "social christian" (believing in conservative "Christian values" and into populism).

EVÓPOLI: Evópoli was explicitly founded as a liberal party, both economically and socially liberal, and has for the most part attempted to adopt that point of view. However, it is also undeniable that the party base somehow ended up being more conservative - or having a large conservative factor - than the original founders intended, leading to frustrating moments like the defection of a Senator because she was too socially conservative or the party having to ditch a formal "Approve" position in favor of neutrality (which annoyed me greatly, as many of us were convinced the party had a duty to make a stand). You can still rely on Evópoli to defend a liberal point of view, but from an increasingly orthodox position as opposed to the more innovative and centrist spirit from the early years.

RN: RN is a messy combination of personalities and factions, which have nonetheless evolved. Originally it was conservatives v. liberals (which disagreed on values, not economics), until the liberals were mostly purged or left to form the short-lived Amplitud. Then the social christians reorganized themselves and created a strong faction, shifting the axis into a struggle between social christians (economically populist, and reformists) and traditional conservatives (economically liberal, and against the constituent process), in which some isolated factions and individuals - including the few liberals left - take sides. Because of how politics have shifted, the social christians are percieved to me more "centrists", because the country itself has swung even more into an economic interventionist mindset.

UDI: UDI used to be clearly defined as Pro-Pinochet (which meant economically liberal), christian and conservative (in that order). The party attempted to pose as "populist" and had strong connections to some low income neighborhoods due to their social work during the 80's, but it was ultimately an orthodox, discipline and ideologically firm party, which gave them a decisive organzational edge against RN's permanent division. That discipline has been lost as the party was percieved to be moderating itself - in relative terms -, leading to J. A. Kast's departure and the founding of the Partido Republicano, particularly because some groups have adopted economic populism, and a dissident faction has embraced a more socially liberal point of view (Lavin). As things stand, you could define it as the more traditional conservative party, and while still strongly pro-Pinochet, you'll find dissidents willing to criticize him.

PLR: If a Romney would fit nicely in UDI or in RN's conservative faction, a Trump would probably fit in Kast's Republicanos very well. The Republicans are the caricature of UDI's extremism turned into an actual political party, which means they champion extreme social conservatism, economic liberalism, far-right points of view and, naturally, a predilection for culture war rhetoric (they've taken the inspiration on the GOP far enough to now be championing gun rights).

UDI being called semi-open Pinochetist is the understatement of the century. They literally have it in its principles declaration. Also, as I explained before, the right isn't really divided about Pinochet, in fact, Pinochet and the defence of human right abusers are probably one of the things that the two wings of RN mentioned above are united in. I guess EVOPOLI technically claims to be non-pinochetist but that never goes beyond lip service. There is the infamous presidential primary debate in 2013 when none of the candidates could get themselves to say the word "dictatorship".

Ok, Rant over, Lumine is the expert here, but your caricature isn't that far off from reality.

We'll have to agree to disagree. Despite the permanent caricature of the right as still clinging to Pinochet, the fact is it is an increasingly irrelevant factor (which was a steady development in the last few years), and has only appeared to be more prominent because of JAK and this far-right backlash against the belief the right was indeed moderating itself too much, particularly when it came to dealing Pinochet's dictatorship.

That's not to say a large part of the right is still bitterly pro-Pinochet and will be to the bitter end, but it's not a truly unifying factor for any of the parties (you'll find prominent people perfectly willing to denounce Pinochet in UDI and RN, though obviously not to the degree that would be ideal) minus the PLR. As to Evópoli, I haven't seen the party shying away from describing it as a "dictatorship" and being perfectly open about the crimes and abuses committed, so I would also dispute the "lip service" remark.

[Lumine]

We also have two new (hopeless) presidential candidates

Man, just to remember Tomas Jocelyn-Holt gives me goosebumps.

That's one (non-serious) vote I haven't regretted for a second.

[Lumine]

Not to interrupt too much (mostly trying to give further context), but the way our proportional electoral system is designed - and this, of course, was both fully intentional and a hilarious mistake of Nueva Mayoria in hindsight - leads to over-representation of whoever has the plurality, particularly if the other lists split the vote too much; which, as we all know, is combined with a new system which will reward the plurality for the gubernatorial elections, and which already hands over the mayoral election via FPTP.

There's certainly ideological merit in wanting to chart a specific course and wanting to avoid the Nueva Mayoria mistake of lacking an actual consensual blueprint for government, but going to a non-stop electoral process (in which all the current elected positions will be up for grabs in the course of a single year) splintered in several different lists - some of them littered with splinter parties or, at times, vanity projects - is only going to ensure overrepresentation of Chile Vamos, as it was pointed out.

If the Chilean left persists on competing separatedly they're only going to ensure that an increasing number of factors go against them, including: A. losing seats due to how the electoral system works, particularly at the constituent organism, B. losing perfectly winnable races for governor and mayor, C. having long-term trouble at coalescing their base at the second round of the presidential, which is exactly what happened in 2009 and 2017, and that's just to name a few.

I'm certainly pleased with this development and I get that a truly "unity" bloc is probably both unmanageable because of personal disputes - and I do think they're more personal than ideological in the end -, but if that mentality is allowed to at the same time sink the prospect of electoral unity, common primaries and the like, then the left will only make it easier for them to lose elections which, given the present context, should be winning easily due to significant advantages. Plus the time to do it is now, before events and deadlines take over and then they find it much more difficult to coordinate.

[Lumine]

Chile Vamos managed to close a deal at almost the last minute, there will be primaries in most - virtually all - of the municipalities in dispute.

The opposition talks collapsed, so there won't be broad primaries even for the gubernatorial elections, but it's unclear how bad it is (whether at least Unidad para el Cambio will be joining the ex-Nueva Mayoria or whether it's a complete collapse).

[Lumine]

Apparently it's worse than expected, quite a conflict of spin as representatives from different opposition parties accuse each other (by alleging what should be mutually incompatible vetoes) of blocking a deal or not wanting primaries in the first place. Particular anger placed against the Frente Amplio for being the first to formalize their separate list, leading to accussations that they left the table first (in turn, some of their representatives attack Convergencia Progresista as being the one who left the table).

I think there's a few hours left, so it will be interesting to see how many opposition lists will be in the end. If it ends up being at least three (or even four) the opposition is likely to lose a number of competitive races.

[Lumine]

Voted as well (Approve and Mixed Convention). It does seem participation has been higher than the past elections under voluntary voting, which should be a encouraging sign for "Approve". The actual margins will be very interesting to see.

[Lumine]

78% to 22% in the latest update, with 1,76% of the vote counted. It's early and it might narrow a bit more, but aye, pretty clear landslide for Approve and, interestingly, for the Constituent Convention too (it seems speculation that the result could be closer there was rather mistaken).

[Lumine]

Really curious as to the eventual turnout now. Perhaps 55-60%?

[Lumine]

Ironically Lavín is going to be greatly strengthened by this. Las Condes is way closer than it should be considering how right-wing it is.

It is certainly likely to be a vindication of sorts for his strategy in the eyes of Chile Vamos, and will probably strengthen those who also stood by Approve to a lesser degree. He'll always be vulnerable in a primary, but I have to think - and hope - that such a resounding defeat will showcase the folly of repeating the tone and content (if we can call it content) of the Reject campaign in the upcoming electoral contests.

[Lumine]

Now I see that Lo Barnechea is similarly close to Las Condes, so maybe is not his influence after all. Do you know why they are significantly closer than, say, Vitacura?.

Not really, I have to say the margin in Vitacura is still surprising. I'd consider it reasonable if Reject was upwards of 30%, but with such an enormous margin it is noteworthy that Vitacura - even with its current profile - would still go Reject that hard.

[Lumine]

Early voting might be a decent idea, though I rather hope we never go into electronic voting. Aside from not finding it reliable in the least, there's a certain charm in the process being both so transparent and also quick to deliver results.