🇩🇪 German elections (federal & EU level)

[Yeahsayyeah]

Extremely happy that SDP is going to win this. The Germans are making the right choice, punishing corrupt and elitarian boring politicians like Baerbock and Laschet, and going for someone competent, pragmatic and caring as Scholz. I certainly support SDP even if i didn't like them during most of my life.

Of course, corruption and elitarianism are totally unheard of in relation to Cum-ex-Olaf respectively Hartz-IV-Olaf...

Genosse Olaf is a means, not an end.

Yeah, probably. I took from Laki's words that he percieves him as an end.

[Yeahsayyeah]

GMS poll of Bavaria (changes from last election):

CSU 29 (-10)
Green 18 (+8)
SPD 15 (=)
FDP 13 (+3)
AfD 10 (-2)
FW 6 (+3)
SED 3 (-3)
Others 6 (+1)

I mean, what can you even say?

Free voters will get seats in the Bundestag with breaking 5% there or is it 5% on the federal level.

What is even their appeal between the CSU and AfD?

They would have to win 5% nationwide, or get at least 3 constituency seats. The first still seems more likely than the other. Originally, their appeal in Bavaria was "centre-right, but not the CSU". I think that still holds. Additionaly, like the FDP, they try to walk the fine line between "the anti-covid measures are wrong and overblown in several aspects" and "the virus is a hoax" as the AfD has basically decided to dive into full denialism over time.

[Yeahsayyeah]

BTW, a result like that in Bavaria (CSU under 30 and SPD/Greens splitting the centre-left vote in half) really could explode the size of the Bundestag because of compensation seats, as CSU probably still would win most of the direct seats.

[Yeahsayyeah]

If there were a centre of gravity for the AfD would it be Chemnitz or Cottbus?

I really don't know, what the concept is here, but they usually get their highest results in eastern and central Saxony, so it's obviously Freital... But jokes aside, the AfD is weaker in bigger cities than in villages and small towns and even in rust-beltish cities like Chemnitz or Cottbus, they are only the largest party with at most the fourth of the vote in a six-party-system. The significance of that sometimes gets massively overblown.

[Yeahsayyeah]

1. Saxony was an independent kingdom that was involved in a lot of wars, and this led to an insular and rebellious culture in the state. During the days of the German empire, there was a lot of resentment towards Prussia. This can still be seen today in the "we don't want Berlin telling us what to do" attitude.

Saxony was never independent, though from the 15th century on one the most important territories in the Holy Roman Empire. It only became a kingdom by Napoleon and a few years later it was basically shrunk in half by the demand of Prussia at the Vienna Congress, but kept as an entity for not letting Prussia become even more powerful, thus eventually solving the Brandenburg/Prussia-Saxony dualism as the main powers in central Germany, that was going on for several centuries. Of course, this fueled anti-prussian resentment, ans especially against Prussian domincance, in what was left, and which by a way, later became a stronger force on the political left at the time of the "Reichsgründung" 1866/1871. There was an electorally succesful left liberal Saxonian People's Party that was allied with the Social Democrats.

The anti-"Berlin", respectively, central-state-aversion for me seems to be a thing of the GDR era, that was a central state, where power and ressources were concentraded in the capital, and it is sometimes characterized as "Red Prussia", btw.

So there is clearly some federalist and exceptionalist mood in Saxony, that the CDU succesfully exploited 1990 onwards, trying to mimic the CSU in that regard.

But "rebellious" isn't the word, that comes in mind, when people think of "Saxonians", it's these folksy, a bit clumsy and slow-witted people obedient to autority, drinking coffee all the time and speaking in a strange dialect, that mostly sounds like wrongly pronounced standard German (In contrary, a case can be made, that Standard German is basically North Germans trying to speak the language of Martin Luther, but i disgress...)

I think the socio-economic factors are more important. Saxony has been an economic centre since the middle ages (Erzgebirge mining and mostly fertile soil), which led to a dense network of towns, capital accumulation and a huge base of socially free peasansts and workers as bases of industrialisation, which once again consolidated this status. So naturally, the social democrats were strong, and they were not solely concentrated in the big cities, but in all rural and small-town areas, that were affected by industrialisation. On the other hand, there were large swaths of handymen under pressure, of rural folks attached to their local church and gentry and an emerging bourgeoisie and quite reactionary elites. So, Saxony in the Empire era was always both, the "red kingdom", whre the SPD could win all but one districts in the Reichstag election in 1903, and the "model country of reaction", where the elites mantained their grip on the state politics and institutions with a mix of carrots and sticks, which probably formed the so-called Saxonian mentality, I spoke of above.

The case can be made, that the GDR cracked down the remnants fo the civil society social democratic structeres, if twelve years of Nazi rules had left anything, and used the implicit obedience that comes with authoritarian traditions. This probably explains, why Saxony is not a left wing stronghold, but it does not explain the Saxonian exceptionalism compared to the rest of East Germany. I think, it has to do with the relative economic decline during the GDR times, when this can't be said in the same way for the areas farther north where many new industries were built. So the desire to get the economic strength back and to get back to the good old days of glory, which the the CDU promised, was probably the biggest here, the political left was compromised the most and when the "blooming landscapes" did not come to pass, a part of the population look for answers and solutions farther right. Something one can often see thoughout Eastern Europe. Kurt Biedenkopf was popular as a person, that he got many more votes in the election for prime minister in the Landtag in 1990, than the CDU had seats. The SPD fielded Anke Fuchs. I still can't see how and why, maybe, because she was available...

And for everything that can be rightfully said about the state CDU embracing right wing currents, turning a blind eye to the right - which helped the abundant Nazi structures in Saxony to emerge, steering unwarranted Saxonian exceptionalism and paternalism, with Biedenkopf at the top, they were obviously better at governing than the other CDU state chapters in the East and for over a decade mostly scandal-free. This, of course, helped them to form the still fluid political landscape as the centrist people flock to them like the SPD formed Brandenburg's while the other three states became largely competitive.

2. During the Weimar period, the political left and right were constantly one-upping each other in extremism. While the SPD and KPD formed a government in 1923, they were promptly overthrown by a radicalized right-of-centre, and thereafter the SPD formed a weak coalition government with the DDP and DVP.

These "popular front" state governments in Saxony and Thuringia where overthrown by force by federal forces on the basis of a "federal execution". One can say, that the workers parties, especially the SPD, never fully recovered from that blow.

4. Saxony had both a large industrial base and also a large rural population. The conflict between the urban left and the conservative bourgeoisie was particularly nasty and heated (see #2 and #3).

The urban-rural dynamic is definitely something, that goes on, as Leipzig and Dresden and it's suburbs surely "westernize" in terms of political culture and the rural and rust belt areas don't do this that much, although generational turnover will probably also do something, there, at least in the mid-sized towns.

5. Refugees from Silesia could also play a role here after being expelled in WWII. Breslau, like Dresden, was also a very pro-Nazi city and it doesn't seem like a stretch to believe that people carried national conservative views and bitterness over the loss of their homeland with them westwards.

In East Germany, the number of 1945 refugees seems to correlate more with PDS votes. This makes sense, as the communists clearly saw these uprooted people, often treated badly by the native population, as a potential base, and in the long run many did find jobs created by the newly built-up industries. And a case can be made, that the open reactionary elements of the refugee population shifted westward between 1945 and the early fifties, when this was relatively easy.[/list]

[Yeahsayyeah]

It would be better to call parties by their proper name...

[Yeahsayyeah]

It would be better to call parties by their proper name...

What are you referring to?

The post above mine, where the poster is showing a habit, he or she seems all the time, that shows him or her living more than 30 years in the past.

[Yeahsayyeah]

It would be better to call parties by their proper name...

What are you referring to?

The post above mine, where the poster is showing a habit, he or she seems all the time, that shows him or her living more than 30 years in the past.

Now that someone has compared the LINKE to the SED, it is time for everyone's standard reminder that the CDU existed in the DDR, supported the SED government and was part of the non-democratic parliament, only became democratic in 1990, and was absorbed into the CDU of Germany - with all its former socialist personell and all it's party infrastructure.

And they got the "Democratic Peasants' Party", too. And the FDP got the "Liberal-Democratic Party of Germany" and the "National Democratic Party of Germany", for the sake of completeness, only. In fact, all of the CDU prime ministers in the East in 1990, despite the Westerner Biedenkopf were "Blockflöten" (recorders, as in: quite high-ranking members of the bloc parties of the SED-led "Antifascist democratic bloc"

[Yeahsayyeah]

Union: I'm going to predict they're locked out of Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, R-P, Saarland, Sachsen,  Sachsen-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thüringen. I presume Merkel still has some coattails in her seat. That leaves 6, a pretty low total.

The CDU most likely will not be locked out in Saxony of all places. And when they lose the Eichsfeld-based seat in northern Thuringia, probably hell freezes over. And I'd guess they will probably still "hold" Saxony-Anhalt except the two city-based seats Halle and Magdeburg

Grüne: Hardest to predict - beyond Berlin and Baden Wurttemberg it's tough as you're essentially predicting individual seats. 3 on the balance of probability, Sachsen seems the most likely given SPD dominance elsewhere.

The Dresden and Leipzig districts are almost impossible to predict with the ongoin dynamics, Leipzig II (south) could go to SPD, Linke, Greens (in no particular order) and even to the CDU in a fluke. Leipzig I (north) is either a CDU, SPD or even AfD as it is a strange mix of traditionally bourgeois inner-city areas, gentrified pre-WK II workling-class areas, ungetrified pre-WK II working-class areas, GDR era housing estates and incorporated suburbs. If I had to bet I would say Greens in the south and an SPD/CDU-nailbiter in the north. In Dresden, all bets are off.

For the Greens the Wendland constituency in Lower Saxony should be mentioned as a possibility. They seem to hold their numbers in the polls in Bavaria, so it seems possible they get some city districts, there. South Hesse? Postdam? Rostock? Their "problem" in winning seats is, that there is often a correlation between SPD strength and Green strength.

AfD: 2. Sachsen and Thüringen, relying on hearsay somewhat.

Saxony is almost a given, Thuringia, Lower Lusatia (South Brandenburg) and Western Pomerania with Merkel gone and the rust belt parts of Saxony-Anhalt clearly seem possibilities.

Die Linke: 1. Berlin seems a safe bet but Sachsen doesn't.

If you run a uniform swing model in certain combinations Rostock seems to be a possibility, as the Left's Dietmar Bartsch is running again, but I think, this was before the SPD surge.

[Yeahsayyeah]

Related to the Saxony discussion, from Wiki:

Also, why the SPD strength in Brandenburg, and in such a sharply defined area? I know their later results are thanks to a popular Minister-President, but this was just a couple months after the Revolution.

Using the state boundaries of today dilutes the fact, that the GDR was separated into 15 districts. And each district had different party lists. So the areas outstanding for the SPD are the districts of Potsdam, Frankfurt/oder and Magdeburg, that one basically can tell apart from their surroundings. So I guess, regional candidate strength and party organisation (SPD being a party of evangelical clergymen and -women helping more in the more rural parts?, idk).

[Yeahsayyeah]

Wow, what a hack.

[Yeahsayyeah]

I am more concerned with Die Linke’s pro-Russian, anti-NATO stance than their past failings. Supporting Vladimir Putin’s regime doesn’t exactly give one confidence in their support for democracy.

They are clearly anti-NATO. That doesn't mean, they are "pro-Putin". The AfD on the other hand is officially pro-NATO and "pro-Putin" at the same time. And for the SPD the most important thing is, that the gas pipline through the Baltic Sea gets completed and started.

[Yeahsayyeah]

Linkie get's sh**t because it has elected stasi members and has numerous members who countinue to defend the human rights record of GDR, the rest of the parties don't.

To get more into details (although I'm not sure, weither I really should do this, but alas:

"Stasi" is old, even as a scapegoat. Even the Union parties who, while in disarray, desperately try to revive the "red socks" campaign to stoke fear of a red-red-green coalition or collaboration don't use this particular angle. As others have already pointed out, all parties had and probably still have people in their ranks who worked for the Stasi. CDU and FDP inherited the bloc parties. Greens came from the  densely policed civil rights and environmental activist milieu. And many important east German SPD people were clergymen and -women which was one of the occupation group under most strict surveillance. Of course, the security organs wanted people, there.

On a side note, singling out the Stasi as a symbol of the political opression and authoritarianism, was politically comfortable for all political parties in 1990. SPD and Greens, because they often had been really opressed by the apparatus, and PDS, CDU and FDP as they could externalise a lot of the potential discussion of political responsibility in the GDR.

The Left and the PDS as one of its predecessor has condemned the state crimes of the GDR, many times. And today, a majority of their members is in West Germany. And most of their parliament faction weren't in any position of larger responsibility. Of course, they still get their shots fired on them in the highly charged symbolic debates, that are sometimes launched to win cheap political points like the "Unrechtsstaat" debate. And even than i can't think of one active politician who "defends the human rights record of the GDR". The one, I can think of, was the DKP member they once had on an open list, I think, in Lower Saxony, but that was probably a decade ago? And she was a nurse, she wasn't good at selling her point and was pushed to absurd positions by suggestive and loaded questions.

Yes, there are elements in the party who are at least a bit indifferent towards the GDR state crimes, but a large part of that is siege mentality in both parts and Germany and, beyond that, a bit of a reflex on the "Wende" shock and misguided nostalgia in the East, that doesn't have any influence on the policies of the party. And it is a dying breed as this is clearly a generational thing. You have to be 40 or possibly older to really have any political rememberance of the GDR. As mostly those SED members stayed in the PDS that wanted to give a reformed, democratic socialism another try, the reactionary die-hard and unrepellent uncreconstructed communists mostly left as "this wasn't really their party anymore".

[Yeahsayyeah]

To add, the most sh**t the Left gets today is beause they want less wars, more distribution of wealth, and tackle climate change.

[Yeahsayyeah]

And as someone who does vote for the legal successor to my own Eastern Bloc country's communist party and who has some personal ties to that social milieu, I like to occasionally poke fun in my own way at the political tradition I effectively support

I wasn't aware of that, so nevermind. You still should probably stop that, as in Germanyit is a typical talking point of self-righteous right wingers to point out this connection every time.

[Yeahsayyeah]

And did you mean the CDU in the comment about the gas pipeline?*

I meant the SPD as chancellor Gerhard Schröder was a main initiator of the project and the SPD-led state government of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern now even founded a foundation to, they call "environment foundation" to make PR for the project. But yeah, the only major party really against this project are the Greens.

On the other things, maybe from an US American perspective on a "new cold war" angle, every leap that would reduce the military influence of the US in Germany is "pro Russian". But that is not really the way, German-Russian relations are thought of, here. In fact, US interests and European/German interests not necessarily align, in this field.

In theory I would prefer a pan-European collective security system (and a European defense strategy) including Russia to the NATO-Russia confronation, we have today. But that's clearly not a realistic approach as Russia in the era of Putin clearly is not acting in good faith.

And for the russophilia, well, there had been strong connections between East Germany and Russia for forty-five years, of course this has an influence on how people here view Russia or think, they understand Russia. In fact, for the middle-aged and older generations, here, the US are much more alien and "un-European" than Russia. So, it doesn't strike me as odd, that parties who would have a huge chunk of their voter base in the East reflect this a bit. What strikes me as odd, is that the west German right-wing-conservatives who for two generations feared "the Russian in front of their door" are reviving the old German conservative russophilia of the Kaiserreich, too.

BTW, coal isn't ramped up in Germany, instead it's renewables and yes, pitifully, partly also natural gas.

[Yeahsayyeah]

Eh. After a certain point it will be like people in Ireland who do not like Fine Gael referring to the party as 'the blueshirts'.

This particular name is reserved for the AfD, though. Well, historically it was the FDJ, maybe I can start helping reconnotate it. On the other hand, an increasing amount of people is referring to the AfD as "Die Blaunen" (the "blue-browns") and as AgD (Alternative gegen Deutschland/ Alliance against Germany).

[Yeahsayyeah]

Can we just dispel with the fiction that the FDP is on average "socially liberal"?

[Yeahsayyeah]

How would Green voters and members react if the Green Party ignored the SPD clearly winning the National popular vote and clearly having by far the most popular leader, and instead made a shady deal with the CDU and FDP. That led to a rightwing government led by Laschet?

Speaking on my behalf, I don't think Green members and voters care too much about Scholz as a person, but most would clearly prefer an SPD-led government over a Union-led one, based on ideological and issue-based common ground, which is certainly bigger, there.

So the concessions to make Jamaica palatable in this situation would have to be huge (and from an FDP standpoint maybe even bigger than with a traffic light coalition.

[Yeahsayyeah]

I think, the most fun to watch will be east German city-based districts, because with that many demographic and political trend moving parts they are very hard to predict

This would be

14 Rostock - Landkreis Rostock II (CDU +4,7 over Linke, +11,6 over SPD): CDU-incumbent and the Left's Dietmar Bartsch running again. Merkel gone in her home state, good SPD result in the parallel state election incoming.

61 Postdam - Potsdam-Mittelmark II - Teltow-Fläming II (They really should find another idea for naming electoral districts in Brandenburg with their sectoral Landkreise. Already covered as the clash of the chancellor candidates. As the things lay now, carpetbegging Olaf will win.

69 Magdeburg (The city of Magdeburg and some surrounding muncipalities, CDU +5,7 over SPD). The 2017 SPD candidate had a good chunk of personal votes, which the CDU incumbent  had not. But the SPD is going with a new candidate. Good pick-up opportunity, though

72 Halle (The city of Halle and some surrounding muncipalities, CDU +5,8 over SPD, +6,8 over Linke, + 9,8 over AfD). Similar story linke Magdeburg, but the SPD candidate Karamba Diaby who has been a well-known civil-society activist in Halle for years and seems to be quite popular is standing again against the CDU-incumbent.

152 Leipzig I (the northern parts of the city, a mix of bourgeois older-city areas, gentifying and still more working class pre-WK I areas, housing estates from the interwar and GDR periods and northern suburbs that were incorporated to the city around the year 2000.  CDU +7 over AfD, +8 over Linke, +11 over SPD.
The CDU is fielding the quite popular ex-athlete turned politician Jens Lehmann (the olympic gold medal cyclist, not the football/soccer player). He is probably still favored to win, as this district includes many of the strongest pro-CDU-areas of the city, but how the different demographic-political trends will affect this quite diverse district, that the SPD also won 3 times, will be interesting.

153 Leipzig II (the centre, western and southern parts of the city, more affluent, hipster, gentrified and gentrifying, younger population, all this. Connewitz as one epicenter of left wing activism and radicalism in Saxony over more bourgeois parts, but also the biggest of the GDR housing estates, Grünau, that once was built to house 100,000 people, which is now basically 40,000. Linke +0,7 over CDU, +10,3 over AfD, +11,6 over SPD, +15,4 over Greens.
In the 2017 campaign the CDU tried to do a red-scare campaign against the most left parts of the districts (which seems to be the main raison d'etre for the city party, well this and being against bicycle infrastructure...) that did not go over too well with the more left parts of the district's population and in this climate of poralisation the Left's Sören Pellmann unseated the CDU-incumbent. On the other hand, in the 2019 Landtag election, the Greens won 2 of the 4 districts that mostly cover this area and came close in a third, and dominated the parts of the fourth that are included in this district, so they could still have a shot. Federal trends could also propel the SPD to victory. If the leftish vote is cancelling each other out, CDU or in a freak accident AfD could happen with maybe even under 20 per cent.

I'll do Dresden and Erfurt later.

[Yeahsayyeah]

Some months ago, there was an AfD representative in some state parliament that propelled the "theory" that corona was a hoax to promote vote by mail and through this machination rig the Bundestag election. So, yeah, they definitely took some inspiration from the US Republican playbook. Nonetheless, the notion in far-right circles, that elections in Germany are rigged and right-wing votes, be it NPD, AfD or whatever is the fad of the day, are thrown out en masse by corrupt left wing and/or establishment poll workers isn't new.

Btw, showing your marked ballot to anyone is actually not legal in Germany.

[Yeahsayyeah]

How will Election Day play out for those of us following for the first time?

Polls open at 8 o'cock and close at six in the evening. About noon there will be the first reports about turnout so far. Some cities and state sites will have more detailed reports. At six, the exit polls will be published, though record vote-by-mail could throw them off. With more and more precincts incoming, the prognosis of the big tv stations will be altered.

Some cities publish live precinct results, when the votes are counted, some state sites publish live muncipality results, some only do publish results, when the constituency/district is complete. Bundeswahlleiter.de only does constituency results, but you can also follow those on the website of the public broadcast ARD.

The first full constitutency results will probably not be in before eight o'clock. Some could stand out until about midnight. If there are no glitches, the result could be in by then, but here also record vote-by-mail could throw this off. In 2017, one district was only fully-counted at four o'clock in the morning, which is probably without precedent. 

The seat prognosis will vary much in the procetions because of and unprecendented number of overhang and compensation seats, of which many will rely on quite small margins in the particular districts.

[Yeahsayyeah]

HAPPY ELECTION DAY // FROHEN WAHLTAG!! 🇩🇪

Some Americans could really get Mark Twain vibes by that. ;-)

[Yeahsayyeah]

Greens strongest party in the Berlin state parliament election according to the prognosis. This wasn't in the polls

[Yeahsayyeah]

What does the basic law dictate here? who gets the first shot to present a government for a confidence motion in the Bundestag?

The official procedere: The president makes the first proposal to the Bundestag. Then they have two weeks to vote for anyone to get a majority. Then, their would be one last round, and the president can decide weither he appoints the candidate with the most votes or dissolves the parliament. Their is no deadline for the president, when to trigger the process by making a proposal.