Crime + punishment

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

[Associate Justice PiT]

There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

I dissent. Even granted that an individual’s preferences are objective, it is impossible for a lesser being to be the judge of a higher being. The Supreme Court is superior to the appeals courts by its very nature - to have the former be judged by the latter is logically incomprehensible. A thousand times more illogical is it for man to pass judgment on God.

     I made my statement with an eye to Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory. I don't know how aware you are of the concept, but he developed a theory that measured a person's understanding of morality based on emphasizing a number of foundations. Liberals tended to emphasize the foundation of Care much more than anything else, while conservatives emphasized Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity as well as Care. Both groups put moderate emphasis on Fairness.

     With that in mind, your contention here (which I agree with, for the record), which is predicated on the concept that the authority to judge rightly belongs to some and not to others, already operates outside of the orthodoxy of liberal morality. The lack of deference given to authority in the morality of the modern liberal is key to why many of our fellows in this thread believe they can judge God's morality by the standards that seem appropriate to them.

[Associate Justice PiT]

     I made my statement with an eye to Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory. I don't know how aware you are of the concept, but he developed a theory that measured a person's understanding of morality based on emphasizing a number of foundations. Liberals tended to emphasize the foundation of Care much more than anything else, while conservatives emphasized Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity as well as Care. Both groups put moderate emphasis on Fairness.

     With that in mind, your contention here (which I agree with, for the record), which is predicated on the concept that the authority to judge rightly belongs to some and not to others, already operates outside of the orthodoxy of liberal morality. The lack of deference given to authority in the morality of the modern liberal is key to why many of our fellows in this thread believe they can judge God's morality by the standards that seem appropriate to them.

I should note that I operate under the assumption of balancing things against each other. I do not care for authority for its own sake - rather, I grant the case through a rationalist’s lens. The existence of an infinite God alone refutes challenges to its own authority, which is why I pointed out that it was silly to argue that a greater being has no authority to judge a lesser being.

     As I recall, Haidt does not distinguish between human and divine authority in terms of developing the Authority dimension. And he certainly did not forget to consider this, since comparing responses given to moral propositions in different cultures is a major aspect of his research, and part of what led to him identifying the WEIRD (Western Educated Industrial Rich and Democratic) cohort; this group diverged heavily from basically all other places and times in what they prioritized in terms of moral beliefs.

     The attitudes to authority you indicate seem consistent with a center to center-left bearing, which coheres with your politics overall. While it may not apply universally to individuals to the left of center, I do note that there is a definite tendency among left-leaning individuals to dismiss the concept that the morality of God must be ontologically prior to the moralities of human beings. Certainly someone who does not believe has no reason to place a system of morality as such prior to their own intuitions in this fashion, but the result is that their critiques of religion fall flat very quickly since they begin by taking as given something that is contrary to the metaphysics of pretty much every organized religion.

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

[Associate Justice PiT]

I've never found the "offense against an all-good victim" explanation for eternal punishment at all compelling, honestly. It's the sort of theological concept that seems like a reflection of the extremely hierarchical and clientelistic society in which it originated rather than a timeless statement about the ways of God to man. The explanation that hell is in some sense a voluntary refusal of God that can't be "taken back" for reasons internal to the human soul has always struck me as a lot more economical and less legalistic.

Before anybody accuses me of theological liberalism, let me clarify that if I did think RFayette and PiT's position had a robust explanatory power, I wouldn't reject it out of personal squeamishness.

     The idea that God's punishment upon the wicked is in a sense their own choice to reject Him is a novel idea in the West, but actually has a long tradition in the East and is attested as far back as St. Isaac of Nineveh in the 7th century, who wrote that the damned punish themselves by failing to accept the love that God offers to them. I do agree with the notion you propound, but I think we must also consider that it is just for God to infinitely punish the wicked. Otherwise He seems apathetic to our suffering if He can leave the condemned in that state for eternity knowing with exactitude the consequences of His actions in doing so.

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

That's a sidestep. If eternal punishment, something we as humans cannot levy comes from a 'good' infinite being, what discerns a good infinite being from a bad one? What would a bad entity do, as the worst form of punishment?

You ask about what is 'just'. The whole point of justice is to make 'whole' the victim, whether the justice is punitive or mild, whether the person is alive or dead. That is what justice means. A God can never be less than 'whole'. A crime against them cannot matter never mind merit any punishment. A finite being such as ourselves cannot inflict harm on an infinite being.

     The question of how to discern a good infinite being from a bad one is actually moot. Evil is ontologically negative, and only exists as a privation of the good. C.S. Lewis points out that nobody acts with the intention of doing evil in all things, but rather they do evil because they lack goodness in their hearts. This implies the falsity of dualist cosmology, which precludes the existence of an evil infinite being.

     I strongly question the idea that justice is all about making the victim whole, and I am not sure where you get that from. If we lock away a murderer, it does not restitute the victim, who is dead either way. That you reference this scenario as not being a challenge to your definition of justice perplexes me. It would seem to be the case that you are presupposing that the victim must be ontologically capable of being made whole, but if we were to say that human beings are purely material and have no soul (i.e. Reality #2 from the topic post), then a dead person would likewise be incapable of being made whole. So for your definition of justice to be functional as presented by you, we must assume that souls are real, which I don't think you believe (correct me if I am wrong).

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

     The crime is not failing to believe in God, but transgressing the moral law which God has given to govern the world, which alienates one from God and makes us unfitting receptacles for His grace. He gave us His only-begotten Son as a sacrifice to take away our sins and redeem us from corruption and from death. If you do not crucify yourself to that sacrifice, then you remain in your sins, rendered unable by the stain upon you to enter into the bliss of Heaven. It bears noting that in the Christian eschatology, the judgment of the wicked is not something arbitrary that God could dispense with, but a necessary result of His plan coming to fruition.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

     The reason for this is that most Christians don't actually want people to suffer eternal damnation. While universalists like Hart will often claim otherwise, we don't believe in damnation because we want people to suffer. If I were pleased to see the nonbelievers burn, I would simply go off and pray by myself and not concern myself with them. Christians place a heavy emphasis on preaching and evangelism because it is our hope to convince these people to repent of their sins and be saved.

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

     The crime is not failing to believe in God, but transgressing the moral law which God has given to govern the world, which alienates one from God and makes us unfitting receptacles for His grace. He gave us His only-begotten Son as a sacrifice to take away our sins and redeem us from corruption and from death. If you do not crucify yourself to that sacrifice, then you remain in your sins, rendered unable by the stain upon you to enter into the bliss of Heaven. It bears noting that in the Christian eschatology, the judgment of the wicked is not something arbitrary that God could dispense with, but a necessary result of His plan coming to fruition.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

     The reason for this is that most Christians don't actually want people to suffer eternal damnation. While universalists like Hart will often claim otherwise, we don't believe in damnation because we want people to suffer. If I were pleased to see the nonbelievers burn, I would simply go off and pray by myself and not concern myself with them. Christians place a heavy emphasis on preaching and evangelism because it is our hope to convince these people to repent of their sins and be saved.

As far as I see it, there are two possible scenarios here:

a) God is omnipotent, so could save everyone if he wanted (without having to resort to relying on them to accept his son as their saviour), but he chooses not to; therefore, he is not omnibenevolent.
b) God is omnibenevolent, so would save everyone if he could, but is not able to do so, and the best he can do is hope that they accept his son as their saviour; therefore he is not omnipotent.

I don’t really see how you can reconcile God being both omnipotent and omnibenevolent without universal salvation.

     This goes back to my first post in this thread, where I said there is no contradiction as long as you do not force modern liberal morality on God. God created humanity as the crown of His creation, with the capacity to choose to do good and follow Him willingly, entering into sonship by His grace. If God were to force people to choose Him who had in their lives rejected Him to the very end, that would defeat the purpose of creating humanity, as at that point we would no longer be moral actors in the true sense. By laying out the plan that He has ordained, He works towards an end far better and more glorious than a mere maximization of human happiness.

[Associate Justice PiT]

In the Christian conception, the reason sin merits eternal punishment is because it is a crime against an infinitely good God first and foremost even when the offense is against other people, as we see in Psalm 51:4.  A materialist worldview lacks this kind of grounding of sin being an offense against an all-good being because none could exist, and I think this, more than the lack of immortality, is the ultimate moral challenge for a naturalistic worldview.

That's a moral contradiction with much more troubling ethical problems than that of a naturalistic worldview.

     There is no real contradiction as long as you don't attempt to bind God to the subjective preferences of modern liberalism.

If an infinitely 'good' entity edicts eternal punishment, what actions would an infinitely 'bad' entity edict and how could you tell them apart?

     The question would be whether the edict is just or unjust. As Rfayette articulated above, sin is an offense against God, who rightfully possesses the authority to define moral law. As God is infinitely greater than us, an offense against His majesty merits an infinite punishment. That God is willing to forgive us for our sins at all is a powerful proof of His love and mercy.

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

     The crime is not failing to believe in God, but transgressing the moral law which God has given to govern the world, which alienates one from God and makes us unfitting receptacles for His grace. He gave us His only-begotten Son as a sacrifice to take away our sins and redeem us from corruption and from death. If you do not crucify yourself to that sacrifice, then you remain in your sins, rendered unable by the stain upon you to enter into the bliss of Heaven. It bears noting that in the Christian eschatology, the judgment of the wicked is not something arbitrary that God could dispense with, but a necessary result of His plan coming to fruition.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

     The reason for this is that most Christians don't actually want people to suffer eternal damnation. While universalists like Hart will often claim otherwise, we don't believe in damnation because we want people to suffer. If I were pleased to see the nonbelievers burn, I would simply go off and pray by myself and not concern myself with them. Christians place a heavy emphasis on preaching and evangelism because it is our hope to convince these people to repent of their sins and be saved.

As far as I see it, there are two possible scenarios here:

a) God is omnipotent, so could save everyone if he wanted (without having to resort to relying on them to accept his son as their saviour), but he chooses not to; therefore, he is not omnibenevolent.
b) God is omnibenevolent, so would save everyone if he could, but is not able to do so, and the best he can do is hope that they accept his son as their saviour; therefore he is not omnipotent.

I don’t really see how you can reconcile God being both omnipotent and omnibenevolent without universal salvation.

     This goes back to my first post in this thread, where I said there is no contradiction as long as you do not force modern liberal morality on God. God created humanity as the crown of His creation, with the capacity to choose to do good and follow Him willingly, entering into sonship by His grace. If God were to force people to choose Him who had in their lives rejected Him to the very end, that would defeat the purpose of creating humanity, as at that point we would no longer be moral actors in the true sense. By laying out the plan that He has ordained, He works towards an end far better and more glorious than a mere maximization of human happiness.

But why does the alternative to heaven have to be fiery damnation? And what is the “end far better and more glorious than a mere maximisation of human happiness”?

     The end promised to us is the reconciliation of the universe itself to God. Those who have prepared for that time by repenting of their sins and walking in His ways will give glory to Him as the angels do. At that time, there is no place where those who are unprepared can go to escape from the imminent reality of God's power. There is an idea, in line with Nathan's response earlier in the thread, that God is not literally judging people and throwing them into the Lake of Fire, but that it appears to be such to those who are not able to receive God into their hearts and recognize the beauty of His coming in glory.

[Associate Justice PiT]

I usually try to avoid sounding like, as John Dule puts it, an edgy internet atheist when debating these things, but the bolded part immediately struck me as the logic of an abuser.

Why, if God is omnibenevolent, does he condemn people to eternal torture with no possibility of redemption (for the thoughtcrime of not believing in him)? What is the point of this? Whom does it help? If I were a Christian, I actually think that the most philosophically consistent position to take would be universal salvation, although I accept this is not supported by scripture.

As an aside, it does make me somewhat uncomfortable that many Christians, who are perfectly pleasant when I interact with them, apparently believe I will suffer eternal torture after death on the basis of only one fact about me (that I am a nonbeliever). Fortunately, I am almost certain that this will not happen.

Yeah, I agree with this and this puts it way better than I could have ever hoped.

In my mind, an all good and all powerful being would surely have the capability to judge people
based on their works and merits; and know whether a person is has lived a just life. Is it fair to deny salvation to people that have lived just and moral lifes, only for the crime of not being Christian?

     The crime is not specifically failure to believe, but rather having sinned in general, with belief being an important factor in absolving that sin. Some of the Church Fathers have expressed the idea that there could be "virtuous pagans" who are saved despite never knowing of the Church. The problem is that "nothing impure will ever enter the [Heavenly Kingdom]" (Rev. 21:27), and this bodes ill for us, "for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God" (Romans 3:23), implying that being justified is more difficult than generally being a good person. Thus, the fundamental disagreement Christian doctrine has with your proposition here lies in the question of what it means to be just and moral. That modern secular society embraces the stance of goodness consistent with the doctrine of Moral Therapeutic Deism is a major factor that separates most people (including many self-identified Christians) from a small-o orthodox understanding of the question of atonement and salvation.

Furthermore, an all loving being, who loves everyone, would also give even the most wicked some form of redemption in some way. Punishment could certainly happen, but could it be eternal? Is there any offence so big that you could never have a chance at salvation?

     The issue with the idea of attaining salvation after death is that most Christian theologians have agreed that spirits are unable to repent, since unencumbered by flesh they perfectly understand their choices and the logical implications they must follow. C.S. Lewis writes of Hell as being "locked from the inside", and St. Theophan the Recluse also expresses that the state of the damned renders them unable to repent of their sins, though God Himself would be willing to accept such a repentance if they could offer it.

Of course nothing of this is supported by scripture or doctrine of any major Christian denomination to my knowledge.

     There was the Universalist Church, but they merged with the Unitarian Church and no longer identify themselves as Christian. Historically, Origen also believed in the eventual salvation of all things, even with the demons. He had followers for a while, and now there are some who are trying to revive his movement. But overall, universalism does not tend to thrive or survive long as a movement. I won't deny that the impediment of belief in universal salvation to evangelism could be a factor in this phenomenon.