🇩🇪 German elections (federal & EU level)

[Astatine]

If there ends up being a majority for Red-Red-Green, can we expect the FDP to heel hard in the coalitions negotiations out of desperation to prevent RRG?

Seems like that would be the ideal Traffic Light situation

I don't think that the Liberals would be giving too many concessions in such a scenario. In 2017, it was planned that the FDP membership base would vote on the Jamaica coalition treaty if the negotiations had succeeded - and I doubt a traffic light coalition with too much red and green in the color mix is what many members would agree to in the end.

But then again, it's not clear whether the hypothetical procedure would end in a convention or a membership vote.

[Astatine]

According to this poll the SPD has now pulled dead even with the CDU. I think Scholz will be the next chancellor

https://twitter.com/electsworld/status/1428006070950244356?s=21

Wahlkreisprognose "polls" should be taken with caution. They tend to publish quite extreme numbers and are completely intransparent in their methodology. Wahlrecht.de (poll database of all reputable polls) does not include them.

[Astatine]

Got my postal ballot today:



Still can't believe that Greens couldn't make it on the ballot in my very first federal election.
Their direct candidate is a professor of mine btw and I did a presentation about nuclear energy in one of his courses.

[Astatine]

Why no Greens on your ballot

The Saar Greens basically f###ed up their nomination process - A very controversial guy whose local party has extraordinarily many members for its size got elected to the first place on the list, due to formal reasons (ineligible delegates voting in a list nomination process) the list had to be withdrawn, intra-party arbitration courts disqualified his local party from electing a new list (just shortly before the final deadline), and both the state and national electoral commissions didn't accept the new list due to major violation of basic democratic principles.

Won't matter a lot (Saarland account for like 1 % of nationwide votes, so the Greens might lose 0.1-0.2 % at max due to that), but the PR was brutal and the Green brand took some damage.

[Astatine]

The SPD certainly look on track to have peaked at the right time, and hopefully their momentum can be sustained for another month until election day. Laschet, despite being ostensibly the Merkel continuity candidate, really seems to be a dreadful choice for a party for whom a large number of their voters have been attracted by their previous leader’s reputation for competence and seriousness - qualities which, to say the least, Laschet does not possess in the eyes of most of the electorate.

One thing I do wonder is whether, now he is very much in the limelight, the media will turn a more critical eye on Scholz like they have already done on Baerbock. Hopefully he proves scandal-proof.

Scholz' advantage is that he has been in federal politics for a while and most voters have developed and solidified an opinion about him in the last three years already - He has constantly had good approval numbers.

The opposite was the case for Schulz (2017) and AKK (2019) as well as for Laschet and Baerbock now. Schulz and AKK were known to some degree when they became party leaders, but their initial, favorable numbers were highly volatile and saw a rapid decline after scandals and generally mediocre performances.

Sure, Laschet had built up some profile before becoming Chancellor candidate and Baerbock as well, but - unfortunately for them - their scandal-plagued first months in the national spotlight is what they will be perceived as for the time being - and there is not much of that left until the general election. I just don't see either of them recovering from that.

[Astatine]

I've said it before and I'll say it again. I think vote intention is still a bit of a lagging indicator. The SPD is steadily gaining ground - but when you see Scholz having such a huge lead on "preferred chancellor" - its just a matter of time before vote intention catches up to preferred chancellor. I will bet that the SPD will end up as the largest party - it it won't be all that close.

Although Scholz is by far the most popular Chancellor candidate, I would take to add that his numbers in some Chancellor preference polls are way higher than in others due to the pollsters' different methodology and should be taken with some caution at least.

FGW (ZDF) and Infratest dimap (ARD) only include the three candidate options and "don't know", while INSA and Forsa offer poll participants to explicitly choose the option "none of the above/don't know".

This "minor difference" still has a notable effect if we compare the results for Chancellor preference (Scholz, Laschet, Baerbock, don't know/dk+NOTA) in the most recent polls:

Infratest (08/20): 41 % 16 % 12 % 31 %
Forsa (08/18): 29 % 12 % 15 % 44 %
INSA (08/15): 29 % 15 % 13 % 43 %
FGW (08/13): 44 % 21 % 16 % 19 %

[Astatine]

https://twitter.com/Wahlrecht_de/status/1429177014796365831

The first somewhat reputable pollster indicating a tie - with the Greens being closer to the Liberals than to Union/SPD.

Depending on the course of the next weeks, one might assume whether the 3rd spot for the Greens is really a shoo-in. Their support has been stagnant/slightly declining during the Scholz surge, and if the last weeks of the campaign appear to be a Scholz vs. Laschet rather than a three-way race, I wouldn't exclude the possibility of Scholz consolidating some center-left voters behind the SPD that are siding Baerbock as of now. Support for the FDP has seen a slight upward trend with the Union vote share dropping.

This election is really the most exciting in years.

[Astatine]

What's totally crazy is the idea of the SPD winning the Chancellorship with just 21% of the vote.

Thanks Laschet.

Wouldn't even 31% be unprecedentedly low?

That was the floor until now, Adenauer was elected with 31 percent in 1949.

What we're seeing is the "Europeanization" of the partisan landscape. The days of the two major parties getting 35+% or even over 40% are pretty much over. As in other countries, we'll probably see governing coalitions with three partners and the chancellor's party just being in the 20s.

I'd don't like that and wish we'd be back to SPD and CDU/CSU competeting for first place in the upper 30s or low 40s since that was not just a more stable landscape, people could actually better determine what happened to their vote. For example in 2017, Linke and AfD were the only certain anti-Merkel votes. Anyone who wanted Merkel out and not to vote for either of these couldn't be certain their vote wouldn't ultimately keep her in power.

One could describe the most recent developments in Germany's partisan landscape as sort of "asymmetric depolarization", at least on federal level. While one might intuitively guess that Germany would follow the general international trends of an increasingly polarized political environment, it should be noted that this tendency exists on the level of "(Linke)/SPD/Greens/FDP/Union" vs. AfD, but on the other hand, the parties within the "democratic bloc" were forced to overcome partisan division for the stake of political stability and governability (although the parties developed to that on themselves, too).

20 years ago, maybe even just a decade ago (at least before Fukushima), speculations about the possibility of a Black-Green or Jamaica coalition, or even Red-Red-Green and Traffic light on federal level would've been considered an absolute insanity. The bloc division between the black-yellow and red-green camp is a thing of the past by now.

[Astatine]

A good example of why First Past the Post is a better system.

Dk man, I wouldn't want to live under a system where a party gets 77 % of the seats with 33 % of the vote.

[Astatine]

A good example of why First Past the Post is a better system.

Dk man, I wouldn't want to live under a system where a party gets 77 % of the seats with 33 % of the vote.

Needless to say, if the Bundestag were purely FPTP the voting patterns would be very different.

There were actually plans to introduce FPTP in the 1960s - because CDU/CSU wanted to punish the Liberals for leaving the black-yellow coalition in 1966. The SPD only didn't agree on that option because the FDP flirted with a social-liberal coalition, that eventually became reality in 1969.

FPTP would've excluded the possibility of any other party emerging but CDU/CSU and SPD - Germans are and have always been somewhat more bound to parties than individuals anyways, at least in the federal Republic. One can disagree with the FDP as much as possible, but they contributed a lot to societal progress in the social-liberal era that would've probably taken way more years to become reality in a bipartisan system. Same with the Green party.

I'd take a multi-party system with coalitions as standard over FPTP with absolute majority governments anytime, although I'd like to see some more pragmatism such as in Nordic countries, where minority governments are the standard.

[Astatine]

With SPD rising, how likely is it that Scholz becomes next chancellor?  I presume Laschet is still favoured.  Also of coalitions seems unlikely a two party will be feasible and probably a three party so any guesses on which are most likely?

Regarding coalitions:

1. Jamaica (Union/Greens/FDP) - If CDU/CSU ends up being largest party, Jamaica would probably the way to go. It seems to be the only option as of now under which Laschet can become Chancellor. The Liberals will definitely prefer it over a traffic light coalition, while the Greens might be more hesitant about that option. If the SPD comes first and red-red-green is possible, then the Greens might even completely pull out of any negotiations with the Union as it would be quite clear that the voters definitely wouldn't want another CDU/CSU term.

2. Traffic light (SPD/Greens/FDP) - The Liberals are quite reluctant when it comes to red-green-yellow. Remember that most of their electorate are not FDP voters for the sake of liberalism, but rather disaffected CDU/CSU voters who are dissatisfied about their preferred party. If the SPD ends up being first and red-red-green is the only viable alternative (besides Jamaica), that will put a lot of pressure on the Free Democrats. They risk losing much of their borrowed electorate, but on the other hand, them pulling out of the Jamaica negotiations in 2017 was not overwhelmingly perceived well (although it might have saved them in the long term), and if they did it again and R2G is the only other option, they risk much of their credibility and the centrist to center-left voters.

3. R2G (SPD/Greens/Linke) - Not really Scholz' preferred option because the Left still seems to be somewhat unreliable as coalition partner. Still, the Green base would likely prefer this coalition over Jamaica. A weakened Linke would reduce the amount of the demands the party could make, especially in the area of foreign policy.

4. Germany (Union/SPD/FDP) - Virtually no chance of happening. While this would obviously be the preferred choice for the FDP since the Green party would be shunned out of government, the SPD really wants CDU/CSU in the opposition. Only chance I see that happening is if the SPD becomes largest party and CDU/CSU is still desperate to govern.

5. Kenya (Union/SPD/Greens) - Nah, not gonna happen.

6. Bahamas (Union/FDP/AfD) - Don't even think about it.

Besides, let's include some two party coalitions that are quite unlikely arithmetically as of now, but let's assume they'd get enough seats:

1. Red-Green (SPD/Greens) - Obviously the preferred choice of both parties. No annoying third partner that's too much pro-free market, or let alone unreliable.

2. Black-Green (Union/Greens) - The default coalition if you had asked me in Summer or beginning of 2020. Greens would rather be with the SPD, but depending on the result (this is the most unpredictable election in decades), there's a chance we'd see Black-Green.

3. GroKo (Union/SPD) - Magic, magic, the incumbent coalition that everyone thought would be voted out receives a majority again. But they wouldn't do it again. The only way another GroKo could emerge - assuming a majority is possible - is if the SPD leads it, FDP doesn't want a traffic light, R2G doesn't have a majority and Greens refuse to get into Jamaica.

[Astatine]

They would need to win three direct mandates to be exempted.  They currently have five, four in Berlin and one in Leipzig, and the four in Berlin were won fairly comfortably last time.

Yes. The issue is that if they really were to drop under 5% (which still doesn't look likely!) they will have lost a huge chunk of their support from 2017 and there's little chance that this would not also show up in direct vote preferences in those or any other set of constituencies. It would be, at best, dicey.

If both CSU (5 % according to INSA) and Linke fall below 5 % but get saved by the three-district rule, this would be the first time in history that two parties below five percent (since creation of the federal threshold) still get seats (exempting SSW).

Btw, the Linke might still get troubles even if they got saved by their direct representatives. As far as I'm concerned, they wouldn't be allowed to form a parliamentary group with full rights ("Fraktion") but only a "Gruppe", which has less significance in the parliamentary process, especially when it comes to funding. Not 100% sure though.

[Astatine]

They would need to win three direct mandates to be exempted.  They currently have five, four in Berlin and one in Leipzig, and the four in Berlin were won fairly comfortably last time.

Yes. The issue is that if they really were to drop under 5% (which still doesn't look likely!) they will have lost a huge chunk of their support from 2017 and there's little chance that this would not also show up in direct vote preferences in those or any other set of constituencies. It would be, at best, dicey.

If both CSU (5 % according to INSA) and Linke fall below 5 % but get saved by the three-district rule, this would be the first time in history that two parties below five percent (since creation of the federal threshold) still get seats (exempting SSW).

Btw, the Linke might still get troubles even if they got saved by their direct representatives. As far as I'm concerned, they wouldn't be allowed to form a parliamentary group with full rights ("Fraktion") but only a "Gruppe", which has less significance in the parliamentary process, especially when it comes to funding. Not 100% sure though.

This was actually the case in 2002, when the PDS (East German predecessor of Die Linke) won two or three districts while failing to get 5% of the national popular vote. Consequently, they did have these members without the status as a parliamentary faction. Not having the status as faction makes everything much more difficult in the Bundestag's daily business for said members.

Yeah, the PDS won 2 seats only. Both Members of Bundestags were nominally independent. If a party gains 3 direct seats though, but less than 5 % of the vote, the resulting parliamentary group would still just be a "Gruppe" and not a "Fraktion". This is what the PDS representation in Parliament was from 1990 until 1998.

[Astatine]

The Prots are going red again! Party like it's 2002!

Ah, beautiful to see my ancestral Lower Saxon heartland painted in deep red!

If those results were to come true (I have my doubts about some districts where I feel incumbency and vote splitting are underrated, but we'll see whether I was wrong), SPD would sweep the districts 4 in states (Brandenburg, Bremen, Saarland, Hamburg).

In 2017, the SPD achieved that in Bremen only (same in 2013), while CDU/CSU managed to do it in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg (5 states), losing "full control" of 2 states (Saarland, Saxony) in comparison to 2013.

[Astatine]

By the way, with the current district estimates several prominent CDU/CSU politicians are on verge of not making it into the Bundestag - CDU/CSU's horrible proportional vote result in combination with relatively strong district performances means that there will a bunch of overhang seats.

Armin Laschet declined to run in his home district but instead opted to only get on the NRW list - As CDU/CSU will still pick up a large chunk of districts with an abysmal proportional result, he might be shunned out of Bundestag. INSA also has mannequin Education Minister Anja Karliczek losing her district, albeit by a narrow margin.
 
Philipp Amthor, CDU "youth" hopeful in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, is losing his district according to INSA, and probably wouldn't get saved over the list.

In Saarland, it seems likely that at least one out of the three somewhat prominent CDU faces will not make it - AKK (Defense Minister, list #1, running in Saarbrücken), Peter Altmaier (Economy Minister, list #2, running in Saarlouis) or Nadine Schön (deputy parliamentary group leader, list #3, running in St. Wendel). If the SPD sweeps all four districts, all three could still get saved thanks to compensatory seats. But the CDU needs to win either all of their districts or none to get all three into the Bundestag.

[Astatine]

Also: In 297 (Saarlouis), in a rematch of 2017, we have a battle of ministers: Altmaier vs. Maas. In 2017, Altmaier won this race by 6. Applying uniform swing, Maas would end up as the winner this time. Not quite as exciting as the Wahlkreis 61 (Potsdam), which is Scholz vs. Baerbock, but still an interesting fact. Also, this shows how overrepresented the small Saarland is in the cabinet.

In fact, at some point it looked like Potsdam could become the most overrepresented district in whole Germany after this election.

The CDU candidate is Saskia Ludwig, a quite controversial right-winger who lost the seat in 2017 to the SPD (but is currently both in Bundestag and Landtag thanks to a list spot). Besides Scholz and Baerbock, former FDP General Secretary Linda Teuteberg and Linke Bundestag Member Norbert Müller are running as candidates.

Now, around March/April, Müller was seen as likely Linke Spitzenkandidat for the Brandenburg list, Teuteberg would get into the Bundestag anyway thanks to being Spitzenkandidatin for Brandenburg, same with Baerbock and Scholz, who might have split votes between them evenly leading to Ludwig winning the seat (some estimates had her winning at that point).

In April, Müller was not placed on the Linke list, and Scholz seems to be the likely winner of this district, while Ludwig's candidacy is hopeless (#7 on the list).

Btw, one district to look at is Christian Lindner's district Rheinisch-Bergischer Kreis. It is typically dark-black territory, but considering that he has some personal appeal (his district vote was almost tied with the proportional vote in 2017, unusual for FDP politicians) and the CDU's dramatic collapse, there is a non-zero chance that this district would be the first one to be won by FDP since 1990. Wahlkreisprognose (dubious methodology) saw him as probable winner at some point, and election.de which is more conservative about its district ratings still has this district as the only one where FDP has an outsider shot of winning it directly.

[Astatine]

Laschet faces another problem: Nobody wants to see him or campaign for him.

Several local newspapers in whole Germany have already noted that there are hardly any Laschet posters around in many towns - Just posters for the local candidates. When he became Chancellor candidate, there were some "announcements" by local activists to refuse campaigning for him, but those threats seem to become reality.

I myself have not seen one single Laschet poster in my district, and even the Green party which only files direct candidates without a list has some posters over here.
What an utter embarrassment for a Chancellor candidate.

There will be a debate between Laschet, Baerbock and Scholz on Sunday, we'll see how that ends. But considering he tries to avoid media spotlight as much as possible to not make another gaffe, I feel he's gonna perform badly.

[Astatine]

https://twitter.com/Wahlen_DE/status/1431135552951267331

Just lol, ik it's YouGov, but Lindner ahead of Baerbock and Laschet in a hypothetical Chancellor matchup is just... hilarious?

[Astatine]

CDU must have reached its floor with these numbers in the low 20s, right?

INSA also publishes numbers on minimum and maximal potentials of parties, and according to their most recent poll (08/23), the absolute floor of CDU/CSU is 17 % who are definitely committed to voting for them. On the other hand, 41 % could imagine themselves voting for the Christian Democrats in general and this number has been fluctuating between 35 and 50 % over the last four years, which really shows that most Germans don't necessarily dislike CDU/CSU as a party but only the candidate.

When Merkel was polling badly around October 2018 before announcing her intention to retire and CDU/CSU's potential maximum was at 37.5 %, the Christian Democrats were still constantly polling above 25 %. Heck, even with gaffe-prone AKK CDU/CSU was never polling below 24 %.

[Astatine]

Do we know much about the political pedigree of AFD voters? Who did most of them vote for before the AFD existed? are they people who used to be CDU voters or are they more ex-SPD or even ex-Linke voters?

Mostly a mix of a lot of non-voters, a lot of CDU voters, some SPD voters, some Linke voters and some FDP voters (the party was close to death when AfD ran for the first time and entered Parliament at the same as the AfD, therefore it is a bit tricky to track who really switched from FDP affiliation to AfD). There is virtually no exchange from Greens to AfD. AfD is also strong in areas in which far-right extremist parties (NPD, Republicans, DVU) had some residual strength and sucked up most of their electorate - where it existed.

[Astatine]

I guess the question is if a good Scholtz performance actually changes the calculus on government formation. Say the SPD surges after a good performance and is at around 28-30% - wouldn’t most of their support come from squishy Greens? Union must already be pretty close to their floor, doubtful they have that much soft support left to bleed.

Probably, but it would give them a clear mandate to govern. It should also be noted that thanks to a complicated seat calculation system, the Union could still narrowly become largest parliamentary group if both parties are almost tied. The system of overhang and compensatory seats (party gets more districts than seats it should have, also based on federal states...) was somewhat reformed to avoid a Parliament that increases too much in size... But I haven't met one single person that could really explain now at which point an overhang seats does get compensated or not. And I know many political nerds.

Also, a stronger SPD might be a favor for the Liberals and ultimately a traffic light coalition, as they would have to concede less to two center-left parties in a three way coalition (although Jamaica would still be the FDP's preferred option). The FDP is vying for the office of Finance Minister... but as 3rd largest party, it would be difficult to demand that. If the Greens fall to be roughly even with the FDP, FDP's chances to get that Ministry are somewhat higher.

I guess CDU/CSU's definite floor is ~15 %. Their campaign is in full disarray, nobody knows what the party stands for and even less people want Laschet as Chancellor.

[Astatine]

- Chancellor: Olaf Scholz (SPD)
- Foreign/vice chancellor: Annalena Baerbock (Greens)
- Finance: Christian Lindner (FDP)
- Labor: SPD (keep Hubertus Heil please)
- Economy: FDP (Linda Teuteberg or Wolfgang Kubicki would be good)
- Environment and climate: Robert Habeck (Greens)
- Interior: SPD (please Boris Pistorius)
- Health: SPD (hopefully Karl Lauterbach)
- Justice: Greens (I'd like Cem Özedmir, before he hopefully replaces Kretschmann in a few years)
- Defense: SPD (former MdB Rainer Arnold would be a comptent choice)
- Digitalization (new): FDP
- Traffic: Greens
- Agriculture: Greens
- Family: SPD
- Education: SPD
- Economic Development: FDP
- Head of chancellery: SPD

I doubt the FDP could demand both the Finance and Economy Departments. The suggested cabinet would be a kind of best case scenario for the Liberals - I'd think switching Economy with Defense (Marie Agnes Strack-Zimmermann) would be somewhat more realistic though?

Also, if a Department for Digital Affairs were established, I would not exclude the possibility of one Department to be scrapped or merged as compensation - Possibly Economic Development? That role could easily be fulfilled by a State Secretary (just like Digital Affairs now).

Also Scholz promised that his Cabinet would be made up of 50 % women at least.

[Astatine]

A stupid question (this is only the second German election I've followed closely)

What are the chances of a grand coalition between the SDP/CDU with the SDP taking the Chancellorship?

That's not a stupid question at all!

Low, but it is not an option that is 100 % excluded. I'd rate it as extremely unlikely for the following reasons:

- First, a SPD/CDU coalition would need to win a majority. Right now, both parties are polling at ~40-45 % combined support with the SPD having the momentum, but it is not even a sure thing whether the SPD will actually overtake the Union nor that another Grand Coalition would have enough seats.

- It would be an absolute humiliation for CDU/CSU to be reduced to the role of the junior partner. The Christan Democrats are likely to get the worst result in their history, therefore I don't believe they have much appetite to be serving under a Chancellor Scholz - especially considering that junior partners in coalitions often get punished in the next elections.

- The SPD doesn't really want to govern with CDU/CSU again.

- I don't believe such a government would be really popular, since out of the last 16 years, a Grand Coalition governed for 12. SPD would make modest gains at max, while CDU/CSU are expected to suffer tremendous losses - Meanwhile Greens and Liberals are surging. From that point of view, it would likely be perceived somewhat "undemocratic" to exclude the party with most gains from government, although there is no formal or legal restriction.

[Astatine]

is it me or is Laschi not doing great at all? He seems very defensive and irritated

Laschet is never doing great in any televised appearances and always seems defensive and irritated. He always appears to be like an edgy child that refuses to empty the dishwasher because Mommy wouldn't let him watch TV after 6 pm.

[Astatine]

So who is perceived to have won the debate? Baerbock?

There will be a quick poll out this evening. I guess Baerbock and Scholz about tied, with Laschet somewhat behind.

But no performance was really outstanding tbh.