Ukraine Crisis

[ag]

One does wonder how much in control the Russians actually are of the pro-Russian militants.

I think, it is pretty safe to say, under pretty much complete control. Russian intelligence officers are deployed there in force. Make your own conclusions.

Problem is, those intelligence officers may have read more into their orders than they may have intended.  Even if they get privately punished later for doing so, the problem is Putin will likely find it impossible to undo they have done, since in order to do so he would effectively have to capitulate to the West.  However regardless of whether forces on the ground are exceeding their orders or they are following their orders, the effect is essentially the same.

I think, given the history of that gentleman, it is pretty safe to assume that the worst orders emanate directly from him (even if they are given in a way that makes them hard to trace). Thinking up any other theory is entirely unnecessary, as it would explain nothing that cannot be explained simply by assuming that Putin behaves as Putin normally does.

In particular, it is safe to assume that there is no promise, verbal or written, that Putin has not decided to violate exactly the moment before making that promise. That is his normal operating mode. So, if he promises you anything, you should assume that he is likely planning to do the opposite (if he has already decided on any course of action), or that his actions will be in no way constraint by the promise (if he has not).

[ag]

One does wonder how much in control the Russians actually are of the pro-Russian militants.

I think, it is pretty safe to say, under pretty much complete control. Russian intelligence officers are deployed there in force. Make your own conclusions.

Intelligence officers can be ignored or removed from the equation... sometimes permanently.

There is exactly no evidence of that happening. And ample evidence that they are very much in control. In fact, it is going far beyond intelligence officers: a lot of the people on the ground are simply Russian soldiers pretty much in uniform, just without insignia. This is pretty much documented at this point. In fact, at least some of these people seem to be the same as in Crimea last month - they have been recognized.

[ag]

Stalin 2.0 murdering Tatars en masse already.

That one is, actually scary. It has no legal consequences (everything of consequence has been done multiple times already), but is a really dangerous sign. Whenever Putin makes statements of this sort, his intentions are almost the opposite: he is reminding the Tartars of the past, threatening them, that their fate Is in his hands. BTW, they already followed this up by prohibiting Mustafa Dzhemilev (the Crimean Gandhi, really) from returning to Crimea.

[ag]

Has Mustafa Dzhemilev said what his plans are? He's still a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Also, what's up with Lyudmyla Denisova? She's from Crimea and she's Minister of Social Policy in the Ukrainian government. Has she said what she's going to do?

Dzhemilev is loyal to Ukraine. He has said it many times, that the Tatar movement will be doing whatever the Ukrainian leadership decides. But they also have to protect their people. They did delegate some representatives to work with the de facto authorities in Crimea. They are in a tough spot. They hate Russia, but they do not want to be deported again - and Putin is perfectly capable of that.

Some of the Ukrainian MPs from Crimea have resigned, but others are continuing. As for a cabinet member, I do not see why one would go: she is not representing Crimea, she is a Ukrainian citizen working in Ukrainian government. Crimea is not even her birthplace - she was born in Russia, in Arkhangelsk. Yes, she spent part of her career there - but, then, so did PM Yatsenyuk.

[ag]

Well, Dzhemilev´s expulsion is confirmed. He has been spending most of his time in Kiev, as he is a Ukrainian MP. When he last went back to Simferopol, a couple of days ago, he was stopped at the border, but allowed in after a consultation with Moscow. However, as he was leaving back for Kiev today he was issued a notification, that he is banned from "Russian Federation" (which, of course, from the standpoint of the Russians now includes Crimea) for 5 years. As he himself says, he has no intention of visiting Russia itself (since 1986, when he was last released from a Russian prison, he has only been there once: a month ago, for negotiations with Putin), but  Crimea is another matter.

Interestingly, Dzhemilev's interview to Ukrainian TV was bilingual. The journalist spoke Ukrainian, he responded in Russian (tried using a Ukrainian word in his first sentence, but, basically, gave up). Of course, his native tongue is Crimean Tartar, and he had to learn Russian, but, being an old man, he never learned Ukrainian properly. Still, his jacket has a large Ukrainian flag pin on it - not doubts about his allegiance whatsoever.

And, just in case, somebody does not know who is Dzhemilev. He was one of the most distinguished Soviet dissidents. I have been hearing his name since before I can remember.  The Crimean Tartar non-violent campaign for return to Crimea has always been one of the most active and admired parts of the dissident movement in the USSR. Dzhemilev was its major leader since... forever. He spent many years in Soviet camps for this. He is, probably, the closest any Soviet people had to Gandhi or Mandela.

[ag]

Propaganda or no propaganda, within the next week or two the West will have to decide how to respond to Russian invasion of mainland Ukraine. And if the response is inadequate, within a year or two the West will have to decide how to respond to Russian invasion of a state that has been pledged full protection.

[ag]

Propaganda or no propaganda, within the next week or two the West will have to decide how to respond to Russian invasion of mainland Ukraine. And if the response is inadequate, within a year or two the West will have to decide how to respond to Russian invasion of a state that has been pledged full protection.

This. I'm just glad that a Republican isn't president right now. If this situation isn't brought to a satisfactory conclusion in two years, this saving grace will no longer be the case.

What is it that you believe to be a "satisfactory conclusion"?

[ag]

I have this feeling that Ukranians will end up having to accept Russia taking over Crimea but I fo believe that peace is yet possible. Ukraine shall be allowed to join in the European Union in exchange it doesn't enter in NATO and give more autonomy to its Oblasts.

Crimea will be de facto Russian for some time. Ukraine will not "accept" it (that would be a betrayal of the Tartars), but there is little that can be done about it right now. But Putin will lead Russia into a sufficient disaster, eventually, to loose it - no real reason for Ukraine to drop the claim. Though, of course, no active actions will be taken - but neither will the sanctions be removed.

Ukraine will not be able to enter the EU meaningfully any time soon: too poor and too underdeveloped. It can, and should, enter NATO though: it needs protection. If, of course, NATO is really a protection. In any case, whatever Ukraine does cannot be conditioned on any agreements with Russia. Russia is incapable of making agreements under its current regime: the only certainty about its behavior is that it will violate any agreement it signs.

[ag]

There's at least one problem with that thesis, and is that there's a majority of 'ethnic' Russians in Crimea -not to mention Sevastopol-. Anyway, who knows what will happen in the next decades? One thing is sure and is that Putin is uglifying this world, and it was ugly enough before this crisis. Did anyone read his speech on 'Novaya Rossiya'?

As for Crimean Tatars, I feel concern on them. Did the interim government help them declaring traitors those who accepted Russian passports knowing that they are under pressure?

1. Well, who knows how many Russian states there will be out there when all of this is over Anyways, given the Russian track record, I will not be surprised if many of those Russians leave for the mainland, rather then enjoy the Russian governance in situ. I would be pleasantly surprised in fact, if Crimean population (including Sevastopol)  is much bigger than 1.5 mln (as compared to about 2.5 now) in 20 years . And by then, with Ukraine well on the path to EU membership and Russia still a pariah, many of the remaining Russians will be tempted to remember they have the right to the Ukrainian citizenship.

2. Tartar and current Ukrainian leadership are working in extremely close contact. Dzhemilev - the undisputed leader of the Tartar movement - is in Kiev and in the Rada. I believe (though on this one I may be wrong) Chubarov (Dzhemilev's heir apparent as the head of the movement) is also spending much of his time in Kiev. So is  I stronly doubt that anything has been/ will be done about the status of Crimean residents without their agreement - if not always on their active advice.  The movement has delegated some representatives to work with the de facto Crimean authorities - as these are delegated, I have no doubts they will be forgiven for any "collaboration".  Of course, any of the marginal "alternative" leaders Russia might try to find will be severely ostracized within the community - the Tartars have been united in dissidence for so long, they know how to maintain unity.

[ag]

I see a problem and is that Dzhemilev is in Kiev, as you say, while the Tatars are currently under Russian de facto authorities. Aside this ethnic minority, there was people opposed to Crimea's annexation or at least not very favourable, but they have to live there and they need Russian passports. Also, from what I've been reading, many have family in Ukraine and, on having been declared 'traitors', they are banned from Ukraine's mainland. I think this is the kind of measures, alongside with the suppression of the status of Russian language in the SE and maybe others, that alienate a significant part of the population and, honestly, everybody should be interested in stabilizing the country. I'll never understand why nobody advises the interim government that some coalition partners should be expelled. Also, there is the question of the power vacuum created in the SE after the removal of Yanukovich. The PoR seems to be disintegrating and, like it or not, that corrupt and feudal structure (I don't have a great opinion of the other parties, but that's another question) was the one who was giving some political cohesion to those regions. Putin is obviously taking advantage of the situation. I suppose the only option is trying to reach a compromise with PoR 'moderates' (whatever that means in this context) and magnates like Akhmetov. It looks like hard to achieve with ultranationalists enjoying prominence.

I am afraid, your understanding of the situation is at wide variance with reality. Perhaps, if you cared to investigate, you would know that they have not been declared traitors, nor have they been banned from the mainland. Ukrainian government is, in fact, repeatedly stressing that it continues considering all Crimeans its citizens, and cares abiout them. It is still doing its best to provide services - if long distance. There has been no wholesale repudiation of Crimean population - Tartar or Slavic.  Rather, there are reated statements to the opposite effect.

Dzhemilev is the main accepted political leader of the Tartars. And he does care about the well-being of his people - who, by and large, are loyal to Ukraine.

[ag]

As for the situation in the East, I do not know where to begin. The local magnates have been appointed governors with full powers (that is who the governors in the East are today). The central government itself is overwhelmingly Eastern - very few of its members have any ties with the West (many more are from Russia, than from Lviv). The only radical nationalist party in the government is Svoboda - and it has been kept away from the important posts. All the major leaders are moderates. Not that it much matters: they will not be in government within a month, after an election. In which almost all candidates (all with any chance of mattering) are Eastern or Southern. I do not know where you get your info - but it is bizarre.

[ag]

PoR does not exist at this point as a unit. It has broken into multiple pieces, its most popular politicians (even in the East) have been expelled. Whom are you suggesting the government should incorporate? And why would they want to be incorporated into a government that will not be a government within a month. I am afraid, your "suggestions" cannot be even formulated in a way that anybody in Ukraine would be able to understand. Who should be incorporated into what?

The inclusion of Svoboda in the government was inevitable. Especially given that except for the Batkivschina nobody else was willing to join. It is not as if being in this government were a prize anybody would be willing to die for. This is a provisional government, with little power and an extremely short term, operating in a highly stressful environment. Svoboda does represent a block in the Rada - that is a given, unfortunately. And, for god's sake, they are a lot less fascist then, say, BJP in India.

As for the talking points it gives to Putin... Listen, Putin, would be declaring Mahatma Gandhi and Winston Churchill fascists today, if that were to suite him. And he would be repeating it as many times as necessary for somebody to believe it. The guy has not said an honest word in years (if ever) - what he says is entirely unconstrained by reality. One should have long learnt to completely disregard whatever he says - except as a rough guide to his actions: as he tends to do the opposite from what he says he intends, his words are, occasionally, unintentionally informative. There is nothing the Ukrainians can do to change that - they could have appointed a full government of canonized Orthodox saints - Russian discourse would be identical.

[ag]

Breaking: Gerhard Schröder celebrates his 70th birthday with Putin in Moscow.

And the bromance continues!

Would it be possible to include him in the sanctions list?

[ag]

PoR does not exist at this point as a unit. It has broken into multiple pieces, its most popular politicians (even in the East) have been expelled. Whom are you suggesting the government should incorporate? And why would they want to be incorporated into a government that will not be a government within a month. I am afraid, your "suggestions" cannot be even formulated in a way that anybody in Ukraine would be able to understand. Who should be incorporated into what?

I don't recall any 'suggestion' apart from expelling Svoboda or a previous comment about reaching some compromise with politicians or personalities from the region. I don't know if the government can incorporate some elements from the PoR or others expelled from that party. If it's possible, perhaps it would be a better solution trying some form of 'national unity'. Is it unrealistic? On the other hand, I'm getting the impression that someone or something has to fill the void in Donetsk and the other places.

Apparently, Khodorkovski was in Kharkiv before the attempt against the mayor because he's promoting a 'Russia-Ukraine' forum. He says he expect that Ukraine will succeed because it would be helpful for the democratization of Russia. It seems that the local Euro Maidan group has been meeting with Anti Maidan activists. The spokeswoman of the Kharkiv Euro Maidan says that it's necessary taking into account and respecting the interests of Russian speakers in order to keep the unity of Ukraine. I wish them luck, what else could I say?   

They have already incorporated in the government several personalities from the region. Interior Minister (Avakov) grew up and spent his entire political career in Kharkiv. Social Policy Minister (Denisova) is, in fact, from Crimea. All the governors are local. The only two parties that agreed to join the provisional government were the Batkyvshchyna and Svoboda - nobody else wanted to touch it. Half the government is, really, non-partisan. As for the ex-PoR politicians - they are either badly discredited (the Yanukovich crowd), irreconcilable with Ukraine´s existence (Tsarev) running for presidency (Tihipko) or in intensive care (Kernes).

Eastern Ukraine is crucial for free Russia. If they manage to create an alternative Russian cultural space, it will be the outlet for all of us. But the only danger for that comes from the East - not from the west. Except for having to file the tax declaration and an occasional other forom in Ukrainian most people in the East have not, really, had much to do with that language. Russian is at least as predominant everywhere there, as (Castillian) Spanish is in Alicante or Galicia. Most schools and nearly all universities are overwhelmingly functioning in Russian. Yes, you have to take Ukrainian literature and history in Ukrainian - but that was the case under the Soviets as well (which, of course, means that all those who grew up in Eastern Ukraine claim to have passed the Ukrainian language high school graduation exams: their Soviet school certificates - which they happily received at the time even though they were all written in Ukrainian, as was the Soviet custom - say so). Workplaces (including government) are nearly all-Russian. So are the newspapers, TV, etc., etc.  And filling out that occasional form in Ukrainian is no harder for a Russian speaker than for a Spanish speaker to fill out a form in Gallego or in Catalan - it isn´t Basque we are talking about, the languages are related. I never lived in Ukraine in my life, never had a formal instruction in the language at all, but ,having on occasion practiced reading Ukrainian-language newspapers, I can usually figure out it  - push comes to shove, an occasional word may have to be googled.

[ag]

If he is allowed to get away with it (and he will be allowed to get away with it), he will continue. It would be A LOT easier to do this in, say, Narva than in Donetsk. Unlike Donetsk, Narva IS overwhelmingly Russian-populated, and many of those Russians are, in fact, Russian citizens. Everybody should understand: the only way to stop Putin is to confront him. If this is not done soon (and, I am pretty sure it will not be), we are moving towards a major international war, most likely nuclear, within the next five years. Avoiding confrontation will lead to millions of dead - and soon.

[ag]

I have to say, if this continues I don't see anything stopping Putin from trying to reconstitute much of Tsarist Russia. That said, ag, I think the main factor will be, as I mentioned before, the local population's willingness to resist & how much they value their independence from Russia. Afghanistan and Chechnya have shown that even small, powerless populations can imposing punishing costs on a behemoth if they are determined to do so. The main reason Putin is winning is because there is very little resistance. People are either afraid or simply don't care whether they are absorbed into Russia.

Yes, they are scared. And so will be you.

[ag]

You really think Putin is going to start a nuclear war?

Eventually. He does not want it: he will grow into it gradually. At some point he will move in too far: be that to Estonia, to Poland, or beyond. At that point the West will respond with force. In terms of conventional force - and even more so in terms of resources available - of course, Russia is no match. But Putin is already drunk with success - and he will be even more convinced of his invincibility at that point, so he will miscalculate. Defeats will start - that will be what will lead him to first threaten, and then use the nukes. At every point almost until he presses the button he will think that the West is weak and will not dare not to surrender. And once he realizes that the West dares, he will be too enraged and too desperate to care.

[ag]

ag, I think you have a form of Putin derangement syndrome, although I'm not sure why. The man is capable of horrible things, but he is not that stupid.

He is: that is the point. I know the type well: he is a fairly ordinary KGB guy, just one who got lucky. He is not even really evil.  It is just that his understanding of the world around him is fairly limited. He thinks he is strong, and everybody else is weak. It is machismo at its extreme. Show him he is not the top dog, and he will run, tail between his legs. But it is suicidal to let him think you do not dare kick him bad: he will take that as weakness, and he attacks the weak.

[ag]

So, essentially, you are saying that the end is nigh for mankind?

Well, if the mankind is willing to hit Putin really bad really soon, then no. Otherwise: I guess, the world can survive without a few big cities. Pity, I have spent 2/3 of my life in two of them (Moscow and New York)

[ag]

Ukrainians won't fight because they are a (relatively) well off country. It's not worth it to give up their comfortable existence to maybe die fighting the Russians.

Afghanistan, on the other hand, was a third world country. Even if a Mujaheddin died, he wasn't losing much.

That's just silly, losing your life is a big deal for everyone. Geography is the main difference, you need adequate terrain (mountains, jungles, swamps) to fight a superior enemy.

Ukrainians fought for 9 years after WWII. So did Lithuanians. But for the moment they are trying to avoid the full-scale war. Civilians try to demonstrate: they have been badly hurt in several Donetsk cities. It is too early for a partisan war to have started: let us hope it never does.

[ag]

If Russia does a full-scale invasion (I don't think they will because they don't have to), I doubt there will be a large-scale partisan war simply due to the terrain; from a geographic standpoint Ukraine is a very easy country to roll into compared to Afghanistan or Vietnam.

Soviet Union needed 9 years of full concentration - with the experienced army, coming straight out of WWII. You underestimate both Ukraine and Ukrainians. But it was awfully bloody and cruel the last time - on both sides. God forbid it happens again.

[ag]

Ukrainians won't fight because they are a (relatively) well off country. It's not worth it to give up their comfortable existence to maybe die fighting the Russians.

Afghanistan, on the other hand, was a third world country. Even if a Mujaheddin died, he wasn't losing much.

That's just silly, losing your life is a big deal for everyone. Geography is the main difference, you need adequate terrain (mountains, jungles, swamps) to fight a superior enemy.

Ukrainians fought for 9 years after WWII. So did Lithuanians. But for the moment they are trying to avoid the full-scale war. Civilians try to demonstrate: they have been badly hurt in several Donetsk cities. It is too early for a partisan war to have started: let us hope it never does.

Thats counting some very small groups in the end.

But OK, Ill qualify it: to fight succesfully against a superior enemy you need adequate terrain. A sustained partisan war in some remote forests and swamps is not enough in itself.

A partisan war is a horrible thing. There is a reason people do not start it lightly. If Russia continues, it may well happen. If it does, it will be a horrid humanitarian crisis, believe me.

[ag]

If NATO was going to intervene over Ukraine they would have already. If there is a war between NATO and Russia it will start over the Baltics.

NATO will not intervene over Ukraine. However, conditional on his success in Ukraine, the probability that Putin will go further West is nearly 1.

[ag]

It seems that in the Russian speaking city of Odessa the pro-Russians are also beginning their protests.  This might be supported by the Russians in Transnistria. Several people killed already.

Actually, there was a major pro-Ukrainian demonstration, which was attacked by pro-Russian forces. Let us keep terminology straight: the protests are pro-Ukrainian, the attacks are pro-Russian.

[ag]

Soviet Union needed 9 years of full concentration - with the experienced army, coming straight out of WWII. You underestimate both Ukraine and Ukrainians. But it was awfully bloody and cruel the last time - on both sides. God forbid it happens again.

The Soviets by no means had to "fully concentrate" against the minor Ukrainian insurgency after WWII. You are dramatically overstating the effectiveness and scale of the Ukrainian insurgency. They were never a real threat to the Soviet State, they were a pest.

You're acting like the Ukrainian insurgency after WWII was some kind of major war.

Locally, it was.  There were many victims, both in Ukraine and in Lithuania. I had a great-uncle (who just died a few days ago). Upon graduation from a law school around 1950 he was offered a choice between a job in a town in Lithuania and another in a rural district in Russia´s far north (rural parts of the Arkhangelsk province). Even though he was an urban dweller (had lived for years in Leningrad), and even though he had been badly wounded in the War and doctors insisted that he needed a warmer climate, he did not hesitate: mortality among the Soviet officials in Lithuania was simply too high to even consider going there.  And big chunks of Western Ukraine were worse.

It was a very cruel guerrilla war, and it was active for years. Yes, it was suppressed: but, then, the Soviets managed to suppress Chechnya as well. Of course, they simply deported the Chechens - but, then, again, their policies in big chunks of Ukraine were not much different: mass deportations, if not as wholesale as in the Caucasus. And the number of Ukrainian nationalists in Soviet camps was always staggering: and their terms were horrendous. Many people wound up spending well over 25 years in jail. Ukrainian nationalism for years continued to be one of the greatest fears of the Soviet officialdom - and that is, despite complete lack of any support from abroad (the world accepted Soviet domination of Ukraine without a question).