🇳🇱 Politics and Elections in the Netherlands: General Election (Nov 22)

[DavidB.]

Frans Timmermans is on a roll again. In 2014, at the UN Security Council, he infamously made up an entire story about the MH17 victims' feelings on the plane, as if they had been holding hands and hugging their children; he almost started crying while telling it. After being confronted about it by tv host and debate moderator Jeroen Pauw, he got so angry he never wanted to join his show Pauw anymore. Family members of MH17 victims were shocked. Yesterday, Pauw spoke about it on tv again, saying Timmermans' statements were "scandalous".

And now, Timmermans did it again. Summer storm Poly tragically cost a 53-year old woman in Haarlem her life on July 5th, and Frans Timmermans said this was "clearly related to climate change." Experts debunked this. Now, the deceased woman's partner gave an angry interview to De Telegraaf, saying Timmermans had certain facts about him and his partner wrong and that his comments had disrupted and politicized his mourning process.

All of this is just the beginning. Timmermans is loved on the left but absolutely hated on the right, even more than Sigrid Kaag. The MH17 story and Poly story will be repeated until the very end. This election may well become a referendum on Timmermans, which will doubtlessly deliver PvdA/GL a lot of seats, but will also make it very difficult for him to cooperate with anyone - especially when he has decimated all his allies.

[DavidB.]

Timmermans knows his classics; when asked whether he truly thinks he can be the face of political change at age 62, he provides the exact same response as Ronald Reagan.

https://twitter.com/Tiesemans/status/1682411992114405376

[DavidB.]

The Timmermans I remember was less cringe tbh. I think he'll flop. He's still an excellent communicator, but he's been Brusselised. And not in the architectural way.

I will vote for almost anyone if required to stop him from becoming PM, even including the VVD (hope it isn't needed...) - but I found this response to be very witty. The cringe part was his announcement in the first place, with very vague, indeed Brusselized language about change. And his statement on the Netherlands needing more "swag" had heavy "how do you do, fellow kids?" vibes.

Purely rhetorically, Timmermans is strongest when speaking normally and making very bold and clear statements on the edge of the truth (his MH17 comment was a feature, not a bug) in order to be inspiring. Vague politician-like claptrap about change doesn't make him sound better. I think he feels as if he is little out of touch with Dutch politics, and the vague stuff is a good way to play it safe and not offend anyone in GL or PvdA. But it won't work.

[DavidB.]

The only BIJ1 MP and party leader, Sylvana Simons, will not be a candidate in the election. She is chronically ill and very often absent from parliament. Still, her decision is a surprise. She says that in addition to her illness, she did not feel at home in The Hague; earlier, she said she "felt unsafe in this environment, where racism, Islamophobia and sexism are rampant." In addition, she says she was hurt by the two remaining BIJ1 council members in Amsterdam quitting the party and blaming Simons for not being there for them. Simons: "I have to defend myself against frames that are untrue. I can do it, but I don't want to do so anymore."

I am guessing Simons feared to win 1 seat again, in my opinion the likeliest outcome if she had run - I can imagine having to do all the (visible) work alone can make an MP feel lonely and vulnerable.

This is a disaster for BIJ1, as she was basically the only known person in the party. They are still set to "continue" (which I presume means: running in the November election) but at this point it would seem unlikely (but not impossible) for them to win a seat. There is talk about BIJ1 teaming up with De Socialisten (The Socialists), a splinter group mostly consisting of people from the expelled former SP youth wing Rood. While their ideals are similar and they probably agree on policy, there would be massive cultural differences as well as a different focus. I don't think it would be very wise for BIJ1 to do it; there is no electoral market for open communism.

--

The exodus continues: DENK party leader Farid Azarkan is also out. This won't necessarily mean anything for them, although Azarkan was key in attracting Moroccan voters in addition to Turkish ones, but I do wonder who will be the new leader - Tunahan Kuzu again?

[DavidB.]

First Ipsos/EenVandaag poll since government collapse has VVD as biggest party. VVD-BBB-PVV-JA21-SP have a majority. PvdA gain a lot, but all from progressive/left-wing parties (D66, PvdD, Volt, SP). PVV also gain 4 seats, mostly at the expense of JA21, who seem to collapse in all polls now.

https://twitter.com/opiniepanel/status/1683794399430426626

[DavidB.]

So now van der Plas says she doesn't want to be PM. I assume this is preparing the ground for Omtzigt?

It would be the most logical option, but both Omtzigt’s and BBB’s press officers have said this will not happen. This is politics so I still wouldn’t rule it out, but it doesn’t seem too likely as of now. Apparently Omtzigt is critical of “Big Agriculture” and finds animal rights to be important, which I didn’t know. We have to wait for Omtzigt’s statement, which should come this week. To me it seems as if he will either not be running or that he’ll be running only in Overijssel.

[DavidB.]

The CDA have officially attempted to get Omtzigt back - the chairman sent him a letter - but he says “that book is closed”. Contrary to what I said in my previous post, rumors get stronger that he will indeed attempt to run and not just in Overijssel. Had expected something today already, in a newspaper on Saturday, but we have to wait some more…

[DavidB.]

https://twitter.com/PopulismUpdates/status/1685751696356786176?t=gnVXfLoHEFXxrMeUgAiLwQ&s=19

He’s been posting about him since 2021 already. Another “issue” that is so incredibly relevant to Dutch voters.

[DavidB.]

Pieter Omtzigt has tweeted he needs more time to make a decision. First, he will go on holidays with his family. A commentator in a vulgar mood calls his prolonged wait the "cockteasing an entire nation" and while I would self-evidently not use such terms, I understand where they come from... In any case, time is running out. The longer he waits, the more difficult it will get to assemble a list of competent and loyal people.

Meanwhile, PvdA MP Henk Nijboer will not stand for re-election. Nijboer, in parliament since 2012, is the PvdA's financial specialist. He talks about "concerns regarding the course of the party" and implies he does not agree with the upcoming merger of parliamentary groups with GroenLinks. "A broad progressive people's party should also appeal to groups in the center to offer an alternative to right-wing governments. They don't feel heard nearly enough by us. (...) Solidarity cannot exist without controlling the borders, tackling climate change requires more public support, and on financial and economic themes Drees' motto still stands: "Not everything is possible, and certainly not everything at once."

procedural question: doesn't the Netherlands have only a single nationwide constituency? What exactly does it entail, then, for a party list to only run in a single district? Only those voters will see them as an option on their ballot?

The Netherlands has a single nationwide constituency for the seat allocation, but, for mostly administrative reasons, 20 "electoral regions". I don't completely understand how this works - Freek is much better at these technicalities than I am, I believe - but the important thing to know is that it is, indeed, possible not to run in all electoral regions, and indeed, only these voters see them as an option on the ballot.

There are broadly two situations in which this happens.

Option 1 is many of the big parties - historically mostly CDA and PvdA - having the same first 50 or so candidates nationwide and then 10 or 20 "regional" candidates which differ per region. These candidates will probably not be elected but may attract voters. In theory, the candidate could actually be elected and the party may like it or not, but the person will be elected if he or she reaches the electoral threshold - and if Pieter Omtzigt had only been a regional candidate for the CDA in 2012 he would also have done so, due to the votes he racked up in his native Overijssel.

Option 2 is that of fringe parties (often lunatics) who don't get enough signatures in all electoral regions but still want to run in those where they do get them (usually the most populous ones).

Option 2b would be new parties in general who run in all 19 electoral regions in mainland NL, but not on the Caribbean Islands, as the limited number of votes to pick up there isn't worth the hassle. For instance, BBB ran in 19 electoral regions but not at the Antilles in 2021.

In other words: the standard is that parties run all realistically electable candidates in all regions, and therefore people don't tend to look into the details of the system - which now matter in Omtzigt's case. For the record: he received 67,626 preferential votes in Overijssel alone in 2021, when he was still part of the CDA. 69,486 votes were needed for a seat nationwide.

For that matter, how do district lists work when all the districts are part of one national constituency? If a party lists different candidates in each electoral district (and not just running the same list of candidates everywhere) how do the seats won by the party get allocated between the different candidate lists?

This is a good question and I cannot answer it. Come to think of it, our electoral system seems to provide for the possibility of having completely different lists in every electoral region - the only issue is that in this case, the candidates from more populous provinces would probably all be elected. No party does this, though. As far as I understand, seats are allocated based on the total tally of all votes cast for a party (that means on all lists of this party), then these seats are allocated first to candidates who crossed the threshold for preferential votes (as long as the party obtains enough seats to allocate those) and then to those lower on the list, depending on how many seats a party has left. But if party A runs a different list in every electoral region, obtains 8 seats and only has 3 candidates who reach the preferential threshold (let's say the number 1, 2 and 3 - somewhere), I would not know how the Electoral Council determines which numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 can take up the seat, out of the 20 regions, provided that none have reached the preferential threshold. Maybe Freek or someone else can help us out here.

[DavidB.]

Who does it look like Omtzigt benefits or hurts? The hypothetical polling seems to show him forming the largest party and taking a lot of support from many parties, though maybe more from the right. Does it look like he has the skills to actually live up to those expectations?

In these hypothetical polls, it looks like BBB, PVV and smaller parties SP and JA21 stand to lose the most if Omtzigt were to run. So yes, your conclusion is correct: it would hurt everyone a little, but some right-wing parties a lot. The extent to which he can live up to this partly depends on his other candidates and his campaign. Currently, Omtzigt can almost be whatever you want him to be - not entirely, because he has a track record of 20 years in parliament and he has recently outlined his ideas in the book A new social contract. But it will be interesting to see whether potential BBB/Omtzigt or PVV/Omtzigt voters will like his ideas on, say, immigration, agriculture or climate when forced to explain them. I am not completely sure these voters will then stick with Omtzigt. If he's running, attacking his positions will also become fair game - no one does this right now and no one has done it. But I still think his chances are strong. The polls for "preferred PM" tend to be a good indicator and he tops them all.

From a left-wing point of view, there are two ways of viewing it: on the one hand, right-wing votes move towards an option that can barely even be called right-wing, which left-wingers could consider to be positive. On the other hand, it is much more difficult to attack Omtzigt than to attack BBB or the VVD - first of all because the political fate of those who attacked him before (Rutte, Hoekstra, De Jonge) hasn't exactly been stellar and Omtzigt scored sympathy points with most voters with it, and second of all because Omtzigt's political views are probably about where the median Dutch voter is, unlike Van der Plas and Wilders (although they try on most issues). And I still think Omtzigt would prefer a coalition very similar to the one preferred by BBB: with BBB themselves, VVD, JA21 and SP, and maybe what's left of the CDA. A PvdA running separately would be a somewhat logical partner, but a PvdA-GL under Frans Timmermans less so.

Meanwhile, in the LOLnews department: the invisible BVNL MP Olaf Ephraim has split off from his party after being denied a spot on the candidate list. This means we now have a record 21 parliamentary groups. It is completely unclear why Van Haga didn't simply give him spot #3 and called it a day, because they will never get 3 seats. Ephraim retaliated with a spree of bellicose messages in an internal BVNL WhatsApp group, which have of course leaked. He implies he will now debate Van Haga as much as possible in parliament during the budget debates in September. Van Haga, meanwhile, has appointed former 50Plus leader Henk Krol as his "running mate" (this cursed term means: #2 on the list). Henk Krol is the champion of missed political opportunities and tends to enter politics with people who are politically finished soon afterwards. Perhaps it is also not the best idea to appoint someone on the issue of "pensions" when said person illegally refused to pay his staffers at newspaper GayKrant their pensions. This is truly the Dutch populist right at its very worst.

[DavidB.]

Omtzigt seems to be popular among some left wing voters which is kind of weird considering his 20 year parliamentarian streak. He has been a rather conservative CDA member. Of course we do not know his future ideas yet so maybe he will pander to left wing voters during the campaign.

I think Omtzigt's popularity among left-wing voters can be explained very easily: he stands up for marginalized people who are being crushed by the government machinery. This is the core of his legacy in parliament, most importantly because of his role in exposing the childcare benefits scandal - and it is what the left is supposed to do. I also don't think his streak in parliament can be unequivocally called "conservative". He is more of a euroskeptic, true, but seems more left-wing on socio-economic issues than the CDA (see also: his support for increasing the minimum wage by 10%, which was eliminated by Hoekstra from the 2021 draft election manifesto at the last moment). On immigration he is more to the right, but on agriculture more to the left.

As to the SP joining such a right wing coalition, the idea is quite absurd. The SP does not want to be in a coalition with VVD, let alone JA21.

This may be your impression but it is not what they say. They excluded the VVD in 2017 but softened this position that fall. Then SP chairman Ron Meyer in De Volkskrant: "Excluding a party is never permanent."

In 2021, Lilian Marijnissen only excluded cooperation with the PVV and Forum for Democracy but she did explicitly not exclude cooperation with the VVD. From NOS: "She does not wish to anticipate on specific potential coalition partners, but will definitely not [enter a coalition] with PVV and Forum for Democracy. She does not wish to completely exclude the VVD [as potential partner], but they are at the bottom of the list." For Marijnissen, the most important thing was the SP would "only enter a government that would decrease inequality".

On the local and provincial level, VVD and SP have already cooperated successfully. With Rutte out and the new VVD leader not carrying a lot of negative baggage, the most important obstacle for VVD-SP cooperation on the national level is removed. I don't think it is far-fetched at all. The only alternative for the SP is ever-further marginalization in opposition.

[DavidB.]

We will see. All I'm saying is that I don't think we can exclude the possibility. In fact, I think that out of all the nearly impossible options on the menu, this combination may turn out to be one of the least impossible ones (even if some SP members will indeed be angry and leave). Of course, if a version without the VVD would be numerically possible (which would be the case if Omtzigt and/or BBB get very big and the VVD drop compared to current polls), that would have the SP's very strong preference.

[DavidB.]

Great explanation, many thanks!

Some developments:

- Former CDA Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs Mona Keijzer, who proved to be a vote magnet both in 2012 and 2017, has officially cancelled her party membership. In 2021, Keijzer was fired from the previous Rutte-III government for criticizing the introduction of COVID passports based on testing, recovery or vaccination, which excluded lots of people from society. She always stood out within the CDA as an outspoken woman (from "the region" - Volendam, close to Amsterdam but culturally miles away) with somewhat of an independent streak. Her personal popularity could not be ignored, but she was never allowed a top job by the old boys network.

Her official reason to leave was talk of the potential CDA leadership candidacy of Hubert Bruls, mayor of Nijmegen, former leader of the Security Deliberation Council consisting of the 25 mayors who lead the "security regions" (which suddenly had much power during COVID) and a controversial figure because of his hardline pro-lockdown stances. Google some images of him to see why this stance was particularly controversial in his personal case. Bruls denies he is in the race, though, and I truly doubt he will lead the party (and if so, they're done).

Expect to see Keijzer back with BBB or Omtzigt, perhaps as candidate for Prime Minister. She's definitely not finished.

- Stephan van Baarle is the likely candidate to take over the leadership of DENK. Van Baarle, 31 years old, has been an MP since 2021 and was DENK's leader in Rotterdam before. In other words, he is very much of an insider and the heir-apparent. Van Baarle is half-Turkish and declares himself to be agnostic. It will be interesting to see how this flies with DENK's core voters - also because Van Baarle received a much poorer personal vote than Kuzu and Azarkan in 2021. I think the party may be in trouble if Kuzu decides not to stand anymore.

- D66 foreign affairs spokesman Sjoerd Sjoerdsma, a former diplomat and one of the most visible MPs on Russia/Ukraine, has decided not to stand for re-election. Sjoerdsma has been in parliament since 2012.

- Following Nicki Pouw-Verweij, one more JA21 MP has decided not to stand for re-election for JA21: Derk Jan Eppink, who was also on the conservative side of the party. Earlier this year, both Eppink and Pouw-Verweij signed a letter criticizing the party's supposed lack of democracy and professionalism.

This means Joost Eerdmans will be the only JA21 MP continuing; it adds to the impression that the core pool of candidates for the party has become rather narrow and the party's positioning more liberal (in the Fortuynist sense). Annabel Nanninga, currently the JA21 leader in the Senate and on the council in Amsterdam, will now be a candidate for the lower house - I can only imagine her at #2 of the list - and leave the Senate.

- Lilian Helder has decided not to stand for re-election "for the PVV". Helder, a lawyer, has been the PVV's spokeswoman on justice, security, and crime since 2010. She has been widely viewed as a good MP and even Justice Minister Yesilgöz (VVD) sent out a tweet recognizing this. The question is: what does "for the PVV" mean here? Would you add these words when you don't intend to stand for re-election at all? The transfer window is still open, after all, and there might be one or two clubs looking to strengthen their squads...

- Anonymous Twitter account Haagse Insider, often pedantic and annoying but also often surprisingly right about rumors and scoops, is saying there is an attempt to create a new Social Democratic list, separate from PvdA/GL. Not sure if true, but I wouldn't be terribly surprised either, as some momentum against the joint list is building. Following MP Henk Nijboer not standing for re-election in opposition to the joint list, PvdA board member and former MP Lutz Jacobi (the only PvdA MP to vote against the Joint Strike Fighter war plane in 2013) has decided to quit her board membership over the merger. Jacobi wants broader cooperation with the left (probably with the SP, too) and is unhappy with the top-down implementation of it. She also says all the organizational talk distracts from the issues that matter. You do wonder how much political space there really is for a more 'Blue Labour' social democratic party, though - in 2017, the Nieuwe Wegen party from former PvdA MP Jacques Monasch received only 14,000 votes.

[DavidB.]

So... the SP but for genepool Freethinkers rather than genepool Catholics?

They can merge and call it SDA.

That would be the Bosniak splitoff from DENK.

[DavidB.]

On Monday, the CDA party board will nominate Henri Bontenbal as leadership candidate. Bontenbal (40) has been an MP since 2021 and represents a younger generation, both in terms of age and in terms of baggage in politics, something many CDA prominents were calling for. He studied physics and has a background in energy. Over the last years he was the spokesman for climate and energy, on which he supports nuclear energy and a "green industrial strategy", and he stood out with his knowledge in debates. Minus for Bontenbal: he is from Rotterdam, not from "the region", where the Christian Democrats have lost most of their votes recently.

CDA members who oppose Bontenbal's candidacy have 10 days (starting from Monday) to find a different candidate supported by at least 3 provincial or 10 local party chapters. In that case, the party congress will vote between the candidates on September 23. This is not expected to happen - no one wants a redux of the disastrous De Jonge/Omtzigt saga.

[DavidB.]

New VVD leader Dilan Yesilgöz has confirmed she will not outright exclude the PVV as coalition partner. She says she will wait for Wilders' election manifesto to see whether there is ground for cooperation. A watershed moment - Rutte had excluded any cooperation since Wilders' "fewer Moroccans" moment in 2014 and based his entire 2017 campaign on this exclusion. Now, Rutte claims to support Yesilgöz' position, as do other VVD prominents such as Rotterdam party leader Vincent Karremans. Yesilgöz emphasizes that Wilders claimed to want "a new start" and awaits whether he comes up with "constructive proposals".

On the other hand, the new CDA leader Henri Bontenbal, who is perceived as being more on the left of his party, continues to exclude the PVV.

[DavidB.]

First Peil.nl poll after the summer break shows big swing towards VVD, PVV, away from BBB and JA21. Numbers compared to July 2 poll:

VVD 28 (+8)
PvdA-GL 26 (+1)
BBB 21 (-6)
PVV 19 (+5)
PvdD 9 (-1)
D66 8 (-2)
SP 8 (-)
CDA 8 (+2)
FVD 5 (-)
CU 4 (-)
Volt 4 (-2)
JA21 3 (-4)
SGP 3 (-)
DENK 2 (-)
50Plus 1 (-)
BVNL 1 (-)
BIJ1 0 (-1)

BBB's hesitancy around the question whether Van der Plas is their PM candidate doesn't look very strong and this impression has been lingering for the entire summer. In addition, nobody talks about the farmers anymore. Looks like they peaked too early. Meanwhile, JA21 has seen Pouw-Verweij and Eppink leave, which I guess gives voters the impression the party is ending. On the other hand, I had definitely underestimated the VVD's capability to move on from the Rutte era. Yesilgöz looks like she could be the next Dutch PM. The PVV gain too - immigration being the top issue now, Wilders' milder tone, and the potential prospect of playing a serious role in government formation all help him (and make sure there is barely any space for JA21 anymore).

The CDA's slight gain is probably due to the massive amount of attention for boring Bontenbal's leadership candidacy over the last few days, with press having nothing to write about, but I expect this bump to fade out - he has the charisma of a wet newspaper, as we say in Dutch.

Polls also don't look very hopeful for D66. Jetten's campaign has been very uninspiring so far - he keeps repeating the sentence "new energy for the Netherlands", a reference to his ministerial portfolio, but in reality it is very low-energy (sounds too much like marketing language and is too vague) and I think he can do a lot better. A missed opportunity to talk about actual issues now that PvdA-GL also don't do that. Wonder what D66' electoral floor is - because they might hit it.

[DavidB.]

Omtzigt is IN. Confirmed in Tubantia. His new party is named Nieuw Sociaal Contract (New Social Contract), just like his book. He says he has a manifesto, but no candidate list, but has until Oct 8th for it. More news to follow.

https://twitter.com/pieteromtzigt/status/1693352512747634907

[DavidB.]

Expecting something along the lines of NSC-VVD-BBB-CDA-SP now. Omtzigt excludes PVV (and FVD) because their proposals would be against the rule of law.

If you view BBB and NSC as CDA splitoffs, you could see a coalition like this as a new way to form somewhat of a center-right coalition without nationalist right involvement, a road that had been blocked after the LPF/PVV breakthrough. Mathematically this only becomes possible when sufficient numbers of former PVV/FVD/JA21 voters jump ship to NSC/BBB, and/or when the left lose voters to these center-right parties - both will probably be the case, but more the former than the latter.

[DavidB.]

He says he has a manifesto, but no candidate list, but has until Oct 8th for it. More news to follow.

honest question: how will he possibly recruit and vet a full slate of serious candidates in just 49 days? has there been any speculation/discussion in Dutch media about this? Because he's basically starting from scratch here and it's not like he has an existing network of party activists to recruit from.

It is unclear. Omtzigt himself has said he does not want to become "too big" as he "has learned from LPF and Forum for Democracy", which grew too quickly and then imploded.

The media are absolutely paying attention to it. Today, NRC published this article (ChatGPT can probably translate it quite well), in which the option of running in only a number of electoral districts is explored. Two political scientists note how remarkable Omtzigt's message really is: "vote for me, but not everybody, please".

[DavidB.]

Timmermans was approved to lead the PvdA-GL list earlier today by a overwhelmingly positive party member vote.

And it has been revealed that the name of the list will be GroenLinks-PvdA.

[DavidB.]

Let's act as if we have a normal party system. We lump BBB and NSC in with CDA. JA21, PVV and FVD are one party. PvdD and SP are also one party. And we shamelessly call GL part of the PvdA.

Then you get: CDA 47, PvdA 28, VVD 22, right of VVD 19, left of PvdA 13, D66 7, small Christian left 4, SGP 4, one issue party (DENK) 3, another one issue party (Volt) 3.

Actually a result with a reasonable amount of similarity to the actual results in the 80s. The only major difference: PvdA (and the entire left) clearly lower and the nationalist right clearly up.

The Christian Democratic pole in the center is by far the biggest and it can choose as its partner between the liberal right (VVD, although no majority here so D66 or parts of nationalist right would be required) or the social democratic left (PvdA), as it has been in most of our post-war history.

If you look beyond party names, this is actually a reversal to the mean - the only exceptions were the Purple era and the Rutte era.

[DavidB.]

Speaker Vera Bergkamp (D66) has announced she will not run for Parliament again. She was controversial because of her role in the investigation of former popular Speaker Khadija Arib (PvdA) on harassment charges (which some deem questionable), for her indecisive leadership in debates where alleged boundaries were crossed, and for the politically motivated way she was likely promoted to the job in the first place - i.e. the job was offered to her as part of the VVD's atoning sacrifice to convince Sigrid Kaag to form a coalition including Mark Rutte.

Kees van der Staaij, SGP leader and "constitutional conscience" of Parliament, will also say farewell after a 25-year stint in Parliament. He modernized the SGP but also stuck to the party's ideological core in a time of increased political fragmentation, in which the party suddenly found itself in a position of increased political significance. He will be succeeded as leader by Chris Stoffer, MP since 2018.

Meanwhile, the JA21 implosion continues. Two out of the party's three MEPs and four former Members of the Provincial States (among which three provincial leaders) have quit the party - in an open letter, they say Annabel Nanninga's candidacy for Parliament proves the party leadership stands above the internal rules, which in turn proves that the party's democratization and professionalization process has failed. Earlier, two out of the three MPs, Eppink and Pouw-Verweij, had refused to stand for Parliament for JA21 again. All of these people are deemed to be part of the conservative faction of the party.

This question may have already been answered but, what's Omtzigt appeal? I mean, the guy had been flirting with the idea of running or creating a party for a long time, and now that he has created one, he doesn't confirm if he will file the maximum number of candidates for MPs and doesn't want to be Prime Minister. Is there a possibility of Omtzigt having the same fate of BBB, its "15 minutes of fame" and then starting to fell as the novelty effect ends?

Omtzigt's appeal is that he has a credible record in standing up for people who have been marginalized by the government machinery, and that he is incredibly tenacious in his questioning of the government regardless of whether his party is in coalition or in opposition.

On the one hand, every party that grows too big too quick has a problem. If Omtzigt wins 31 seats, 30 MPs won't be Omtzigt, which is always going to pose a risk. On the other hand, Omtzigt's personal popularity is enormous; his approvals are sky-high across the board. He is undoubtedly set to disappoint people once his positions on certain contentious issues (climate, agriculture, immigration) become clearer or when his party has to make compromises in government, but his appeal isn't based on one issue (such as BBB, arguably) and the two themes around which he focuses his campaign, better governance and improving people's livelihood, are broad, classic Christian Democratic, and not easily fixed. One former CDA member called it "the liberation of Christian Democracy from the shackles of the CDA party" and that's an interesting perspective.

[DavidB.]

Peil.nl/De Hond also has a new poll - with NSC, for the first time - and interesting voter flow charts.

The poll



Same picture as I&O, but VVD a little higher and PvdA/GL a little lower. Interesting, because De Hond always used to have quite a negative house effect for the VVD and tended to overpoll "populist" parties - but this could in fact be his weighing of a group that cares a lot about immigration and has now returned to the VVD.

Digging deeper, 28% of all voters would vote for NSC or BBB and another 20% consider to vote for either or both of them. In this figure, "double counts" (NSC voters who consider BBB and vice versa) are already eliminated.

De Hond then looks at the three biggest winners (NSC, BBB, PvdA/GL) and the three biggest losers (CDA, D66, VVD) compared to GE21. Values are expressed in terms of seats.

The winners



This chart shows where NSC gains come from - and the answer is: pretty much everywhere, but more from the center-right (the VVD and D66 figures surprise me) and the right. Note that you don't see BBB and JA21 here because these parties didn't win so many seats in GE21 yet, although I suspect among the high figure for "Andere Partij" (other party) there should be a lot of JA21 voters in 2021. But most (former) JA21/BBB voters came from VVD/CDA/PVV only after GE21. Many of these voters have now moved on to NSC, but not from all parties equally, as we will see further on.



BBB are still set to gain 13 seats. It is interesting to see that they have lost a lot of CDA->BBB voters to NSC, while VVD->BBB and PVV->BBB voters tend to stick around more. Compared to GE21, BBB now gain the most from VVD and PVV, not from the CDA anymore. This is the first time we see this and it probably has to do with the more right-wing profile of BBB compared to NSC.

These former VVD voters sticking around for BBB are probably the ones in more rural areas. Assuming Omtzigt runs everywhere, I think NSC's electoral performance will be rather similar across the country (but with a peak in Twente, where Omtzigt is from, and potentially in "populist" areas) while BBB's result will be more periphery-based than in the PS election.


GL-PvdA (here erroneously called PvdA-GL) are the third biggest winner according to this poll. They manage to retain nearly all PvdA and GL voters in 2021, proving that there are barely any voters who are turned off because of the merger.

The remainder of their gains comes largely from D66, who had "borrowed" a lot of left-liberal swing voters when they won 24 seats in 2021 but were always likely to support the "winner" within the left-liberal bloc; PvdA in 2010 and 2012, D66/GL in 2017 and D66 in 2021. They also win 3 seats among former non-voters and 2 seats from other parties, likely PvdD, Volt and SP.

However, there is barely any appeal to center-right or nationalist right voters: almost all of the gains come from the left-liberal bloc. This will make it difficult for GL-PvdA to become the biggest party, as it looks like they are close to their electoral ceiling already. It looks like the number of voters who even consider to vote for the left has substantially decreased compared to 2012, when the PvdA won 38 seats and the left/progressive parties in total 71 seats.

The losers

The flow charts for the three biggest losers - CDA, D66 and VVD - are even more interesting because they show where these voters went in three sequences: GE21, the time of the Provincial election earlier this year (PS23), and the current poll. Note that the value for PS23 reflects the hypothetical poll for parliament at the time and not the actual vote in the PS23 election, but the two were almost identical.



This chart clearly shows the CDA has lost its voters in two sequences: first, they lost about half of their GE21 voters in PS23, most substantially to BBB. Then, they lost another third or so of the remaining voters, mostly to NSC. Many CDA GE21 -> BBB PS23 voters have also moved to NSC.



D66 immediately lost a lot of voters to PvdA/GL after Sigrid Kaag entered a government with Rutte again, clearly a move which many didn't think was in line with her promise of "new leadership". After their bad PS23 result and the presentation of Timmermans' candidacy, they lost even more voters to the combined left list.

However, also note that out of the 24 seats D66 won in 2021, there is a net transfer of 5 seats to NSC (4) and BBB (1), parties outside the left-progressive bloc. If the left-progressive bloc as a whole do worse than in 2021, these voters may be a big part of the explanation. My assumption is that many of them - at least the ones moving to NSC - think of themselves as centrist ("the reasonable alternative", as the D66 slogan once was) or value "statesmanship", which they saw both in Kaag and now in Omtzigt. D66's increasingly polarizing style (which Kaag herself didn't engage in so much) tends to turn such voters off.



In PS23, the VVD lost a lot of voters compared to GE21. Now, they are set to win a lot of them back. I think De Hond absolutely should have included non-voters in this chart, as the VVD actually tends to lose most voters in second order elections because of abstention; think of an average Dutch person not very interested in politics with a busy life, but who will vote for Rutte in the general election because of statesmanship/he is normal/we're not doing that badly/all the others are worse.

In any case, it is clear the VVD causing the government to collapse over the theme of asylum and immigration doesn't seem to hurt them and actually helps gaining back right-wing voters. They gain a total of 4 seats from JA21 and BBB voters in PS23 who voted VVD in 2021. "Don't knows" also tend to be strong for the VVD, which has become somewhat of the "default option" under Rutte. It is also clear that the leadership change to Yesilgöz has widely been received well (the I&O poll also had her favorabilities the highest of all party leaders, after Omtzigt). Their non-exclusion of the PVV probably also helps attract anti-immigration voters, especially now that JA21 are imploding.

I expect Yesilgöz to focus heavily on security, asylum, and immigration; the VVD result will end up lower (about 20 seats) if they don't succeed in setting the campaign agenda on these themes and higher (about 30) if they do. They will mostly be competing with BBB and PVV for these voters. A two-horse race with GL/PvdA doesn't seem so likely anymore, however, which decreases both parties' potential and benefits NSC/BBB.

[DavidB.]

The SP has presented its provisional list for the election. Three new faces in the top-10: two assistants in parliament, Sarah Dobbe (#6) and Bastiaan Meijer (#10), and a former alderman in Zutphen, Mathijs ten Broeke, at #8. The SP's most important loss is popular former MP Renske Leijten, known for her work on the childcare benefits scandal, who quit her job a month before the government collapsed. She will still be at #50 on the list - ending rumors about a transfer to her partner in crime Pieter Omtzigt's NSC - but is unlikely to take up her seat if elected.

A surprise: Jasper van Dijk, the SP's spokesman on immigration and foreign affairs, is at #9 only, which is probably an unelectable position. Van Dijk's legacy is a shift into a less "activist left" direction: he is very critical of labour migration and also pushed the party in a more pro-NATO, pro-Ukraine direction, which would have been unimaginable under his predecessors Sadet Karabulut and Harry van Bommel. Unsure whether his low position is his own choice (he's been in parliament since 2006) or the consequence of the necessity of renewal. In any case, the SP's continuous downward trend in the polls (currently about 5 seats, compared to 9 in 2021 and 14 in 2017) doesn't help.