What is God?

[Alcon]

Allow Google Image Search to help you!

Option A


Option B


Option C


Option D


Option E


I hope that answers your questions.  All of them.  I will assume it does.

[Alcon]

Beyond human comprehension.

Isn't certainty that something is beyond human comprehension sort of self-contradicting?

If you accept that a property of an entity is inability to be comprehended by humans, then that basically constitutes a concession that such an entity's existence would also not necessarily be observable.  So treating it as a certainty does not seem rational.

[Alcon]

No. I don't see why it should be either; you can easily acknowledge the existence of something while admitting that you will never be able to understand it anything more than an extremely basic level.

The very concession that humans are unable to empirically observe a phenomenon means they are not omniscient, and therefore are not capable of transcending their ability to observe.  You can acknowledge anything you want, but it is done through that lens.  Therefore, it is no less fallible than any other empirical observation you make -- owing to the complexity of the issue, I'd argue more.

This is essentially the problem I have with both hard theism and hard atheism, but the former is more common.

That depends what you mean by "observable", doesn't it. But, then again, I wasn't really thinking of observation.

Then, other than observation, how did you reach the conclusion you stated?

Of course it isn't rational. I never claimed it to be rational. Rationality is a human concept anyway; an attempt to impose order (as we see it anyway) on chaos. Not that that's necessarily or always a bad thing. Many good things have come from it. It's just we should be more aware of its limits than we generally are; rationality does not (and obviously does not) have an objective existence.

That is a somewhat impotent definition of rationality.  "1=1" is not an "attempt to impose order"; in fact, I would as go as far as to argue that it is objective.  Could our sense of what is objective be incorrect?  Yes, but that does not mean we should assume that such an observed phenomenon is subjective.  That does not follow under any sense of rationality.

There are, I'll concede, other levels on which our "rationality" is a cultural construct, but I am not talking about those.

Everything we do has inate flaws. Religion is, in this respect and many others, no different from other human institutions.

I don't think anyone is arguing that we should ignore the flaws in other human institutions.  I would also argue that religion receives special treatment unlike any other human institution, though, so in that sense it's "different."

[Alcon]

As for 1=1, does the number "1" have an empirical existence? Outside of a reference? That is we can have one orange, one computer, one person but one by itself... one of what? Isn't the number one by itself an undefinable concept? an abstraction upon reality?

Err...the concept is something being itself, not anything to do with "1." 

[Alcon]

As for 1=1, does the number "1" have an empirical existence? Outside of a reference? That is we can have one orange, one computer, one person but one by itself... one of what? Isn't the number one by itself an undefinable concept? an abstraction upon reality?

The concept is something being itself, not anything to do with "1."

Ah okay, I was taking a purely numerical interpretation (perhaps if you said 2=2 it would be more clear). However I still think my argument stands, or rather what you are stating is nothing more than an abstract tautology on its own. The important thing here is define something being 'itself' (A chair is a chair.. but this chair may have features that separates it from other chairs.. like style, construction, material, etc). Yes I admit this is a detour.

My argument is that rationality's relevance as a human concept is limited in this case.  Yes, an empirical observation of the way reality exists is seen through a subjective lens.  But "rationality" shouldn't be besmirched like that.  I concede that a lot of "rational acts" are based on underlying axioms that relate to cultural values.  But there are more fundamental rationalities, which I feel no discomfort in assuming are objective (even if I cannot prove it, not being omniscient), that relate to operations of logic, etc.

I mean, those are not observed through any less faulty means, but the distinction is meaningful.  Would you, for instance, say that "an attempt to impose order on rationality" is an apt description for that separate class of rationality?  I wouldn't.  Moreover, I think it competes against the assertion that rationality probably lacks an objective existence, let alone that it concretely (or definitionally ) does.

[Alcon]

But how can empirically prove whether an act/belief/whatever is truly rational nor just a cultural value? Or for that matter and more radically, whether a priviledged something: an act/belief/whatever as rational and therefore good is itself a cultural value (why support the objective over the subjective?). Many - most societies - ideas of rationality would be alien to our. It was a 14th Century Theologian who invented Occam's Razor after all.

o/t: You're suchhh of a sociologist. 

I'm confused about what part of that I did not answer in the quoted portion.

You are assuming that the human mind organizes reality and its experiences in a 'rational' way. But the historical record shows otherwise (think of many hunter-gatherer societies - not 'rational' from our POV, but this is a very different issue which I can talk about at some length...).

I don't see where I made any such assumption.  I think you may be radically misinterpreting my argument, probably as a result of me radically mispresenting it, but I'm not sure how...

[Alcon]

I'm cool with that, and it's interesting (and unjustly undervalued in this kind of dialogue), but I feel that you're addressing the components of my analogy instead of how they relate.

[Alcon]

I'm cool with that, and it's interesting (and unjustly undervalued in this kind of dialogue), but I feel that you're addressing the components of my analogy instead of how they relate.

Well then I must have missed something, or my brain isn't functioning. What be your analogy again?

My analogy regarded tautologies and similar base logical operations.  My argument is that they aren't really prone to cultural relativism.  They could be, I suppose, but I see no justification against assuming they aren't.

(That's the short version because I am really, really, really sick right now and can't write anything smarter.  Sorry.  Later )

[Alcon]

woo, more zombie-mode posting.

I genuinely must be misunderstanding what you're saying, because how would the "symbols of language/mathematics themselves" be relevant in a tautology?

You're talking about some very interesting anthropological phenomena, but they are cultural limiting factors, not differences in the perception of reality.  The possible existence of greater than two objects is not defined by culture, even if it is not defined as such.  Much like that tribe in Brazil with no understanding of depth perception...

Unless, of course, you are arguing that our interpretation of tautology is a byproduct of cultural upbringing as much as theirs?  That is an argument I'm skeptical of

[Alcon]

Just want to mention that I'm on tap to reply to both Gully's and your post, Al, when I'm clear-headed and not on OTC drugs.

[Alcon]

Just want to mention that I'm on tap to reply to both Gully's and your post, Al, when I'm clear-headed and not on OTC drugs.

Considering that I replaced at a quarter past three in the morning, I think it's only fair if you reply before the drugs leave your system.

I just wasted all of my energy yelling at BrandonRowan.  I wish I'd read your post first.  I mean, you even switched out "replied" for "replaced."  If that's emotional manipulation, it's brilliant.  If it's not, go the hell to bed.  I'm not going to get any more reply-y tonight. 

[Alcon]

What I'm saying is that we use 'symbols' (language and maths) to describe things, including things we hold to be innately true (1=1, the red ball is a red ball) but that these symbols are products of human cognition which we then insert or project onto reality. The symbols themselves have no truth value (or if you want to invoke the language of linguistics, the relationship between the sign and the signified is completely arbitrary).

Define "truth value."  And for that matter, where are you reading into a claim that symbols aren't arbitrary cultural constructs?  That isn't relevant to the concept of tautology.

Also as to a large extent logic is a product of language that means... in certain languages for instance, logical paradox is gramatically impossible as it isn't in English. Also tautological description is not the only way of describing anything.. the red ball may be the red ball, but it is other things as (such as having a position in time and space).

...I'm not understanding the relevance of anything to my argument about the "thought mode" of faith.  Especially the last sentence.

Of course there are truths that exist outside of human experience and thus culture, such as gravity, but it is quite clear that human beings were not designed to know these things. God, to get back on topic, might be one of these things. (note: when I refer to 'culture' I'm generally refering to all aspects of human existence with the outside world as it is lived, at least in a modern society, whether certain attributes of your self are determined by "nature" (genetics) or "culture" (social constructionism, development, etc) is not important here, all your day to day actions are cultural in a specific sense, even those that are innately human, like anything sexual.)

I think you're kind of rambling.  Not that I mind, your stuff is always genuinely interesting, but it's making it hard to understand your central argument...

I think your argument is that the scientific method is a cultural byproduct as is the belief that the nature of the world can be derived through objective observation.  No?  That's an interesting argument, albeit an arguably self-defeating one   In fact, you're operating on the assumption that your culturally-impacted observation and methodology is valid in order to posit the argument itself.  So, you're conceding the weakness no less than I am.  I don't claim absolute, universal objectivity -- I would be insane to.  I am not, after all, God.

[Alcon]

I don't understand how I'm committing the fallacy if you aren't.  I understand that descriptions of reality can be subjective, and address "essences."  What makes a person the same person if they get amnesia?  All of our cells are replaced gradually, anyway.  Some fundamental concepts are culturally defined.

Again, "a rock is a rock" is not about what a "rock" is.  As I said before, the emphasis is on the tautology, not the description of a rock as having "rock" properties.  "Rock" properties are totally irrelevant to the tautology.  While it's an interesting tangent, it's therefore not pertinent to my original statement.  That is, a rock is not "a rock" because it has rock-like qualities; a rock is a rock because something is itself.

And if you are going to challenge that assumption on the basis of the Misplaced Concreteness fallacy, you've essentially misplaced concreteness in the fallacy's validity. 

[Alcon]

We agree, hurray. My misplaced concreteness comment was based on how you refer to language as refering in itself to reality (or at least my perception that it does) rather than how reality is perceived.

Yes it is, It is making a statement that it is a 'rock' and thus not a stone, a pebble, a turtle or anything else. This linguistic judgement is subjective.

How does it preclude it from being anything else? 

The idea I'm advancing is the reflexive property (x=x) and nothing else.  I don't think that is what you are responding to, considering "rockness" is an irrelevant property to reflexive logic.  The only cultural judgments I have to make in such a situation is that "something is itself."

Perhaps I can put it better this way, x being a specific property:  "if object is x, then object cannot also not be x."

My intent wasn't to drag in the frequent subjectiveness of x into the argument.  I think my original response (this may be another topic though, tbh) pertained to the idea that the logical operation of consistency is not a purely cultural construct.  Under such a scenario, "rockness" is taken as an axiom by both parties, so I don't think what you're arguing is for the most part situationally relevant.

I think the problem is here is that we both making some subtly different metaphysical assumption, but defining it is difficult.

Yeah, I don't think we disagree very much at all, if we do.  Which seems pretty inevitable in this sort of topic. 

[Alcon]

* I would hold that logic is a human invention and back to our original topic, thus flawed especially finding out about what we might call the transcendental. The argument that God can not exist because it 'refutes logic' assumes that logic is both an accurate description of reality and can be applied to the whole of totality (all that exists). Neither of which are very logical (or rather, empirical - given that most people now believe the two things to be same) assumptions. Reason is a limited tool, many of our experiences can not be reasoned with, usually we just invent or hear 'an explanation' and accept it is fact, the content of the explanation dependent on what we believe to be true or sounds true. But I'm rambling again...

Ignoring confirmation bias for a moment... 

On what basis do you assume that tenants of logic, such as reflexive identity, are culturalized human constructs instead of articulated observations?  Do you maintain that it is impossible to make even basic observations (about, say, mathematical operations) without being influenced by culture in a way that modifies the result of that operation?

Because, if so, I do not agree.

[Alcon]

But I'm not talking about something as culturally-defined as "rock" or "stone."  I am talking about taking a defined property (not an abstraction like "good" or "bad") accepted as axiomatic by both parties and testing for consistency. Moreover, I'm just advocating the assumption of correctness, not the objectivity.

And I can't think of any alternative systems pertaining to this specific instance, other than "screw this, I'll believe what I want!"  I don't know of any cultures that actually maintain that something can be simultaneously true and untrue?  Against what burden of proof would one be theoretically climbing?

P.S. Your article on Problems of Universals actually distinguishes particular and abstract objects in a way that seems relevant to what I'm arguing, nein?

Edit: Admittedly I just read the first few paragraphs...gotta bus to catch, but I didn't think this post would derail my chance to read/respond to it later.

[Alcon]

If it is accepted by both parties then it is to some extent a cultural item. You agree that we define the world around ourselves? After all if the two people disagree on whether it is a rock or a stone... then can we say anything axiomatic about it?

My argument is that there is a marked difference between an artificial concept ("rock" and "stone") and an operation of logic ("something is itself.")

There are theoretically cultures that could be grown to not directly observe the results of reality, yes.  I will concede that my argument does not hold up if you assume something other than observed reality is real, and likelier than observed reality.  But how are those Theoretical Cultures relevant to my argument?

Of course no culture holds things to be both true and untrue (at least none I know of). That's because 'culture' as a concept is to a certain extent an interpretation of reality. I believe here you are confusing Is-Ought or bringing in moral ideals into an area which doesn't have any. I am, from my point of view, describing language as I see it.. only if we have a particularly defined concept of reality (which apparently I am going against) could we say that I am making a "moral point". Perhaps a linguistic system should refer to reality as a whole, but it obviously does not. It's not a rock, or a stone, it is a zwigwag (a word I just made up).

Admittely this bit might not be completely well thought out: I'm a bit tired right now. But I really enjoy this discussion.

I do too, but how you've managed to turn a description of the reflexive property into a moral ideal is something I don't understand

How have I brought up morality here, in any way, shape or form?

(I don't mean to sound rude or anything here -- I'm enjoying this even more than I am being confused by it.)

[Alcon]

That's a lot of post, and there are stretches where I do not follow your logic at all.  I mean, I understand it all, but it seems like digressions, so I must not understand what you're actually saying.  For instance, I think I've clearly never said that words have truth value themselves, but that's like the third time you've rebutted that argument.  Am I missing something?

I also feel like you're continuously using arguments that pertain to, say, "woman" as a cultural construct.  Your argument is that "woman" has no truth value because it is a cultural construct.  I agree and never have implied that I don't.  My argument is that there are certain properties (such as, I don't know, "breasts" -- not the word, but perhaps the shape or feel) that aren't exactly (outside of description) subject to cultural bias.  That is, the existence of the thing with the properties described by "breasts" is, word issues aside, not subject to cultural pretense.

I understand that there is an off-chance that, despite every culture in the universe believing this, that they all feature the same reality-distorting bias.  There is also a chance that I am schizophrenic or in the Matrix.  I am not talking in objective absolutes; not being omniscient, I have no use for them.  I understand that "burden of proof" is structurally a concept of my own culture.  But assuming the underlying elements are apparent "universal observances" the will -- for practical purposes -- be the mode in which I operate.  And, going back and assuming our science is valid for a minute (because to make your argument you do too!), I don't think that is remotely unreasonable.

Either way, instead of continuing to relate this all to "property of 'rock'," something that I'm not actually arguing for, why not relate it to the reflexive property?

I wasn't accusing you of uber-relativism.  Even if I were, that's not a moral issue per se.  I'm accusing you of denying the usefulness of empiricism using an argument advanced from it.  Your argument resents on the same premise of the argument against which you are using it.  (Unless you're accusing it of being self-defeating or something, an entirely different tract of logic?)

[Alcon]

That's the problem I'm having too, to be honest

I understand your argument.  I agree with it.  I don't put as much emphasis on it, obviously, not being a sociologist, but I think it's entirely true--

But I was talking about tautologies originally.  I took your original comment to be a rejection of assuming that certain logical operations are "true," because they are instead just cultural manifestations (or whatev.)  Not speaking of something like "rock," but something like...I don't know, "fire-sky makes see circles pained" (or the phenomena entailed therein).  Now I don't really think you were arguing against assuming that those empirical observations are accurate, and even judging other empirical observations like that.  I just think you were arguing for sensitivity about how concrete we take general descriptions (my "bright blinding light" may be another's "white pain.")

Like, I think we've successfully boiled down our "disagreement" to the inevitable differing-focus non-disagreement.  Now I don't understand what your original argument was, since I think you understood mine but still seemed to be disagreeing.  I hate to just drop a good discussion because of that   It would be so unfulfilling!