Venezuela Politics and Elections - Presidential Election (July 28, 2024)

[MRCVzla]

There is just over a year left until the Presidential Elections can be held in Venezuela for 2024, depending on whether the basic guarantees that the democratic opposition always demands are met, the elections could be a little more "free" and competitive, without excessive persecution (in the form of disqualifications) of their leaders or of "kidnapping" of parties through judicial means, otherwise it will be like in 2018, an "electoral type event" where President Nicolás Maduro and the ruling party PSUV are guaranteed to extend for 6 more years for the so-called "Bolivarian Revolution" regime until 2031, it has even been rumored that, as in 2018, the date of the presidential election will be called early forward to "catch the opposition unexpectedly", although it is generally expected that the election is held around Q4 (mainly December) of 2024, in total, whoever is elected must take the oath of office no matter what on January 10, 2025 as is said in the 1999 Constitution.

First of all, in less than two weeks, in principle on October 22, the Primaries of the opposition Unitary Platform will be held to elect a candidate to face Maduro in 2024. The event will be self-managed by the platform itself, which has its own Electoral Commission, the process will be manual and public places will be used primarily as voting centers, with a total of more than 3,000. The diaspora of Venezuelans abroad will also be able to participate, but only those who are in the "Permanently Electoral Register." official in more than 85 cities in 32 countries (15 of them in the United States), it was originally planned that there would be at least technical help from the CNE to facilitate the use of schools and other educational institutions as voting centers as well as the management of a security plan with the military of the "Republic Plan", in fact a request was submitted in June to the electoral power, but in one of the regime's strategies of doing what they wanted, the CNE board resigned, forcing a new renewal of the entity by the National Assembly of the Chavista supermajority with the mediation of the "co-opted" opposition, the renewal resulted in maintaining the 3:2 relationship of control of the CNE by the ruling party with the until then Comptroller General and long-serving official Chavista rank Elvis Amoroso as the new President of the Electoral Power. A few weeks ago at the beginning of October, the new CNE belatedly "responded" to the request of the National Primary Commission, expressing its willingness to provide the necessary technical help, but in exchange for delaying the date of the Primaries, the background would also be include more candidacies and cancel those where politicians are presented who, in the eyes of the institutions, are disqualified from holding public office, either due to alleged corruption or "having supported the sanctions or being behind plans against the Government/considered Traitors to the Homeland", etcetera.

The latter has been the thorniest issue of the entire Primary process since some of the 13 candidates who registered at the end of June have this type of impediments to finally be a potential candidate for the 2024 election (and de facto, the main opposition leader). According to the order from left to right on the ballot paper:

1. Andrés Caleca (independent supported by Movimiento por Venezuela, MPV, center-left): Economist and frequent electoral expert within the opposition, former member of the CNE between 1998 and 2000.
2. Freddy Superlano (Voluntad Popular of Leopoldo López, center to center-right): former AN Deputy elected in 2015 and the original winner of the election for Governor of the state of Barinas in 2021, he is one of the candidates who has a disqualification ( the same one that did not let him take office and force a partial election where the opposition still won), a faction of the historic left-wing Bandera Roja party also supports him.
3. Andrés Velásquez (La Causa R, very critical center-left), eternal presidential candidate in the 80s and 90s (specially at 1993), former Governor of the state of Bolívar (from whom he alleges that the 2017 election was stolen) and also a former parliamentarian, his party has been in of the opposition's hard line in favor of abstentionism.
4. Gloria Pinho (independent): Doctor in Constitutional Law who even presented a TV show, she was a candidate in 2021 for Mayor of the Chacao municipality (Caracas metropolitan area) for the co-opted opposition (obtaining 4.6%), she has denied having ties with other presidential candidates not present in the primaries who are against the presence of certain disqualified candidates, as most independent candidates, runs a civic platform in favor a dialogue.
5. Henrique Capriles Radonski (Primero Justicia, center) (*): former Mayor of the Baruta municipality and Governor of Miranda, winner of the previous opposition Primaries in 2012 and defeated presidential candidate in 2012 and 2013, also disqualified for alleged involvement in the Odebrecht case but at the same time his figure within the opposition has been diminished by the most radical wing, Maduro still maintains resentment towards him for the protests after the 2013 election...
6. Luis "Baló" Farías (independent): one of the unknown candidates in the race, a veterinarian from the state of Mérida (west), was a member of the movement called "Rebellion of the regions" where several politicians from the co-opted opposition were also found, is presented with a civic, progressive and decentralized platform.
7. Carlos Prosperi (de jure Acción Democrática of Henri Ramos Allup, socialdemocrat): Lawyer from the "llanero" state of Guárico, former Deputy, he is one of the main favorites to win the primaries for his more moderate line, he is part of the official faction of the historic "tolda blanca" and one of the member parties of the so-called internal "G4" of the Unitary Platform, if he wins he would also be one of the candidates that would garner the greatest consensus among those who are not running for the primary, he also has the support of the Movimiento Futuro of former Governor of Lara and 2018 presidential candidate Henri Falcón who distanced himself from the co-opted opposition and the Ecological Movement of Venezuela (MOVEV)
8. María Corina Machado (Vente Venezuela, conservative): the former Deputy is the main favorite to win the primaries and be the new opposition leader, despite having been disqualified for years (the 15-year ban was recently renewed thanks to complaints from politicians of the opposition co-opted by her link with the Guaidó's "interim government" and support for sanctions against the Chavista regime), she and her party represent the hardest and most critical line against Chavismo, counting on strong popular support, also supported by others parties within the same line (previously abstentionist or pro-sanctions) such as Alianza Bravo Pueblo of the exiled-persecuted Antonio Ledezma, Convergencia, Gente Emergente, among others.
9. César Almeida (independent supported by the UPP89 party, dissident Chavismo): another of the unknowns candidates, computer engineer, businessman and agricultural producer, also self-represented within civil society, like almost all opposition candidates, his program specializes in recovery of both institutions and the productive sector and infrastructure to improve the economy.
10. Roberto Enríquez (COPEI-ODCA, centre-right/christian democrat): traditional "Copeyano" politician and former Deputy, he was the leader of the Christian social party COPEI before its judicialization, claiming until recently to remain leader of the "tolda verde", he was persecuted political during the 2017 protests, more recently it seems that he is putting aside the dispute to regain control of COPEI (currently in the co-opted opposition) and present himself under a new, more social conservative movement. dependent on religious sectors (pro-life, against "gender ideology"), one of its allies is the Christian evangelical party NUVIPA.
11. César Pérez Vivas (Concertación Ciudadana, center): another former politician from COPEI, former Deputy and former Governor of the state of Táchira, he presents himself under a moderate and civic platform with the support of several independents and some dissidents of Chavismo.
12. Tamara Adrián (independent): activist for women's rights and the LGBTIQ+ community, she was the first transgender representative in both Venezuela and all Latin America in 2015, previously a member of Voluntad Popular, she runs with the United for Dignity movement and an environmental platform, in favor of Human Rights and also inclusion and gender equality.
13. Delsa Solórzano(Encuentro Ciudadano, center-right/social liberal): former Deputy for the Un Nuevo Tiempo party, she founded her own party in 2018, with a liberal platform and like all candidates, in defense of Human Rights, she is also within of the hard line of the opposition in favor of sanctions and at the time also of abstention as forms of pressure against Chavismo.

Regarding Capriles (*), just this weekend, he announced his resignation as a candidate for the primaries so that the disqualification against him would not harm the election of the opposition candidate. At the moment it is rumored that he would support another candidate (mainly Prosperi), otherwise your votes will be counted as null as the ballots cannot be reimpressed. Other candidates withdrew before or during the registration period, for example one of the members of the G4, Un Nuevo Tiempo does not have its own candidate, the governor of the state of Zulia and leader of the party Manuel Rosales refused to be one and the temporary candidate of the party, José Rafael Hernández, a low-profile leader, resigned a few weeks after formalizing his registration. The comedian and businessman Benjamín Rausseo (the popular "Er Conde del Guácharo") also intended to participate, and in the end he remained an independent pre-candidate outside of the Primaries, and of course the former President of the National Assembly and controversial "Interim President" Juan Guaidó also withdrew from the race and had no choice but to finally go into exile abroad (Miami) to avoid facing political persecution by the alleged cases of corruption due to the management of money confiscated from the Chavista regime by the Western "International Community", especially with the handover of the subsidiary of the state oil company PDVSA in the USA, CITGO to Chevron as well as the "Monomeros case" in Colombia. Outside of the Primary process, the leaders of the co-opted opposition also have presidential aspirations, Bernabé Gutierrez of AD ad-hoc, Juan Carlos Alvarado of COPEI ad-hoc and José Brito of Primero Venezuela, as well as the politician Antonio Ecarri, critic of the internal management of the Unitary Platform, meanwhile some other opposition parties like Leocenis García' liberal Prociudadanos or the Fuerza Vecinal party linked to opposition mayors are very open to support the winning candidate of the primaries.

The Primaries themselves have also been threatened by other presidential precandidates, one of them, Luis Ratti, an independent who calls himself an "opposition" who attempted to run in 2018, has tried through judicial means to suspend the process so that it can be can exclude those disqualified like Machado. Whoever wins the primaries would not only be the opposition candidate in 2024 but also the de facto leader of the opposition, and would probably have influence within the negotiations of the Dialogue process with the Government currently with the main mediation of the Government of Mexico, the opposition wants guarantees for "free elections" and everything that a hypothetical democratic transition entails, the Government wants in exchange the lifting of international sanctions against it or even the release of the businessman of Colombian descent Alex Saab, currently extradited and prosecuted for corruption by USA.

In parallel, the Chavista regime with Maduro at the head, facing international sanctions against it, has focused on carrying out a serious fight against the corruption caused by the Chavista leaders themselves (such as that of former Minister Tareck el- Aissami who was in charge of the state oil company PDVSA) and also against organized crime (they recently intervened in the Tocorón prison, which was corrupted and controlled by the infamous criminal group of the "Aragua Train" that has expanded throughout Latin America by same rhythm as Venezuelan migration), the economy continues to be marked by inflation and the continuous devaluation of the Bolívar and the purchasing power of ordinary Venezuelans (the so-called "economic war"), although less serious than in other years due to the flexibility of the use of the American dollar as an everyday currency, to the point that despite the sanctions against Chavista officials, some private or foreign investment has been revitalized as well as the presence and organization of large sporting and musical events of renowned and popular artists, even so, there are still restrictions to freedom of expression with the closure and persecution of critical media outlets (mostly radio stations or newspapers/news sites), as well as the lack of basic services such as electricity, water, gasoline distribution, public transportation, better salaries for the education sector, and how we say "pare usted de contar", obviously in foreign policy they are aligned with China, Russia and other "anti-imperialist" countries or contrary to the influence of the United States and the West on their sovereignty, and in the region with their similar countries. Cuba and Nicaragua, as well as Lula's Brazil, AMLO's Mexico or the internal movements of their long time allies Rafael Correa and Evo Morales, while they have recovered and improved relations with Colombia under the government of Gustavo Petro, in the ongoing major international conflicts are on Russia's side in the invasion/War with Ukraine and Palestine against the "State of Israel", the one that Hugo Chávez "infamously" cursed against during his lifetime.

Maduro himself and the PSUV (his wife Cilia Flores and son Nicolás Maduro Guerra, Diosdado Cabello, the Rodríguez Gómez brothers, with also the implicit roles of Attorney General Tarek William Saab, the leadership of the Military High Command, among other high ranks) have been in the pre-campaign for their own re-election for a third term until 2030, they have recovered another judicialized party to their alliance such as the Communist Party (PCV) that was led by dissidents, and suddenly to rival the Primaries opposition, have once again brought out of the drawer the issue of the defense of Guyana Essequiba as part of Venezuelan territory, a long-standing territorial dispute based on the Geneva Agreement of 1966 (and in response to the Paris Arbitration Award of 1899 that ruled in favor of the United Kingdom) where Venezuela claims this territory as its own, to the point of forcing the inclusion of said territory in all official maps, the claim of Essequibo is one of the few issues where Chavismo and the Opposition are in complete agreement, many opposition leaders they have been active defenders of Essequibo (including María Corina Machado), in the face of the inaction of the Government when someone more allied to Chavismo/pink tide governs in Georgestown and which is revived when there is a more pro-USA government that is willing to open the exploitation of the present assets of the Essequibo (that is, oil or gold) to companies like ExxonMobil. Maduro and his Government, in response to a recent contrary ruling from the International Court of Justice, have shown their willingness to hold a Consultative Referendum on the defense of the Essequibo Territory within this year, 2023, and to reactivate the advancement of solutions in a manner peaceful between Caracas and Georgetown to resolve the border dispute, massive collections of signatures have previously been carried out by the ruling party but to show their rejection of the international sanctions against them, especially those dictated by the Obama and Trump administrations, in this case The regime is accused of wanting to politically use a consensus position that does not necessarily have to be supported by a referendum, but rather by diplomatic and legal defense action for the Essequibo territory.

Anyway, this is how things are going in Venezuela for 2024.

[MRCVzla]

Is there any hope for any improvement of the situation? Or are we to resign ourselves again to Chavismo until 2030 and beyond?

There will be hope if the entire opposition (unitarians, scorpions and others on the outside) decides to put their things together, to achieve better electoral conditions (less advantageousness and arbitrary disqualifications, open the Electoral Registry for new voters and that the massive diaspora can also vote freely), without so much admonition to their leaders or parties, otherwise Chavista advantage will continue to prevail to 2030 or beyond and depress any option of real progress and prosperous future.

I am going to vote for Prosperi, for me Maria Corina, despite having a strong influence in the opposition electorate with her combative style against Maduro and the rest of the PSUV entourage, her desire to be the opposition leader at all costs if she wins, despite her arbitrary disqualification. It may represent a setback for some progress made by the opposition leaders for the population that still resides and can vote in Venezuela to continue maintaining the trust that has been gained again through the electoral process as a way out of Chavismo.

Because if the conditions are not achieved and the Dialogue Process fails again, whether by the opposition itself or by the Chavista regime itself (mostly the latter), I fear that they could call for abstention again and as in 2018 or 2020, because like in those "electoral type events" not all the other candidates who call themselves "opposition" are reliable for their main electorate (a mix of urban middle class voters with low-income popular sectors), allowing Chavismo to carry out its usual advantage and fraud with the voting centers, extending the closure of tables and force public officials or anyone who depends on subsidies or bonuses to vote for them or sign on the "1x10" forms of their electoral machinery, thus giving themselves another 6 years and who knows if they will return to "shaking up the street" with another round of protests with who knows how many unnecessary violent deaths and police and judicial abuses towards political leaders, the so-called "foreign intervention" with the "arrival of the American marines will not happen and will never occur" (if Trump never exercised that "action that had on the table" at the time, even less will Biden, nor again will Trump himself or another Republican if they manage to win in 2024), nor is any rebellion or desertion of the FANB military effective because of how corrupt the military leadership is. self-defined as "revolutionary and Chavista", as seen in 2019.

If Prosperi wins or is designated a consensus candidate, he is more likely to reunify all those opposition sectors that distanced themselves from the main group of the G4 (Ecarri, Rausseo, Leocenis, the MAS...), he could even reunify the own "adecos" who are with Bernabé and are in the Assembly. Fight adequately for the fair conditions and carry out a more or just fair and joyful campaign so that the alternative change can occur sooner rather than later. in the most peaceful manner possible and faith in public institutions being reestablished.

[MRCVzla]

An update: both Freddy Superlano (VP) and Roberto Enríquez (COPEI de jure) have retired their candidacies to the Primary, Superlano and VP are supporting María Corina after a "long debate" with Leopoldo López (some "strong differences" between both VP figures), while Enríquez will side with "the winner of the Primary", he says there is "not time to remount in the last week of campaign" so his votes will be likely null, neither PJ, UNT and this faction of COPEI have an "official" candidate so their potential votes are probably going either MCM, Prosperi or Delsa Solorzano who are the most strongest, Andrés Caleca is also claiming that potential votes. They are rumours of other minor candidates without any chance (Almeida, Baló Farías) to dropping out in the next hours/days while other candidates in this group like Pérez Vivas are staying believing on the "citizen exercise" who the Primary is.

Fuerza Vecinal, the party of the opposition mayors questions the viability of process saying as "the primary as it is planned will lead us to the path of defeat and would be a victory for the government", similar questions come from Bernabé Gutiérrez (AD ad-hoc) about the process will be a "fiasco" for allow disqualified candidates "until the end".

Meanwhile, the usual suspects of José Brito and Luis Ratti claims to the TSJ and CNE to intervene and suspend the primary, fearing a potential MCM win who "lead into a time of violence".

[MRCVzla]

I was about to ask if you could make a rundown of who is who among the million different non-PSUV parties, but I started wondering... do parties, like, exist in Venezuela anymore? Or is there just a bunch of intervened zombies and individual politicians who might as well be independents for how many indistinguishable and powerless one-man parties they're members of?

I can try to do some summary, but many of the things at the party level that have been discussed in previous forum topics, for example in the 2020 parliamentary event or in the 2021 regional elections, are still in force.

The parties in Venezuela exist, but it is somewhat complicated, it is a mixture of both types that you say, there are the satellite parties of the PSUV that could be divided into three groups:
1. A civic wing and closer to the Maduro or Rodríguez brothers circle (Somos Venezuela Movement or Alliance for Change, led by former opposition student leaders who "jumped the talanquera"), a party linked to the evangelical Christian church also belongs to this group (ORA, his former leader, a former minor presidential candidate passed away a few years ago)
2. A more radical, almost "paramilitary" wing of left-wing nationalists (UPV, Tupamaros).
3. A wing composed of traditional left parties composed of communists (PCV), democratic socialists (PPT) or social democrats (PODEMOS, MEP)

In general, all these parties, especially groups 2 and 3, have their own internal structures but in the end their mobilization machinery is a smaller fraction than that of the PSUV-State, without forgetting of course any admission to critical dissidence. Otherwise another almost unknown group of militants complains to the TSJ about the lack of an internal process and they grant them the party, first they were PPT and PODEMOS in 2012 (in the case of PODEMOS, its founder had been in exile for "persecution" but was reconciled with Chavismo and reclaimed the party when those who had control then had already supported the Opposition for some time), later the Tupamaros and the last to fall was the PCV, in 2020 a large part of the critical Chavistas who still define themselves as " revolutionaries" ran in the parliamentary elections under the symbol of the PCV and obtained 1 seat. In the end, they all de facto act electorally as if they were internal factions of the PSUV, they contribute to increasing votes and ensuring that there is a certain "plurality" within the alliance that is the Great Patriotic Pole.

In the unitary and majority opposition, each party has its structure and machinery, with the G4 parties (AD, PJ, UNT and VP) being what moves the most, plus others that also have consolidated structures but many also suffer from the "caudillo syndrome." ", UNT with Rosales, VP with Leopoldo, La Causa R with Velásquez, ABP with Ledezma, the currently "missing" Proyecto Venezuela with the Salas family, etc., even though many are in fact splits from already established parties (UNT or ABP come from AD, PJ comes from COPEI and in turn VP comes from PJ and part from UNT, MPV is from PPT...), then you already have more personalist movements such as those from María Corina (Vente) or Delsa Solorzano (Encuentro Ciudadano).

This same thing can be said to be repeated with the co-opted opposition grouped in the Democratic Alliance, where there are intervened parties (AD with Bernabé, COPEI of Alvarado, VP of Noriega), splits (Primero Venezuela of Parra and Brito coming from PJ, Cambiemos de Timoteo Zambrano coming from UNT), established parties (MAS) or grouped around a personalism (EL CAMBIO of Pastor Bertucci, SPV of Claudio Fermin), Avanzada Progresista was also a little under this last concept but now that Falcón returned to the "unity" with his new FUTURO movement, AP is once again treated as a split (from PPT and Podemos) with a certain structure and machinery at the local level.

From the "ni-ni" group within the opposition, Fuerza Vecinal has the leadership of the mayors (many of them with origins in PJ, VP and UNT), there is also Unión y Progreso which is a COPEI split led by "El Tigre" Fernández and his loyalists, while there are also the personal vehicles of Antonio Ecarri (LAPIZ, a party focused on education) or Leocenís García (Prociudadanos, self-proclaimed as liberal right but not abstentionist), and then the plethora of minor parties within or not of the great alliances where there may be other dissident Chavista or moderate left-wing/progressive groups, Christians, liberals, socialdemocrats or many regionalist/local movements.

And, for that matter, does PSUV still have some party structures or is the "campaigning" all done by the state, the army and gangs now?

A mix of all the cases, they have their structures spread throughout the country (the so-called UBCH, Bolívar-Chávez Battle Units), coordinated with other non-electoral social entities that have been created or nurtured "in Revolution" such as the Social Missions, the Communal Councils, the "Collectives" as well the Militias (the "gangs"), the financing is almost unknown although it is obvious that they do use a lot of money for the (forced) mobilization of people and public officials to appear large crowds, there is something voluntary for public employees to donate one day of their salary to the party, and the rest is... complicated, the military seems to doesn't help enough is they are claim themselves as "bolivarian, revolucionary and chavista"

Although the advantage is notorious, as I already said, today they are not seems to be as strong as in 2018, it is difficult for them to fill the streets like before when they hold rallies, the objective that they imposed on themselves with Chávez alive of the "10 million votes", I don't think it will be fulfilled in 2024 either, at most 6 million and something even with "fraud" like in 2018 but I think it will be much less (more than 4-5 million) even if there are finally conditions for a "free and fair contest" for the competitive Opposition.

[MRCVzla]

Government and Unitary Opposition retaked the Dialogue Process thru signing a Partial Agreement in Barbados, not only with the mediation of Mexico and Norway, but with some high representatives of the US, EU and other LATAM countries.
The first partial agreement is about the "promotion of political rights and electoral guarantees":
- Recognize and respect the right of each political actor to select his candidate for the presidential elections freely and in accordance with his internal mechanisms.
- Jointly promote electoral guarantees for all actors before the CNE in 2024.
- Propose that the Presidential Election be carried out in the second half of 2024 (most likely around October).
- Execute the updating of the Permanent Electoral Registry (inside and outside the country)  including registration days, data promotion campaigns, establishment of registration points with the presence of witnesses from political actors, continuation of the identification process throughout the country, holding a registry update day electoral abroad and purification of the electoral register
- Develop all the audits planned in the electoral system, including the Electoral Registry with the participation of all political actors and international observation.
- Make a request for an invitation to agreed technical electoral observation missions including the European Union, the UN, the African Union, the Inter-American Union of Electoral Organizations and the Carter Center.
- Promotion of a public discourse and political and social climate favorable to the development of a peaceful electoral process without external interference.
- Exhort actors (public officials) to respect electoral regulations and decisions of the CNE.
- Require competent authorities to adopt measures to guarantee security and freedom of movement for all candidates throughout the country.
- Recognition of candidates and their campaigns having transparent financing mechanisms without limitations beyond those provided for in the law.
- Promote balance in public and private media and ensure equality for all candidates in access to media and social networks, as well as to public spaces under the administration of the Venezuelan regime.
- Promote participation of all media, national and international, in coverage of the electoral campaign.
- A public recognition of the results of the electoral elections.
- All candidates in the presidential election who meet the constitutional requirements will be allowed to register.
- Parties will ensure that the conditions of the Agreement are applicable to the rest of the electoral processes contemplated in the schedule (parliamentary, regional, etc.).
- A monitoring and verification mechanism in accordance with the guidelines that govern the dialogue process.
- The process of dialogue and negotiation will continue to strengthen an inclusive democracy.

The second partial agreement refers to "the protection of vital interests to the Nation", surely the recovering of the actives of the country abroad who are in "hostage" from US, UK since Guaido's "interinato", maybe some lifting to the sanctions against Chavista ranks and a common position relative to the Esequibo problem.

Most of this things are already in the Constitution and the ongoing Electoral laws, it's just an attempt to chavista regime to accomplish this and not do their usual shenanigans. Disqualification of Opposition politicians was barely discussed on the agreement, but still is a kind of "elephant in the room", more if MCM wins the Sunday' Primary.

Let's see how long this agreement lasts if it is fulfilled or if it will be like others that have tried to agree, breaking down (mainly on the part of the government) and ending up as "wet paper"

[MRCVzla]

The CNE, by suggestion of the National Assembly, has officially called the Consultive Referendum about the defence of the Guyana Esequibo territory on December 3rd, the questions will be revealed in the next days (three to be exact).

The first effects after the Partial Agreement are here: OFAC temporary lifts for 6 months the sanctions to the Government to export and sold Venezuelan oil and gas abroad, meanwhile the Government, as is usual during this dialogue process, liberates some opposition political prisioners, like journalist Roland Carreño (member of VP).

This sunday Opposition Primary will not to be hold for Venezuelan expats in Argentina (due to the General elections there and the country' Electoral Authority not give permission to even hold the Venezuelan Primary earlier) and Israel (for the ongoing war). A controversy is also happening as Prosperi-backed AD are calling to postpone the Primary (36 hours before) allegedly for logistic reasons as last-minute reasignments of voting centers or the draw of the precinct witnesses, very favourable to MCM' Vente and not so for AD or the other candidates.

The Primary National Comission will reunite with Prosperi and AD on the next hours, rumors say if the reunion ends without solution, Prosperi may would drop.

[MRCVzla]

Despite all the controversies surround Prosperi and his AD faction hours before the voting centers were installed, voting is underway until 4:00 pm (GMT-4) in the more than 3000 centers carried by the CNdP (National Commission of the Primary) plus some others abroad were Venezuelans can updated their "electoral status" to vote.

I voted with my parents after noon in a public square were most of the precincts of my parish were grouped. High turnout (i live in one of the opposition strongholds, Diego Bautista Urbaneja municipality in the eastern Anzóategui state, the "little Miami")... but a lot of heat wave at that hour, they are 7 precincts ordered by the last numbers of the ID card ("cédula de identidad") and mostly two files per precinct (one of the "third age" over-60yo voters, other one for the "younger" under-60), my precinct' queque lasted long so i voted after hour and half after arrived, but as the process is manual is kind of "quick", other thing who retards the process is searching the ID number thru the "cuaderno de votación" to firm and validate my participation. I ended up voting for Andrés Caleca (supported by the progressive MPV) due to Prosperi and AD's "meltdown" in Social Media over the allocation of precinct witness ("testigos de mesa")... but the mood is most people is voting for MCM no matter is she cannot be the candidate for 2024, but as a fierce and strong new Opposition leader.

Results may be know in the night after 8:00 pm, the media regulator CONATEL has forbidden every single coverage on Radio and broadcast TV stations, so most of the coverage is doing by independent pro-opposition online or abroad/expat media as well in social networks.
VPI TV: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I_w3Tu8EQcs
EVTV (El Venezolano TV): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwD-pyfha4E
TVV Network: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3tEZdlDxTY

[MRCVzla]

The first bulletin with the results of the Primary were delayed to probably tomorrow as CNdP president Jesús María Casal says the totalization servers were the votes will be reported are blocked by a fail (suposedly sabotage by the state-owned telephone company and main internet provider in the country, CANTV) and they are fixing this problem. Still projected a María Corina landslide, the doubt maybe is who is coming 2nd as Caleca or Delsa Solorzano could be surprise and what would be the difference respect to MCM, rumors says Prosperi may not recognize the result.

[MRCVzla]

The first bulletin finally was released after midnight, just 26.06% counted and a 6% of the total registered voters (still projected around 2 million turnout, which is ok known the circunstances)

María Corina Machado 552.430 votes - 93,13%
Carlos Prosperi 28.153 - 4,75%
Delsa Solórzano 4.565 - 0,77%
Andrés Caleca 3.383 - 0,57%
César Pérez Vivas 1.671 - 0,28%
Andrés Velásquez 1.558 - 0,18%
Luis Farías 641 - 0,11%
Gloria Pinho 543 - 0,09%
Tamara Adrían 424 - 0,07%
Cesar Almeida 295 - 0,05%

[MRCVzla]

The CNE has just revealed the questions that the Consultative Referendum on the defense of Guayana Esequiba will have that will be on December 3, there will be a total of 5 questions, the last question could take a step further in the historical claim of said territory to the seriously consider the creation of 24th State of Guayana Esequiba (Venezuela is made up of 23 states and a Capital District) with its own authorities and granting citizenship to those who reside in that area.

1. Do you agree to reject with all means, in accordance with the law, the line fraudulently imposed by the Paris Arbitration Award of 1899, which seeks to deprive us of our Guayana Esequiba?

2. Do you support the 1966 Geneva Agreement as the only valid legal instrument to reach a practical and satisfactory solution for Venezuela and Guyana regarding the controversy over the territory of Guayana Esequiba?

3. Do you agree with Venezuela's historical position of not recognizing the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to resolve the territorial controversy over Guayana Esequiba?

4. Do you agree to oppose by all means, in accordance with the law, Guyana's claim to unilaterally dispose of a sea pending delimitation illegally and in violation of International Law?

5. Do you agree with the creation of the Guayana Esequiba state and the development of an accelerated plan for the comprehensive care of the current and future population of that territory that includes, among others, the granting of citizenship and Venezuelan identity card in accordance with the Geneva Agreement and International Law, consequently incorporating said state on the map of Venezuelan territory?

[MRCVzla]

The controversial questions in the Esequibo referendum are mostly the 3rd, because chavismo gives for loss the ICJ rule about the Esequibo and could unrecognize the court, this could affect the tons of cases about Human Rights violations against the regime, and the 5th also could suggest a scenario about a potential Russian-esque military invasion to Guyana in order to reclaim effective sovereign on that territory, also the mentality in the people against of "if you can barely sustain our house (the problems about basic services, electric, water, gas, transport, health, security...), how can you support another one?"

Meanwhile, there is the 2nd bulletin of the Opposition Primary, with the 64.9% of the precincts counted and a turnout of 1,59 million, no great movement, Maria Corina still wins 9/10 voters.

[MRCVzla]

Third and final bulletin of the Opposition Primary has been released, with a 91% of the precincts counted and a total turnout of 2.4 million votes (2.3m in Venezuela proper plus more than 132k abroad), good numbers above the expectatives for an internal election (less than the 3 million of the 2012 Primary but still), tomorrow more detailed results will be published on the Primary National Commission site, for transparency sake.
https://twitter.com/polianalitica/status/1717031308965134819

Both Chavismo and the scorpion "opposition" are so mad with the result who are chanting "fraud" over the process with their usual lies, taking the early first bulletin as the total and the "huge" abstention according to the total of the REP and the landslide result in favor of MCM is "inflated" as well all the inconvenients of electing a candidate in paper "disqualified".

For now, MCM seems to moderate more their discourse and almost all the Unitary Opposition is rally behind her (except Prosperi who didn't recognized yet her victory, despite ended 2nd thanks to the AD' machine, party who recognized the result and disapproved his candiate' attitude), the challenge now is, likely under extensive talks with "the enemy", trying to qualify MCM again and accomplish the Agreements of Barbados and other ones in future about electoral conditions in order to some kind of "free and fair" elections, but with chavismo in charge, who knows....

[MRCVzla]

The strategy of criminalize the Opposition Primarty from the chavista regime seems to "work", the Supreme Court (TSJ) has anulled the Primary results suspending “all the effects of the different phases of the electoral process conducted by the National Primary Commission”, in the middle of process open for the Public Ministry (MP) against the CNdP because under the chavista relate "the only institution who can hold elections in the country (even internal) is the CNE"

I'm translating this note from El Diario (opposition leaning news site): https://eldiario.com/2023/10/30/tsj-dejo-sin-efecto-eleccion-primaria-oposicion/

TSJ annulled the opposition primary election
The National Primary Commission must present the administrative background of the phases of the electoral process

The Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) announced that it will annul the primary election held on Sunday, October 22, in which María Corina Machado won.

The announcement comes after Tarek William Saab, attorney general of the Maduro regime, announced that he opened an investigation for alleged fraud in the electoral contest in which more than 2.5 million Venezuelans participated.

The judicial entity ordered the suspension of “all the effects of the different phases of the electoral process conducted by the National Primary Commission” (CNP), after receiving an appeal filed by deputy José Brito, of the National Assembly elected in 2020, which requested a review of “irregularities.”

In accordance with ruling 122 of the Electoral Chamber of the TSJ, the organizing commission of the opposition elections must record “the administrative background, containing the twenty-five phases of the electoral process” of the primaries, ranging from the call to the event to the minutes. of scrutiny, totalization and proclamation.

Other TSJ requirements
Among the demands of the TSJ is to record the minutes of acceptance of the candidacy of the candidates disqualified by the Comptroller's Office from holding elected positions, as is the case of the winner of the internal elections María Corina Machado, on whom this administrative measure weighs, imposed in 2015 for a period of one year, but recently extended until 2030.

Likewise, they must deliver the resignations of the candidates Henrique Capriles and Freddy Superlano , who declined to participate just a couple of weeks before the elections, also disqualified, as well as those of any other citizen who has decided to renounce their candidacy.

The TSJ gives the CNP a period of three days to submit “a report” indicating “the mechanism used to safeguard electoral material and the place designated for this purpose.”

Finally, he orders to notify the attorney general, Tarek William Saab, and other public powers of this sentence and of the facts reported by Brito that, he assured, could constitute “the alleged commission of electoral crimes and the alleged commission of common crimes,” without specifying what type of illegal acts they committed.

Disqualification of María Corina Machado
Eugenio Martínez, teacher and specialist in electoral coverage, explained that the TSJ ruling would seek to reinforce the disqualification imposed on Machado.   

“The late ruling of the TSJ seems aimed at ratifying the disqualification of María Corina Machado, at the same time as constructing the narrative so that the PU cannot argue (according to the Barbados agreement) that she was elected in the primary and therefore should be allowed to participate. in 2024,” Martínez published on his official X account on Monday, October 30.

Other note translated for the newspaper El Universal (since almost a decade ago, owned by pro-government leaning businessman's or "boliburgueses"): https://www.eluniversal.com/politica/167553/tribunal-supremo-de-justicia-suspende-todos-los-efectos-de-las-primarias-opositoras

Supreme Court of Justice suspends "all effects" of the opposition primaries
The highest Court announced that the internal electoral process carried out by a sector of the opposition is suspended due to an ongoing investigation

Caracas.-  The Electoral Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) of Venezuela ordered the suspension of "all the effects of the different phases of the electoral process conducted by the National Primary Commission" (CNP), held last Sunday, after receiving an appeal introduced by opposition deputy José Brito that requested a review of "irregularities."

"All the effects of the different phases of the electoral process conducted by the National Primary Commission are suspended"; says part of the sentence.

Sentence number 122, file 2023-0000065, "admits this Contentious Electoral Appeal filed by citizen Deputy of the National Assembly José Dionisio Brito Rodríguez, Venezuelan, of legal age, holder of identity card number V- 8,263,861" .

Likewise, it declares "the request for precautionary protection is appropriate, and consequently all the effects of the different phases of the electoral process conducted by the National Primary Commission are suspended."

The TSJ also ordered the National Primary Commission , in accordance with article 184 of the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice:
- Administrative background of the 25 phases of the primary process.
- Regional and national totalization records.
- Voting notebooks.
- Voting ballots.
- Scrutiny records.

In addition, they must submit to the Supreme Court the minutes of acceptance of the candidacy of the candidates disqualified by the Comptroller's Office from holding elected positions, as is the case of the winner of the internal elections María Corina Machado, on whom this administrative measure weighs. imposed in 2015 for a period of one year, but recently extended until 2030.

Likewise, they must hand in the resignations of the candidates Henrique Capriles and Freddy Superlano - who declined to participate just a couple of weeks before the elections -, also disqualified, as well as those of "any other citizen who has decided to renounce his candidacy."

The TSJ gives the CNP a period of three days to submit "a report" indicating "the mechanism used to safeguard electoral material and the place designated for this purpose."

Finally, he orders to notify the attorney general, Tarek William Saab, and other public powers of this sentence and of the facts denounced by Brito that - he assured - could configure "the alleged commission of electoral crimes and the alleged commission of common crimes."

They are really scared after MCM victory didn't you... anyway seems to have no major problem to the Unitary Platform, as i said, they are still fully rally around MCM and try to negociate her disqualification and delay "as possible" some Plan B of an emergency consensus candidate (or falling again on the trap to calling abstention). The only worry is the possible leak of the voting notebooks (if they not already destroyed) who contains the list of people who voted at the Primary and their use for the regime to discriminalize public officials or any benefactor of social programs (ala the so-called "Tascon list" from the time of the "firmazos" in favour of the 2004 Recall referendum)

[MRCVzla]

I see the far-left in Venezuela is still the pack of authoritarian, corrupt a-holes they’ve always been. Oh well, clearly another victory for The Global South!

PSUV are now center-left after kicking out the communists, and have especially shifted to a more upscale position in line with other social democratic formations given that the prior patronage machines that resulted in PSUV staying in power are being spared from the onslaught of the state. Look at Zulia or the prison raids, if what they’re doing isn’t trying to increase palatability to the middle class I don’t know what is.

Nah, they are still social conservative "revolutionary" left-wingers who qualify the whole opposition as "extreme right" (and not all the opposition are anti-communists conservatives) and the military side with Diosdado is still relevant, for much PR effort they doing being champions against corruption (same corruption most of their own people do) or cleaning the mess they left to do at the prisons with the organized crime "pranes". You probably also said that due to the high profile they get some of their "civic" ranks who are projecting their own moderate or self-brand populist image rather than the traditional chavista package as Carabobo governor Rafael Lacava, Miranda's Héctor Rodríguez or even the governor of my homestate Anzoátegui's Luis Marcano.

That's how "scientific" socialism/communism works. It starts with an idealistic but naive worldview (you're currently in this stage) and ends with an authoritarian corrupt elite living at the expense of  increasingly starving and miserable masses: homo homini lupus est.

They are in the "authoritarian corrupt elite living at the expense of increasingly starving and miserable masses" stage a long time ago despite still selling at the people the "idealistic" stage, one if not the main reason why there has been a mass migration, sanctions or why there is still no "free elections" yet, more pronounced since Chávez' "planting" in 2013 or when they lost the Assembly in 2015 (and "recovered" with that Constituent Assembly who at the end didn't propose any single change to the Constitution"!)

[MRCVzla]

Surely this act of annulling the opposition primary should invalidate the sanctions deal with the US?

The State Dept. gave Venezuela an end-of-November deadline to allow all candidates the opportunity to run, so sanctions can presumably snap back as early as December 1st if necessary.

And in a last-minute agreement, the Norwegian representation at the Dialogue Table announced how the mechanism to appeal bans will happen, a note from English-language blog Caracas Chronicles details how:

Appealing Inhabilitaciones

A few hours before the November 30th deadline ended, the mechanism to review bans from running for office was just announced: candidates, like María Corina Machado and Henrique Capriles, must appeal their bans (inhabilitaciones) between December 1st and 15th at the Comptroller’s Office. A Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice will rule on the admission of the claim and the requested precautionary protection.

The mechanism is full of tricky points: all parties must accept the ruling of the TSJ on this matter and the institutions cannot be ‘disrespected’ by the candidates. There are also points on “territorial integrity” which could tie the process to the candidates’ positions on the Esequibo referendum, rejected by María Corina Machado and Voluntad Popular. It’s still unclear which candidates will appeal.

“I do not see in this mechanism anything else than a simulation and an ambiguity that is left to the discretion of a politicized body in favor of PSUV. Except for pressure or non-public negotiations, the result seems to be a foregone conclusion”, tweeted political scientist Juan Manuel Trak.

https://www.caracaschronicles.com/el-feed/maria-corinas-adventures-in-inhabilitacion-land/

The consultative referendum (in theory, non-binding) on the Esequibo issue will take place this Sunday. The campaign has been monopolized by Chavismo, its political allies and the rest of the institutions under the slogan "Venezuela All" calling to vote "5 times YES" to all the questions of the referendum, there was a simulation a few weeks ago that the Government ( without data) has been described as a success. The unitary opposition has left its voters in "freedom of conscience", there will be sectors such as MCM or VP that will abstain without making it public but others such as Capriles, Rosales, Caleca or Ramos Allup's AD have made public their intentions to go. to vote in the referendum and not let Maduro and the rest of Chavismo take the credit for participation out of mere and just patriotism.

The questions with the most doubts for those who oppose Chavismo but are nationalist enough to support the consultation are the last 3, in the third (not recognizing the jurisprudence of the ICJ in the territorial dispute) it is likely to vote NO, while in the fourth (oppose "by all means" Guyana's unilateral action to occupy the territorial sea to be delimited) or the fifth (the creation of the Guayana Esequiba State and an accelerated plan to give citizenship to the inhabitants in the area under claim) can be between a NO or allow a null/blank vote, there are still doubts whether the success of the consultation gives carte blanche to the regime to raise the tensions of the dispute, even calling for a "military invasion" to recover Essequibo, calling for a State of Exception that It could suspend the 2024 Presidential Election (if it is moderately competitive) and illegally extend Maduro's mandate. There have been concerns on the part of the Brazilian Armed Forces about the issue, and Guyana has also made "provocations" by raising a flag in the area, giving more oil concessions in the disputed sea and trying before the ICJ itself to suspend the holding of the referendum.

The ICJ itself has unanimously decided a few hours before the referendum was held that both Venezuela and Guyana should not take actions that aggravate the situation regarding the territorial dispute, it has expressed its concerns regarding the fifth question but has not ordered to suspend or eliminate questions from the referendum (Chavismo sells this as a victory). The ClJ concluded that there is a link between the rights claimed by Guyana and the measures requested against the referendum. "Until a final decision on the controversy is adopted, Venezuela will refrain from taking measures that modify the situation of the territory," says the ICJ.

Another note from Caracas Chronicles about the referendum:

What is Venezuela Actually Seeking With the Esequibo Referendum?
Venezuela’s authoritarian regime is holding a referendum over a claim the country has kept for decades. Why? To face the opposition, measure its mobilization power and stroke electoral nationalism before the 2024 elections

Tony Frangie Mawad November 30, 2023

The Guyana-controlled Esequibo region, claimed by Venezuela for more than a century and formally disputed again since 1966, is tacitly included in Article 10 of the Venezuelan Constitution which says Venezuela’s territory follows the borders of the colonial Capitanía General de Venezuela and subsequent “non-vitiated” arbitral awards (Venezuela’s official claim over the Esequibo says the territory was a part of the Capitanía. The country also considers that the 1899 Paris Arbitral Award, which officially handed the Esequibo to Great Britain, is “null and void”). The case at the International Court of Justice has been ongoing since at least 2018 –following diplomatic escalations after Guyana handed offshore concessions to Exxon Mobil and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation. So, why is Venezuela now organizing a five-question referendum –an electoral act that will not dictate the decisions of a militarist-authoritarian regime– on its claimed sovereignty over the Esequibo? There might be three reasons:

A response to the opposition primaries
The referendum is a show of strength to the unexpectedly high participation in the opposition primaries (2.3 million in Venezuela). Maduro has already affirmed that around 3.5 million people participated in the Esequibo referendum drill on November 19th, but the National Electoral Council didn’t publish official results. In fact, while it happened when Guyana handed new oil concessions, the referendum was announced by the Chavista-controlled 2020 National Assembly barely a month before the primaries: when María Corina Machado’s skyrocketing rise was already clear as crystal and the final version of the Barbados agreement was being reached upon.

This approach is clearer in PSUV’s Héctor Rodríguez’s recent statements: “the queues of voters for the mock referendum for the Esequibo were very much longer than the ones in the opposition’s primaries, impressive. The primary does not exist, it was nothing.”

It’s not the first time such a retaliatory display of political muscle takes place. During the 2017 protests, more than 7.6 million people allegedly voted in a self-managed referendum organized by the then opposition-controlled National Assembly to reject the creation of a National Constituent Assembly (ANC). A few days later, Chavismo announced that more than 8 million voted to choose the members of the ANC. The results were denounced as fraudulent, with at least an extra million votes, by software company Smartmatic – which provided the voting machines.

The referendum has already stoked divisions within the opposition. While Machado has called for its suspension, Andrés Caleca has announced he will participate and Henrique Capriles has even promoted it. The Unitary Platform, meanwhile, said that each voter should decide what to vote and if to vote.

Mobilizing Chavistaworld
Chavismo is also seeking to measure its mobilization power in its bases and clientelist networks before the 2024 presidential elections. Chavismo, for example, barely managed to mobilize 3.5 million people in the last regional elections – 2.3 million less than in the 2017 regional elections. The opposition, instead, gathered 100,000 more people in the primaries than the Democratic Unity Roundtable did in the 2021 regional elections.

An example of this mobilization “experiment” is the creation of “Patrol Chiefs” in the National Guard to deploy a 1×10 plan, an old Chavista strategy in which each official must take 10 family members or close friends to vote. The plan was first deployed in the November 19 drill. Similarly, the government announced Communal Councils, the National Militia, the recently created Congress of the New Era and CLAP committees –all part of its clientelist networks and bases– will join ruling party PSUV in the “5×5” strategy to supposedly mobilize the outrageous number of 12 million voters.

This strategy has led to claims of local committees menacing to CLAP food bags away from beneficiaries that won’t vote in the referendum and in an express operation to print IDs (necessary to vote) that has resulted in chaos to some SAIME offices.

Suspending the elections?
While this is still in the realm of the speculative, there is the possibility that Chavismo is seeking to create a climate of war or confrontation to decree a state of emergency and suspend the 2024 presidential elections that –if they are moderately competitive, following the Barbados agreements– could be catastrophic for PSUV. The strategy could be a toned-down version of Argentine dictator Leopoldo Galtieri’s 1982 Falklands War, when the Argentina junta disastrously invaded the disputed British-controlled Malvinas islands to raise nationalist sentiments and mitigate its domestic unpopularity. While a war could blow the sanctions relief, it’s clear Chavismo prioritizes keeping power over ending sanctions.

Frontal warmongering is still low in the dispute, but the Venezuelan Armed Force announced is building airstrips and civilian buildings near the Esequibo, while one of the referendum questions included proclaiming the region as an official Venezuelan state and handing Venezuela IDs to locals. Meanwhile, Guyana met with Brazil in its 26th Annual Regional Military Exchange Meeting, where Brazilian Brigadier General Paulo Santa Barba said that a problem that “affects one country could have repercussions for everyone.” Brazil, which has economic interests in the disputed region, has in fact strengthened its defense in the border region in the last few days.

So, if Argentina’s 1982 war had a festival for the Falklands as a prelude and Venezuela is now organizing the Esequibo Fest, what assures us that the similarities between Galtieri’s and the Maduro regime will end there?

https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2023/11/30/what-is-venezuela-actually-seeking-with-the-esequibo-referendum/

[MRCVzla]

1st Bulletin was out, Turnout of 10.554.320 votes but not necessarly voters, maybe the number is the sum between the 5 questions so actual turnout should be very low around 2-3 million voters, press reports earlier saw few queque lines if not any at many precincts, huge abstention in pro-opposition strongholds, maybe chavismo/PSUV machines tried in the last hours of the afternoon his "operación remolque" with their usual tactics of force public employees to vote... but their still they keep the relate of winning in a unnecessary referendum about a sensitive issue.

(Ratio Yes/No)
Q1: YES 97.83% | NO 2.17%
Q2: YES 98.11% | NO 1.80%
Q3: YES 95.40% | NO 4.10%
Q4: YES 95,94% | NO 4,06%
Q5: YES 95,93% | NO 4,07%

A certain pattern can be observed in the last 3 questions where around 4% who voted NO could be pure opposition voters, many leaders, governors and mayors of the unitary opposition did go to vote but not the vast majority of their voters.

It will dawn and we will see...

[MRCVzla]

Amoroso' CNE announced in a act "updated" results of yesterday' referendum... o better say, yet another electoral-type event, reaffirms what more than 10 million VOTERS went to the polls, but a number sightly reduced than the announced last night: 10.431.907.
Q1: Yes: 10.193.142 | No: 209.600 | Void: 29.165
Q2: Yes: 10.200.364 | No: 181.122 | Void: 50.416
Q3: Yes: 10.009.932 | No: 383.433 | Void: 38.542
Q4: Yes: 10.012.068 | No: 380.877 | Void: 38.963
Q5: Yes: 9.948.430 | No: 378.551 | Void: 104.928

Reminder there was many reports of huge abstention or "more force officials than voters" at the polling stations around the country, with no direct independent observation, a monopolyzed state-funded campaign under a sensitive issue, a Referendum just called to 1) counter-react the Opposition Primary result and 2) express their reject of the actions and deals Guyana does to exploit oil under disputed sea (and mainly against ExxonMobil' concessions). The results of the questions actually doesn't care because everybody knows that would be approved anyway, it's was the turnout who cared to see how much the State/chavismo can mobilize voters under the issue, even if much moderate opposition figures ended showing up for patriotic reasons. This will be the same CNE what Machado and/or the unitary opposition will face next year, so with the Barbados' Agreements in hand they should have to fight more in order to improve electoral conditions (as well the voting rights for the abroad migration), with more independent observation/polling scrutineers, the risk to have "made up" results could be lower and have some moderately competitive election and see actual lines and lines of voters independent of their choices voting and no "ghost lines" raising this doubts.

[MRCVzla]

Today the TSJ has announced "as established under the Barbados Agreement" some rullings related to opposition politicians barred to run. The most important is reafirm the inhabilitation of the main opposition candidate María Corina Machado for 15 years because her request "does not comply with the requirements established and demanded in the Agreement(...)", also former presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski got rebanned as well until 2036, many others politicans stay banned but others, more "pragmatic" as Leocenis García, Aragua politician Richard Mardó. former San Cristóbal mayor Daniel Ceballos or former Zulia governor (and 2012 precandidate) Pablo Pérez got their bans lifted. This news may determinate the next proceedings by the opposition to face this year' elections. If MCM will stay "until the end" (as her campaign slogan says) and keep figthing for another hopeful appeal, nominate some other "habilitated" politician to run or we are going headed for another 2018 Nicaragua-esque electoral-type event scenario, were Chavismo continues to demoralize institutionally, calls elections very early without enough guarantees (like secure voting rights/update voting register for the diaspora) and only with co-opted opposition candidates against Maduro... or any other PSUV rank. The Barbados Agreement are mortally wounded, if not ended by those who do not want to give up any power.

During this time between this and the Essequibo referendum fiasco, the outright "symbolic" recognition of the Essequibo as Venezuelan territory in official maps and the meeting between Maduro and Guyana President Ali in order to relax tensions (minor spoiler: not enough). The controversial Colombian-born businessman Alex Saab got released by US authorities and returned to Venezuela (and received like a hero) in an exchange with some jailed US military and political prisoneers, the own TSJ board got some changes as they got another "unknown" pro-government attorney as her new President (and a former MP and CNE rector as President of one of the main Court' chamber)... all this as chavismo itself denounces daily some "magnicide plans" against Maduro in order to continue persecute opposition politicians or experts (even the ones already in exile), feeding this Nicaragua scenario of unfair elections and not giving up power easy, as any statement from Maduro's, Cabello, the Rodríguez brothers or the Attorney General Saab (which the later also is doing some PR stunts in order to resolve the mysterious death of a popular rapper) is taken seriously by the non-polarized part of the Venezuelans still living in the country.

[MRCVzla]

The CNE (following recomendations done by the 2020 elected National Assembly) has called the Presidential Election for July 28. Electoral Permanent Register (REP) for the election will be closed on April 16. Candidates' nominations will be between March 21-25. Campaign will happen between July 4-25.

In my opinion, one of the most convenient dates for the regime (Maduro and co) and the co-opted opposition (the myriad of hopeful pre-candidates they have), the majority of Venezuelans abroad maybe cannot update their register status in order to vote. Probably will not be proper international observation mission, the government has been very vocal against the fact the EU or some "opposition alligned" international organization supervises the process, most likely to see some chavismo friendly "international accompaniment missions" watching on election day.

The date where the election has been called and the election date are not coincidence. Today is Hugo Chávez' 11-year anniversary of "his sowing" and the election would be the day he would have turned 70 years old, kind of symbolic dates for chavismo.

Unitary Opposition (and ofc MCM) has less than 20 days to decide what they are doing, they currently are stick to present MCM "'til the end" despite her ban on March 21, but most likely they will have to nominate a last minute consensus candidate. If they decide to not stand a candidate after the likely rejection of MCM' candidature, this will be another "electoral type event" like 2018.

[MRCVzla]

María Corina Machado has just designated Corina Yoris-Villasana, a low-profile academic member of the opposition' National Primary Commission (also President of the Venezuelan Society of Philosophy) as her replacement candidate by the Unitary Platform for the July Presidential Election, in theory she's not banned to run and will be nominated with the MUD and UNT party symbols (with the possibility of more parties joining), MCM will still fight against her political ban in case she somehow finally made it to July. In the last days, the government' Security Forces had raided and put capture order to many people close to MCM and her party Vente Venezuela, accused of being behind alleged "destabilizing plans" against Maduro and the regime. The operation to register new voters has been underway since a few days, for now only in Venezuelan territory and in selected points, registration points have not yet been opened in the Consulates for residents and other emigrants abroad.

President Maduro will run for reelection with the support of the parties of the Great Patriotic Pole, included the intervened Communist Party (PCV) and a new "Green Party", linked to people close to Miranda State Governor Héctor Rodríguez.

Among the figures already running for the co-opted opposition are Luís Eduardo Martínez (AD), Antonio Ecarri (Lapíz-AP) or former San Cristóbal mayor Daniel Ceballos (with it's own party AREPA), others with intention are José Brito (PV), Javier Bertucci (ELCAMBIO), Juan Carlos Alvarado (COPEI) as well Leocenís García (Prociudadanos*). Still unclear but very likely to run is comedian and entrepeneur Benjamín Rausseo with his own party CONDE (named after his artistic nickname "Er Conde del Guacharo").

*Prociudadanos is allegedly lose his party register, due to low votes obtained in the 2021 elections, other opposition parties like MAS, Convergencia or MPV (most likely to nominate MCM or her replacement) also lose their status.

[MRCVzla]

the election is going to be frauded in favor of maduro wont it?

Only in the case the regime disqualifies Yoris or any other opposition candidate/party and reaches their goal of desmoralize the "electoral route". As this is not happening yet, the Unitary opposition is doing whatever they have in their hands to "play clean" (respecting international agreements on the issue like what remains of the Barbados' one) and make the election at least competitive and winnable, hence the pressure to have electoral register points abroad, in order to voters who fleed the country can update their electoral status and vote in July.

[MRCVzla]

Last hours to submit the candidatures to the CNE, throughout the weekend since the substitute candidate was announced, the MUD, UNT and the environmental party MOVEV have reported that they have blocked access to the CNE's online platform to be able to nominate Dr. Corina Yoris, which it's still not barred to run and denied a Wikipedia edit-based-fake news about a supposedly Uruguayan citizenship, an until now the system has not yet allowed the application to be made, a 4th party, Fuerza Vecinal has not submit any nomination yet as "their expecting the MUD one" to join them. Meanwhile, President Maduro and 9 other candidates* have been able to run even with public events at the headquarters of the Electoral Power. At the last minute, the CNE, although it did not extend the deadline to present applications, did include two parties so that they could apply, MAS and Centrados, the latter would apparently nominate the former MP and former CNE rector Enríque Márquez, until now a member of UNT and the Unitary Platform, as his candidate, not known if is an "stand-in" or be catalogued as another unrelailable "scorpion".

The entire narrative that is being created is that the regime wants to "impose" the opposition candidate among the various options co-opted or suspected of being so, and yet tell his electorate and related media that the "legitimate" opposition is not on the electoral path and continues to "organize coups and other destabilizing plans from abroad", something of which is not entirely true. The next few hours or days will be crucial to truly determine whether we are facing an "election-type event" or not.

*Among the parties that have been able to nominate there are a couple of "briefcase cards (party symbols)." The FUTURO Movement, which was linked to the former Lara governor and 2018 runner-up Henri Falcón, was ultimately "stolen" by people close to the Miranda governor and thus joining the parties that support Maduro's re-election. Another case is a newly created party called "Popular Democratic Right", one faction supported the unitary candidacy of MCM but the one that has control of the symbols nominated the "independent" Luis Ratti, one of the main promoters of the disqualification of MCM (and the MUD).

[MRCVzla]

Deadline passed, MUD was not able to register a candidate as they still blocked the access to the CNE server until the end of the process, at last minute with Márquez, Fuerza Vecinal originally nominated Pablo Zambrano as an "stand-in" but his postulation was unprocessed, they joined the one UNT finally can did with not having other option than postulate their leader and Zulia governor Manuel Rosales as mostly their "stand-in" candidate. 12 candidates (all men) would probably be on the electoral machines on July, now wait tomorrow for the reaction of the PUD and MCM, mostly what the chavismo wanted to happen... (?)

1.⁠ ⁠Nicolás Maduro (PSUV and GPP allies)
2.⁠ ⁠Luis Eduardo Martínez (AD)
3.⁠ ⁠Antonio Ecarri (Lapíz-AP)
4.⁠ ⁠Juan Carlos Alvarado (Copei)
5.⁠ ⁠Daniel Ceballos (Arepa Digital)
6.⁠ ⁠Benjamín Rausseo (Conde)
7. Javier Bertucci (El Cambio)
8.⁠ ⁠José Brito (Primero Venezuela and minor allies)
9. Claudio Fermín (Soluciones)
10. Luis Ratti (DDP)
11. Enrique Marquez (Centrados-MAS)
12. Manuel Rosales (UNT-Fuerza Vecinal)

EDIT: Seems at very very last minute, the CNE granted an exception to the MUD (who was unable to register a candidate telematically) to reserve their slot so they can nominate a candidate after all, still unknown if will finally be Yoris, another name endorsed by MCM or support Rosales but seems they will be an ongoing negotiation to found the definitive candidate, calling to abstention (what chavismo wants) is not a likely option yet, for now.

EDIT 2: Former diplomat Edmundo Gonzalez is the MUD' stand-in candidate, the PUD strategy is try to substitute with a consensus unity candidate or at last resource, join an already submitted candidate.

[MRCVzla]

Just to give and update, on April 19, prior to the deadline to candidate' substitutions being reflected on the electronic machine, there was a consensus within the Unitary Platform (PUD), María Corina Machado and Manuel Rosales to nominated the originally "stand-in" candidate, diplomatic Edmundo González Urrutia to be officially the unitary' opposition candidate, González Urrutia accepted the candidacy to the joy of many opposition voters and Rosales dropped is own. Without any impugnations against him, in this time Urrutia has given public interviews while MCM has done campaign for him in the interior of the country, 2 out of the 3 parties who endorsed Rosales (UNT and MPV) joined the newly MUD candidate, the other one, "Fuerza Vecinal" endorses Antonio Ecarri with a lot of internal controversy, other opposition candidate, Centrados' Enrique Márquez attended early reunions with the PUD and Rosales but he's staying in the race for now.

The deadline was extended until April 23, other 2 candidates, COPEI' Juan Carlos Alvarado and the infamous Luis Ratti quit the race and joined the candidacy of AD ad-hoc' Luis Eduardo Martínez. The TSJ didn't shut out and give José Brito the Primero Justicia' symbols and ad-hoc control of the party priorly denied, even the CNE accepted a last minute endorsment, as well the Comptroller General's Office announced a new round of political disqualifications of opposition leaders, many of them members of the Primero Justicia aligned with the Unitary Platform.