Establishment Clause, Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind

[A18]

Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)

A blind ministerial student in Washington State was denied the state vocational rehabilitation aid he was eligible to receive because he wished to use the funds at a Bible college in order to become a pastor.

JUDGES: MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and III of which O'CONNOR, J., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

OPINION: JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment precludes the State of Washington from extending assistance under a state vocational rehabilitation assistance program to a blind person studying at a Christian college and seeking to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Finding no such federal constitutional barrier on the record presented to us, we reverse and remand. ...

[A18]

I agree that the ruling is constitutionally sound.

Witters never got his aid, however. The case was remanded to the Washington Supreme Court, which then held the aid violated the state constitution.

[A18]

Locke v. Davey makes no sense. If a state can not single out a particular religion, it can not single out every religion.

[A18]

If a state requires that no person shall attend a college that teaches anything about religion, that has the clear effect of curtailing religious discussion. How is that not free exercise of religion? Washington's constitution has an effect of the same variety.

If state law prohibited an individual from burning down any building, except those used to discuss religion, would that not violate the free exercise of religion?

[A18]

Those provisions were clearly directed against measures singling out the clergy for public support. They did not in any way curtail religious speech, and thus are of little relation or importance to this matter.