Politico: Biden admin isn’t fully convinced Ukraine can win, even with new aid

[Obama24]

I think the solution is for NATO to kick Russia out of Ukraine and hope that Putin and his people treasure their lives enough to not start a nuclear war.

I think the solution is to split Ukraine in half.
The Russians get their half, and the West keeps the western half.
Then the reduced Ukraine gets admitted to NATO.

That would never happen. Ukraine would never support it, thus, neither would the Biden administration.

I am not talking about the incompetent Biden administration here.

Calling anyone “incompetent” after your big brain take is serious pot and kettle energy

It is obvious that they are incompetent. They have set the world on fire.

Not particularly. Set the world on fire how?

Russia has been engaging in expansionist policies for over a decade. If anything, it was the failure of the second Obama term, and Trump's term, to nip their ambitions in the bud.

As far as Gaza, I'd argue that Trump's aggressively pro Israel policies, including formalizing recognizing Jerusalem and moving the embassy there, helped set the stage for this intensified conflict.

[Crumpets]

I'm no.... miltiary expert, but can someone with knowledge in that area, tell us if Russia or Ukraine are winning ?

- Ukraine more or less has already transitioned to a wartime economy, and is relying on Western support to maintain its military viability for at least a period of a few more years when it might (but not necessarily) be able to build a domestic defense industry to rival Russia's non-wartime defense industry.

To the 1st bolded, I dispute this considering we're more than 2 years into this conflict and Ukraine is just now instituting a draft after reports of manpower shortages on the front lines for about 6 months.

That's not really what happened. Ukraine already instituted mass mobilization just a few days into the war back in 2022 as part of Zelensky's martial law declaration, which has since been re-upped roughly every 90 days. What the recent mobilization law did was decrease the minimum age at which one could be drafted from 27 down to 25, and called up an additional unspecified number (likely in the hundreds of thousands) for service. The reason this was so controversial was (in part) because there are just so few Ukrainian men in their 20s, and there are worries this might cause a demographic nightmare going forward.

- DC seems pretty confident the new aid package will stop Russia's advances and give Ukraine a chance at some new counter-offensive operations.

To the 2nd bolded, what kind of timeline we talking about? The Ukrainians per the Washington D.C.-based Institute for the Study of War are expecting a Russian summer offensive.

Offensives and counter-offensives can happen at the same time, and neither is necessarily successful. I agree that Russia will probably go on an offensive this summer. The general consensus (and that's all it is) is that Ukraine will be able to blunt it where it happens, and can maybe make some gains elsewhere, although probably not sweeping gains like we saw in summer/fall 2022. So, not a concrete prediction just an example, but this would look something like Russia launching an offensive to take all of western Donetsk Oblast, them only being able to take Chasiv Yar after months of heavy fighting and losses, and meanwhile Ukraine maybe doing something like taking Vasylivka or Oleshky or some other frontline town on another part of the front. So "stop Russian advances" was probably not the best wording on my part but "allow for net zero territorial changes across the front" would be more accurate, even if territory is still changing hands.

Also, at the risk of slightly doxxing myself, I used to work at ISW, and I like their work and trust their analysis. They were much better at reading the tea leaves ahead of the initial invasion than I was. Support their work!

I don't want to mega-post here, and this took me longer to type than I was anticipating, so I'll come back to the other three points later, but I promise I'm not ignoring them.

[Open Source Intelligence]

I'm no.... miltiary expert, but can someone with knowledge in that area, tell us if Russia or Ukraine are winning ?

- Ukraine more or less has already transitioned to a wartime economy, and is relying on Western support to maintain its military viability for at least a period of a few more years when it might (but not necessarily) be able to build a domestic defense industry to rival Russia's non-wartime defense industry.

To the 1st bolded, I dispute this considering we're more than 2 years into this conflict and Ukraine is just now instituting a draft after reports of manpower shortages on the front lines for about 6 months.

That's not really what happened. Ukraine already instituted mass mobilization just a few days into the war back in 2022 as part of Zelensky's martial law declaration, which has since been re-upped roughly every 90 days. What the recent mobilization law did was decrease the minimum age at which one could be drafted from 27 down to 25, and called up an additional unspecified number (likely in the hundreds of thousands) for service. The reason this was so controversial was (in part) because there are just so few Ukrainian men in their 20s, and there are worries this might cause a demographic nightmare going forward.

I get that, but they have 2 choices as far as I can tell if foreign states are not going to deploy troops into combat roles inside Ukraine: draft/mobilize more men, or run at a larger manpower deficit that the Russians will continue to gradually exploit as they've done so far this calendar year. So you're in between Scylla and Charybdis: either the country's demographic future goes to sh*t or you lose the war to Russia. And if you're not willing to risk the former to stop the latter, that's not a country fully committed to winning the war. This is a hard decision to make and it's not easy, but hard decisions are what is necessary. Dithering on it for months is no different than what Congress did with the aid.

(Frankly, I think all of eastern Europe's demographic future is going to be sh*t, whether they're at war or not.)

[Hindsight was 2020]

Russia pressing in the Donbas is one thing but actually doing a summer co into the Kharkiv area is really risky that could easily blow up in their face and speed up the dreaded “run out of storage tanks and ivf” clock that Kofman loves to talk about

[Open Source Intelligence]

Russia pressing in the Donbas is one thing but actually doing a summer co into the Kharkiv area is really risky that could easily blow up in their face and speed up the dreaded “run out of storage tanks and ivf” clock that Kofman loves to talk about

It smells to me like wanting to stretch Ukrainian lines thinner. Kharkiv is not currently a front. If the Ukrainians are forced to defend against the threat of a Kharkiv operation, those troops are not helping defend somewhere else on the front line.

[Hindsight was 2020]

Russia pressing in the Donbas is one thing but actually doing a summer co into the Kharkiv area is really risky that could easily blow up in their face and speed up the dreaded “run out of storage tanks and ivf” clock that Kofman loves to talk about

It smells to me like wanting to stretch Ukrainian lines thinner. Kharkiv is not currently a front. If the Ukrainians are forced to defend against the threat of a Kharkiv operation, those troops are not helping defend somewhere else on the front line.

But Ukraine did reinforce the area along with fortifying it as well so they might not need to divert troops out of the Donbas to stop it not to mention in turn whatever Russian losses there could of also been used to press in the Donbas

[HisGrace]

Interesting we've not got red avs admitting Ukraine can't regain all their lost territory. When I said that a few months ago and said the best outcome was a negotiated settlement with Ukraine giving up territory and then joining NATO you guys all insinuated I was a Putin supporter despite my long record to the contrary-

https://talkelections.org/FORUM/index.php?topic=585502.msg9422901#msg9422901
https://talkelections.org/FORUM/index.php?topic=565896.msg9229906#msg9229906
https://talkelections.org/FORUM/index.php?topic=484880.msg8505980#msg8505980

Also, why does wanting a negotiated settlement in Ukraine mean you're pro Russia but wanting one in Gaza doesn't mean you're pro Hamas?

[Woody]

Russia pressing in the Donbas is one thing but actually doing a summer co into the Kharkiv area is really risky that could easily blow up in their face and speed up the dreaded “run out of storage tanks and ivf” clock that Kofman loves to talk about

It smells to me like wanting to stretch Ukrainian lines thinner. Kharkiv is not currently a front. If the Ukrainians are forced to defend against the threat of a Kharkiv operation, those troops are not helping defend somewhere else on the front line.

But Ukraine did reinforce the area along with fortifying it as well so they might not need to divert troops out of the Donbas to stop it not to mention in turn whatever Russian losses there could of also been used to press in the Donbas

You also said Ukrainians had retreated from Avdiivka right after it fell, to prepared and finished second line defenses, now look at what is happening. So who knows what this is supposed to mean.

[Beet]

Wanting a negotiated settlement doesn't mean you're "pro" the enemy any more than Eisenhower was pro-North Korea.

[Former Dean Phillips Supporters for Haley (I guess???!?) 👁️]

Interesting we've not got red avs admitting Ukraine can't regain all their lost territory.

Ukraine can absolutely regain all their lost territory, but you cannot validly say "Ukraine can/cannot retake its territory" without referring to the context. Territory does not get taken back (or not) in a vacuum.

it is really a question in 2 parts:

1) Time frame. Wars are ultimately matters of commitment and endurance. Whoever gives up first, loses - not necessarily whoever loses the most land or troops or equipment. Even if we provide Ukraine with nothing more than current levels of help, they may eventually win if they are willing to keep fighting for longer. Like 20-30+ years, for example, like the Vietnamese did in Vietnam. If nothing else, eventually Putin will die, and a new Russian leader (after a very long quagmire in Ukraine) may well decide to simply withdraw and ask for sanctions relief, with the argument that "hey, I am not Putin." On the other hand, Ukraine is clearly not going to take back all their territory within the next year (given the current levels of aid/training/etc in any case). If you look back at historical wars, you can see a strong tendency for occupiers to eventually get kicked out, if the local population does not want them there, even if it takes a long time and even if the occupier has military superiority.

2) How much we choose to help them. The thing about this is it is not up to Ukraine, it is up to us. Just as 2 particular examples, USA has 3450 M1A1 and M1A2 tanks in storage, and 850 M109 Paladin self propelled artillery in storage. So far we have only given Ukraine about 30 M1-A1 Abrams.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1_Abrams#cite_note-306
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M109_howitzer#cite_ref-Military_Balance_2022_92-1

That is only 2 particular types of equipment illustrative of the fact that we have plenty of old stuff sitting around, there are many other types of equipment and many other models (also including old F-16s and other planes, not just land equipment).

Could Ukraine re-take all its territory within the next 2-5 years if we were to give them 3450 Abrams, 850 M109 Paladins, similar amounts of other land equipment, along with hundreds (rather than 10s) of old F-16s plane, and perhaps some of the F-117s and F-22s that are starting to be retired for the cherry on top, as well as aiding with newer essential technologies like drone/counter-drone?

Absof'inlutely. Although they could probably do so with quite a bit less than that as well, especially if we did not politically pressure the Ukrainian military into premature offensives before they have what they need and are fully ready (like we along with Zelensky did with the 2023 Zaporizhzhia offensive).

On the other hand, could Ukraine re-take all its territory within the next 1-2 years with the current far slower and much more limited level of aid? With rinky dink numbers like 30 Abrams and maybe 200 Bradleys?

That's an entirely different question, and obviously is far less likely (though it really does depend more on long range and indirect fires than on tanks/IFVs).

But that's not the only question you should ask, unless you want to be intellectually dishonest like JD Vance and say, as he did prior to the passage of the aid bill, "Ukraine can't win, they don't have enough ammo and equipment," while ignoring the fact that the reason why Ukraine lacks enough ammo and equipment is not that there is some law of nature that says Ukraine lacks ammo and equipment, but rather was that we were not giving it to them.

[Crumpets]

Coming back after much delay to finish my responses here.

- Since the failure of Ukraine's summer offensive last year, Ukraine's strategy has focused less on regaining territory and more on destroying Russia's equipment and manpower and damaging Russia's economy (with things like drone strikes on oil refineries).

To the 3rd bolded, that implies Ukraine has written off the territory they've lost or don't believe they'll ever take it back without external actors. When combined with your last statement of "they'll never be allowed in NATO with active combat on their territory" (which is the correct take), perhaps they willingly cede the territory in exchange. I don't think territory though is the Russian goal and the NATO part is more the real one. Russia's goal in my opinion is to do a version of what the U.S. did to Mexico in the Mexican-American War of Mexico at the end were still allowed to exist, but were completely dismantled from ever being allowed to form a challenge to American hegemony in the region.

I didn't mean to say Ukraine had given up on capturing territory permanently, just that they recognized they weren't in a position to take territory after the end of their last counter-offensive and before the new equipment/mobilized soldiers arrived. It's an operation shift, not a shift in strategic objectives. I disagree that Russia's goal is to keep Ukraine neutralized over territorial gains, though. This is definitely a common take in the West, but I personally have never seen any indication that Putin has decided that this is a war over alliances more than a war over territory and culture. He even famously ignored the question of NATO expansion in his interview with Tucker, even when given the most leading possible questions on it. Russia had pretty minimal reaction to Finland joining NATO, which in theory poses pretty much the same strategic threats and constraints on Russia as Ukraine joining. This is different from Georgia, where I think you're right that it was about keeping the country out of NATO, and even Ukraine 2014, which was about trying to keep Ukraine in Russia's sphere of influence and out of NATO and the EU. But if you read the most pro-war voices in Russia, they never put this conflict in terms of "keeping Ukraine neutral" or out of NATO. It's 100% "These are Russians who have lost their way, and until Russia marches on Kyiv and forces their submission, they will forever be under Ukronazi oppression."

- But bottom line, this is now a war of political will with Putin thinking he can outlast Western willingness to provide support and Ukraine thinking they can hold the line until either Russia's economy collapses (not off the table, but something that has been predicted many times with only a little to show for it) or Putin faces some sort of serious internal challenge, like we saw last year with the Wagner insurrection.

To the 4th bolded, I think back to the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts for precedent. First canary on this front is not in November, it's the EU Parliament elections in June. They're elections that most are agnostic about and have been used in some areas to be purely a vote to punish people. And all signs are the establishment parties will decrease to where the Parliament's center-left/center-right/liberal grand coalition that has governed forever might not have the votes to guarantee a majority. As far as the U.S., Biden if he wins could easily turn himself into Lyndon Johnson I feel if this drags on a few years if he lives, and if he doesn't live who really knows what Kamala Harris thinks and who her National Security Advisor/State Secretary/Defense Secretary will be. Putin's old if you want to look at "maybe he'll die", but he's still younger than both Biden and Trump. I'd like a better plan however to deal with Russia that's not "cross our fingers, maybe there's a coup".

I agree with all of this with two caveats: Putin is younger than Biden or Trump, but still a full seven years beyond the life expectancy for a man in Russia. Granted, he doesn't drink and has access to the best healthcare, but that's the equivalent of either Biden or Trump being 86, so it does behoove us to have plans in place for Putin's death and not take him continuing to live for a while as a given. Also, I think all signs point to a significant power struggle after Putin's death. That's not to say there will be a coup or a civil war, but even the recent reshuffle of Belousov replacing Shoigu replacing Patrushev had the effect of leveling the playing field in a hypothetical power struggle, rather than Putin making a hand-picked successor clear. He may still do this, but there are a lot of people in Russia with troops who answer to them that may want to challenge his decision after he's gone.

from my perspective, DC is still mostly "in it to win it" for Ukraine and, I think contrary to what sometimes is claimed, would rather Ukraine defeat Russia than degrade Russia in a bloody, hot stalemate.

To the final bolded, how does Ukraine at this point defeat Russia without foreign troops deployed or declaration of war on our part against the Russian Federation? There's hope and then there's realism. Victory at this point has been defined PUBLICLY as Russian withdrawal from all occupied Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. If it's privately defined as something else by either the Biden or Zelensky administrations, that needs to start becoming public. Right now the Ukrainians have a 1000-mile front line with not enough men to defend the whole thing all at once, and they just now passed a draft. What the hell? Those are not the actions of a state planning on taking back Donbass and Crimea, which tells you that victory as currently defined publicly is not realistic. Meanwhile open source satellite images tell you the Russians have made multiple defensive line fortifications for the areas they've taken over.

You'll get different answers to what victory means depending on who you ask, but victory in my mind, and in the mind of most people I work with on this, means degrading Russia's ability to fight to the point that it is dissuaded from any further military operations against Ukraine or its other neighbors. What this looks like is hard to say, but it does not look like Ukraine marching on Moscow, and Ukraine forcibly taking all the territory it has lost since 2013 is basically a 1:million best case scenario for them. If you want me to name one concrete scenario of what this might look like, it would be something like Ukraine having very successful counter-offensives that cut the Crimean landbridge, trying to cut off all access to Crimea by train, car, boat, and plane over the span of several years, and then negotiating an exchange of Russian withdrawal from all or most of the Donbas in exchange for ending the Crimean blockade, recognizing Russian control over Crimea, and an end to most international sanctions against Russia. Will that happen? Probably not, but that's one "Ukraine victorious" scenario that doesn't involve a return to 2013 borders or military capabilities well above what we've seen Ukraine manage in the past. And unfortunately, you're not going to get public declarations of specific acceptable scenarios from leadership because, as Trump likes to say but not practice, you don't want to tell your enemies exactly what you're planning and what your terms are before you try to cut a deal. If Russia senses the West or Ukraine is scaling back their goals, it will show him the attrition is working and he just needs to fight another year or two before we totally give up on Ukraine.


Also, just want to say these are all great points you brought up, and just because I have different views doesn't mean I don't respect your argument or that I don't think you could end up being right. Like I said, this is stuff I just have to think about every day, and I want to be able to articulate my views as best as possible.

[Hindsight was 2020]

Russia pressing in the Donbas is one thing but actually doing a summer co into the Kharkiv area is really risky that could easily blow up in their face and speed up the dreaded “run out of storage tanks and ivf” clock that Kofman loves to talk about

It smells to me like wanting to stretch Ukrainian lines thinner. Kharkiv is not currently a front. If the Ukrainians are forced to defend against the threat of a Kharkiv operation, those troops are not helping defend somewhere else on the front line.

But Ukraine did reinforce the area along with fortifying it as well so they might not need to divert troops out of the Donbas to stop it not to mention in turn whatever Russian losses there could of also been used to press in the Donbas

So the Kharkiv border wasn’t as fortified as I thought but Ukraine has contain the Russian push to some greyzone villages with heavy casualties and not pulling troops out of the Donbas so the prediction wasn’t that far off

[Badger]

Woody with another “Ukraine is doomed pay attention to me!” Threads and the first comment is Red Velvet with a variation of his “Ukraine deserves what it getting for daring to want to be Western allied. Long live the BRICS” post. Just a 1-2 punch of awful lol

Makes you wonder what share of his compensation comes in Rubles and what comes in Putin's semen

[Woody]

Russia pressing in the Donbas is one thing but actually doing a summer co into the Kharkiv area is really risky that could easily blow up in their face and speed up the dreaded “run out of storage tanks and ivf” clock that Kofman loves to talk about

It smells to me like wanting to stretch Ukrainian lines thinner. Kharkiv is not currently a front. If the Ukrainians are forced to defend against the threat of a Kharkiv operation, those troops are not helping defend somewhere else on the front line.

But Ukraine did reinforce the area along with fortifying it as well so they might not need to divert troops out of the Donbas to stop it not to mention in turn whatever Russian losses there could of also been used to press in the Donbas

So the Kharkiv border wasn’t as fortified as I thought but Ukraine has contain the Russian push to some greyzone villages with heavy casualties and not pulling troops out of the Donbas so the prediction wasn’t that far off

Russians have penetrated 10 kilometers into the oblast and it's only been a week, and at the same time taken half of Vovchansk. Give it time.