2013 Elections in Germany

[palandio]

At least up until the 1970s, you can savely assume that - while not every refugee was a Social Democrat - almost every Social Democrat in rural Southern Germany was a refugee. By the way: There is no "indigenous" Social Democracy in said region to this day. As far as my personal observations reach (Upper Bavaria south of Munich), around 80% of SPD members there are no native-born Bavarians, but "Zugereiste", especially from Franconia and Northern Germany. To some degree, they have replaced the refugees as social outsiders.

It's true that in most places in rural Upper Bavaria the SPD is a somehow "foreign" (and non-catholic) party, at least most of its membership. On the other hand there have always been some "indigenous" SPD voters, maybe in the past more than today.

The early-industrialized communes (Kolbermoor, Hausham, Penzberg, Peissenberg,...) have/had some kind of Social Democratic tradition, reaching back about 100 years, i.e. before the post-WW2 expulsions. Although I have to admit that these have also been places with a somehow diverse population (almost "social outsiders").

Other interesting comunes in our region are Geretsried, Traunsreut, Waldkraiburg and Neugablonz, new towns founded after WW2, with a very high refugee population. I would have to look up their historical voting behavior, but they were certainly among the strongholds of parties like the WAV, GB/BHE and in the 60s/70s the NPD. Today they have low turnout (similar to the Hausham type of communes) and relatively high CSU results (at least compared to other relatively big communes in the same area). The reasons for this could be the immigration of (mostly conservative) Eastern European ethnic Germans who were able cheap housing in the blocks.

My mother's family is partially refugee (though not moving to a "refugee town") and the parental and grandparental generations were very conversative or revisionist. What Franknburger told about his mother-in-law's family resembles very much what my mother told me she had heard: It has always been a very important theme at home, though very rarely talked about (openly). My great-grandmother hated the Russians and Poles very much until the end of her long life because the expulsion and the rape of her then 14-year-old daughter (though this was nothing she talked about openly, of course). She was a fervent CSU supporter because it represented the Western style economic miracle and social conservatism. She also admired Helmut Kohl, at least until 1990 when he conceeded the Eastern territories to Poland.

What is interesting though is that often the baby-boomer generation children of right-leaning refugees became more left-wing and the children of conservative "indigenous" people not so often...

[palandio]

My prediction:
CDU 37-40%
SPD slightly below 30% (bad trend)
Greens 14-15%
FDP 6-7% (including tactical vote)
Left 4-5% (profitting from disgruntled SPD voters, but seen as "lost vote")
Pirates 3%
Others 3-4%

CDU/FDP slightly favored, but very close.

[palandio]

Interesting "redistribution" of state-level FW voters (-6): CSU 1, SPD 0, Grüne 2, FDP 1, Pirates 1, Others (DVU?, NPD?) 1.

I would be very, very cautios about such inferences.

Some interesting observations on the comparison of polls and actual results:

2008 Bavarian state election:
pre-election polling consensus (mean of latest five polls from wahlrecht.de) vs. election itself:
CSU      48.2% vs. 43.4%
SPD      19.8% vs. 18.6%
Greens 8.8% vs. 9.4%
FDP       7.6% vs. 8.0%
Left       4.2% vs. 4.3%
FW        7.4% vs. 10.2%
Others  4.0% vs. 6.1%

2009 German federal election, Bavarian results:
GMS Sept 17 vs. election itself:
CSU       46% vs. 42.5%
SPD       17% vs. 16.8%
Greens 12% vs. 10.8%
FDP        14% vs. 14.7%
Left        5% vs. 6.5%
Others  6% vs. 8.7% (8.7% was the highest percentage of others of all Länder!)

Interpretation:
- CSU was overestimated both times. Pollsters tend to underestimate large swings. They could have adjusted their models now, but CDU/CSU underperforming their polls is what is to be expected normally.

- There was a consistent, though very heterogenous part of the electorate that voted FW in the state election and did not come back to the CSU in the federal election. (In fact, the CSU did worse in the 2009 federal election.) Instead many of them voted REP, BP, OeDP or even the Left. Both the FW and the "others" have overperformed their polling numbers both times.

[palandio]

Directly after 1990 the FDP was very strong in Halle, because it is Genscher's home town.

It would say that this year the CDU might stand a good chance:
Petra Sitte (LINKE) will start from her 33.7% in 2009, get some incumbent bonus (say 3-6%), lose some points (4-10%) because the LINKE is not in a very good shape at the moment, so altogether 27%-35%

The CDU will start from 30.9% in 2009 and will likely get back some FDP voters, so altogether say
30%-36%.

The SPD will start from 16.3%. In 2005 their proportional vote performance was 33.6%, but probably this time they will get way below 30%. Additionally they don't have the incumbent bonus anymore.

So it's LINKE against CDU, with CDU slightly favored.

[palandio]

In the East the SPD has slight chances of winning in Gotha-Ilmkreis (Thuringia), Leipzig II (Saxony) and in the western-most electoral district of Mecklenburg, though the most likely outcome is that they win in none of them.

In Hamburg they will likely rebound in Eimsbüttel (though even the Greens could win there) because the proportional vote in 2009 was still favorable for them and their "only" problem was personal. Hamburg-Wandsbek and particularly Hamburg-Nord will be more difficult.

On the national level much depends on turnout:
In 1998 CDU+CSU+FDP were at 20.41 million votes, far from a majority.
In 2002 CDU+CSU+FDP were at 22.02 million votes, no majority.
In 2005 CDU+CSU+FDP were at 21.28 million votes, no majority.
In 2009 they got 20.97 million votes, which was enough for a majority in the Bundestag.

The SPD went from 20.18 million votes in 1998 to 18.49 in 2002 to 16.19 in 2005 to 9.99 in 2009... Their main is turnout.

My prediction:
CDU+CSU 17.3 million votes (up from 14.66)
SPD 10.8 million votes (up from 9.99)
Greens 6.4 million votes (up from 4.64)
Left 3.4 million votes (down from 5.16)
FDP 3.3 million votes (down from 6.32)
Pirates 1.0 million votes (up from 0.85)
AfD 1.0 million votes (up from 0.00)
NPD 0.4 million votes (down from 0.64)
Others 1.0 million votes (down from 1.12)

[palandio]

Don't forget voters just staying at home. This is the biggest problem for the SPD. Bigger than floating voters, I would argue.

In my opinion it's very much about perceived candidate quality. Schröder was a very gifted and lucky campaigner, he managed to win in 2002 and almost win in 2005 despite heading very unpopular governments. Steinmeier and Steinbrück as his ideological heirs now get punished by voters who regret their 2002 and 2005 votes.

Many in the SPD had hoped that Steinbrück (who at that time was reasonably popular) would be a good fit:
- moderate enough to keep floating votes
- a bit of tough rhetorics regarding financial regulation and the fight against tax paradises to recapture left-wing voters
- being perceived as a straight-talking, strong politician.

Now the reality is:
- Merkel is still reasonably popular with moderate voters
- Steinbrück is already defined as being a right-winger (by SPD standards), his left-wing rhetorics come over as untrustworthy
- foot-in-mouth syndrome

Kraft is definitely more left-leaning than Steinbrück, Steinmeier etc., though you could argue about how much left-leaning she is actually.

[palandio]

The challenges named by Franknburger go beyond the "right-left" debate, but many of the answers can be tied to the "old" scheme.

1) The government's handling of the Euro crisis is at the same time reasonably popular in Germany and in my opinion totally disastrous. Sadly the SPD in stuck in some kind of in-between situation between supporting Merkel's Euro crisis handling, criticizing her as too soft, speaking about Euro-bonds and arguing against austerity. That all does not fit together. I am not sure what I would do in their place, but having no position or several contradicting positions at the same time turns out to be a bad strategy.

2) Environmental politics are the Greens' key issue, it would not make much sense to make this the SPD's central competence. On the other hand I would welcome a more pronounced SPD position in favor of local energy supply and independence from the large energy monopolies.

3) The third issue is very important but it is also a key example for the hypothesis that left and right are not becoming obsolete. It was the SPD-Green government who introduced the publicly subsidized private "Riester-Rente", while at the same time lowering the pensions for future pensioneers (not current pensioneers as you seek to imply).
At a first glance this idea might seem reasonable. But it has already been stated by Mackenroth and Samuelson that the social spending of an economy has always to be financed by the current production. This does not depend on whether the pension system is capital-market based or a simple redistribution scheme.
Hence the Riester reform was simply a way to help insurance companies earn more money and to cut back the employer contributions to the pensions.
Left-wing? Right-wing? I would argue the latter...
Another issue is rising the pension age. This is difficult. Remember that raising the pensions age does not regard current pensioneers but future generations. It is clear that if there are more pensioneers and less contribution payers something has to change. There are several options:
a) Hopefully the productivity will rise. This would imply that there will be more to distribute than before.
b) Lower pensions.
c) Raise the pension age, depending on number on work years, life expectance and the unemployment situation. (Recall that we still have statistically 3 million unemployeds plus some uncounted reserve plus underemployment plus the unemployment we are exporting to the south with out trade surplus.) In a situation where there is not enough work for everyone this option has similar effects as b).
d) Raise the contributions.
e) Broaden the financing base. E.g. include more tax financing (like other Northern European countries) or abolish the "Beitragsbemessunggrenze" while maintaining a maximal pension (like in Switzerland).
-> In the end I would propose a combination of several measures.

In my opinion the SPD still has its place as a party representing the interests of middle and working class voters (white-collar and blue-collar alike). It's not true that we all have become rich or even richer than before. People just have other jobs where they don't get physically dirty.
Green and green-liberal parties may grow because their natural base (progressive academically educated urban upper/middle class) is growing. That does not mean that all others have to become like them. Call them "protest parties" or how you would like but please accept that on many questions one can find several different answers with good arguments and not just the one TINA answer, the only one valid in the 21st century.

Hmm, this has become a bit lengthy and polemic.

[palandio]

Ok, I can fully agree with your last post.

A propos right-wing party: How many votes do you think will the AfD get? I hope they won't get over the 5%-threshold and likely they won't but who knows...

[palandio]

The "Party of Reason" will most likely get results comparable to the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany, the Party of Bible-abiding Christians, the Anarchist Pogo Party of Germany and many others. Funny names have been good to attract a handful of voters, but not more.

There are many potential protest parties competing, why should anyone vote for the PdV? Additionally it is not the only party competing for tea bag votes (cf. AfD).

[palandio]

You're right, of course. My main point was that in terms of electoral success the MLPD plays in the same league as the other parties I have named. Communist splinter parties in Germany show almost exactly the same patterns of support as the PdV (some local councillors plus 0.1% in some random state level election).
By the way most of the other parties' names are meant to be serious as well. Exceptions are DIE PARTEI and the Pogo Anarchists.

[palandio]

New federal election poll from IfD Allensbach for Frankfurter Allgemeine:
CDU/CSU 38.5% (-1.0% from last month)
SPD 28.0% (+1.5%)
Grüne 15.0% (-0.5%)
FDP 5.0% (-1.0%)
Linke 7.0% (+1.0%)
Piraten 3.0% (+0.5%)
Others 3.5% (-0.5%)

Interviews are from the period 27 March - 12 April.
AfD support is in the 1-2% region, though interviews are from before their founding convention.

Funny that a conservative pollster shows CDU/CSU+FDP at 43.5%, when the others have:
GMS 48%
Forsa 47%
FGW, Infratest, Emnid 46%
GMS 44%

[palandio]

This NRW poll (Left at just 3%), would actually mean that the Left is below the 5% treshold Germany-wide if we assume the same uniform losses in other states.

In 2009, the Left got 8.4% in NRW, but 11.9% Germany-wide.

So, the Left did 42% better in Germany than in NRW.

With 3% right now, the left would get ca. 4.3% Germany-wide.

Uniform proportional losses would be a very unrealistic assumption.
The Left's Eastern electorate is more stable than in the West.
Infratest dimap has the Left at 3% in the West (down from 8.3%; -64%) and 16% in the East (down from 28.5%; -44%). These proportions are in line with the 2011 Landtag results, recent polling from other firms and the historic evolution of the Left electorate.

I would not exclude the Left getting below 5%, but to see this you would need a result of barely more than 2% in the West.

[palandio]

Are these lows or reversals of 2009 heights?

The 2009 federal election result for the Left was somehow exceptional. There are some villages in the Bavarian Forest where they jumped from 2% to over 17% and similar cases. But this has been a one-time protest vote (CDU/CSU/SPD coalition, 2009 economic crisis, pension age 67, Lafo+Gysi campaigning).

On the other hand the Left results in recent elections are significantly lower than they have been in the 2005-2009 period.

But on the other hand these recent results in the West are still much higher than the pre-2005 PDS "zero, something" results.

[palandio]

29 parties have been registered for the Hessian state elections, though most still need to collect signatures. The most hilarious name in my opinion:

LUPe (Lärmfolter-Umwelt-Politik-ehrlich)

which would be something like

LOUPe (Noise torture-Environment-Politics-honest)

By the way the NPD probably has failed to reach the required amount of signatures for the Bavarian state elections in Upper Bavaria und Lower Franconia which together make up over 40% of Bavavia.

[palandio]

... and tax increases  to fund infrastructure investment (pretty stupid, since most of the infrastructure investments over the last years have been useless money-burners á la Stuttgart 21 and Berlin-Brandenburg airport).

So you would rather let the country break down in ruins. The rain dropping through the roof into the classrooms. Children not learning to swim because public swimming pools are closed. Trucks transporting large amounts of chemicals which would be suitable for railway transport, but railways are "overcrowded". Rents rising into the sky in the cities because there are (almost) no public housing projects anymore.

Germany actually is running up a huge deficit every year when you account for amortization of public infrastructure. That is, we are living from the substance. Speaking only about money-burners (which S21 and BBI most probably are) gives only a small part of the picture.

[palandio]

... and tax increases  to fund infrastructure investment (pretty stupid, since most of the infrastructure investments over the last years have been useless money-burners á la Stuttgart 21 and Berlin-Brandenburg airport).

So you would rather let the country break down in ruins. The rain dropping through the roof into the classrooms. Children not learning to swim because public swimming pools are closed. Trucks transporting large amounts of chemicals which would be suitable for railway transport, but railways are "overcrowded". Rents rising into the sky in the cities because there are (almost) no public housing projects anymore.

Germany actually is running up a huge deficit every year when you account for amortization of public infrastructure. That is, we are living from the substance. Speaking only about money-burners (which S21 and BBI most probably are) gives only a small part of the picture.

Your points are legitimate, and you deserve an answer. The short answer is "No", but the longer one gets much more complicated.
Before I start with the long answer, may I suggest that you look at this series of articles, which I came across via links posted in one of the Detroit bankruptcy threads (thanks TrainInTheDistance).

But allow me to already make one point: We had a similar (and at that time legitimate) debate around 2005, which lead to the Grand Coalition increasing VAT by three points from 16% to 19%. If that massive increase, combined with current record-low unemployment and social security expenditure, was not enough, I would first like to see a detailed analysis of what went wrong before emerging on the next tax increase. I would also like to have some safeguards installed to ensure the now proposed tax increase round will not go equally wrong, but achieve the postulated objective of strengthening community finances for provision of essential services (note that the stress here is on "essential services", which, in my opinion, do not include airports or philharmonies).

Oh, and the 'lack of freight railroad capacity" is directly linked to Stuttgart 21, because the project that was not financed, as funds were already earmarked for Stuttgart 21, was a new double-rail freight-only line along the Upper Rhine, to take some of the Rotterdam-Bale (- Northern Italy) traffic off the roads. And quite some of that traffic is - yes - chemicals (Sandoz, BASF, etc.).

Thank you for your kind answer to my polemic statement.
In my opinion you are right when it comes to long-term sustainability of infrastructure investments and planning. Our focus should be on providing essential services and maintaining existing (sustainable) infrastructure.
When I mentioned chemicals on trucks I had in mind a case in south-eastern Bavaria where a highway is under construction despite environmental concerns while the railroad will remain single-track for the next years. But your example is maybe even better.
Our opinions on state financing might differ slightly, but then we would get fully off-topic. :-D

Back to topic:
Families in Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria might be only slightly more conservative than the average German voter because the CDU's core voter group is among pensioneers. Pensioneers usually don't follow the school holiday scheme. (I'm afraid I can't provide any numbers.)

[palandio]

[...]
The Linke uptick is also coming as a bit of surprise considering their recent polling in the East (see below). The East-West breakdown provided by infratest dimap suggests gains in the West on the expense of the Greens. However two states in which spring polling suggested heavy Linke losses, namely NRW and Baden-Würtemberg, are still on holidays.
[...]

Some hypothetical numbers, assuming that the East makes up 17.2% of the total vote, down a little bit from 2009. How can the Linke arrive at 8% as federal polls suggest?

With 4.0% in the West and 27.1% in the East they would get 8.0% overall.
Or with 4.5% in the West and 24.7% in the East.
Or with 5.0% in the West and 22.3% in the East.
Or with 5.5% in the West and 20.0% in the East.
Or with 6.0% in the West and 17.6% in the East.

For comparisons: In 2009 they had 8.3% in the West and 28.5% in the East.
So you see the federal polling and some of the regional polling do not fit together perfectly but it is not to big of a stretch either.

[palandio]

In America they don't have proportional representation and "Fraktionsdisziplin" though. These are natural incentives against big-tent parties.

Yes there is something going on with the Greens and pedos.
The first thing that came up some time ago was some "fiction" written in the 70s/80s by "Dany le Rouge" Cohn-Bendit about his time as a kindergardener in an anti-authoritarian kindergarden at the University of Frankfurt (kids petting his ...).
Then there were some newspaper articles about an inner-green pressure group called SchwuP in the 80 that wanted to abolish the whole penal law for sexual offenses. They managed to achieve some (regional) party conference decisions that demanded legalization of "non-violent" pedophilia.
After these newpaper articles the Greens commission some political scientist to investigate these things. And parts of his results are now finding their way into the media.

[palandio]

My Bavarian Wahl-O-Mat results:

Linke    77.6%
Piraten 74.4%
Grüne   70.9%
SPD      66.3%
ÖDP      60.5%
FDP       57.0%
FW        53.5%
CSU      45.3%

Not sure what to make out of this:
- Linke and Piraten will almost surely fall below the 5% hurdle, so it might be better anyway to vote Grüne and/or SPD (last time I splitted my votes between SPD and Grüne, which in Bavaria means real proportional vote splitting, differently from the federal case)
- To prevent a CSU absolute majority it might actually be wise to vote FDP. Yes, I prefer CSU+FDP to CSU. But still, voting FDP is really too much for me.
- My average result for all parties seems to be higher than that of most of you. What did I do wrong to get Linke at 77.6% and FDP at 57% at the same time?

[palandio]

Good observations. I would add the following points:
ad 2.: The influx into the Berlin periphery and cities like Jena, Dresden etc. is not only "Western". I think that the Eastern demographics are gradually segregating, i.e. those who get attractive jobs move where the jobs are (i.e. Western Germany and Eastern university cities) and the rest stays where they are. The new Eastern-born middle class will likely exhibit the same turnout as their Western counterparts. That also means that Eastern migration to the West is only to a small extent responsible for declining turnout imo.
ad 3. The first map is about 2002, when in Bavaria their was a strong "Stoiber effect" that led to higher turnout in favor of the CSU. So a decline in 2009 had to be expected (damaging also the CSU, differently from the rest of Germany, where the CDU held up much better). Nevertheless low turnout in Eastern Bavaria is really an interesting phenomenon, because there are no other rural areas in the West with similarly low turnout. Maybe we need to dig deep into historic collective psychology. Eastern Bavaria has historically been a very poor area with a high voting potential for non-left-wing opposition parties like the anti-clerical Bavarian Peasants League, the separatist Bavaria Party and now the Free Voters. I would welcome further suggestions.
5. The areas with the highest turnout in the West are mostly suburban; if they are rural they are at least close to some big economic hub(exception: Münsterland). Many rural areas exhibit rather mediocre turnout. When it comes to the cities itself we can can observe a large divide within every big West German city. The more well-off areas have very high turnout, like the suburbs, the poorer quarters have low turnout.
6. Electoral districts with particularly low turnout in the West (other than Eastern Bavaria):
Duisburg II, Essen III, Gelsenkirchen (these are part of an economically problematic belt that runs from Northern/Western Duisburg to Northern Dortmund)
Hamburg-Bergedorf-Harburg (contains quarters like Harburg and Wilhelmsburg)
Mönchengladbach (I don't know enough)
The city of Augsburg (Particularly high percentage of Soviet-born Germans)

[palandio]

Some numbers on Eastern Bavarian turnout in federal elections.
turnout in Niederbayern (Lower Bavaria) minus turnout in Bavaria as a whole:
1949: +2.3%
1953: +0.5%
1957: -0.8%
1961: +-0.0%
1965: -0.1%
1969: -1.9%
1972: -2.0%
1976: -2.0%
1980: -2.5%
1983: -2.5%
1987: -4.1%
1990: -5.5%
1994: -5.1%
1998: -4.7%
2002: -2.5%
2005: -4.2%
2009: -6.4%

I don't know why...

[palandio]

Next sunday we will vote in Bavaria. Poll of polls (including FGW 09/06, Infr. 09/05, GMS 09/03, Emnid 08/28, I'm still hoping for a Forsa poll; when there where no number for Linke and Pirates I assumed 2%):
CSU 47.5% (+4.1% from last time)
SPD 19.3% (+0.7% from last time)
Free Voters 7.8% (-2.4% from last time)
Greens 11.8% (+2.4% from last time)
FDP 4.0% (-4.0% from last time)
Left 2.8% (-1.5% from last time)
Pirates 2.3% (+2.3% from last time)

Seat projection (180 seats):
CSU 100; SPD 40; Greens 24; Free Voters 16

My evaluation:
- The CSU has good chances to regain an absolute majority. There remains the risk for them that they underperform pre-election polls like they did in 2008 and like CDU/CSU has done in every federal election since at least 2002.
- Deluding expectations for the SPD, though the federal trend from Greens to SPD and tactical voting by Left Party sympathizers could provide them with (very modest) gains over their disastrous 2008 result.
- The FW outperformed their polls in 2008 by 3%, so maybe they are underestimated a bit this time as well.
- If the federal trend has a noticeable effect on the Bavarian state election, the Greens might stagnate. On the other hand a relatively good result in Bavaria (ca. 12%) might also help the federal party to reverse the trend.
- The FDP is campaigning hard on the message that a coalition government is much better than an absolute CSU majority. The Bavarian FDP lacks a traditional base, though, so the 5% hurdle might be to high for them.
- The Left is clearly under 5% in all polls. In recent state election this has translated in even worse election results. Their goal will be to limit the damage, because a very bad result in Bavaria could diminish their chances in Hesse.
- The Pirates will probably get their typical core vote result similarly to Lower Saxony where they got 2.1%.

What about the constituencies?
* München-Milbertshofen was the only constituency won by the SPD in 2008 by their front-runner Franz Maget. This time he will be replaced by Ruth Waldmann. Waldmann remains a slight favorite. Some areas in Southern and Western Neuhausen have been added to the constituency. From the East to the West these areas include inter-war social housing, co-operative housing (particularly railroaders), partially gentrified inner-city quarter, gentrified inner-city quarter, post-war social housing. These areas have a strong SPD potential (at least in the mean).
* München-Altstadt-Schwabing (named Schwabing in 2008) was the closest constituency in 2008. The SPD even got more "second votes" than the CSU, but Ludwig Spaenle (CSU) got slightly more vote than Isabell Zacharias (SPD). Margarethe Bause (Greens) placed third, but obtained a very strong result. All three compete for the constituency this time, too. The shape of the district has been changed and this might not favor the SPD. The constituency has lost Southern and Western Neuhausen (see above). It has gained Altstadt-Lehel. The Altstadt (old city) normally shows strong FDP results and relatively strong CSU results. The SPD is particularly weak. The Lehel, a very expensive inner-city residential quarter shows slightly weaker CSU results. The second area gained by the constituency is Isarvorstadt, which consists of a variety of quarters like Gärtnerplatzviertel, Glockenbachviertel (Munich's "gay quarter") and Schlachthofviertel. These are all typical inner-city quarters which have for a long time had a not so good reputation. Since the late 80s there has been a continuing gentrification process particularly in the Gärtnerplatz- and Glockenbachviertel. These quarters show the strongest Greens results in Munich, very low CSU results and dwindling SPD results (in some places still slightly above average). Vote splitting will hurt Greens and SPD.
* Other Munich constituencies where the SPD has slight chances are München-Giesing, München-Moosach, München-Bogenhausen, München-Hadern and München-Moosach. Note that by some kind of gerrymandering these are all very heterogenous samplings of Munich quarters and because of this they show very similar results. München-Giesing for example includes not only Giesing, a quarter with a "working class" reputation, but also Harlaching and Solln, which are mostly upper class residential quarters.
* In Franconia there might be a clear swing away from the CSU, particularly in the Nuremberg metro. The reason is that in 2008 the CSU's incumbent governor was Günther Beckstein from Nuremberg. Constituencies like Nürnberg-Nord, Nürnberg-West and Fürth might show much closer results this time, though they are likely still out of reach for the SPD
* In Freising the match will be between CSU and Greens. The CSU is still favored, but the Greens have obtained a very strong result last time. In the south of the constituency there is the Munich Airport which the CSU wants to extend. Protest against the extension is huge. Additionally the city/town of Freising is home to some agricultural/forest science faculties of the Technical University of Munich and to a Hochschule (college) specialized in agriculture/forestry/gardening/foor processing etc. Freising has been one an ecologist "stronghold" as early as 1978 when the ideologically rather interesting AUD obtained their strongest result there.

P.S.: I like the confessional map, Franknburger. I think that in 2009 the FDP spatial distribution does not really a strong correlation (because the suburban/wealthy factor is stronger), though in individual voting this correlation still exists. And it shows up in Norther/Central Baden-Württemberg.

[palandio]

Hopefully we will see an election in which the FDP is reduced to its core vote which will allow us to spot its core strongholds. I think that in 2009 the CDU loan/protest vote has caused a strong dilution in Southern Baden.
Pre-WWI Baden and Württemberg had a very clear divide between a catholic Center Party on the one side and mainly protestant liberal parties on the other side (the SPD was strong in cities with a large working class). Later (in 1952/53) the first governor of united Baden-Württemberg was liberal Reinhold Maier. Since then the liberals have faded, reaching only 5.3% in the 2011 state election. And so has most of its support in areas where it once had a majority. But not quite.
The following election atlas allows us to look at the FDP's strongholds in the 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011 state elections more in detail:
http://vis.uell.net/bawue/11/atlas.html
To me most of the FDP stronghold look like traditional protestant DVP/DDP stronghold, with the exception of Donaueschingen and Bodensee.

[palandio]

My final Bavaria numbers:
CSU ca. 46%
SPD ca. 19.5%
Greens ca. 11%
Free Voters ca. 9%
FDP ca. 3.5%
Others ca. 11% (including Left ca. 2.5% and Pirates ca. 2%)
---> Absolute Majority CSU (46% vs. 39.5%)

[palandio]

My Bayern state elections "others" prediction in detail:
Left 2.5% (-1.8%)
Piraten 2.1% (+2.1%)
ÖDP 2.0% (+-0%)
REP 1.7% (+0.3%)
BP 1.5% (+0.4%)
NPD 0.7% (-0.5%) [failed to provide valid lists for Upper Bavaria and Lower Franconia]
Others 0.5% (+0.1%)

turnout ca. 56%