2013 Elections in Germany

[minionofmidas]

http://www2.fr-online.de/bundestags-wahlhelfer/index.php

Here's a federal test; not sure I like it but fwiw...

Greens 66%
Left 55%
SPD 38%
FDP 24%
CDU/CSU 3%

[MaxQue]

With general regards to one line of discussion, as recently as 2005, the SPD polled 34% across Germany and as recently as 1998 managed 41%. And whatever may have changed irrevocably since, and whatever longterm factors may well (and certainly actually do)* lurk around, it is pathetic to blame the party's current lousy (federal) electoral situation entirely on things that are 'inevitable' or in some other way totally out of their control.

1998, 2002 and 2005 showed how much impact a popular leader and good campaigner (in this case, Schröder) can have. No doubt, such things can and will happen again. The general trend, however, remains intact. Just take a look at the following chart (SPD trendline by me). It shows that the SPD has been in a more or less steady decline since 1972. The seven-year-interval between 1998 and 2005 constitutes a deviation, after which the vote share reverted back to the trendline. So, the 23% result in 2009 was actually no shocking, outrageous aberration, but completely in line with a trend that's been going on for over 40 years now.

That is reminding of Liberals in Canada, in decline since the early 80's, with a bump in the 1993-2004 era.

[Viewfromthenorth]

http://www2.fr-online.de/bundestags-wahlhelfer/index.php

Here's a federal test; not sure I like it but fwiw...

Greens 66%
Left 55%
SPD 38%
FDP 24%
CDU/CSU 3%

SPD 38%
FDP 31%
Grüne 24%
CDU/CSU 21%
Linke 17%

...well, that was surprising.

[MaxQue]

With automatic translation, I got:

SDP 45%
Greens 31%
Left 31%
FDP 14%
CDU/CSU 10%

Not very surprising.

[Tender Branson]

In the last Infratest dimap poll (one of the 2 "exit pollsters"), the SPD has slipped to the lowest level since November 2009 - 24%:

http://www.infratest-dimap.de/en/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/sonntagsfrage

[SUSAN CRUSHBONE]

ERvND, the thing is, you are using like seven or eight data points. You know what else you can prove with that amount of data?


This kind of hyperextrapolation of political trends is pretty silly.

[SUSAN CRUSHBONE]

http://www2.fr-online.de/bundestags-wahlhelfer/index.php

Here's a federal test; not sure I like it but fwiw...

62% Greens
48% Left
38% SPD
34% FDP
21% CDU/CSU

[ZuWo]

http://www2.fr-online.de/bundestags-wahlhelfer/index.php

Here's a federal test; not sure I like it but fwiw...

FDP 45%
CDU/CSU 38%
SPD 24%
Linke 17%
Grüne 10%

[Tender Branson]

Die Grünen: Die Aussagen der Partei stimmen zu 72% mit Ihren überein
Die Linke: Die Aussagen der Partei stimmen zu 69% mit Ihren überein
SPD: Die Aussagen der Partei stimmen zu 34% mit Ihren überein
FDP: Die Aussagen der Partei stimmen zu 31% mit Ihren überein
CDU/CSU: Die Aussagen der Partei stimmen zu 24% mit Ihren überein

[RedPrometheus]

SPD: 79%
Greens: 52%
Left: 48%
FDP: 34%
CDU/CSU: 3%

That's a clear result ;-)

[ERvND]

So which elections did you actually use for the trendline? Only 72 to 90 presumably, since even including 1994 would presumably destroy the neatness of the graph?

As I already said, outliers and deviations did happen (and will happen again). It's no natural law, after all, just a general political trend.

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Of course. It's one of the reasons for the 1994 outlier, and it's also partly responsible for the 1998-2005 phase, as Schröder got disproportionately more votes in the East. Almost 25 years after the reunification however, voting patterns in the East and the West seem to have converged. Easterners still have a bias towards Die Linke, while Westerners are more into parties like the Greens and FDP, but both agree not to vote for the SPD.

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Yes, and where is the methodological concern with that? Obviously it's one of the SPD's main problems that many of their supporters have turned into non-voters.

[Beezer]

Unlikely, they'll just change to suit the times, as all large parties do.

The neoliberal re-orientation ("third way", "Agenda 2010" in Germany) was such an attempt to suit the times. We see the results.

I think the argument can be made that if the SPD had truly embraced Schröder's reforms (the way most Labour supporters accepted New Labour), it wouldn't be in the pitiful state that it is in right now. Instead major infighting ensued with SPD candidates (sometimes the same people) applauding as well as simultaneously lambasting Schröder for his reforms, while those on the left now consider the party to be too neo-liberal while center-right voters won't entrust a party with their vote if they feel it is going to raise taxes and increase social expenditure in any meaningful way.

[Franknburger]

Over the last weeks, there have been six state-level polls published on preferences for the federal election as well as for the next state election, namely Berlin (July 31st), MV (Aug. 17), SN, SAT & TH (Aug. 20) and Hessen (Aug 20/21). It is quite interesting to compare for each party the average differential between the state level and federal poll result:

CDU         +3.3
SPD          -2.5
Grüne       -1.5
FDP          +0.3
Linke        +1.0
Others      - 0.7

There is a clear Merkel bonus and Steinbrück malus. It is most apparent for Merkel's home state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where the federal CDU polls 8% better than the state-level party (reverse figures for SPD), but even without MV, the federal CDU polls in average 2.4% better than the state level one.
The federal Greens underperform by 1-2% in all states except for top candidate Göring-Eckardt's home state of Thüringen. However, even there, the federal result is just equal to the state result, she does not pull any bonus from her home state.
The pattern for the Linke is quite interesting: Federal election underperformance in their strongholds in Saxony, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen, over-performance in Hessen, Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
Other parties, finally, are doing a bit better on state than on federal level. This relates especially to the NPD, and presumably also to DVU (no figures available) in East Germany. In spite of the AfD's federal ballot presence, some state-level NPD and DVU voters may vote for CDU, possibly also SPD, in the federal election.

[minionofmidas]

So which elections did you actually use for the trendline? Only 72 to 90 presumably, since even including 1994 would presumably destroy the neatness of the graph?

As I already said, outliers and deviations did happen (and will happen again). It's no natural law, after all, just a general political trend.

What you actually did is use a trend that existed ages ago (and starting at the SPD's all time high, mind you, not that there's necessarily anything wrong with doing so) extend it into the future indefinitely which is invalid even when the future's still the future, and then hey presto, find an isolated (soon not so isolated) data point that confirms to that trend despite twenty years of recent history - as long as the original trend was - in between not doing so in any way or form.

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Of course. It's one of the reasons for the 1994 outlier , and it's also partly responsible for the 1998-2005 phase, as Schröder got disproportionately more votes in the East.[/quote]lolno. The SPD did massively worse in the east at every election except 2002, when they did ever so marginally better there. Your correct data points from 1990 on are 35.7%, 37.5%, 42.3%, 38.3%, 35.1%, 24.1% (I'm reasonably sure all these figures from wikipedia actually include West Berlin with West Germany, which is of course wrong, West Berliners not having voted federally before 1990, but the difference this makes is tiny - 2005 and 2009 without W Berlin are 35.2% and 24.2%). 2005 and 2009 are not quite as big gaps as existed in the 90s, though.  

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Yes, and where is the methodological concern with that?  
[/quote]It makes the graph wrong, pure and simple. It massively undersells the badness of the 2009 performance, and may artificially make it fit a trendline it doesn't actually fit.

1972    91,1
1976    90,7
1980    88,6
1983    89,1
1987    84,3
1990    77,8
1994    79,0
1998    82,2
2002    79,1
2005    77,7
2009    70,8

That's federally; too lazy to find the Western data which are slightly higher (though the gap varied widely, 1998 had almost western level turnout in the east, to everyone's surprise.)
As it happens, of course, the rot in turnout was temporarily stopped at much the same time the SPD's fortunes revived for a time before they threw it all away.

[Franknburger]

Unlikely, they'll just change to suit the times, as all large parties do.

The neoliberal re-orientation ("third way", "Agenda 2010" in Germany) was such an attempt to suit the times. We see the results.

I think the argument can be made that if the SPD had truly embraced Schröder's reforms (the way most Labour supporters accepted New Labour), it wouldn't be in the pitiful state that it is in right now. Instead major infighting ensued with SPD candidates (sometimes the same people) applauding as well as simultaneously lambasting Schröder for his reforms, while those on the left now consider the party to be too neo-liberal while center-right voters won't entrust a party with their vote if they feel it is going to raise taxes and increase social expenditure in any meaningful way.

I  fully agree. In fact, when comparing 2005 CDU and SPD election programs with the outcomes of the 2005-2009 grand coalition, I tend to put the SPD's effective weight in that coalition at some 70-80%. A few examples:
- Substantial tax increase (3% VAT rise, plus alcohol and tobacco tax) in order to get additional funding for infrastructure investment. Advantage SPD.
- Income tax was essentially left untouched. No tax increase for higher income groups, but also none of the CDU proposals (flat tax, "tax declaration on a beer coaster") implemented. Tax decrease for lower income groups, in line with SPD preferences, but ultimately enforced on the government by the Constitutional Court. I'd call it a draw.
- Health insurance: None of the proposed CDU reforms (uniform insurance payment) implemented. Instead, raising income thresholds for opting out of the public system, abolishment of most of the privileges of private health insurers, government support for "social functions", especially  maternal and children health-care. Almost as social-democrat as it can get (and a major SPD achievement!)
-Labour market: Introducing legal minimum wages for certain professions / sectors. Not as far-reaching as the SPD had desired, but still advantage SPD.
- Economic policy: Combatting the 2008 financial crisis in Keynesian style with deficit spending and increasing public investment. Advantage SPD.
- Family policy: Introduction of "Eltenrgeld" (payment for parental leave, on the condition that both the mother and the father take some leave), legal guarantee for pre-school child day care, increasing the public parental allowance ("Kindergeld"). Advantage SPD, even though the reforms were administered by CDU Minister von der Leyen.
-Transport policy: Delayed railway privatisation & restructuring, focus on several major new transport infrastructure projects. Advantage SPD.

In other words: The grand coalition was almost as social-democratic as it can get. [As a green, I am of course quite unhappy with several of its outcomes, especially in relation to transport policy and civil rights, but I accredit the SPD with having brought forward a number of sensible reforms]. And what did the SPD do in 2009? Instead of highlighting their successes, they behaved as if they had been in opposition all the time. Their appalling 2009 result did not have anything to do with demographics (even though demographics are not working in their favour), but was simply due to the fact that nobody knew what kind of politics the SPD was standing for.

And Merkel? Lacking a vision of her own, but being excellent in sensing public opinion and building coalitions, she quickly grasped the opportunity to sell policies that were mostly SPD-designed as her own. Whenever the SPD shifted a bit further to the left, trying to keep their membership comfortable and stop further desertion towards Die Linke, Merkel (and a few other strategists inside the CDU) quickly moved in. In that process, she has abandoned a good part of the CDU's traditional base, and the real miracle is that no serious right-wing alternative has been able to emerge so far.

For the average voter, the choice is simple: Two major parties without a clear strategy. One of them, the SPD, because they are struggling with finding a consensus on how to move forward, and also lack a leader that can unite the party and its potential electorate. The other one, the CDU, because they have become populist in the better meaning of the word, i.e. take account of popular issues and public opinion and adapt their positions and strategies accordingly. With the SPD, you don't really know what you will get. With the CDU, you know it will take some time, maybe double U-turns as on nuclear energy, but ultimately they will come up with something that is in line with public opinion and moves the country in the right direction. Slow and inefficient, but at least safe.

[ERvND]

What you actually did is use a trend that existed ages ago (and starting at the SPD's all time high, mind you, not that there's necessarily anything wrong with doing so) extend it into the future indefinitely which is invalid even when the future's still the future, and then hey presto, find an isolated (soon not so isolated) data point that confirms to that trend despite twenty years of recent history - as long as the original trend was - in between not doing so in any way or form.

Granted, my approach is rather bold, and I'd better not try to have it published in a statistics magazine or something.

I am just a political amateur, and as such, I simply took a look at the longtime trend, and the connection between the (undeniable) trend from 1972-1990 and 2009's result was striking. Maybe that's just by accident, maybe not. Soon there'll be another data point, and we'll see how good or bad it fits into my theory. Right now, at least, it looks as if the 23% result was no grotesque outlier, and we won't see the SPD above 25% in the near future.

[ERvND]

And what did the SPD do in 2009? Instead of highlighting their successes, they behaved as if they had been in opposition all the time. Their appalling 2009 result did not have anything to do with demographics (even though demographics are not working in their favour), but was simply due to the fact that nobody knew what kind of politics the SPD was standing for.

And Merkel? Lacking a vision of her own, but being excellent in sensing public opinion and building coalitions, she quickly grasped the opportunity to sell policies that were mostly SPD-designed as her own. Whenever the SPD shifted a bit further to the left, trying to keep their membership comfortable and stop further desertion towards Die Linke, Merkel (and a few other strategists inside the CDU) quickly moved in. In that process, she has abandoned a good part of the CDU's traditional base, and the real miracle is that no serious right-wing alternative has been able to emerge so far.

Your analysis is good, but it relies too heavily on personal developments, as in "the SPD leaders were inept, while Merkel was clever".

Actually, it's a structural problem: In grand coalitions, the bigger partner benefits, while the smaller one is punished by the voters. It happens (almost) always, not only in 2009. Surely it has something to do with basic human psychology. That's also why all sane SPD leaders want to avoid a new grand coalition at all cost. They know it would happen again, no matter how skillful they might act this time.  

[Franknburger]

And what did the SPD do in 2009? Instead of highlighting their successes, they behaved as if they had been in opposition all the time. Their appalling 2009 result did not have anything to do with demographics (even though demographics are not working in their favour), but was simply due to the fact that nobody knew what kind of politics the SPD was standing for.

And Merkel? Lacking a vision of her own, but being excellent in sensing public opinion and building coalitions, she quickly grasped the opportunity to sell policies that were mostly SPD-designed as her own. Whenever the SPD shifted a bit further to the left, trying to keep their membership comfortable and stop further desertion towards Die Linke, Merkel (and a few other strategists inside the CDU) quickly moved in. In that process, she has abandoned a good part of the CDU's traditional base, and the real miracle is that no serious right-wing alternative has been able to emerge so far.

Your analysis is good, but it relies too heavily on personal developments, as in "the SPD leaders were inept, while Merkel was clever".

Actually, it's a structural problem: In grand coalitions, the bigger partner benefits, while the smaller one is punished by the voters. It happens (almost) always, not only in 2009. Surely it has something to do with basic human psychology. That's also why all sane SPD leaders want to avoid a new grand coalition at all cost. They know it would happen again, no matter how skillful they might act this time.  

It is anything but a natural law that grand coalitions benefit the bigger partner, while the smaller one gets punished.  Take a look at the 1969 federal election, the 1999 and 2007 state elections in Bremen, MVP 1998, Berlin 2001, Brandenburg 2004 and 2009, and also at current polling for Austria.
To the extent a red-red coalition in the East may also be qualified as a kind of grand coalition, MVP 2006 and Berlin 2011 are further examples of the larger partner getting punished over proportion.
In fact by my count, after 1990 there have been more German grand coalitions that saw the smaller partner winning or both parties moving more or less in parallel than grand coalitions that had the leading partner winning at the expense of the smaller one. And the SPD's defeat in the 2009 federal election is unparalleled in size (the closest I could find was Baden-Würtemberg 1996, CDU +1.7, SPD -4.1).    

[jaichind]

http://www2.fr-online.de/bundestags-wahlhelfer/index.php

I got

62% for FDP
45% for CDU/CSU
17% for Green Party
17% for Left
14% for SPD

Not surprising.  FDP is about the only party I would support in Germany.  Even CDU/CSU is too left wing for me in terms of economic policy.         

[jaichind]

1998, 2002 and 2005 showed how much impact a popular leader and good campaigner (in this case, Schröder) can have. No doubt, such things can and will happen again. The general trend, however, remains intact. Just take a look at the following chart (SPD trendline by me). It shows that the SPD has been in a more or less steady decline since 1972. The seven-year-interval between 1998 and 2005 constitutes a deviation, after which the vote share reverted back to the trendline. So, the 23% result in 2009 was actually no shocking, outrageous aberration, but completely in line with a trend that's been going on for over 40 years now.

Could not one make the same argument about CDU/CSU from 1983 where it seems by looking at the chart that it is also in free fall after 1983.  I think what we are observing is the decline of the two party system in Germany with the rise of Greens and then Left and now Pirates and AfD.  In fact various minor parties (much of it the far right) seems to also have increased their share of the vote over the last few decades as well.

[Leftbehind]

I think the argument can be made that if the SPD had truly embraced Schröder's reforms (the way most Labour supporters accepted New Labour)

Sorry, but most Labour supporters haven't accepted New Labour, and the only way SPD could've replicated it is if they'd brought in two-party FPTP, effectively leaving the left no alternative but to hold their nose and vote to keep the right out, else waste their vote or stay at home.

The already faltering New Labour project came crashing down at the party's feet, as all the chickens came home to roost leading up to the 2010 GE, and an awkward sounding wonk has been elected leader since then mainly on the basis of keeping the continuity candidate out.

Anyway.

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[minionofmidas]

I am just a political amateur, and as such, I simply took a look at the longtime trend, and the connection between the (undeniable) trend from 1972-1990 and 2009's result was striking.

1972-87*, but otherwise, yeah it's ... cute. neat. interesting, too. Just not particularly meaningful.

Actually, it's a structural problem: In grand coalitions, the bigger partner benefits, while the smaller one is punished by the voters. It happens (almost) always, not only in 2009.

This is correct.

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Who?

*EDIT: No actually, it'd not really look less neat if a West-only figure were used for 1990 and 2012, so strike that objection.

[minionofmidas]

Take a look at the 1969 federal election, the 1999 and 2007 state elections in Bremen, MVP 1998, Berlin 2001, Brandenburg 2004 and 2009, and also at current polling for Austria.
To the extent a red-red coalition in the East may also be qualified as a kind of grand coalition, MVP 2006 and Berlin 2011 are further examples of the larger partner getting punished over proportion.

MVP 2006 (election not held on same date as federals for first time in ages) and Berlin 2001 (collapse of coalition over corruption scandal affecting only larger partner) are kind of unfair examples to use though. -_-
And really, red-black in Brandenburg never felt like a "grand" coalition - the CDU never behaved or was treated by local media etc as an equal partner.

[palandio]

My Bavarian Wahl-O-Mat results:

Linke    77.6%
Piraten 74.4%
Grüne   70.9%
SPD      66.3%
ÖDP      60.5%
FDP       57.0%
FW        53.5%
CSU      45.3%

Not sure what to make out of this:
- Linke and Piraten will almost surely fall below the 5% hurdle, so it might be better anyway to vote Grüne and/or SPD (last time I splitted my votes between SPD and Grüne, which in Bavaria means real proportional vote splitting, differently from the federal case)
- To prevent a CSU absolute majority it might actually be wise to vote FDP. Yes, I prefer CSU+FDP to CSU. But still, voting FDP is really too much for me.
- My average result for all parties seems to be higher than that of most of you. What did I do wrong to get Linke at 77.6% and FDP at 57% at the same time?

[Beezer]

I think the argument can be made that if the SPD had truly embraced Schröder's reforms (the way most Labour supporters accepted New Labour)

Sorry, but most Labour supporters haven't accepted New Labour, and the only way SPD could've replicated it is if they'd brought in two-party FPTP, effectively leaving the left no alternative but to hold their nose and vote to keep the right out, else waste their vote or stay at home.

The already faltering New Labour project came crashing down at the party's feet, as all the chickens came home to roost leading up to the 2010 GE, and an awkward sounding wonk has been elected leader since then mainly on the basis of keeping the continuity candidate out.

Compared to the SPD, Labour's move to the center has definitely been far more successful and, more importantly, enduring. Schröder introduced Agenda 2010 and was ousted two years later (barely admittedly), with the SPD hovering around 25% of the vote now thanks to the infighting (imo). Blair was elected on the New Labour manifesto and re-elected twice. I'd say that's a pretty good track record for New Labour regardless of what its members now think of it. It has left a lasting mark on the party that will be quite difficult to shake off.

And if it hadn't been for the weird leadership electoral system, a Blairite would be at the head of the party today.