UK General Election 2019 - Election Day and Results Thread

[Swedish Rainbow Capitalist Cheese]

Labour really has two paths now:
1. “Old” Labour
Have a leader more moderate and popular than Corbyn, and move the party in a populist, economically left direction while deemphasizing culture and social issues in order to appeal to cultural conservatives. Essentially, return to its Old Labour roots.
Pros: Potentially more easy electorally, can grab back marginal North seats.
Cons: Feasibly unlikely now against Johnson’s Tories and post-Brexit world.

2. “Remain” Labour
Fully embrace the Remain coalition of cosmopolitan, socially liberal and market liberal middle class; co-opt Lib Dem’s coalition, while maintaining social democratic policies and emphasis on economics. Similar to Blair’s New Labour, but without the neoliberalism and Iraq-baggage.
Pros: More feasible electoral future, seal in place the new Brexit political divide. Potential to unite the left by taking Lib Dem and Green votes.
Cons: Electorally fraught, difficult to break through with Lib Dem Remainers in the South; hard to win Conservative southern seats.

If I was Labour leader, I’d pick option 2, but that’s just me.

There's not enough woke London suburbia and university towns to make option 2 a road to an electoral majority. At least not with a FPTP electoral system.

To illustrate the conundrum of that potential strategy, despite the fact that the popular vote in the referendum was close in 2016, it's estimated that 406 constituencies voted to leave in while 242 voted to remain.

Option #2 is probably more likely, if for no other reason than they've won three majorities with that formula and zero (in the last forty-five years) with the other one.

Blair managed to win those majorities by bringing in new metropolitan middle-class voters to the party while simultaneously keeping the traditional working-class base in the North and Midlands loyal. Labour needs both groups to be successful. Remove one and the floor falls through, as it did last week.

Still, you are correct that strategy 2 is more likely (with the exception of New Labour's centrist economics which are not coming back...), but it hasn't much to do with which strategy that would actually be most successful. The fact is that most Labour members today are metropolitan types and they'll choose a leadership that speaks to their own preferences, not what is actually going to win elections.

[DistingFlyer]

Labour really has two paths now:
1. “Old” Labour
Have a leader more moderate and popular than Corbyn, and move the party in a populist, economically left direction while deemphasizing culture and social issues in order to appeal to cultural conservatives. Essentially, return to its Old Labour roots.
Pros: Potentially more easy electorally, can grab back marginal North seats.
Cons: Feasibly unlikely now against Johnson’s Tories and post-Brexit world.

2. “Remain” Labour
Fully embrace the Remain coalition of cosmopolitan, socially liberal and market liberal middle class; co-opt Lib Dem’s coalition, while maintaining social democratic policies and emphasis on economics. Similar to Blair’s New Labour, but without the neoliberalism and Iraq-baggage.
Pros: More feasible electoral future, seal in place the new Brexit political divide. Potential to unite the left by taking Lib Dem and Green votes.
Cons: Electorally fraught, difficult to break through with Lib Dem Remainers in the South; hard to win Conservative southern seats.

If I was Labour leader, I’d pick option 2, but that’s just me.

There's not enough woke London suburbia and university towns to make option 2 a road to an electoral majority. At least not with a FPTP electoral system.

To illustrate the conundrum of that potential strategy, despite the fact that the popular vote in the referendum was close in 2016, it's estimated that 406 constituencies voted to leave in while 242 voted to remain.

Option #2 is probably more likely, if for no other reason than they've won three majorities with that formula and zero (in the last forty-five years) with the other one.

Blair managed to win those majorities by bringing in new metropolitan middle-class voters to the party while simultaneously keeping the traditional working-class base in the North and Midlands loyal. Labour needs both groups to be successful. Remove one and the floor falls through, as it did last week.

Still, you are correct that strategy 2 is more likely (with the exception of New Labour's centrist economics which are not coming back...), but it hasn't much to do with which strategy that would actually be most successful. The fact is that most Labour members today are metropolitan types and they'll choose a leadership that speaks to their own preferences, not what is actually going to win elections.

Agreed on all points - although Labour's winning 1990s formula is gone, their support base (and caucus) still reflects those years to some small degree. The kicking they took yesterday will also probably encourage such a candidate (I wasn't suggesting above that they necessarily could succeed Blair-style now, but in the party's present state it's understandable to look to a previous winning play.)

Blair was of course often compared to Clinton when they were in office, and the likeness does have some justification (bringing in affluent urban-&-suburbanites), but a key difference is that a Nixon-Reagan realignment hadn't really happened in Britain yet - yes, Margaret Thatcher had her 'Essex Man,' but he was (a) mostly in the South and (b) already in the process of moving from the working to middle class. Blue-collar northerners did not come over to her, and the Tories still won heavily among the ABC1 types (leads of 30% or more) and didn't do nearly as well among the rest. One reason for the big Reagan wins in the 1980s was that, like Blair, he had grabbed a big chunk of the opposition's base while keeping all of his own at the same time. Clinton got back some (though certainly not all) of those voters, but also took out a piece of the other party's base (affluent northeasterners & west coasters) - clean sweeps of New England had only happened once before for a Democrat, but are now the norm.

A lot of media outlets have compared Boris Johnson to Donald Trump, but I can't really agree with that - apart from Europe (a big issue, admittedly!) Johnson has been more of an old One Nation Tory than a hardcore right-winger (or spitting, rabble-rousing demagogue). Last week's election is also not really comparable to the one three years ago in the US: if it was, then the Tories would have swept the North, won decently in the Midlands, and gotten crushed in London & the Home Counties, none of which are obviously true.

Certainly comparisons with the US can be overused, but if you have to make one then a better comparison would be if Nixon or Reagan had followed Clinton instead of the other way around: the affluent suburban base has already been dented, but he's getting a big chunk of the blue-collar vote to compensate. (According to the Ashcroft poll, the Tory lead this time among ABC1s & C2DEs was virtually identical; contrast this with the Thatcher & Major years, or for that matter any time before that.)

[Antonio the Sixth]

find a way to turn the SNP into a permanent satellite.

that assumes Scottish independence never happens

Well, if Scottish independence does happen, that's even more reason for Labour not to compete there.

The whole prospect of independence (which isn't some unrealistic dream given that Brexit is likely to have very negative effects on the Scottish economy) means that it's unrealistic for Labour to turn SNP into a "permanent satellite". Any Labour-SNP alliance will be temporary and likely fraught with tension.

It's really not that complicated. Either independence succeeds and the Scottish Question stops being an issue for Labour (they're going to have to work their ass off to win a majority of English and Welsh seats, but it can be done). Or it fails, the SNP eventually has to accept that, and settles with a partnership with Labour. I mean I guess they could keep asking for a new IndyRef every 5 years or so, but they'll get tired of it eventually.

SNP is a broad tent populist party like Fianna Fail in Ireland. They have no reason to be permanently allied with Labour if it doesn't give them a referendum.

Did you even read my post?? When did I say anything about not giving them a referendum?

[RFK Jr.’s Brain Worm]

There's a fairly recent precedent of the left working with seperatists in the Anglosphere. It didn't exactly go well.

I’m drawing a blank here. What is it?

[DistingFlyer]

There's a fairly recent precedent of the left working with seperatists in the Anglosphere. It didn't exactly go well.

I’m drawing a blank here. What is it?

I think he's referring to the coalition/confidence-and-supply proposal between the Grits, New Democrats & Bloc back in 2008.

[mileslunn]

There's a fairly recent precedent of the left working with seperatists in the Anglosphere. It didn't exactly go well.

I’m drawing a blank here. What is it?

I think he's referring to the coalition/confidence-and-supply proposal between the Grits, New Democrats & Bloc back in 2008.

And that never materialized as Grits changed leaders and pulled out.

[Clyde1998]

YouGov - How Britain voted in 2019
By age
18-19 - Lab 52% (-14), Con 22% (+3), Lib 15% (+6), Grn 5% (+3), SNP 4% (+2), Brx 1% (nc)
20-24 - Lab 57% (-5), Con 21% (-1), Lib 10% (+1), SNP 7% (+4), Grn 3% (+1), Brx 1% (nc)
25-29 - Lab 54% (-9), Con 23% (+1), Lib 12% (+5), SNP 4% (+1), Grn 4% (+2), Brx 1% (nc)
30-39 - Lab 46% (-9), Con 30% (+1), Lib 14% (+6), SNP 5% (+1), Grn 3% (+1), Brx 1% (nc)
40-49 - Con 41% (+2), Lab 35% (-9), Lib 13% (+5), SNP 5% (+1), Grn 3% (+1), Brx 2% (nc)
50-59 - Con 49% (+2), Lab 28% (-9), Lib 12% (+5), SNP 4% (nc), Brx 3% (nc), Grn 3% (+1)
60-69 - Con 57% (-1), Lab 22% (-5), Lib 11% (+4), SNP 3% (nc), Brx 3% (+1), Grn 2% (+1)
70+ - Con 67% (-2), Lab 14% (-5), Lib 11% (+4), SNP 2% (nc), Brx 2% (nc), Grn 2% (+1)

By gender
Male - Con 46% (+1), 31% (-8), Lib 12% (+4), SNP 4% (nc), Grn 3% (+1), Brx 2% (nc)
Female - Con 44% (+1), 35% (-8), Lib 11% (+4), SNP 4% (+1), Grn 3% (+1), Brx 2% (nc)

By social grade
AB - Con 42% (-4), Lab 32% (-6), Lib 16% (+6), SNP 4% (+1), Grn 3% (+1), Brx 1% (nc)
C1 - Con 43% (+2), Lab 34% (-9), Lib 12% (+4), SNP 4% (nc), Grn 3% (+1), Brx 2% (+1)
C2 - Con 49% (+2), Lab 31% (-9), Lib 9% (+3), SNP 4% (+1), Brx 3% (+1), Grn 3% (+2)
DE - Con 47% (+6), Lab 34% (-10), Lib 8% (+3), SNP 4% (nc), Brx 3% (-1), Grn 2% (nc)
ABC1 - Con 43% (-1), Lab 33% (-7), Lib 14% (+5), SNP 4% (+1), Grn 3% (+1), Brx 1% (nc)
C2DE - Con 48% (+4), Lab 33% (-9), Lib 8% (+2), SNP 4% (nc), Brx 3% (nc), Grn 2% (+1)

By education level
Low (GCSE or lower) - Con 58% (+3), Lab 25% (-8), Lib 8% (+3), Brx 3% (nc), SNP 3% (+1), Grn 2% (+1)
Medium - Con 48% (+3), Lab 31% (-8), Lib 11% (+4), SNP 4% (nc), Grn 3% (+2), Brx 2% (nc)
High (Degree or higher) - Lab 43% (-6), Con 29% (-3), Lib 17% (+6), SNP 4% (nc), Grn 4% (+2), Brx 1% (nc)

By 2017 vote
Con - Con 85% (+2), Lib 7% (+2), Lab 4% (-7), Brx 2% (+2), Grn 1% (nc), SNP 0% (nc)
Lab - Lab 72% (-11), Con 11% (+1), Lib 9% (+4), Grn 3% (+2), Brx 2% (+1), SNP 2% (+2)
Lib - Lib 59% (+17), Lab 20% (-14), Con 14% (-6), Grn 4% (+2), SNP 1% (nc), Brx 1% (nc)
SNP - SNP 87% (+16), Con 5% (-6), Lab 4% (-11), Lib 1% (-1), Grn 1% (+1), Brx 0% (nc)
Grn - Lab 34% (-33), Grn 30% (+16), Lib 15% (+5), Con 10% (+4), SNP 6% (+4), Brx 1% (+1)
UKIP - Con 67% (+3), Brx 19% (+5), Lab 5% (-11), Lib 3% (+1), Grn 1% (nc), SNP 0% (nc)
Plaid - Plaid 46% (+13), Con 28% (+15), Lab 15% (-35), Lib 4% (+3), Brx 3% (+1), Grn 1% (nc)

By 2016 referendum vote
Remain - Lab 49% (-6), Lib 21% (+9), Con 19% (-6), SNP 6% (+1), Grn 4% (+2), Brx 0% (nc)
Leave - Con 74% (+9), Lab 14% (-10), Brx 4% (nc), Lib 3% (nc), SNP 2% (nc), Grn 2% (+1)

By 2017 vote and 2016 referendum vote
Con Leave - Con 92% (+2), Lab 2% (-4), Lib 2% (+1), Brx 2% (+1), Grn 1% (nc), SNP 0% (nc)
Con Remain - Con 65 (-6), Lib 22% (+12), Lab 8% (-9), Grn 2% (+1), SNP 1% (+1), Brx 0% (nc)
Lab Leave - Lab 52% (-20), Con 33% (+11), Brx 6% (+4), Lib 4% (+1), Grn 2% (+1), SNP 1% (+1)
Lab Remain - Lab 79% (-9), Lib 12% (+7), Con 3% (-1), Grn 3% (+2), SNP 2% (+2), Brx 0% (nc)
Lib Leave - Con 46% (+3), Lib 30% (+3), Lab 9% (-16), Grn 6% (+4), Brx 4% (+2), SNP 1% (+1)
Lib Remain - Lib 66% (+18), Lab 21% (-16), Con 6% (-6), Grn 3% (+1), SNP 2% (+1), Brx 0% (nc)

Changes compared to the 2017 data. The Brexit Party compared to UKIP. 2019 vote by 2017 vote is compared to 2017 vote by 2015 vote figures.

[Annatar]

According to YouGov, crossover age when a voter is more likely to vote conservative than labour fell from 47 in 2017 to 39 in 2019. What this means practically is whereas conservatives won voters born before 1970 in 2017, in 2019 they won voters born before 1980.

It also means they won Gen X after losing it in 2017, the only generations the conservatives lost were the millennials and gen Z which is still very small in terms of voters.

https://mobile.twitter.com/MattChorley/status/1206854346677334016

[🦀🎂🦀🎂]

The correct answer, for what it's worth, is to just try to be Labour; to doggedly and pragmatically make the case for using the power of the State to improve the lives of ordinary people. To look outwards rather than inwards and to accept society as it is (rather than what it might rather it be) and to use that to consider what can be done to improve things. Labour has been at its best (and this includes the early years of New Labour) when it has been like this. And it has been at its most electorally successful when like that as well...

in your opinion do you think the white male working class of the welsh coal mining factories stayed with the labour for so long because of fragile masculinity due to the rise of Margaret Thatcher, but now that corbyn are the party of SJW's and African-British voters they are moving more inclined to the pro-life Conservative Party?

[Filuwaúrdjan]

In general I am sceptical of YouGov's post-election demographic breakdowns. However in this instance I strongly suspect that the general pattern for Labour, dropping badly across the board and falling particularly hard where it was strongest last time, is accurate. A wholesale rejection by the electorate.

[Lord Halifax]

find a way to turn the SNP into a permanent satellite.

that assumes Scottish independence never happens

Well, if Scottish independence does happen, that's even more reason for Labour not to compete there.

The whole prospect of independence (which isn't some unrealistic dream given that Brexit is likely to have very negative effects on the Scottish economy) means that it's unrealistic for Labour to turn SNP into a "permanent satellite". Any Labour-SNP alliance will be temporary and likely fraught with tension.

It's really not that complicated. Either independence succeeds and the Scottish Question stops being an issue for Labour (they're going to have to work their ass off to win a majority of English and Welsh seats, but it can be done). Or it fails, the SNP eventually has to accept that, and settles with a partnership with Labour. I mean I guess they could keep asking for a new IndyRef every 5 years or so, but they'll get tired of it eventually.

SNP is a broad tent populist party like Fianna Fail in Ireland. They have no reason to be permanently allied with Labour if it doesn't give them a referendum.

Did you even read my post?? When did I say anything about not giving them a referendum?

You implied they would eventually get tired of demanding one all the time and would then remain allies of Labour ("the SNP eventually has to accept that, and settles with a partnership with Labour").

[rob in cal]

Do we have any insight of what the 2nd choice of Lib Dem voters was if there was either an Australian style altervative vote, or french style runoff? Especially intresting would be the votes of Lib Dem voters in marginal Labor vs Tory seats that everyone knew going into the election would be close. In so many of those races the Lib Dem vote seemed to average between a low of 4 into the higher single digits.
   Seems to me that alot of those voters might not be left leaning voters at all, much more centrist in outlook as they wouldn't even vote Labour tactically when there candidate had no chance at all. So, of the 11.55% of the electorate who voted Lib Dem, just how many are die hards who were never up for grabs for Labour, and who maybe shouldn't be considered as truly left leaning voters?

[afleitch]

In general I am sceptical of YouGov's post-election demographic breakdowns. However in this instance I strongly suspect that the general pattern for Labour, dropping badly across the board and falling particularly hard where it was strongest last time, is accurate. A wholesale rejection by the electorate.

And in Scotland a re-rejection. There has been a bit of buyers remorse anecdotally but our ground game was saying, 'it's midway between 2017 and 2015 which proved right and we piled on support each week. Labour were ramping up in the last week as were the Tories in Orangeland but it failed to materialise. Kirkcaldy was even won, which may have been the result of acting fast.

The good thing is that former Labour now SNP voters are becoming 'habitual'. There was fear that would loosen.

They've also returned to us in north east Tory-SNP contests. Once fishing gets f-ed up those should swing back harder.

Worth noting that Labour's Scottish GE vote share fell to the lowest since 1910.

[parochial boy]

I can't help but think that ignoring non-voters really weakens the meaning of all that YouGov stuff

[CumbrianLefty]

I can't help but think that ignoring non-voters really weakens the meaning of all that YouGov stuff

Turnouts were down in a lot of the seats that Labour lost (and nearly lost) Any analysis of the results that doesn't take that into account isn't a wholly convincing one.

[bore]

I have too many conflicting feelings, and a bit more of the dust needs to settle, to produce any sort of political analysis of this election and where things will go from here but I do have some takes, large and small, about its psephological aspect. (Sorry about the length, I had a lot of Thoughts and it was cathartic to write them out).

1. We all knew that the lib dems had had an atrocious campaign, but even taking that into account, they had an atrocious night. Like with the last election, there was a significant amount of churn in their vote, with both gains and losses. Somewhat remarkably, as Talleyrand noted, the lib dems won only 2 seats in each of 2015, 2017 and 2019; Alastair Carmichael’s genepool Liberal Orkney and Shetland and electoral colossus - but only within the borders of Cumbria- Tim Farron’s Westmorland and Lonsdale. The central problem for any party is “What is the point of this party? Who are they for?”. The joy and challenge of election analysis is that you can answer this question, in the most truthful way, by looking at results, which can not lie. But a look at liberal results over the last decades and possibly even century has never really given any sort of answer. Their seats at any given time were a mishmash of celtic fringe, fortuitous by election gains, local personalities, seasoned more recently by universities and seats that were too posh for labour and too liberal for tories. Now though, barring Scotland (which is a law unto itself) and Farron, I think we can use that seat data to finally answer that question. They are the party of the liberal, highly educated, rich, with all that entails(Note this remarkable tidbit from the yougov post election poll: - the Lib Dems are the only party where propensity to vote for them is correlated with income (though with the caveat that income is not the same as class)).  This is a real disappointment for those angling for the glory days of Ashdown and Kennedy, because these people are not actually that common and can’t win you that many seats. But it does have some upside, if you have a real authentic constituency, even if niche, and you represent them, their support will endure.  Their map has been nomadic over history. So many seats have followed the progression of going Liberal for a term or two or three, and then, after their MP loses or retires a steady slide into deposit losing territory. This election, bleak though it may be, they may well have found an identity that solidifies their floor, even at the expense of lowering their ceiling. For a party that has lost so much, that may not be so terrible a result.

2. A testament to the incompetence and unlikability of Swinson in particular is that she lost East Dunbartonshire. Their other results in Scotland, which is politically a separate country, and must be considered so for campaign purposes, were actually pretty good. Not only did they increase their vote nationally by 2.4%, they also had a string of impressive results, regaining (albeit a distant) second place in Ross, Skye and Lochaber, gaining Northeast Fife from the SNP of all people, holding Edinburgh West and particularly, Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (now, according to Hanretty, their only seat which voted (51%) to leave). All this suggests that Swinson, who lost 3.8% or 1500 votes, probably did so not in spite of her newfound prominence and access to media platforms but because of it, which is pretty damning of her tenure as a leader.

3. Thinking about Scotland more generally, the first thing to note is, once again, how evenly spread the SNP vote is. As Gully noted, it is remarkable that a party which received 45% nationwide only received over 50% in 8 of 59 constituencies. Overall the SNP result is probably not best seen through the lens of 2015. It was certainly not as triumphant, unlike then, where unionists were taken unawares, they fought a successful rearguard campaign in a decent number of seats. The campaign was also oddly muted it. The UK parties campaigned in a UK manner, Jackson Carlaw, Richard Leonard and Willie Rennie were overshadowed by their bosses, and the SNP were not as independence focused, though they did not ignore it, as in the previous two elections.  I think, and the polls bear this out, that it would be wrong to read the result as a massive endorsement of independence. What it does show however, is a Scottish electorate that is completely at odds with the English, not just far apart, but swinging in opposite directions. It shows there is a very large bloc of voters who may not be sold on a yes vote, but who see themselves as distinct from and hostile to English politics and the Conservative party. This is a ticking time bomb that may switch if, as seems almost inevitable, they are poorly handled by Johnson.

 4. One of the most remarkable results, though it will receive little attention in London, was the SDLP regain of Foyle (the constituency is just the city of derry, it is called foyle after the river so the boundary commission don’t accidentally restart the troubles) on a swing of 17.3 per cent. Brexit, and the ostentatious disregard shown for the island of Ireland by the British political classes has paradoxically both increased support for a united Ireland and reduced support for abstentionism.

5. Another set of fascinating results is Labour’s performance in Scouseland. A look at this list of labour seats held before the election ordered by average age shows that practically the only old people who still vote Labour are old scousers. Labour got 80.8% in Knowsley, 79.4% in Bootle and 84.7% in Walton. This is one of the only areas left in Britain where people vote like it is the 50s, where political parties are a fixed part of your identity, rather than being a conditional relationship with distant and distrusted politicians. And this complete and utter tribalism occurs in some of the most white working class seats in the country. Why is this? I don’t know, but there is no facile answer. Merseyside was certainly devastated by Thatcher, but so were many areas which now have conservative MPs. It can only be the result of a a specific culture which has developed around Liverpool over a long period of time. But, as sui generis as it is, I think it is something that the party should look seriously at to try to learn from, and that academics and journalists must also consider before making overly hasty generalisations about what exactly has happened.

6. During this campaign Labour had one of the largest and most finely tuned campaigning machines in british electoral history, while the conservatives had five canvassing pensioners and some racists with twitter accounts. Nevertheless, unsurprisingly, the rising tide lifted all boats. Despite all the sound and fury over tactical voting, election pacts and ground game, in seats where this applied the conservatives triumphed as easily as seats where it didn’t. It is of course the case that ground game can make a difference, and is worth doing. Canvassing has its own rewards besides getting out the vote, anyway. But we must not forget that it will only tip the balance in the most marginal situations. As Al frequently and rightly says, elections are not a strategy game. If you are losing in a seat by 10, no amount of ground game will save you. So the focus on it for its own sake, the factoring of it into predictions, especially at high turnout general elections, has been grossly disproportionate.

7. A related point, this election saw massive swing differentials by region. The swing differentials, it has to be said, were basically predicted by almost everyone, even if the absolute swing was not. But there is a tendency to make savvy predictions about how this differential will massively help one party or another, and this is almost always a mistake. If you put the 2019 result into a swingometer from 2017 you get a majority of around 75, that is, almost dead on. Though the actual seats won might differ, the number of them, which is what fundamentally counts, will almost always balance out.

8. If the results in Great Grimsby put paid to the idea that how an individual MP votes matters a huge amount to constituents, this election does show quite a lot of evidence that significant numbers of people cast personal votes, even if its incredibly rare that there are enough of these people to get the MP elected in their own right. Consider, for instance, the fall in the tory vote in Beaconsfield and Rushcliffe, the swing in Norfolk North, Ian Murray’s performance in Edinburgh South, or Frank Field’s in Birkenhead.

9. One of the few consolations of British politics being so full of bad people is that every election, even the most miserable, offers a few amusing moments, albeit often of the schadenfreude variety. Perhaps the most amusing here are the miserable performances of Chris Leslie, the Brexit surge (and conservative vote drop!) in Barnsley Central, Labour, despite everything, holding Hartlepool, Nigel Dodds losing, the aforementioned Lib dem gain in northeast fife while Swinson lost her seat, and, most of all, the Lib Dems failing to gain Sheffield Hallam.

10. In the UK in general, perhaps one of the most surprising aspects of the election was a stickiness in seats Labour gained in 2017. They held 14 of 28 seats in England and wales they gained at that election, and most of the others, places like Peterborough, Bury North, Kensington, High Peak, had very small Tory majorities. The so called sophomore bump could be a partial factor in this  remarkable local stability, but given that it occurred in the context of a massive national swing, there must be other factors. I think what it shows above all is that, despite the massive surface level change, there is a similarity between the 2019 campaign and the 2017 campaign. The places that were most attracted by Corbyn then are the ones that were least repulsed (because labour still lost ground in these seats, just far less) by him now. The contours of the support are the same, and now the counter swing tory gains look like harbringers. Stoke on Trent South suggests West Bromwich East, Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland suggest Redcar and so on. 2019 shows us what places Corbynism was really attractive in, and what places it was merely attractive as not May’s Conservatism.

11. Another point to make is that in a lot of the heartland seats labour still received around the same percentage or only slightly less than they got in 2015 and 2010. The difference, of course, being that unlike in those elections, the not labour vote coalesced around the Conservatives, or, to put it another way, Labour got 2010 votes and the Conservatives got 2017 votes (note that the raw number of tory votes rarely increased by that much this year, it did not need to) in these constituencies. In Blyth Valley, Labour received 46% in 2015 and 41% this year, in Heywood and Middleton they received 43% in 2015 and 41% this year. In Grimsby they received exactly the same percentage (32.7) in 2010 and 2019.  Given Labour did slightly better percentage wise in 2019 and most of the shares are a bit lower, as well as the addition to the electorate of new labour friendly young voters in between elections, that does add up to a performance that was worse. And there are a few seats, Mansfield, Bolsover, Cannock Chase (labour down to 25% in a seat they held going into 2010!) where the significant drop really does herald a trend away. But in most cases it is not a cataclysmic drop on 2015, its just no one comments on a marginal hold, but they do notice a loss (hence the tiresome since 1935 stuff with seats like Wrexham which were held marginally multiple times previously). I need to make myself very clear here. I am not saying that this election was not cataclysmic for the Labour party as an institution. I am saying that previous elections, in a very real sense, were almost as bad, but no one noticed, because of a split vote amongst non labour voters. That is, the issues Labour are having go beyond Brexit and will not be solved by it going away, though they may appear to be solved in the short term by the conservative vote splitting enough to allow reversions.

12. So let’s be unambiguous, this result was terrible for Labour. Not only is 203 seats abysmally low, it is remarkable how many seats nearly, but not quite, fell. That is, it would have only taken a stiff wind and the result would be much worse. Labour have a majority of 208 in Coventry Northwest and 401 in Coventry South. Their cumulative majority in the Newport seats is 2894 and they have a triple digits majority in Wansbeck. To get an idea of the state labour are in it is worth, as always reading Alasdair Rae’s work. Gully said on election night that the seats Labour are left with can pretty much fall into 3 categories- the most completely devastated post industrial areas, universities towns and metropolitan seats, and, well, there is no path to a majority that just appeals to these places.

13. Finally, a note of optimism. There has been much rubbish talked by gloating tories and their media outriders that such a large majority effectively guarantees two terms. This is ridiculous, because actually all the talk pre election about the map being bad for the tories still holds, they just did so well it didn’t matter. On a uniform national swing it only takes about 3% for the tories to lose their overall majority, and they need to be well over 300 to be in any danger of forming a minority government, so skilful have they been at alienating the other parties. Yes, a labour outright majority is much more of a stretch than that, but it’s frankly been a stretch ever since the independence referendum, and will be until the situation in Scotland changes. It doesn’t practically because the SNP have no choice but to support a Labour government, so can be effectively counted as, albeit troublesome, Labour votes. But a 4 per cent swing is perfectly plausible even in normal times, and we do not live in normal times. This election, 2017, 2015 in Scotland, if they have shown one thing,  have shown that the electorate is incredibly volatile, and prior performance is no indication of future success. All current majorities are like the foolish man who built his house upon the sand, and could disappear tomorrow. Boris Johnson is not beloved now, and his support is conditional, but even if he was and it wasn’t there is no reason at all to doubt that Labour can win easily in 2024. No reason, that is, based on fundamentals and national conditions, plenty based on the track record of the Labour party.

[CumbrianLefty]

As far as Liverpool is concerned, the hostility to the MSM in general (and the Sun in particular) has to be a factor I would have thought (and Sun readers often gravitate to the Mail in later life, too)

[Antonio the Sixth]

Are people seriously trotting this "guaranteed two terms" thing? I guess no one remembers Super Mac...

[parochial boy]

Bit off topic, but why are the Western Isles traditionally so much more Labour than the rest of the Highlands?

[Clyde1998]

Bit off topic, but why are the Western Isles traditionally so much more Labour than the rest of the Highlands?

In Scotland, Labour traditionally did best in Catholic areas, which included the Western Isles, while the Conservatives traditionally did best in Protestant areas. (Sectarian voting )

A lot of the Conservative vote in the Highlands went to the Lib Dems when the Tory vote fell away.
The seat covering Caithness and Sutherland (the most northern seat on the mainland) was Labour in the 60s and 70s, but only one got over 40%, before the local MP defected to the SDP - which eventually merged with the Liberals.

The seat covering Ross and Cromarty (directly south of Caithness) had traditionally been a Liberal seat, which the Conservatives took in the 70s after being 'National' Liberal (former Liberals who broke away to support the Conservatives) in the 50s.

Inverness went Labour in 1997 and 2001, albeit also never exceeding 40%, after having previously been Liberal otherwise (barring a brief Conservative spell following WWII).

Argyll and Bute is a good example of the Conservative to Lib Dem switch having been Tory since the 1920s (with the exception of SNP wins in both 1974 elections). The Liberals finished second in 1983 and became the beneficiaries of anti-Conservative tactical votes from SNP and Labour voters, as well as former-Conservative voters, from 1987 to the end of the century. The Lib Dem vote only exceeded 40% here once in 1997 and the Conservative vote has returned to its 80s level.

[Clyde1998]

I can't help but think that ignoring non-voters really weakens the meaning of all that YouGov stuff

Turnouts were down in a lot of the seats that Labour lost (and nearly lost) Any analysis of the results that doesn't take that into account isn't a wholly convincing one.

YouGov's data for how people vote this time shows the 2017 vote figures as Con 43.6% (+0.2 on what they actually got), Lab 40.5% (-0.5), Lib 7.4% (-0.2), SNP 3.2% (+0.1), UKIP 2.1% (+0.2), Grn 1.8% (+0.2), Plaid 0.5% (nc), Oth 0.9% (+0.1).

I'm guessing the differences are an indication of turnout, which would fit the Labour having a low turnout among their supporters.

About 24% of people who voted this time apparently didn't vote in 2017 (which seems high?).

[jaichind]

Full yougov post-election survey

[AMOLAK MANN]

The initial BBC projections haven't always been right on, but their track record is pretty good overall:

2017 - projected Tories short by 12 (actually short by 8 )
2015 - projected Tories short by 10 (actually a majority of 12)
2010 - projected Tories short by 19 (correct)
2005 - projected a Labour majority of 66 (correct)
2001 - projected a Labour majority of c.160 (actually a majority of 167)
1997 - projected a Labour majority of c.175 (actually a majority of 179)
1992 - projected Tories short by 25 (actually a majority of 21)
1987 - projected a Tory majority of 26 (actually a majority of 102)
1983 - projected a Tory majority of 146 (actually a majority of 144)

(They didn't provide an exact figure in 1997 & 2001, giving just a rough estimate.)

They were rather off in 1987 & 1992, but otherwise were pretty close on all the rest (though you can debate if their 2015 exit poll was 'close' or not, I suppose).

1997 the BBC didn't broadcast the forecast but it was for a 209 LAbour majority and in 2001 they did broadcast seat numbers and the precise majority forecast was 157.I can give details of ITN if anyone likes and details for both channels prior to 1983

[CumbrianLefty]

The initial BBC projections haven't always been right on, but their track record is pretty good overall:

2017 - projected Tories short by 12 (actually short by 8 )
2015 - projected Tories short by 10 (actually a majority of 12)
2010 - projected Tories short by 19 (correct)
2005 - projected a Labour majority of 66 (correct)
2001 - projected a Labour majority of c.160 (actually a majority of 167)
1997 - projected a Labour majority of c.175 (actually a majority of 179)
1992 - projected Tories short by 25 (actually a majority of 21)
1987 - projected a Tory majority of 26 (actually a majority of 102)
1983 - projected a Tory majority of 146 (actually a majority of 144)

(They didn't provide an exact figure in 1997 & 2001, giving just a rough estimate.)

They were rather off in 1987 & 1992, but otherwise were pretty close on all the rest (though you can debate if their 2015 exit poll was 'close' or not, I suppose).

1997 the BBC didn't broadcast the forecast but it was for a 209 LAbour majority and in 2001 they did broadcast seat numbers and the precise majority forecast was 157.I can give details of ITN if anyone likes and details for both channels prior to 1983

The BBC forecast in 1997 was also for a 47-29 Labour lead in the GB popular vote (as opposed to the 44-31 margin that actually transpired) IIRC this overestimate may have been down to also predicting a turnout similar to 1992, when in fact it actually dropped seven points to 71%.

[AMOLAK MANN]

I'm not sure also if the overestimate was again the shy Tory phenomenon-the unweighted figures and LAb 49%, Con 27%.

BBC:
October 1974-projected Labour majority of 125(actually a majority of 3)
1979-projected(implicititly) a Tory majority of 19 (actually a majority of 43).

ITN-same as BBC from 2005 but before that:

2001 - projected a Labour majority of 175 (actually a majority of 167)
1997 - projected a Labour majority of 159 (actually a majority of 179)
1992 - projected Tories short by 21 (actually a majority of 21)
1987 - projected a Tory majority of 68 (actually a majority of 102)
1983 - projected a Tory majority of 116 (actually a majority of 144)
1979- projected a Tory majority of 63  (actually a majority of 43).

Another exit poll for The Sun newspaper in 1992 projected Labour as the largest party short by 19(with Tories short by 24)
October 1974-projected Labour majority of 15(actually a majority of 3)