As mentioned before, relative to the 2016 LegCo elections the pro-establishment surged differently by location.
HK Island +18.5% (the wealthy)
Kowloon +95.7% (the working class)
New Territories +27.6% (the middle class)
The Kowloon pro-establishment surge since 2016 is just massive. It plays into the narrative that the level of economic development of the rest of the PRC means it is the middle class and wealthy in HK that feels the threat of economic competition from HK's economic integration with the rest of PRC. The working class got hit already back in the 1990s from the first wave of PRC-HK economic integration and at this stage most likely welcomes PRC-HK economic integration by shifting their votes to the pro-establishment bloc.
In the 30 functional seats, it seems one centrist won and the other 29 were captured by the pro-establishment bloc.
As mentioned before this is part of the bigger shift of the impact of HK economic integration with the rest of Guangdong. At this stage, there is not much separating the productively of HK college-educated middle-class workers and their Guangdong counterparts. Only in very high-end services like top-tier legal and financial services does HK still have a competitive edge over the rest of Guangdong. The HK working class also bore the brunt of economic impact in the 1990s due to economic integration with the PRC. At this stage, further economic integration with Guangdong might actually drive up the relative wages of the HK non-college-educated working-class relative to their HK college-educated middle-class counterparts. These economic trends are showing up in the total vote the pro-establishment bloc is getting as the pro-establishment bloc coalition is becoming an alliance of the elite and non-college educated working-class at the exclusion of the large middle class in between.
This is reminiscent of
a first-half-of-2019 blog post I saw on the electoral coalitions of pre-protests Hong Kong. In terms of class composition there are also some striking parallels between the post-2016 US Dem and US GOP coalitions.
The majority of Hong Kongers are undoubtedly either Pro-Beijing (or at least not as rabidly anti-China to the extent that the international media makes them out to be)... Allow me to, as a Hong Konger, give you the full breakdown of genuine political positions/opinions one can hold in Hong Kong. And I’m going to simplify this by segregating the Hong Kong population into six separate distinct categories based on their political opinions/positions.
1. Pro-Beijing
These people unequivocally identify themselves as Chinese, and align themselves with both the People’s Republic of China on the mainland, and the incumbent Pro-Beijing Hong Kong government. They view the Chinese Communist Party as a benevolent benefactor, patron, and ruler in both Hong Kong, and on the mainland. They are the city’s silent majority. Furthermore, with regards to social class. Both the majority of the city’s poor and rich fall within this political bracket.
2. Pro-Democracy (Liberals)
Also known, as “Pan-Democrats” or “Pan-dems”. These people identify as Chinese, but generally oppose the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party and wish to pursue democratic reform in both Hong Kong and on the mainland. Frequently fraternising with other Chinese identifying pro-democracy activists and liberals, both in Taiwan and on the mainland, they view themselves as fellow travellers to those who were killed during the 4th of June, 1989 over the course of the Tiananmen Square protests. They also happen to be the main opposition to the Pro-Beijing group, and the second largest political cleavage in the city (though even then, they are still eclipsed in both electoral numbers and influence by Pro-Beijing parties)... Adherents to this political position tend to be primarily middle to upper class.
3. Pro-Democracy (Socialists and Social-Democrats)
While these people might identify as Chinese, they absolutely loathe the central government in Beijing, and those they perceive to be its local lackeys in Hong Kong. Over the last ten-fifteen years social-democrats, and left-leaning democrats split from the generally liberal dominated Pro-Democracy movement. Believing in a radical form of direct social democracy, they tend to be virulently and openly anti-CCP and Beijing. They generally don’t seek out compromise or attempt to work with the Pro-Beijing group, and consider the liberal Pro-Democracy camp to be “too soft” on Beijing and the CCP.
They often draw most of their stock from young middle class voters and students, and are the third largest group in Hong Kong (although they pale in numbers compared to both liberal Pro-Democracy and Pro-Beijing voters)
