Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Cassius]

https://variety.com/2023/film/news/volodymyr-zelensky-ukraine-oscars-appearance-russia-1235547499/

"Oscars Reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Bid to Appear on Telecast (EXCLUSIVE)"

Does not Zelensky have a war to run? How come he is constantly trying to show up at these types of events?

Because the military runs the war not him. Part of the reason Ukraine has done so well is the Zelensky let’s the military run the war while he goes abroad to build public support as opposition were Putin runs the military operations

It’s not altogether clear that this is the case, given that Zelensky appears to have sent fresh troops to Bakhmut over the objections of his generals, whilst Putin has clearly allowed commanders on ground more latitude in the last few months (for example, allowing Surovikin to withdraw from the symbolically important but difficult to support Kherson bridgehead). Ultimately, the political leadership sets the war goals and this has an inevitable impact on how the military ‘runs’ the war.

One of the problems for Ukraine is the, essentially political, need for it to demonstrate, for the benefit of NATO, that it is constantly on the advance and ‘winning’, which may well lead to some ill-advised offensives in the south without the equipment necessary to achieve serious gains, alongside the increasingly wasteful use of men and resources in Bakhmut.

[Hindsight was 2020]

https://variety.com/2023/film/news/volodymyr-zelensky-ukraine-oscars-appearance-russia-1235547499/

"Oscars Reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Bid to Appear on Telecast (EXCLUSIVE)"

Does not Zelensky have a war to run? How come he is constantly trying to show up at these types of events?

Because the military runs the war not him. Part of the reason Ukraine has done so well is the Zelensky let’s the military run the war while he goes abroad to build public support as opposition were Putin runs the military operations

It’s not altogether clear that this is the case, given that Zelensky appears to have sent fresh troops to Bakhmut over the objections of his generals, whilst Putin has clearly allowed commanders on ground more latitude in the last few months (for example, allowing Surovikin to withdraw from the symbolically important but difficult to support Kherson bridgehead). Ultimately, the political leadership sets the war goals and this has an inevitable impact on how the military ‘runs’ the war.

One of the problems for Ukraine is the, essentially political, need for it to demonstrate, for the benefit of NATO, that it is constantly on the advance and ‘winning’, which may well lead to some ill-advised offensives in the south without the equipment necessary to achieve serious gains, alongside the increasingly wasteful use of men and resources in Bakhmut.

The rumors I heard were the opposite that the generals want to stay in Bakmut and Zelensky wanted to leave?

[Cassius]

https://variety.com/2023/film/news/volodymyr-zelensky-ukraine-oscars-appearance-russia-1235547499/

"Oscars Reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Bid to Appear on Telecast (EXCLUSIVE)"

Does not Zelensky have a war to run? How come he is constantly trying to show up at these types of events?

Because the military runs the war not him. Part of the reason Ukraine has done so well is the Zelensky let’s the military run the war while he goes abroad to build public support as opposition were Putin runs the military operations

It’s not altogether clear that this is the case, given that Zelensky appears to have sent fresh troops to Bakhmut over the objections of his generals, whilst Putin has clearly allowed commanders on ground more latitude in the last few months (for example, allowing Surovikin to withdraw from the symbolically important but difficult to support Kherson bridgehead). Ultimately, the political leadership sets the war goals and this has an inevitable impact on how the military ‘runs’ the war.

One of the problems for Ukraine is the, essentially political, need for it to demonstrate, for the benefit of NATO, that it is constantly on the advance and ‘winning’, which may well lead to some ill-advised offensives in the south without the equipment necessary to achieve serious gains, alongside the increasingly wasteful use of men and resources in Bakhmut.

The rumors I heard were the opposite that the generals want to stay in Bakmut and Zelensky wanted to leave?

You maybe right, after all none of us is privy to the inner workings on the Ukrainian high command. I’m basing this off a report from Bild (filtered through the Kyiv Independent summary below) suggesting that Zaluzhny previously wanted to withdraw but was seemingly overruled. This would fit with my understanding of Zaluzhny as being a fairly cautious character.

https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/bild-zaluzhnyi-and-zelensky-have-conflicting-views-on-bakhmut

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

https://variety.com/2023/film/news/volodymyr-zelensky-ukraine-oscars-appearance-russia-1235547499/

"Oscars Reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Bid to Appear on Telecast (EXCLUSIVE)"

Does not Zelensky have a war to run? How come he is constantly trying to show up at these types of events?

Because the military runs the war not him. Part of the reason Ukraine has done so well is the Zelensky let’s the military run the war while he goes abroad to build public support as opposition were Putin runs the military operations

It’s not altogether clear that this is the case, given that Zelensky appears to have sent fresh troops to Bakhmut over the objections of his generals, whilst Putin has clearly allowed commanders on ground more latitude in the last few months (for example, allowing Surovikin to withdraw from the symbolically important but difficult to support Kherson bridgehead). Ultimately, the political leadership sets the war goals and this has an inevitable impact on how the military ‘runs’ the war.

One of the problems for Ukraine is the, essentially political, need for it to demonstrate, for the benefit of NATO, that it is constantly on the advance and ‘winning’, which may well lead to some ill-advised offensives in the south without the equipment necessary to achieve serious gains, alongside the increasingly wasteful use of men and resources in Bakhmut.

"Had", I think. Surovikin was demoted, Gerasimov took direct control and some weeks afterwards, Russia abandoned the attritional strategy and began an offensive earlier than most analysts had expected (instead of after the spring rasputitsa).

Lee, Kofman and a few others have speculated that this happened because Gerasimov promised faster victories to Putin. Leadership micromanagement of generals takes place in most wars and is probably present to some extent on both sides.

[Woody]

https://variety.com/2023/film/news/volodymyr-zelensky-ukraine-oscars-appearance-russia-1235547499/

"Oscars Reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Bid to Appear on Telecast (EXCLUSIVE)"

Does not Zelensky have a war to run? How come he is constantly trying to show up at these types of events?

Because the military runs the war not him. Part of the reason Ukraine has done so well is the Zelensky let’s the military run the war while he goes abroad to build public support as opposition were Putin runs the military operations

It’s not altogether clear that this is the case, given that Zelensky appears to have sent fresh troops to Bakhmut over the objections of his generals, whilst Putin has clearly allowed commanders on ground more latitude in the last few months (for example, allowing Surovikin to withdraw from the symbolically important but difficult to support Kherson bridgehead). Ultimately, the political leadership sets the war goals and this has an inevitable impact on how the military ‘runs’ the war.

One of the problems for Ukraine is the, essentially political, need for it to demonstrate, for the benefit of NATO, that it is constantly on the advance and ‘winning’, which may well lead to some ill-advised offensives in the south without the equipment necessary to achieve serious gains, alongside the increasingly wasteful use of men and resources in Bakhmut.

"Had", I think. Surovikin was demoted, Gerasimov took direct control and some weeks afterwards, Russia abandoned the attritional strategy and began an offensive earlier than most analysts had expected (instead of after the spring rasputitsa).

Lee, Kofman and a few others have speculated that this happened because Gerasimov promised faster victories to Putin. Leadership micromanagement of generals takes place in most wars and is probably present to some extent on both sides.

What?? They never did anything like that? Did I miss something?

If you're talking about Kreminna (I assume you are), that was not an offensive, those were positional battles. If you're saying that was an offensive you're insane.

[Dereich]

https://variety.com/2023/film/news/volodymyr-zelensky-ukraine-oscars-appearance-russia-1235547499/

"Oscars Reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Bid to Appear on Telecast (EXCLUSIVE)"

Does not Zelensky have a war to run? How come he is constantly trying to show up at these types of events?

Because the military runs the war not him. Part of the reason Ukraine has done so well is the Zelensky let’s the military run the war while he goes abroad to build public support as opposition were Putin runs the military operations

It’s not altogether clear that this is the case, given that Zelensky appears to have sent fresh troops to Bakhmut over the objections of his generals, whilst Putin has clearly allowed commanders on ground more latitude in the last few months (for example, allowing Surovikin to withdraw from the symbolically important but difficult to support Kherson bridgehead). Ultimately, the political leadership sets the war goals and this has an inevitable impact on how the military ‘runs’ the war.

One of the problems for Ukraine is the, essentially political, need for it to demonstrate, for the benefit of NATO, that it is constantly on the advance and ‘winning’, which may well lead to some ill-advised offensives in the south without the equipment necessary to achieve serious gains, alongside the increasingly wasteful use of men and resources in Bakhmut.

"Had", I think. Surovikin was demoted, Gerasimov took direct control and some weeks afterwards, Russia abandoned the attritional strategy and began an offensive earlier than most analysts had expected (instead of after the spring rasputitsa).

Lee, Kofman and a few others have speculated that this happened because Gerasimov promised faster victories to Putin. Leadership micromanagement of generals takes place in most wars and is probably present to some extent on both sides.

What?? They never did anything like that? Did I miss something?

If you're talking about Kreminna (I assume you are), that was not an offensive, those were positional battles. If you're saying that was an offensive you're insane.

Russian forces bombard Ukraine's Bakhmut in major new offensive, NATO chief says


Russia begins long-feared winter counteroffensive in Ukraine


Along Ukraine's frontlines as Russia presses winter offensive


Russia’s emerging new offensive in Ukraine, explained by an expert

[Woody]

https://variety.com/2023/film/news/volodymyr-zelensky-ukraine-oscars-appearance-russia-1235547499/

"Oscars Reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Bid to Appear on Telecast (EXCLUSIVE)"

Does not Zelensky have a war to run? How come he is constantly trying to show up at these types of events?

Because the military runs the war not him. Part of the reason Ukraine has done so well is the Zelensky let’s the military run the war while he goes abroad to build public support as opposition were Putin runs the military operations

It’s not altogether clear that this is the case, given that Zelensky appears to have sent fresh troops to Bakhmut over the objections of his generals, whilst Putin has clearly allowed commanders on ground more latitude in the last few months (for example, allowing Surovikin to withdraw from the symbolically important but difficult to support Kherson bridgehead). Ultimately, the political leadership sets the war goals and this has an inevitable impact on how the military ‘runs’ the war.

One of the problems for Ukraine is the, essentially political, need for it to demonstrate, for the benefit of NATO, that it is constantly on the advance and ‘winning’, which may well lead to some ill-advised offensives in the south without the equipment necessary to achieve serious gains, alongside the increasingly wasteful use of men and resources in Bakhmut.

"Had", I think. Surovikin was demoted, Gerasimov took direct control and some weeks afterwards, Russia abandoned the attritional strategy and began an offensive earlier than most analysts had expected (instead of after the spring rasputitsa).

Lee, Kofman and a few others have speculated that this happened because Gerasimov promised faster victories to Putin. Leadership micromanagement of generals takes place in most wars and is probably present to some extent on both sides.

What?? They never did anything like that? Did I miss something?

If you're talking about Kreminna (I assume you are), that was not an offensive, those were positional battles. If you're saying that was an offensive you're insane.

Russian forces bombard Ukraine's Bakhmut in major new offensive, NATO chief says


Russia begins long-feared winter counteroffensive in Ukraine


Along Ukraine's frontlines as Russia presses winter offensive


Russia’s emerging new offensive in Ukraine, explained by an expert

From the same source:

“I don’t think this is the big thing that we’re all waiting for,” said John Spencer, a retired Army major and chairman of urban warfare studies at the Madison Policy Forum.  

He said the operation is in its early phase — similar to when Russia positioned its forces on the borders of Ukraine in January 2022 — with a massive mobilization not yet observed.  

“They’re beginning to shape the battlefield,” said Jim Townsend, a former Pentagon official now also with the Center for a New American Security. “The offensive hasn’t started in terms of masses of troops, but they’re beginning to try to maneuver on the grounds and to get them position to begin that offensive.”

Also, they're using the term offensive loosely. Bakhmut is not an offensive. And the other links are describing Stoltenberg's opinion.

[Woody]

Russia did not launch an offensive this year, lol.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

https://variety.com/2023/film/news/volodymyr-zelensky-ukraine-oscars-appearance-russia-1235547499/

"Oscars Reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Bid to Appear on Telecast (EXCLUSIVE)"

Does not Zelensky have a war to run? How come he is constantly trying to show up at these types of events?

Because the military runs the war not him. Part of the reason Ukraine has done so well is the Zelensky let’s the military run the war while he goes abroad to build public support as opposition were Putin runs the military operations

It’s not altogether clear that this is the case, given that Zelensky appears to have sent fresh troops to Bakhmut over the objections of his generals, whilst Putin has clearly allowed commanders on ground more latitude in the last few months (for example, allowing Surovikin to withdraw from the symbolically important but difficult to support Kherson bridgehead). Ultimately, the political leadership sets the war goals and this has an inevitable impact on how the military ‘runs’ the war.

One of the problems for Ukraine is the, essentially political, need for it to demonstrate, for the benefit of NATO, that it is constantly on the advance and ‘winning’, which may well lead to some ill-advised offensives in the south without the equipment necessary to achieve serious gains, alongside the increasingly wasteful use of men and resources in Bakhmut.

"Had", I think. Surovikin was demoted, Gerasimov took direct control and some weeks afterwards, Russia abandoned the attritional strategy and began an offensive earlier than most analysts had expected (instead of after the spring rasputitsa).

Lee, Kofman and a few others have speculated that this happened because Gerasimov promised faster victories to Putin. Leadership micromanagement of generals takes place in most wars and is probably present to some extent on both sides.

What?? They never did anything like that? Did I miss something?

If you're talking about Kreminna (I assume you are), that was not an offensive, those were positional battles. If you're saying that was an offensive you're insane.

I'm talking about Bakhmut. It didn't start off as the main effort, but the regular Russian army started taking a much larger role in that battle in December or January (IIRC) - shortly after Gerasimov took Surovikin's job into his own hands.

I hesitate to fall back on the same analysts too often, but the ones I cite have stated multiple times (and for weeks) that they believe this is the offensive. It might not end at Bakhmut, but the level of activity indicates it began there (along with other fronts in the Donbas where activity picked up without territorial changes - Avdiivka and Vuhledar).

[Woody]

https://variety.com/2023/film/news/volodymyr-zelensky-ukraine-oscars-appearance-russia-1235547499/

"Oscars Reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Bid to Appear on Telecast (EXCLUSIVE)"

Does not Zelensky have a war to run? How come he is constantly trying to show up at these types of events?

Because the military runs the war not him. Part of the reason Ukraine has done so well is the Zelensky let’s the military run the war while he goes abroad to build public support as opposition were Putin runs the military operations

It’s not altogether clear that this is the case, given that Zelensky appears to have sent fresh troops to Bakhmut over the objections of his generals, whilst Putin has clearly allowed commanders on ground more latitude in the last few months (for example, allowing Surovikin to withdraw from the symbolically important but difficult to support Kherson bridgehead). Ultimately, the political leadership sets the war goals and this has an inevitable impact on how the military ‘runs’ the war.

One of the problems for Ukraine is the, essentially political, need for it to demonstrate, for the benefit of NATO, that it is constantly on the advance and ‘winning’, which may well lead to some ill-advised offensives in the south without the equipment necessary to achieve serious gains, alongside the increasingly wasteful use of men and resources in Bakhmut.

"Had", I think. Surovikin was demoted, Gerasimov took direct control and some weeks afterwards, Russia abandoned the attritional strategy and began an offensive earlier than most analysts had expected (instead of after the spring rasputitsa).

Lee, Kofman and a few others have speculated that this happened because Gerasimov promised faster victories to Putin. Leadership micromanagement of generals takes place in most wars and is probably present to some extent on both sides.

What?? They never did anything like that? Did I miss something?

If you're talking about Kreminna (I assume you are), that was not an offensive, those were positional battles. If you're saying that was an offensive you're insane.

I'm talking about Bakhmut. It didn't start off as the main effort, but the regular Russian army started taking a much larger role in that battle in December or January (IIRC) - shortly after Gerasimov took Surovikin's job into his own hands.

I hesitate to fall back on the same analysts too often, but the ones I cite have stated multiple times (and for weeks) that they believe this is the offensive. It might not end at Bakhmut, but the level of activity indicates it began there (along with other fronts in the Donbas where activity picked up without territorial changes - Avdiivka and Vuhledar).

That's fair. Makes sense too. Of the conventional forces of the Russian Army that were sent to Bakhmut were mostly VDV, and IIRC Gerasimov sacked the head of VDV after Surovikin was made his deputy. Supposedly because he wanted their role to bigger during later combat operations.

But still, overwhelming majority of Bakhmut's attackers are undoubtedly Wagner guys (Geolocations, bloggers, footage, tactics). There has been nothing to indicate the opposite. The only reason there was such an indication in the first place was because Wagner's usual frontal assaults and then digging their new positions started to decline around January, so that's were the assumption was based on in the first place. Still a presence of Russian Army though. And after the Russian MoD took over the prisoner process Wagner is going to have to get creative when manpower shortages arrive.

[Stranger in a strange land]

https://twitter.com/TruthPuke/status/1633513142507704320

Aww, so wholesome!

I bet those men certainly don't work for a genocidal state you have a fetish for.

Many, if not most, American Iraq & Afghanistan veterans will tell you that this sort of small-scale "hearts and minds" humanitarian activity is at best useless and at worst counter-productive. It wastes the troops time, exposes them to enemy attack, and any small gifts they pass out, be it flowers, candy, or bottled water, can't possibly compensate for the death, destruction, and disruption to local life that the war and occupation are causing, breeding further resentment.

Worse, if a Ukrainian partisan wants an excuse to get rid of a personal enemy, accepting gifts from the occupiers is a good one. Ukraine may not be a tribal society with generations-long family vendettas, but I also don't imagine that Europeans are above this sort of behavior.

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

Haha Georgians are f[inks]ing based.

https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1633941841874767872?t=gDj5O0S5Oc__ZOEqHn9AWA...

[It’s so Joever]

The truth is, if we allow Russia to win this war we set such a dangerous precedent and signal to literally every medium sized country they need to build nukes. It is long term more dangerous to humanity to allow Russia to win and trigger multiple nuclear weapon programs in previously compliant countries than to take the small risk increased engagement will “lead to WW3”. Something I think nobody wants to mention is that Russia is devoting a huge amount of their resources to just Ukraine, the west is basically lifting a single finger, I mean you can talk big sums of money all you want but those are still minuscule parts of the US budget. If Russia truly is willing to engage a war with the West over Ukraine, that is their own demise (and yes the world if a nuclear launch genuinely manages to not be put down by someone in chain of command)

But did that not already happen with the 2003 Iraq War? The main lesson of the Iraq War was that Saddam Hussein's main mistake was that he did NOT manage to get chemical and nuclear weapons.  So any lesson war can teach was already taught back in 2003.

That contributed a good amount too, but at the very least the invasion was not an attempt to outright gain land and was done for political change. Plus it still was done under the pretense of preventing WOMD proliferation, so it sent a mixed message. This was done purely to gain one as can be seen with the annexations, showing not even showing complete compliance with not building WOMDs or nukes/inspections will stop countries from invading you.

[jaichind]

But did that not already happen with the 2003 Iraq War? The main lesson of the Iraq War was that Saddam Hussein's main mistake was that he did NOT manage to get chemical and nuclear weapons.  So any lesson war can teach was already taught back in 2003.

That contributed a good amount too, but at the very least the invasion was not an attempt to outright gain land and was done for political change. Plus it still was done under the pretense of preventing WOMD proliferation, so it sent a mixed message. This was done purely to gain one as can be seen with the annexations, showing not even showing complete compliance with not building WOMDs or nukes/inspections will stop countries from invading you.

I would argue 2003 is worse.   The lesson from the Russia-Ukraine war is "if you have a boundary dispute with a Great Power then you are not safe" but the lesson from Iraq War is "if you have a political system that a Great Power (potentially thousands of miles away) does not like you are not safe."  It seems the risk of the Iraq War is greater since you can count the number of states you have a border with while who knows which Great Power thousands of miles might like your system or your head of state.  Also, the result of the current war can be resolved with the adjustment of boundaries but potentially leaving the current regime intact.  The 2003 Iraq War is a clear example of a maximalist regime change.  So all in all the lessons of 2003 are much more frightening than the Russia-Ukraine war.

[Woody]

Even more equipment destroyed in the Bakhmut route.

AFU sending more reinforcements to Chasiv Yar/Bakhmut itself.

https://twitter.com/RadarFennec/status/1634223254482165760
https://twitter.com/Eureka_News_ENG/status/1634217734127996932

[HillGoose]

But did that not already happen with the 2003 Iraq War? The main lesson of the Iraq War was that Saddam Hussein's main mistake was that he did NOT manage to get chemical and nuclear weapons.  So any lesson war can teach was already taught back in 2003.

That contributed a good amount too, but at the very least the invasion was not an attempt to outright gain land and was done for political change. Plus it still was done under the pretense of preventing WOMD proliferation, so it sent a mixed message. This was done purely to gain one as can be seen with the annexations, showing not even showing complete compliance with not building WOMDs or nukes/inspections will stop countries from invading you.

I would argue 2003 is worse.   The lesson from the Russia-Ukraine war is "if you have a boundary dispute with a Great Power then you are not safe" but the lesson from Iraq War is "if you have a political system that a Great Power (potentially thousands of miles away) does not like you are not safe."  It seems the risk of the Iraq War is greater since you can count the number of states you have a border with while who knows which Great Power thousands of miles might like your system or your head of state.  Also, the result of the current war can be resolved with the adjustment of boundaries but potentially leaving the current regime intact.  The 2003 Iraq War is a clear example of a maximalist regime change.  So all in all the lessons of 2003 are much more frightening than the Russia-Ukraine war.

sounds like red propaganda

[It’s so Joever]

But did that not already happen with the 2003 Iraq War? The main lesson of the Iraq War was that Saddam Hussein's main mistake was that he did NOT manage to get chemical and nuclear weapons.  So any lesson war can teach was already taught back in 2003.

That contributed a good amount too, but at the very least the invasion was not an attempt to outright gain land and was done for political change. Plus it still was done under the pretense of preventing WOMD proliferation, so it sent a mixed message. This was done purely to gain one as can be seen with the annexations, showing not even showing complete compliance with not building WOMDs or nukes/inspections will stop countries from invading you.

I would argue 2003 is worse.   The lesson from the Russia-Ukraine war is "if you have a boundary dispute with a Great Power then you are not safe" but the lesson from Iraq War is "if you have a political system that a Great Power (potentially thousands of miles away) does not like you are not safe."  It seems the risk of the Iraq War is greater since you can count the number of states you have a border with while who knows which Great Power thousands of miles might like your system or your head of state.  Also, the result of the current war can be resolved with the adjustment of boundaries but potentially leaving the current regime intact.  The 2003 Iraq War is a clear example of a maximalist regime change.  So all in all the lessons of 2003 are much more frightening than the Russia-Ukraine war.

No it’s not, you saw my logic before, Iraq was going against the international order established by refusing to cooperate inspections into the system. The fear literally was that Iraq had some WOMD which is a violation of the status quo. In contrast the Russian invasion of Ukraine was one of pure boundary dispute and the Ukrainians had no real choice. It’s pretty different, although I won’t argue 2003 didn’t hurt.

[Hollywood]

Deteriorating situation has developed for the AFU in Avdiivka after the Russian Armed Forces  eliminated Ukrainian anti-aircraft positions.  The Russian Army has had air superiority for the past two days, and they are increasing air strikes on Ukrainian positions as Russian ground forces attempt to encircle the town.  Russians are methodically destroying Ukrainian Artillery and Munition Depots in Avdiivka and Krasnohorivka in order to enable their infantry to advance towards those towns.  Ukraine should immediately transfer anti-aircraft weapons to this area, or Avdiivka may fall to the Russians.

https://twitter.com/bigrussianshop/status/1634329094165807106

https://twitter.com/BenMaracek16/status/1634325763326394369

[2952-0-0]

I would argue 2003 is worse.   The lesson from the Russia-Ukraine war is "if you have a boundary dispute with a Great Power then you are not safe" but the lesson from Iraq War is "if you have a political system that a Great Power (potentially thousands of miles away) does not like you are not safe."  It seems the risk of the Iraq War is greater since you can count the number of states you have a border with while who knows which Great Power thousands of miles might like your system or your head of state.  Also, the result of the current war can be resolved with the adjustment of boundaries but potentially leaving the current regime intact.  The 2003 Iraq War is a clear example of a maximalist regime change.  So all in all the lessons of 2003 are much more frightening than the Russia-Ukraine war.

The lesson from both of these wars is that the leadership of great powers could decide that they could divert from their domestic woes by starting a foreign adventure. Putin invaded Ukraine not because he wanted to adjust the boundary, but because he wanted to actually conquer it entirely to give his regime some more staying power, and then exterminate the Ukrainian identity itself. That is far more dangerous than invading a country with the intention of regime change. Bush, for all his faults, had no interest in exterminating Iraq as a nation and annexing it as a 51st state. He "merely" hoped to remake it into another post-WW2 Japan or Germany.

And besides, if the current Russian war ends with Ukraine ceding some territory while leaving the government in Kyiv in place, then that will guarantee another war a few years later, where another region gets annexed. And that will become a license for dozens of nations to build their own nuclear deterrent, including Ukraine. Some people are willing to live with their nation undergoing a foreign-backed regime change. No one will accept their nation getting wiped out.

[Ⓐnarchy in the ☭☭☭P!]

But did that not already happen with the 2003 Iraq War? The main lesson of the Iraq War was that Saddam Hussein's main mistake was that he did NOT manage to get chemical and nuclear weapons.  So any lesson war can teach was already taught back in 2003.

That contributed a good amount too, but at the very least the invasion was not an attempt to outright gain land and was done for political change. Plus it still was done under the pretense of preventing WOMD proliferation, so it sent a mixed message. This was done purely to gain one as can be seen with the annexations, showing not even showing complete compliance with not building WOMDs or nukes/inspections will stop countries from invading you.

I would argue 2003 is worse.   The lesson from the Russia-Ukraine war is "if you have a boundary dispute with a Great Power then you are not safe" but the lesson from Iraq War is "if you have a political system that a Great Power (potentially thousands of miles away) does not like you are not safe."  It seems the risk of the Iraq War is greater since you can count the number of states you have a border with while who knows which Great Power thousands of miles might like your system or your head of state.  Also, the result of the current war can be resolved with the adjustment of boundaries but potentially leaving the current regime intact.  The 2003 Iraq War is a clear example of a maximalist regime change.  So all in all the lessons of 2003 are much more frightening than the Russia-Ukraine war.

The invasion of Iraq, or the seizure of northeastern Syria, or the regime change of Gaddafi, stem not from some moralistic dedication to democracy or "international law" but the ancient principle of "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must"

Putin's invasion of Ukraine is unlike Iraq not in the weak justification behind it but in the weakness of his forces and the inability to impose whatever regime he pleases onto Kiev as Bush did onto Baghdad.

[Storr]

Deteriorating situation has developed for the AFU in Avdiivka after the Russian Armed Forces  eliminated Ukrainian anti-aircraft positions.  The Russian Army has had air superiority for the past two days, and they are increasing air strikes on Ukrainian positions as Russian ground forces attempt to encircle the town.  Russians are methodically destroying Ukrainian Artillery and Munition Depots in Avdiivka and Krasnohorivka in order to enable their infantry to advance towards those towns.  Ukraine should immediately transfer anti-aircraft weapons to this area, or Avdiivka may fall to the Russians.

https://twitter.com/bigrussianshop/status/1634329094165807106

https://twitter.com/BenMaracek16/status/1634325763326394369

https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1634253620538638336?s=20

[jaichind]

https://www.ruetir.com/2023/03/ukraine-considers-renaming-russia-to-moscovia/

"Ukraine Considers Renaming Russia To Moscovia"

President Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky has instructed its government to consider changing the name Russia became ‘Moscovia’.

[Lord Halifax]

https://www.ruetir.com/2023/03/ukraine-considers-renaming-russia-to-moscovia/

"Ukraine Considers Renaming Russia To Moscovia"

President Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky has instructed its government to consider changing the name Russia became ‘Moscovia’.

Muscovy in English, the name Russia was known by before Putin's "role model" Peter the Great. Very nice trolling. Philip Pullman used it in the His Dark Materials trilogy.

[jaichind]

https://www.ruetir.com/2023/03/ukraine-considers-renaming-russia-to-moscovia/

"Ukraine Considers Renaming Russia To Moscovia"

President Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky has instructed its government to consider changing the name Russia became ‘Moscovia’.

Muscovy in English, the name Russia was known by before Putin's "role model" Peter the Great. Very nice trolling. Philip Pullman used it in the His Dark Materials trilogy.

Clearly, this is a battle for ownership of the prestigious legacy of "Rus".  The Ukraine claim of course can stretch back to the days of Kievan Rus.  It seems there are two opposite forces at play inside Ukraine over how to define itself in civilizational terms.  There is a push to redefine Ukraine as a Western Slav nation versus an Eastern Slav nation.  Clearly, Poland is very much for this and is doing everything to make this a reality.  The opposite force would be to redefine Ukraine as the true leader of the Eastern Slav civilizational circle by capturing the legacy of "Rus."

[Hindsight was 2020]

https://www.ruetir.com/2023/03/ukraine-considers-renaming-russia-to-moscovia/

"Ukraine Considers Renaming Russia To Moscovia"

President Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky has instructed its government to consider changing the name Russia became ‘Moscovia’.

Muscovy in English, the name Russia was known by before Putin's "role model" Peter the Great. Very nice trolling. Philip Pullman used it in the His Dark Materials trilogy.

Clearly, this is a battle for ownership of the prestigious legacy of "Rus".  The Ukraine claim of course can stretch back to the days of Kievan Rus.  It seems there are two opposite forces at play inside Ukraine over how to define itself in civilizational terms.  There is a push to redefine Ukraine as a Western Slav nation versus an Eastern Slav nation.  Clearly, Poland is very much for this and is doing everything to make this a reality.  The opposite force would be to redefine Ukraine as the true leader of the Eastern Slav civilizational circle by capturing the legacy of "Rus."

Or it’s a country simply giving the middle finger to its neighbor for committing genocide on their population 🙄