Afghan government collapse.

[All Along The Watchtower]

What happened to the Taliban being part of a "political process?"

[All Along The Watchtower]

Well it’s a good thing the Taliban has no ties to Al-Qae-

[All Along The Watchtower]

UN Security Council report from June:

40. As reported by the Monitoring Team in its eleventh report (S/2020/415, paras. 32–44), the Taliban and Al-Qaida remain closely aligned and show no indication of breaking ties.18 Member States report no material change to this relationship, which has grown deeper as a consequence of personal bonds of marriage and shared partnership in struggle, now cemented through second generational ties.

41. While the Doha agreement has set some expectations for a break in the long- standing relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaida, the publicly available text of the agreement does not define expectations, and its annexes remain secret.

42. According to Member State information, Al-Qaida is resident in at least 15 Afghan provinces, primarily in the east, southern and south-eastern regions, and are led by Al-Qaida’s Jabhat-al-Nasr wing under the direction of Sheikh Mahmood (not listed).19 Members of the group have been relocated to more remote areas by the Taliban to avoid potential exposure and targeting. According to Member States, Al-Qaida maintains contact with the Taliban but has minimized overt communications with Taliban leadership in an effort to “lay low” and not jeopardize the Taliban’s diplomatic position vis-à-vis the Doha agreement.

43. Member States reported that a significant part of Al-Qaida leadership remains based in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the core is joined by and works closely with Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent.

44. Al-Qaida’s own strategy in the near term is assessed as maintaining its traditional safe haven in Afghanistan for the Al-Qaida core leadership. The Monitoring Team takes note of assessments that have suggested a longer-term Al-Qaida core strategy of strategic patience for a period of time before it would seek to plan attacks against international targets again.20 This scenario is untested against stated Taliban commitments to prohibit such activities.

45. Al-Qaida, including Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, is reported to number in the range of several dozen to 500 persons. Al-Qaida core’s membership is of non-Afghan origin, consisting mainly of nationals from North Africa and the Middle East. Although, as noted above, Member States assess that formal communication between senior Al-Qaida and Taliban officials is currently infrequent, one Member State reported that there is regular communication between the Taliban and Al-Qaida on issues related to the peace process. The group’s leader, Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri (QDi.006), is believed to be located somewhere in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Previous reports of his death due to ill health have not been confirmed. One Member State reports that he is probably alive but too frail to be featured in propaganda.21 Another Egyptian national, Husam Abd Al-Rauf (alias Abu Mohsin al-Masri) was killed on 20 October 2020 in Andar district of Ghazni Province. Al-Rauf was thought to be both an Al-Qaida Shura Council member and its chief financier.

46. Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent operates under the Taliban umbrella from Kandahar, Helmand (notably Baramcha) and Nimruz Provinces. The group reportedly consists of primarily Afghan and Pakistani nationals, but also individuals from Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. Its current leader is Osama Mahmood (not listed), who succeeded the late Asim Umar (not listed). The group is reported to be such an “organic” or essential part of the insurgency that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to separate it from its Taliban allies. Several Member States characterized this relationship by noting that the wife of the former leader of Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, Asim Umar (see S/2020/415, para. 36), was among 5,000 Taliban prisoners freed by the Afghan Government in 2020 as part of the Doha agreement.

47. The killing of several Al-Qaida commanders in Taliban-controlled territory underscores the closeness of the two groups. Following the death of al-Rauf in October, the Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent deputy, Mohammad Hanif (alias Abdullah), was killed on 10 November 2020 in Bakwa District of Farah Province.
According to a Member State, he had been providing bomb-making training to Taliban insurgents in that location. Both individuals appear to have been given shelter and protection by the Taliban. On 30 March 2021, Afghan Forces led a raid in Gyan District of Paktika Province that killed a prominent Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent commander, Dawlat Bek Tajiki (alias Abu Mohammad al-Tajiki), alongside Hazrat Ali, a Taliban commander from Waziristan.

48. Al-Qaida’s presence in Afghanistan has also been confirmed by its own affiliated propaganda and media wings. Al-Qaida’s weekly Thabat newsletter reported on Al-Qaida operations inside Afghanistan, listing Al-Qaida attacks since 2020 in 18 provinces.22

49. In May 2020, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent released an Eid al-Fitr audio message in which it portrayed the Doha agreement as an example of divine victory and reward for pursuing jihad. While both organizations are expected to maintain a posture of distance and discretion for as long as such is required for the achievement of Taliban objectives, Al-Qaida nonetheless stands to benefit from renewed credibility on the back of Taliban gains. It will be important for the international community to monitor any sign of Afghanistan again becoming a destination for extremists with both regional and international agendas.

https://www.undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2021/486

[All Along The Watchtower]

Worth pointing out that this version of the Taliban is very different from the original in some important ways: they're much more comfortable with the idea of modern governance (there has even been some deeply strange bragging of late about how taxes on businesses are lower in Taliban controlled districts) and even with the concept of 'foreign relations' as something that extends beyond talking to ISI bagmen every so often. They are still spectacularly nasty bastards of course. I suspect that most of this shift is generational.

I’m reminded somewhat of the totally indigenous Syrian rebel group “Al-Nusra Front” not just courting donors to the anti-Assad cause in Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi, etc., but also, harshly condemning ISIS (brave) and making alliances with other, more genuinely Syrian rebel and opposition groups.

Al-Qaeda and their allies in insurgencies around the world have become a lot smarter over the years, certainly more so than the bloodthirsty, sectarian ISIS and its predecessor, Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is Exhibit A for their strategy; you shouldn’t declare a jihadist Caliphate until you overthrow all the corrupt apostate governments and turn them into properly Islamic states, with the crucial partnership with local insurgents. Play the long game, as it were.

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U.S. should get out of the Middle East.

?

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if Ahmed Shah Masood hadn't been offed before 9/11

^^Underrated as a tragedy for the country imo

[All Along The Watchtower]

Lots of claims above that the Taliban enjoy "massive" public support in Afghanistan.

It’s 1932, and many Western observers claim that Ibn Saud and their Wahhabi shock troops enjoy “massive” public support across the Arabian Peninsula.

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These thugs should be diplomatically isolated again, and include their Pakistani sponsors this time too.

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On a historical note I believe this is the first time since the 1970's that the whole country is under one government, there are no competing factions left fighting, who could have thought 20 years after 9/11 that this is how it would end, a complete and absolute Taliban victory, not even a civil war or different factions fighting each other but one government in power, first time country has been unified in decades.

Wrong, as usual. For quite a while after the 2001 war, the Taliban controlled (at best) scraps of hillside here and the odd valley there and stayed alive largely due to their ability to regroup safely on the other side of the Durand Line.

Really? Can't imagine why they were able to do that....