Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

https://twitter.com/lijukic/status/1504080415585447936?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwc...

I expected more Poles, given the strength of feeling in the diaspora.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

https://twitter.com/JimmySecUK/status/1504157074372108300?s=20&t=Zf2RGNOBURt...
Also, I am not the 'Oryx' who is nicely posting military updates on twitter btw.

 This is effing excellent. I hope most literal kidnapping criminals posing as real soldiers who Committed this war crime kidnapping him all died a very gory and painful death.

These were not some poor conscripts who have nothing to do with Putin or his foreign policy, but special forces with the ugliest reputation in the world.. H*** is just a little bit Fuller with their deaths

It was a prisoner swap - the Russians got back nine men in exchange.

:

Oh well, at least the Mayor is safe. Bad precident though

you can tell which side actually values human life (ya know, "the good guys") when there are extremely lopsided prison exchanges.

It's probably a good deal even if you don't care about human life. If the authorities had kept on torturing the mayor, perhaps they could have eventually gotten results and trotted him out for a PR video.

In return for losing that chance, what did Russia get in return? 9 junior guys, a drop in the ocean in the grand scheme of things.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

You've all heard of Major Generals being killed well now a full General has been arrested.

https://twitter.com/christogrozev/status/1504441427929047041

In b4 he's sent to the front line.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

https://twitter.com/MrKovalenko/status/1504507707629395970?s=20&t=r-0eBJpFY8...
Read a few other reports confirming this; if true, it not only increases the chances of a possible assault to liberate Kherson but also strengthens the defenses of Mykolaiv and reduces the chance of the city being surrounded by Russian forces.

And pushes back when any kind of assault on Odesa could possibly happen (if it ever comes). The Russians need to take Mykolaiv to have any realistic chance of taking Odesa.

Indeed. Unless Russia decides to invade from the coast; as was feared just a few days ago (I suppose that was a confirmed feint, now?) although it's highly debatable whether they actually have that capacity I suppose.

Does anyone know what Ukrainian defenses in Odessa are like?

I don’t know how well the surrounding villages are fortified but they’ve mined the beach outside the city. Inside the city, there seems to be the basis for a long-term insurgency: Odessa’s massive, maze-like catacombs could be bad news for invaders. The catacombs grew over hundreds of years due to mining, are poorly mapped, at least 2500km long and (in places) 60m deep. There are probably still remnants of Soviet stockpiles from the insurgency during Nazi occupation.

There are regular cave-ins and thermobarics could help, but it sounds like a security nightmare, tbh.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Seems like things have stalemated slightly. Am I reading that wrong?

Yes - the British MoD is painting too rosy a picture of this. Russia captured Rubizhne and Izium yesterday. The former means the Ukrainian-controlled countryside east of Sjieverodonetsk are almost encircled. The latter also seems to be an encircling move (although one that is further from completion) threatening everything east of Sloviansk, which is much more significant.

These moves will lower the morale of Ukrainian troops in the Donbas. If the advances continue, those remaining will have to decide if they want their areas to become Mariupol-but-not-on-the-sea or if they want to pull out and give Russia a series of quick wins involving gain of materiel, less damage to the area and less alienation of the local populace. In the later years of the Syrian war, rebel and IS groups often faced these kinds of decisions - places unlucky enough to become “pockets” of resistance saw much worse destruction that was usually ended (after weeks, months or years) with the remaining defenders taking Syrian-sanctioned bus rides to other rebel and IS territory.

Russia has stalled outside of northeastern Ukraine and may be losing ground between Mykolaiv and Kherson, but a slow (net) advance is still an advance.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

The caveat being that a slow disorganised advance can be pushed back equally as easy if the resources are there.

If small gains are reversed quickly, this is true. Larger-scale campaigns against cities or areas where defenders have had time to fortify tend to require massing the kind of firepower that Ukraine is not being resupplied with. The Pentagon and British MoD claim that Russia doesn’t have air superiority, but this is because the Ukrainian Air Force has been using clever, evasive tactics that limited its sorties to 5-10 hours per day. They would probably need to be flying more to support a major offensive.

The Western focus on “defensive weaponry” to avoid escalation doesn’t help here, although the captured Russian materiel does.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Defence Sec. Lloyd Austin has left Slovakia for Bulgaria today.

Yesterday, WaPo reported, Slovakia reiterated it was willing to send its S-300 as soon as it had a viable replacement or a capability guaranteed for an unspecified period of time. Germany is currently deploying some of its Patriot AA to Slovakia, which may meet the second requirement.

When asked about US supply of Patriots or alternatives to Slovakia at a press conference, Austin said: “These are things we will continue to work with all of our allies on, and certainly this is not just a U.S. issue. It’s a NATO issue.” Given how open most countries have been about supplying drones, MANPADS, etc., I think this means this isn’t a done deal.

A senior, anonymous Pentagon official told WaPo that alternatives could be supplied to Ukraine in lieu of the S-300, but this doesn't make much sense to me. Slovakia only had a few S-300s to begin with, and the other Soviet systems are supposed to be complementary (it’s unlikely to be either/or given that both medium- and long- range SAMs are getting destroyed in Ukraine).

Today, Lavrov argued the supply of these weapons would not be allowed since Soviet/Russian systems have a legal certificate meaning owners need Russia’s permission to send them to third parties. The existence of such a certificate is plausible, but it could be easily ignored and Slovakia may not recognise it anyway because it got its S-300s from the USSR (including Ukraine ), not Russia.

According to the Ta Nea newspaper, the Greek MoD has said there is no question of the S-300 being sent to Ukraine, as it is necessary for Greece’s defence.

N.B. there was no mention of replacement systems, Greece uses the Patriot system, and it didn’t buy the S-300 to begin with (it took the systems off Cyprus’ hands decades ago). I think this stance might change if Greece is offered enough of the systems it actually buys to replace its S-300s, but I could see a scenario where generals strongly prefer having a mix of these systems and refuse to trade any S-300s.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Some of the posts above imply that Russia needs to accomplish what it wants to accomplish pretty soon (soon being undefined), before it runs out of gas as it were, as opposed to just keep grinding along indefinitely slowly wearing Ukraine down until it has nothing left. Which point of view is more accurate, or is that just an unknown? If Russia does have a limited time window to attain its objectives, does anyone have any idea how long that might be?

it's the first one causing the second one, the Russians do not want to do the grind thing, nobody on offense wants to do the grind thing (even if you don't care about the numbers of your own men you kill, you would still rather not do it that way outside of extremely specific situations that probably couldn't even exist in the real world in 2022) .  The thing is though, if the front line units are just getting an erratic trickle of fuel/gear/men, even slowly grinding is impossible to sustain.  The actual men doing the fighting are going to lose what little moral they have left in such a situation.  Russia's position is likely getting worse by the day.

Take the VDV and Spetsnaz (specops) units.  Those are filled with loyal, well trained, well equipped and experienced men.  They have taken extremely heavy casualties, but are also (likely) the cause of most of Russia's gains.  These men are exhausted as they've (likely) been overly relied upon by the higher ups.  Their moral must be in the toilet if they had one to put it in.  It's unsustainable.  The fact that Belarus has done nothing, the fact that Russia is calling in men from Syria and C.A.R. puts further proof to that point.

Or I'm wrong and Putin is about to pull a quarter of a million well equipped, well trained and experienced men out of his butt and place them on the border as if he was turning in a set of Risk cards late in the game.

Isn’t this somewhat compensated by Russian conscripts gaining battlefield experience?

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

One of the most interesting posts ever to me was the comment made by compucomp, presumably sincerely and without guile, that he was very open to the idea of adjusting his views as the PRC government adjusted its views. I remember way back when, when John Chancellor commented during the Nixon in China time, about the aspect of Chinese culture that it respects authority.

This is so foreign to the mindset in American culture, and presumably the Anglosphere in general, where authority is there to be challenged, and it is held in suspicion. I admit that I get a naughty little pleasure in violation malum prohibitum laws that I think are silly or inane.

Anyway, it is just a cultural difference that should be borne in mind when interacting with other posters. You are not going to chance a poster's mindset in general here. In my experience, getting on in life is more about trying to accommodate and navigate around the eccentricities as you see it of people, rather than to reform them into your image, or an image that you would prefer. Attempting the latter will generally lead to frustration and disappointment.

It's not the prevailing view (probably not in China, either), but partisans in America take the majority of their political cues from the leaders they've thrown their lot in with, and sometimes they do this consciously. The difference in China is that there is only one set of partisans.

It's just this taken to an extreme:

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Evidence that Russia is probably drawing from its own supply of Tochka missiles rather than using those of Belarus (which are still in active use):

https://www.twitter.com/ELINTNews/status/1504846855347257361
Tochkas are effective and were only retired by Russia at the end of 2020, so they should be usable with minimal maintenance. Still, Ukrainians should be pleased to see them popping up more - it’s an indicator that Russia is running out of their more advanced Iskander missiles.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Russian ambassador to Bosnia while threatening them with regards to NATO expansion: "How do you know we have no plans against Croatia, Hungary, Poland?"

This kind of talk isn't a particularly serious threat (they're just throwing out names of European countries at this point), but it is likely to further alienate all of these countries. It must be a little embarrassing for Orban to stick to his relatively lukewarm stances on this conflict (not allowing transport of military aid through Hungary, etc.).

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Obligatory big if true comment:

https://twitter.com/Sierra__Alpha/status/1504870032312094721?s=20&t=oatDIv5S...
https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1504861665434779651?s=20&t=oatDIv...

Some evidence!

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1504906047810637828?s=20&t=RgApMn7...

Nice.

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1504945187126132739?s=20&t=682-s-E...
Link to ISW March 18th Russian offensive campaign assessment: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18

"The ability of Ukrainian forces to conduct a successful major counterattack indicates Russian forces attempting to encircle Mykolayiv likely overstretched, and Russian forces are unlikely to have the capability to resume offensive operations toward Odesa in the near term."

Buried in that ISW report is a refutation of the earlier US report that Russia had captured Izium: it asses that the town centre is still in Ukrainian hands. This is good new for Ukrainian defenders and I retract my earlier comments about the British MoD's assessment being too rosy.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Germany sending more ancient GDR garbage.

https://twitter.com/NotWoofers/status/1505646760055689219?s=20&t=hxjUowwFa3O...

Ukraine is burning through Javelins faster than they are being manufactured and they are overkill for most vehicles anyway. Sending them serviceable surplus that Germany won’t use is perfectly sensible. Old ATGMs were pretty effective against Syria, which uses many of them same vehicles Russia does.

More countries should have sent their Soviet kit instead of LARPing about their most advanced weapons and no-fly zones. Ukraine is familiar with this stuff and finding upgrades without Russia could be difficult and expensive.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Slovakia has confirmed the Dutch and German deployment of Patriot missiles (for 6 months) is an insufficient replacement for their S-300. The US has said that negotiations are ongoing, but the deal looks to be in a bad place.

Aside from Greece (which has stated its Osa and Tor systems are also necessary for its defence), there has been no mention of transferring the weaker systems. It looks like no one is willing to part with them for whatever Western Europe and the USA are currently offering as replacement.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Slovakia has confirmed the Dutch and German deployment of Patriot missiles (for 6 months) is an insufficient replacement for their S-300. The US has said that negotiations are ongoing, but the deal looks to be in a bad place.

Aside from Greece (which has stated its Osa and Tor systems are also necessary for its defence), there has been no mention of transferring the weaker systems. It looks like no one is willing to part with them for whatever Western Europe and the USA are currently offering as replacement.

Bulgaria has also ruled out transfer of any air defence systems "at this time", and claims no one has asked. This makes sense because the country hasn't transferred any other military aid, the PM is dependent on at least one party that is against sending any and pressure on Bulgaria is understandably minimal so long as other, more hawkish countries fail to transfer their systems.

The US has, apparently, informally raised the prospect of Turkey transferring its S-400s, and members of Congress have publicly signal boosted this. This might not be a good idea in principle and is a much, much heavier lift than anything else floated so far. It's almost certain they're not willing to pay Turkey's hypothetical price if they can't even pay whatever Slovakia's is for its one battery of S-300 launchers.

This is the MiG deal 2.0. There's an outside chance Czechia has sent some Strela-10 and Kub systems to Ukraine as part of its confidential package of military aid, but this is unlikely given the (in)actions of its neighbours. It looks like longer-range AA isn't coming, at least until there is another escalation. The West gets some credit for sending it anyway - engagement with the stories about it already being sent or on the way is much higher than that with the follow-up pieces explaining that it wasn't.

I wouldn't be surprised if we soon hear from the Pentagon that enough MANPADS will compensate for the lack of these systems.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Thomas Friedman prognosticates.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/20/opinion/putin-zelensky-ukraine.html

1. The plan A's of Biden (Biden = NATO/EU), Zenensky and Putin did not work out well for Putin. Biden's sanctions really did bite, Zelensky stalemated the ground war, and Putin's lightening strike victory with lots of Quislings was a fail

2. Putin's plan B was to attack civilians, cause a mass refugee crisis, have them flood NATO counties, and force NATO to pressure Zelensky to give Putin a huge pound of flesh.

Friedman does not say how plan B is working out for Putin, but the NYT says the refugees in Europe are being flooded with job offers, and they have a big labor shortage. So that aspect of the plan strikes me as a massive fail. I also don't see Zelensky handing Putin the keys to the store due to turning his attention to taking out civilians rather than acquiring real estate.

If Putin's Plan B proves a fail, Plan C is for Putin to attack supply areas for Ukraine in Poland, and plan D is to launch chemical weapons and nukes. I don't believe it. If Putin bombs Poland, the chemical weapons and nukes will be hitting NATO troops in Ukraine, and ...  stop, I just don't think Putin is that nuts.

But my opinion is worth what you paid for it.

Your opinion is certainly worth more than Thomas Friedman's - he thought this war wasn't even possible because both countries had McDonald's. It'd be much less of an escalation to use chemical weapons in Ukraine (which would be an extremely risky idea for various reasons) than to attack Poland with conventional weapons, so plans C and D (as Friedman views them) are the wrong way around.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

LOCK PUTLER UP!

https://twitter.com/axios/status/1505885423276544000

Photographs appear to show that the Ukrainian military put trucks in there beforehand:

https://mobile.twitter.com/KyleJGlen/status/1505860511795195906
You can make a decent case that they were right not to care about it being made a military target (because of Russia’s record of targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine), but in this case, Russia struck a military target. It did so as part of an immoral and illegal war, but this strike probably wasn’t a war crime per se.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Speaking of support for an alternative to the Western view on the war, here's Israeli PM Bennett's comments on the issue today:

On Monday, Israel sent an aid delegation to Ukraine to establish a field hospital. While at the airport to see the delegation off, Bennett gave a few remarks, saying Israel was "managing this unfortunate crisis with sensitivity, generosity and responsibility, while maintaining a balance between the various factors – and they are complex."

Hm... sounds similar to Chinese ambassador to the USA Qin Gang yesterday on CBS News?

AMB. QIN: China makes its observation and conclusion based independently- based on the merits of the matter itself. On the one hand, we uphold–

MARGARET BRENNAN: The United Nations Secretary General said Russia invaded–

AMB. QIN: we uphold– We uphold. On the one hand, China upholds the U.N. purposes and -- and the principles, including that- the respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, including Ukraine. On the other hand, we do see that there- there is a complexity in the history of the Ukraine issue. And we are–

To be fair, Israeli FM Yair Lapid did say that Israel will not become "route to bypass sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and other Western countries.” So Israel's stance is a bit more pro-Western than China's. I guess all those years of unconditional support and billions (trillions?) of aid bought you something? LOL?

I've been calling them out for over a decade. You can thank the Ray Goldfields and Parrotguys of the world for trying to shut down debate at every turn by shouting "pogrom" and "blood libel" at the tamest criticism.

Israel is a terrible friend to America.

China doesn't have a mob of Russian troops on its borders, ready to give the Syrians the order to attack at the moment's notice. America helped to put Israel in that situation, and Israel has still managed to give far more per capita than the United States.

The smears from people like Kinzinger are genuinely disgusting, and seeing who the OP you're quoting is should give away just how bad-faith this whole line of conversation is.

Nuh uh, you think Israel would have actually gotten so far without heavy Western support? Don’t give me that. And to claim that Arab opposition to Israel is a result of America is Lolworthy. And that “troops” bill crap isn’t an excuse either. South Korea has an even more deranged neighbor to the North for gosh sake. Look I was all for supporting Israel for geopolitical reasons…but if the government wants to betray us, then I guess that means we can reduce the amount of money we send there.

Israel’s behavior has been disgusting in this conflict, and if they pull this shtick much longer, I hope Biden reminds Bennett who calls the shots.

What are you even talking about? Israel hasn't "Betrayed" anyone - they've served as an honest broker in a near-impossible situation, mediating while still providing extensive aid. The idea that Israel should "give Ukraine an Iron Dome" is nonsense - not only would it take months to set up, but the interceptor missiles aren't designed to handle the larger Russian missiles.

The US failed to intercede against Assad's genocide in Syria, essentially allowing Putin to take charge of the area and giving Putin massive leverage over Israel. Israel issued a quick condemnation of the invasion when it happened, and Putin immediately started making threatening noises towards the Golan.

The simple fact is, virtually every accusation against Israel during this accusation has been a provable LIE.

"Israel refused to give Ukraine an iron dome!" - Lie. Zelensky never asked.

Ynet reports that Israel did veto the US transfer of Iron Dome systems to Ukraine in 2021, citing concerns about hurting its relations with Russia. After the veto, the US dropped its plans to simultaneously send Patriot air defence missiles.

"Israel tried to convince Ukraine to surrender!" - Lie. Ukraine's government denied the unsourced report.

Both governments denied this happened. It probably didn't.

"Israel is helping Russia evade sanctions!" - Lie. They sent Abramovich on his way quickly, despite him being legally allowed to seek refuge (which he didn't, choosing Putin)

Israel is helping Russia evade sanctions by failing to enforce any of its own. It dragged its feet on a toothless pledge to avoid becoming a loophole for European and American sanctions.

"Israel is refusing to cut off Russian currency!" - Lie. They did it a week before the Ukrainian foreign ministry was fooled by an out-of-date screenshot and nearly started an international incident.

You are correct here.

I say this as someone who is strongly supportive of Ukraine, but this entire affair has been a repulsive display of how easy it is to spread a lie and demand the victim prove a negative.

There are a lot of lies about Israel and Kinzinger is a clown, but it is generally true that the country has been pretty close to neutral in the conflict, which is one of the reasons why they're mediating it. They've condemned the invasion, but one side was denied an Iron Dome that the US was probably going to pay for and the other is flying license-built Israeli drones (some contracts were signed after the invasion of the Donbas, although this became illegal after 2018).

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

https://twitter.com/michaeldweiss/status/1505952644875132932

These kinds of reports have been BS in the past and the annoying this about this one is that it's harder to verify because of the secrecy around this weapons program and the likelihood that US-owned Soviet systems probably only exist in small numbers which won't be immediately noticeable in open sources.

I note that the report claims they "are being sent", not that they have arrived. We shall see if the Ukrainians offer any public thanks or whether there's an update stating they've actually been delivered. Despite the small number of systems and confidentiality, there's a decent chance some politician publicly claims credit for this if it's actually real.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

https://twitter.com/michaeldweiss/status/1505952644875132932

These kinds of reports have been BS in the past and the annoying this about this one is that it's harder to verify because of the secrecy around this weapons program and the likelihood that US-owned Soviet systems probably only exist in small numbers which won't be immediately noticeable in open sources.

I note that the report claims they "are being sent", not that they have arrived. We shall see if the Ukrainians offer any public thanks or whether there's an update stating they've actually been delivered. Despite the small number of systems and confidentiality, there's a decent chance some politician publicly claims credit for this if it's actually real.

I am starting to think this might be real. This plane is heavier than the usual transport craft carrying aid to Ukraine: https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1506132683306508289
 It could be something else, or it could even be systems to be deployed elsewhere in Europe, but the deliveries alleged in that report (which the War Zone considered credible enough to signal boost) are one candidate for what is (was) on board.

The report also has some credibility because it states that the US had not sent the Belarusian S-300 and pure clickbait would either claim it had been sent or refuse to rule out that it hadn't. It makes some sense that the US, being reluctant to part with its aggressor training tools, only gives up its most outdated and most easily simulated - and it's public knowledge that the US only ever received parts of a Belarusian S-300 anyway. Russian sources claimed (at the time) that it was devoid of electronics.

Recalling the earlier report about SA-8s, -10s, -12s etc. being sent to Ukraine, the only Western ally that has an S-300V variant - which is what an SA-12 is - is the US, which got one from Russia in the 1990s. This was, allegedly, without its most powerful radar, but that should still have left it functional. If both the earlier report and this one are correct, there's a fair chance that S-300V is among the systems that are going to be sent.

Edit: the report mentions the Osa (SA-8) short-range system as being among those sent, so at least we know that if there's any truth to the claim, they're not just sending MANPADS.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Sanctions have completely stopped Russian tank production: https://www.unian.net/war/iz-za-sankciy-v-rossii-ostanovil-rabotu-edinstvennyy-proizvoditel-tankov-novosti-vtorzheniya-rossii-na-ukrainu-11753992.html

....this also makes it impossible to build new parts for maintenance and repair too. Also Russian's military hardware's targeting systems is based on semiconductors imported from Taiwan. Now that Taiwan has banned imports to Russia, they no longer can maintain the weapons systems on their hardware.

This is a Ukrainian claim without Russian or international confirmation.

Not being able to build new tanks would be a big blow, but IIRC the Russian army (like most armies) has its own maintenance and repair teams, and a vast supply of older machines in storage that could be cannibalised for spare parts if necessary.

It would come on the heels of this, reported by Russian state media on March 9: KamAZ will completely switch to Russian spare parts. Ukrainian sources previously reported that KamAZ, the principal supplier of trucks to the Russian army, was facing shortages of parts - and KamAZ corroborated they faced shortages of Western parts before announcing they were going to switch to using no Western parts by the end of the month. The probable hit to Russian truck production seems more important because they don't seem to have nearly as many trucks lying around as they do tanks and they need more to fix their logistics problems.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

You forget that Russian troops can’t just sit there indefinitely without supplies.

Logistics will be one of their biggest challenges, but three things either have or are about to make such challenges easier:

- The establishment of a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea (done)
- The destruction of threats to their navy (mostly done; they’re already using Berdyansk to resupply)
- The fall of Mariupol, which sits behind their land bridge (almost inevitable)

Their only supply lines near Kyiv are narrow and run through Belarus and then the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, so this is where the problems could remain most acute.