Miranda v. Arizona

[A18]

Option 2! Needs to be overturned.

[MODU]

Option 2! Needs to be overturned.

Why?

[John Dibble]

Well, the result of the case itself was unfortunate - if I'm not mistaken that's the case that established police officers must read people their rights when they arrest them. In and of itself I don't think that's bad, but the case resulted in someone who really was a criminal getting off on a technicality.

For people who don't know about this case:

Miranda v. Arizona
In 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in Phoenix, Arizona for stealing $8 from bank worker and charged with armed robbery. He already had a record for armed robbery, and a juvenile record including attempted rape, assault, and burglary. While in police custody he signed a written confession to the robbery, and to kidnapping and raping an 18-year-old woman 11 days before the robbery. After the conviction, his lawyers appealed, on the grounds that Miranda did not know he was protected from self-incrimination.
 
The case, Miranda v. Arizona, made it all the way to the Supreme Court, where the conviction was overthrown. In a landmark ruling issued in 1966, the court established that the accused have the right to remain silent and that prosecutors may not use statements made by defendants while in police custody unless the police have advised them of their rights, commonly called the Miranda Rights. The case was later re-tried, Miranda was convicted on the basis of other evidence, and served 11 years. He was paroled in 1972, and died in 1976 at the age of 34, after being stabbed in a bar fight. A suspect was arrested but chose to excercise his right to remain silent, and was released.

[Blue Rectangle]

In a landmark ruling issued in 1966, the court established that the accused have the right to remain silent...

Constitutionally sound...

...and that prosecutors may not use statements made by defendants while in police custody unless the police have advised them of their rights, commonly called the Miranda Rights.

...pure fabrication.

The Second Amendment grants the right to bear arms.  Does this mean I can sue the government because the police didn't drop by my house and say, "by the way, you have the right to bear arms."

Just as ignorance of the law is not a defense, so should ignorance of your rights not be the fault of the government.

[True Democrat]

I'm undecided about the "anything you say can be held against you in a court of law" being constitutionally sound, but it certaintly better this way.

[John Dibble]

I'm undecided about the "anything you say can be held against you in a court of law" being constitutionally sound, but it certaintly better this way.

Now if only they hadn't let a rapist go. Oh well, pretty much every right has some sort of blood or dirt attatched to it. I do think that being read your rights is a good thing, I just wish criminals couldn't get off on technicalities because of it.

[True Democrat]

I'm undecided about the "anything you say can be held against you in a court of law" being constitutionally sound, but it certaintly better this way.

Now if only they hadn't let a rapist go. Oh well, pretty much every right has some sort of blood or dirt attatched to it. I do think that being read your rights is a good thing, I just wish criminals couldn't get off on technicalities because of it.

Later, Miranda was killed in a bar and his killer had to be the Miranda rights. 

[John Dibble]

I'm undecided about the "anything you say can be held against you in a court of law" being constitutionally sound, but it certaintly better this way.

Now if only they hadn't let a rapist go. Oh well, pretty much every right has some sort of blood or dirt attatched to it. I do think that being read your rights is a good thing, I just wish criminals couldn't get off on technicalities because of it.

Later, Miranda was killed in a bar and his killer had to be the Miranda rights. 

Ah, karma.

[A18]

It's fine for a state to change its laws and require that cops read suspects their "Miranda rights." My dispute is not with that. My dispute is with pretending it's a constitutional issue, which it is not.

[Emsworth]

The decision is definitely constitutionally sound.

In order for a confession to be valid, it must be given freely and voluntarily. This is a principle of the common law, not the creation of an activist court. It has been upheld in a variety of decisions of the Supreme Court, the most important of which is Chambers v. Florida (1940). Rulings made during the nineteenth century also support the same conclusion.

Now, in order for a confession to be truly voluntary, it is absolutely vital that the defendant should be informed of his rights. Consider a case in which the defendant is not so informed. In the words of Justice Henry Brown, written seventy years before Miranda:

"Questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, [and the interrogator may decide] to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions."

If, however, the defendant is warned of his rights, these considerations do not arise. Since the defendant is clearly aware that he has the right to remain silent, that he is under no obligation to answer, the issue of involuntary confessions simply does not arise. However, if the defendant is not so informed, the confession is necessarily tainted and ipso facto involuntary.

[opebo]

I'm completely indifferent to the decision's "consitutional soundness", because I like it.

[A18]

In order for a confession to be valid, it must be given freely and voluntarily.

That is not the issue at hand.

If one chooses of his own free will to confess, it is voluntary, by definition. Whether he knows his rights or not is largely irrelevant.

[Emsworth]

If one chooses of his own free will to confess, it is voluntary, by definition. Whether he knows his rights or not is largely irrelevant.

I addressed that issue in quoting Justice Brown's views, and in the paragraph that followed that quotation.

The lack of torture is not the only factor which determines the voluntariness of a confession. Prolonged questioning, for example, can render the confession involuntary: for the witness does not confess because what he says is true, but because he is thus pressured by the inquisition. The issuance of a Miranda warning, however, necessarily removes these considerations: for the defendant, being thus informed, cannot consequently claim that his confession was not voluntary.

[Speed of Sound]

option 1

[Blue Rectangle]

The decision is definitely constitutionally sound.

In order for a confession to be valid, it must be given freely and voluntarily. This is a principle of the common law, not the creation of an activist court.

No one is saying that confessions should not be voluntary or that the court created this requirement.  They did, however, create a radically new definition of what voluntary means.  If Miranda Rights are part of common law, then why didn't the U.S. court system notice that for almost two centuries?

I consider it very activist to shift the requirement from restricting the police from certain actions to mandating that the police act as legal council for the accused.

[Emsworth]

If Miranda Rights are part of common law, then why didn't the U.S. court system notice that for almost two centuries?

That is not what I said. Voluntariness is required under the common law: not the Miranda warning.

But the Miranda warning is an essential safeguard to ensure that the confession is truly voluntary: otherwise, the suspect may be browbeaten, pressured, and coerced by prolonged questioning. And this was acknowledged seventy years before Miranda v. Arizona in Brown v. Walker. It is not just a question of the suspects' rights, but also a question of whether a confession in such a case is reliable.

[Blue Rectangle]

If Miranda Rights are part of common law, then why didn't the U.S. court system notice that for almost two centuries?

That is not what I said. Voluntariness is required under the common law: not the Miranda warning.

You stated that the Miranda warning was "vital" to a voluntary confession.  If it is so vital, why did the court not realize that in Brown v. Walker?

But the Miranda warning is an essential safeguard to ensure that the confession is truly voluntary: otherwise, the suspect may be browbeaten, pressured, and coerced by prolonged questioning. And this was acknowledged seventy years before Miranda v. Arizona in Brown v. Walker. It is not just a question of the suspects' rights, but also a question of whether a confession in such a case is reliable.

Right, so Brown v. Walker already limited the interrogation tactics that could be used by the police.  That is constitutionally sound and not activist.  The Miranda decision created out of thin air a requirement that the police give legal advice to suspects.  This new requirement is a good idea, but that doesn't mean it is constitutionally mandated.  This is the textbook definition of judicial activism: creating a new law because it is a good idea, not because the constitution demands it.

[Emsworth]

If Miranda Rights are part of common law, then why didn't the U.S. court system notice that for almost two centuries?

That is not what I said. Voluntariness is required under the common law: not the Miranda warning.

You stated that the Miranda warning was "vital" to a voluntary confession.  If it is so vital, why did the court not realize that in Brown v. Walker?

Simply because that was not the issue presented to it at the time. The Court can only decide a case or controversy immediately before it: anything else would be a dictum, and would have no value as precedent.