Parliamentary Universalism (Motion at Vote)

[Smid]

To get the ball rolling...

Thinking about it, while my proposal's suggestion for the election of PM is more along the lines of Westminster systems, Hashemite's suggested options are probably easier to administer - probably the STV option is what I'd prefer (I forget which number that one was). Hashemite, would you perhaps put forward your ideas on electing the PM here again.

I still am in favour of motions of no confidence first to trigger a vote for PM, and I think motions of no confidence and elections of the PM should be limited to the Lower House and that the PM should be a member of the Lower House.

[Smid]

Afleitch, I agree with absolutely 100% everything you said in that last post.

I think we need to have no confidence motions as the trigger for an election for the PM because:

1. It means that as soon as a party lacks the support in the Lower House, the other parties will have the opportunity to topple them and form government (rather than having to wait until a particular date for an election)

2. It means that a party can't focus on just trying to prop up numbers on a particular date for an election. While there'd still obviously be some sort of GOTV campaign during a no confidence vote/election of PM, it would be less predictable than if an election is to be held, say, the first weekend of August.

If we restrict votes for PM/confidence to the Lower House, it means that parties will need to balance the need to have the numbers in the Senate to pass legislation with the need to maintain numbers in the Lower House to prevent their own government from toppling or to have the numbers to topple another party's government. This adds an extra level of strategy to the game.

I'm also keen on a legislative activity requirement to vote in confidence/no confidence motions - if we give people the right to participate, there's no reason we can't expect them to use that right and to disallow them from voting if they don't.

The Lower House will give new members the opportunity to debate Bills and get to know how Atlasia works - similar to what has been said about the Regional Systems presently.

[Smid]

Hashemite,

I'd been meaning to respond to this post for quite some time and I apologise for the length of time it has taken and thanks for posting it again here. You succinctly summarise the advantages and disadvantages of each, so I won't go into them at length. Likewise, since we're building the Constitution from scratch, I won't address the concerns you had with my earlier proposal - those things will either not be incorporated as we construct our Constitution, or we can discuss them at that time.

I'm snipping your post down to the format I support:

3. In all rounds of voting, a candidate needs 50%+1 of all votes cast to win. The candidate receiving the least votes is eliminated after each round, he doesn't have to endorse another candidate immediately. In addition, a candidate may drop out at any time without having to endorse another candidate immediately. Ex, using Smid's scenario of a RPP 20, DA 18, SDP 15, JCP 8 House and let's say as RPP 5, DA 5, SDP 4, JCP 1 Senate. Assuming no party rebels or absences for simplicity's sake.

Round one. 76 votes cast, 39 for majority. Realistic is eliminated.
Smid (RPP) 25
Franzl (DA) 23
Lief (SDP) 19
Realistic (JCP) 9

Round two. Assume all realistic votes flow to Smid. Lief is eliminated.
Smid (RPP) 34
Franzl (DA) 23
Lief (SDP) 19

Round three. Assume all Lief votes flow to Franzl, who is elected 42-34.
Franzl (DA) 42
Smid (RPP) 34

Pros: The winner will always have the support of a majority in Parliament.
Cons: A high number of candidates in the first round means that it could take a long time.

MPs only elect the Prime Minister from declared Prime Ministerial candidates (no write-ins or NOTA). The same scenarios (1, 2, 3, 4) from Alternative 1 apply, but only the House votes (composition RPP 20, DA 18, SDP 15, JCP 8 ). So on and so forth.

Anyways, this is all just an alternative.

Lastly, if you want more fun in this, courtesy of the Fourth Republic. The elected Prime Minister, in a speech to the House, outlines his political agenda and his government's policy. All MPs vote in a confidence vote, which requires 50%+1 of all votes cast to pass. Voluntary and voting abstentions are therefore counted in this total. Members not voting are not counted in this total. If it passes, the Prime Minister names his cabinet and must/could (two alternatives, you see) proceed to a second confidence vote in the House with the same rules as in this first vote. A NCM can be proposed at any time, and requires 50%+1 of all votes cast to pass. If it passes, the PM and his cabinet must resign immediately and a new vote is held. Just an idea.

In terms of the votes held, I like the idea that there is a pause in voting as each candidate is eliminated (which can lead to strategic negotiations in between voting rounds) but if there are concerns about the length of time it will take to elect a PM, we could speed it up through IRV (when I said STV in my earlier post, I actually meant IRV. It's something of a nasty habit of mine to accidentally do that at times).

As I've mentioned previously, I prefer the idea that only the Lower House elects the PM, rather than a joint sitting of the Lower and Upper Houses.

I also like the idea of the elected PM having to give a speech upon their election which then becomes a Confidence Vote where everyone votes on them. Actually, I really like that idea.

Again, as I've previously indicated, I really like the idea of at any time the Parliament may choose to move a No Confidence Vote in the PM. The way you've detailed it is exactly what I think.

[Smid]

Sorry about the delay in responding, I just saw these.

Why should members need a constituency name?  And why the difficulty in changing states?

Regarding the constituency name, this is to allow people to incorporate local information in their speeches to the House: for example "As I talk to local small businesspeople in my constituency of Staten Island, they tell me of the pressures placed on them from the global financial crisis. Yesterday I had the great pleasure of speaking to a dry cleaner and he implored me to vote in favour of this Bill, saying that if this Bill doesn't pass, financial reality will force him to close his doors and put three people out of work..."

I think that sounds more interesting than just saying "This Bill helps alleviate pressures on small business and allow them to hire more people, during these difficult times." The whole aim of the constituency name was simply to allow local factors in speeches on Bills.

Regarding the difficulty in changing seats - this was for a few reasons: firstly, I think it makes things more realistic, you don't have reallied MPs and Congressmen changing seats/states, except in fairly rare circumstances. Since everyone's a Member of Parliament in the Lower House, we should have some restrictions on seat-changing.

My main issue with seat-changing, however, is that it virtually makes Regions pointless. As I mentioned during the discussion on Regional boundaries in the DWTL Region Shrinking Plan a few weeks ago, it doesn't matter which states we put into a Region or how many members are enrolled in those states if we don't have some form of restriction on transfers. If the South was broken up right now and members put in two different Regions, I think it would be naive to think that the various RPP members wouldn't transfer into one or the other Regions it was split into to ensure the party still maintains a political grip on a region. Likewise if the Pacific was broken up, I am sure the various JCP members would transfer into one or the other Regions for the same reason. While my plan does not incorporate regional governments (since I think they'd be a drain on talent from the Lower House), I have maintained Regional Caucusing (effectively the same as elections presently) for Senate elections and for the passing of Constitutional Amendments. If we are to maintain the influence of Regions, I think it is important that we ensure there are protections to prevent them being abused. It's pointless having any form of boundary commission if as soon as they bring out a plan, people just move around to negate the effects of the planned boundary.

I guess the short answer would be - I think that carpetbagging is not a good thing and that is why I aim to restrict it, but there may be others who prefer its fluidity. Anyway, that's why I've tried to impose restrictions.

Here's an odd idea: make the PM be elected by the Senate, subject to approval by the Lower House.  But the Lower House can also kick the PM out of office.  Would give people more of an incentive to get elected to the Senate.

That's certainly an option. One reason that I took the Senate out of the PM election process was to cause a conflict - to make people and parties decide whether they'd prefer to run for Senate or simply hold a seat in the Lower House. They'd have to balance and weigh up their options to decide which they'd prefer, it creates an additional level of strategy within the game.

Might want to specify posted 15 posts on the entirety of the Atlas Forum.

Sure, it doesn't change the meaning or the intent.

To mollify the people whining about elections, do what I did in the Midwest: hold elections every two months.  And lower the number of Senators down to 10, so it doesn't get too crazy.  Both more and more competitive elections are necessary.

That's cool, I wasn't too fussed about the number in the Upper House or the frequency of elections. There were to be elections every two months anyway (three classes of Senators, each elected to six-month terms, each class elected two months apart).

I'd support STV.

I don't mind STV and I don't mind Regional Caucusing. If we're not having regional governments, then it's probably important to leave some form of regionalism in and I thought Senate elections would be a good way to do that. Mind you, if we reduce the number of Senators from 15 to 10, we could have one election using STV and the other using Regional Caucusing (effectively what we have now).

The initial provisions seem somewhat self-defeating; how could anyone create a party with more than five people without somehow magically teleporting to that number first?

Make it three people, I'd say.  If they're active enough to make by-laws and elect people, why not recognize them?

This is mainly for people breaking away. If a party gets too large, it won't have enough positions for its members - cabinet or senatorial - and this may lead to dissent within the party's backbench and lead to a number of members leaving. I'd prefer to set the bar somewhat higher to keep things at least a little stable, though. If a party has the ability to introduce legislation, that's a pretty important privilege and I'd rather make it not too easy to achieve. Also, if five independents get together, they should be able to form a party (and since independents wouldn't have the right to introduce legislation, they gain substantial benefit from being able to form a party - again, I therefore don't want to make it too easy to gain that benefit).

I do like the strong party system, though.

Yeah, that's something I like about it. The party can even have by-laws determining whether they require a binding caucus (ie, when the party makes a decision about a Bill, all the members have to vote the way the party determines, even if they disagree with the Bill personally, unless the Leader declares the matter to be a conscience vote - personally I don't like binding caucuses, it's more common among left-wing parties, but I think parties should be able to determine their own rules to govern how things like that work).

Obviously my Upper-House-election idea would kind of invalidate parts of this... and I think restricting the PMship to a party leader is kind of annoying, even though I understand it would encourage coalition-building.

Yeah, that was pretty much my objective there.

Jee, what's up with the time period for people to oppose a PM candidate's nomination?  So many time restrictions!

The time restrictions are to try to ensure there are set rules for these sorts of elections - same as time limits/restrictions presently for elections. They are to set minimum lengths of time as much as maximum lengths - they're not purely restrictions. If the rules state that there is 24 hours to speak against a nomination for Prime Minister, it's not just to limit it to that length of time - it's also to prevent the Speaker from moving the vote to quickly to try to cause it to fail/succeed. It's to create a window, rather than a restriction.

Good, I think; will support the party system.  Perhaps let the number of laws able to be proposed by the opposition be set in the House Standing Orders, so as to have recriminations and nasty, bitter arguments about them.

It also is unclear to me what the regulations are for the Senate.

A good idea about the House Standing Orders. I'm giving that some more thought. I'm a little worried that a government will be most likely in coalition - and therefore the balance may be weighted a little too much in favour of the Opposition, leading to more benefits to them (and thus reducing some of the incentive to push to topple the PM). I'm going to continue thinking about this idea. The regulations for both houses would be set out in the Standing Orders (each House would need to pass its own Standing Orders, which would only detail the regulations for the relevant House).

Obviously I support the abolition of regions.  You also misspelled every Midwestern state.

I noticed that, but wasn't sure which state was which, so figured I'd put it in as is and let it be amended accordingly.

Justices should be elected by the Senate every twelve months.  I think five is a bit too many considering the workload and that they'd have to resign their seat.

Fair point. The legal side of Atlasia is not my forte (my experience is predominantly in parliamentary procedure - and I do have RL experience there). Chapters 7 and 8 were mostly put up as a bit of a framework for further adaptation and amendment by people who know that stuff and are more interested in it than I am.

[Smid]

I just figured mine was formatted a little more cleanly. It also basically incorporated Smid's stuff.

Okay.  The big difference I see between yours and Smid's/mine (which have their differences, but I assume they'll be ironed out) is that you have the election of a President in there; neither of our proposals have one.

The main reason for me leaving out the President was because in a bicameral universal system, each Bill has had to pass a majority of Atlasians, and therefore I wished to remove the power of veto from the President (so he's not going against the will of the people, although I think it more likely the President won't exercise that power, and therefore doesn't really have a role). If we water down the President's powers to that extent, it becomes a little pointless having one. That said, if we had some form of reserve powers for the President (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reserve_power) that could be incorporated, there wouldn't be a problem having a President... I just can't think of any powers they should have, is all. Perhaps removing fixed terms and allowing them to dissolve the Senate/a class of Senators at their discretion might be something they could do. I think dismissing the PM is pointless, since that can happen easily through confidence motions so should be the responsibility of the House.

I'm having another thought begin to form, I might post it shortly... I want to develop it a little first. It would involve both Houses voting for PM, as per your suggestion, but only the Lower House voting for President, removing fixed terms on the Senate, and allowing the President to dissolve the Senate for elections perhaps the Lower House can set election dates for the President (thus creating a counter-point to each other... the Senate can't impeach the President, the President can't interfere with the Lower House, the Lower House can't dissolve the Senate - basically a government version of rock, scissors, paper).

Actually, if the Lower House can call a snap election on the President, perhaps give the President the power of veto - if the Lower House doesn't like a veto, they can vote to call an election for President. Anyway, just kicking around an idea here.

[Smid]

If you could incorporate your ideas into the sort of the formatting I laid out (looks nicer IMO) then we could work from there.

It certainly does look nicer putting it together in that sort of a format, but that new idea is more at the brainstorming stage at the moment, so I'd prefer to hear what others think of that before I try to codify it. I might try putting it together roughly (ready for extensive amendment) in case it makes things clearer, but it's a new position that I haven't discussed before (predominantly because I didn't think it necessary) and it needs a lot more work yet.

[Smid]

Sorry I've been AWOL a bit of late. Work's been quite busy, which means that while I'll peruse the boards every now and then (I've usually got the page open at the back of my windows somewhere), and comment at times, I haven't had many chances to sit and draft anything longer than a PM or two. I've been giving thought to what I was suggesting, and even bounced an idea or two off someone who hasn't been involved in developing the universal proposal to try to get a different perspective on it.

At the forefront of my mind has been the development of the inclusion of a presidential position, the role of the office and the limitations posed upon it.

I've been thinking of moving away from fixed terms, and imposing a maximum time limit for terms instead. Additionally, for the role of the President, I'm thinking of removing the power to veto (since a Bill would need to pass with a majority in both Houses, so it would clearly be representative of the views of the majority of active Atlasians), however allowing the President to amend the Bill and refer it back to the Senate. If the Senate approves the President's amendments, the Bill becomes law. If the Senate does not approve of the President's amendments (and those amendments could quite radically change the Bill if the President wishes), the Senate may further amend the Bill and send it back to the President. The President would then have two options - they can either support the Bill as amended by the Senate, or they can call a "Double Dissolution" election, dismissing the Senate and their own position, whereupon elections will be held for all Senators and for the Presidency.

That sounds more complex than it actually would be in practice, a flow diagram would definitely help. I might see if I can do one up and edit the post later today. For a term-limited President, this would cause them a greater internal conflict - pass a Bill they don't like, or lose a term even if they win an election.

If we remove fixed terms and impose maximum term lengths, one slight twist on term limits (and this is a thought I've only just had) would be to state when a President can no longer run for election (until a certain period of time has passed) rather than how many elections they can contest. This would slightly reduce the internal conflict I mentioned in the previous paragraph and may lead to more frequent DD elections. For example, say under fixed terms, we would have presidential elections every three months. If we have a term limit of two terms, then the President may serve for a maximum of six months. Perhaps instead of doing that, we could have a maximum term length of three months between elections, but allow the President to run in as many presidential elections as he or she sees fit until six months have passed since they were first elected (and allow them to serve out their full final term, even if it extends beyond their six months). After vacating the office (if they are excluded from contesting an election due to being term-limited) they may not contest an election for four months from the end of their term (regardless of how many elections are called in that time).

I've also been thinking of limiting the powers of the Lower House, since that seems to be a sticking point for most non-universalists. Perhaps preventing the Lower House from introducing fresh Bills would create an incentive to run for the Senate, thereby making Senate elections more competitive.

[Smid]

I've also been thinking of limiting the powers of the Lower House, since that seems to be a sticking point for most non-universalists. Perhaps preventing the Lower House from introducing fresh Bills would create an incentive to run for the Senate, thereby making Senate elections more competitive.

     I definitely think limiting the lower house's powers would be a good idea. Maybe we should also implement Brandon's idea of a minimum activity level to retain it, so if it turns out that the lower house routinely gets ~5 people voting on bills we can put it out of its misery.

Perhaps the minimum activity requirement could be more along the lines of a minimum number of votes and speeches to reach "quorum" and if quorum is failed, the Bill passes regardless of the Lower House vote (since by that stage it will have been passed by the Senate). In other words, the Lower House forfeits its rights on that legislation, rather than perpetual. I mean, we still have regional governments under the current model, despite months (years?) of inactivity in the majority of them. I think the Lower House can provide the necessary experience for new members, which is currently at times the way Regional Assemblies have worked - although this would cover everyone, not just people fortunate enough to register in a region with an active Assembly.

[Smid]

     If both houses vote concurrently (which seems to be what you're implying), then that would be acceptable. It just should not be the case that bills get slowed down waiting to see whether or not the lower house will manage to fulfill a quorum. Maybe the lower house should be given a deadline of 48 hours after the cessation of voting in the upper house to achieve a quorum or forfeit its right to vote on that bill.

No, the procedure would be:

Bill is introduced in the Senate,
Bill is voted on "in principle" in the Senate,
Amendments are moved and voted on in the Senate,
Amended Bill is passed by the Senate. Progresses to the Lower House.
Amendments are moved and voted on in the Lower House,
Bill is voted on in the Lower House, including any amendments that have been moved (otherwise, it's just the Bill, as amended by the Senate).
If there are amendments moved by the Lower House, the Bill is sent back to the Upper House for the amendments to be ratified, if the Bill was not amended by the Lower House, it gets sent to the President.
If the Senate ratifies amendments made by the Lower House, the Bill is sent to the President. If the Senate does not approve the amendments made by the Lower House, the Bill fails.

I'm trying to put together a flow chart for the presidential amendments, Double Dissolution concept, but I can likewise incorporate this element to the flow diagram.

[Smid]

I don't my name being mentioned as someone you've been chatting with about this proposal, Smid. It's quite alright.

In any case I do like some of the improvements here and think it makes it a far better proposal than previously (though I still favor Parliamentary Bicameralism) but I do find the term limit idea a bit confusing. I think term limits would be a bit hard to follow implemented under a system that could be dissolved fairly often, and it might be better if you ignored term limits altogether here. (Then again, you could keep the fixed term limits idea and force people out of office even if their term wasn't lived out in full, as a way to encourage them to work together to avoid dissolution in the first place.)

Cheers. I didn't want to say anything earlier in case people interpretted "talking" to mean "we have reached an agreement" and I didn't want to make it look like I was putting words in your mouth, as it may have appeared if I'd said "I've been talking with Marokai, and here are a few suggestions on how we can make this thing better."

I do think that certain mechanisms should be incorporated to make sure a bill doesn't languish for whatever period of time in the lower house waiting for a quorum that would not be realized. Perhaps the PM should be able to temporarily dissolve the lower house without affecting the function of the upper house if he determines that it is too inactive.

Time periods are essential in a universal system, otherwise it would get bogged down for too long. If there aren't enough votes cast on a Bill within a certain length of time, then it can be assumed the Lower House has no qualms with the legislation and it's considered passed.

I have done up a flow chart and put it in the gallery because I'm heading home and will therefore be on another computer soon. I'll post it here and explain it later, though (since I don't want to miss my train). I'm not terribly adept at PowerPoint, so my flow chart is actually an organisation chart. Each junction is effectively a yes/no question, and you'll just have to follow it down. It's spread across four pages to make it less jumbled (with relevant instructions at the bottom of each), consequently, it may still look a little complex, but if you follow it down - well, Diagram 1 is really no different to the current Senate procedure (with the addition of a vote when a Bill is first introduced, which could kill the Bill right then and there... other than that, Diagram 1 is identical to the current system... but more on all that later - better yet, don't wander over, leave it until I post it here).

[Smid]

Okay, I suspect this will be long and possibly complex (if I can't explain things clearly).

Firstly, assume we limit the introduction of legislation to the Senate, and allow the Lower House to vote on Bills, amend Bills, but not introduce Bills. This first Diagram displays the procedure by which a Bill would be introduced to the Senate:



Larger version: https://uselectionatlas.org/FORUM/GALLERY/2482_04_05_09_2_51_15.png

The Bill is introduced to the Senate, the same as it is now, however before the Bill is amended, it is debated "in principle" and then voted on. If Senators think the Bill is a good one, or that it is reasonable but could be improved with amendments, they vote in favour. If they don't think there is any way the Bill could be improved by amending it, that there is no way they could support the Bill without it being so drastically changed it would become something else entirely, they vote against the Bill. If the Bill passes this "First Reading," it proceeds to amendments. If it fails the First Reading, the Bill fails.

Amendments are moved and debated. They're voted on the same as amendments presently are. Eventually, there will be no more amendments. The Bill, as amended, is now voted on. This is the "Second Reading." If the Bill passes this Second Reading, it is then sent to the Lower House. If it fails the Second Reading, the Bill fails.

Diagram 1 is therefore not really any different to current Senate procedure, except that it basically introduces a stage at which the Bill could be tabled immediately upon introduction, and instead of being sent to the President for signature/veto, it's sent to the Lower House.



Larger version: https://uselectionatlas.org/FORUM/GALLERY/2482_04_05_09_2_52_02.png

Once the Bill arrives in the Lower House, MPs now have the chance to move amendments. If no one has any amendments to move, the Bill progresses directly to a vote. If the Bill passes the vote, it is sent to the President for signature/amendments. If the Bill fails at that stage, it fails.

If amendments are moved, they are debated and voted on, exactly as per normal. If no amendments are successful, the Bill is voted on, and if it succeeds, it is sent to the President for signature/amendments. If the Bill fails, it fails. If there are amendments successfully made to the Bill, it is now different to what the Senate passed, so therefore it must be sent to the Senate for the amendments to be ratified.



Larger version: https://uselectionatlas.org/FORUM/GALLERY/2482_04_05_09_2_52_38.png

The Senate moves a simple Aye/Nay vote on the Bill as amended. If the Lower House amendments are approved by the Senate, the Bill is sent to the President for signature/amendment. If the amendments are not approved by the Senate, the Lower House amendments are removed from the Bill (all of them). The Senate now has the same Bill it passed earlier (the Bill as previously amended by the Senate). Senators may move further amendments (including any Lower House amendments they thought improved the Bill, since the earlier vote was on all amendments, not on individual amendments). It's also possible the Senate moves no further amendments, but it's up to the Senate to decide that.

Once the Senate has no further amendments, it votes on the Bill, and the Bill is returned to the Lower House. The Lower House can no longer amend the Bill, but simply votes Aye/Nay on it. If it votes against the Bill, the Bill fails. If it votes in favour of the Bill, it progresses to the President.



Larger version: https://uselectionatlas.org/FORUM/GALLERY/2482_04_05_09_2_53_46.png

Once the Bill is presented to the President, the President has two options: sign the Bill or amend the Bill (no outright veto). If they sign the Bill, it becomes law, precisely as is currently the case. If they have additional amendments, they propose the amendments (which may alter the Bill - indeed, the President may deliberately move amendments that he or she knows will be unacceptable to the Senate, in an attempt to get the Senate to kill the Bill).

The Senate then considers the President's amendments, the same way it previously considered amendments moved by the Lower House. If the Senate approves the Presidential amendments, the Bill becomes law (other option, Bill returns to President, who must now sign the Bill into law). If the Presidential amendments are not supported by the Senate, the amendments are stripped from the Bill, which is again voted on (the Senate can no longer add amendments). This gives the Senate the option of killing the Bill. If they vote up the Bill again, it is sent to the President. If the President signs the Bill into law, it becomes law. If the President refuses to sign the Bill, he calls a Double Dissolution election.

We obviously still need to work out the finer details of a DD election (probably in an Act, rather than in the Constitution), but it would probably be for the first weekend more than five days from the date on which it is called (no lengthy campaign period), and last for 72 hours, etc (whatever the normal rules for elections would be).

In a normal General Election (GE), half the Senate (let's say there are 10 Senators, a GE would elect 5 Senators) would be elected and also the President (at each GE - ie, no mid-term Senate elections, but the Senate has a longer term than the President). At a DD, the President and the WHOLE Senate is up for election. Assuming we just use STV-At Large for Senate elections, this would have the effect of doubling the number of positions to be elected, and therefore halve the quota required to be elected (changing the dynamic and improving the chances of very small minor parties and independents). Since this will affect the electability of incumbent Senators, there is a reason for them to kill the Bill in that final step if they so desire. The last five Senators elected would be the first five to be up for re-election at the next GE.

It probably looks quite time consuming, but at most of those steps, there probably won't be amendments. The process for the average Bill would probably be (passes through Diagram 1, then follow left branch of Diagrams 2 and 4):

- Introduced in the Senate
- Passes First Reading
- Amended (or not) by the Senate
- Passes Second Reading
- Passes Lower House
- President signs Bill into Law.

It's only controversial pieces of legislation that would take a more circuitous route and require greater wrangling by parties eager to push their agenda. So most Bills would be completely uncomplicated, but if a party wants to try to block a Bill, it could use the more complex elements of procedure to its advantage.

[Smid]

Aye, Aye.

I recognise PiT's concerns, perhaps we can move an amendment to that later.

[Smid]

I would easily vote for an amendments section that requires a two thirds majority. I think a simple majority cheapens the process, considering the importance of Constitutional Amendments.

Yeah, that's cool. A few options would be two thirds of both Houses, two thirds of a joint sitting of both Houses (ie, everyone votes together, rather than passed by the Senate and then by the House, each with a two thirds majority), or passed by the Senate (simple majority) and then the House (two thirds majority).

[Smid]

Personally, I'd prefer the passed (normally) by the Senate, and then requires a 2/3rd majority of the House. Two-thirds of a joint sitting would probably be easiest to manage, because you could just open a thread and have everyone vote in it.