1952-Taft/Bridges v. Kefauver/Harriman

[Kaine for Senate '18]

Discuss with maps

Taft/Bridges: 55.68% PV, 316 EV
Kefauver/Harriman: 44.32% PV, 215 EV

[gorkay]

I have an alternative history thread going, BTW, in which Taft was elected in 1948.

May I ask what, in your alternative history, happened to Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson?

[CPT MikeyMike]

May I ask what, in your alternative history, happened to Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson?

Keep in mind the 1952 conventions (for both parties) went right down to the wire. It was no guarantee that either Dwight Eisenhower or Adlai Stevenson were going to be the nominees until the ballot voting so this match up is very realistic for 1952.

As for the map, Harriman doesn't bring much to the table and I think Taft also wins NY, NJ, DE and MD. Kefauver only wins the south. Keep in mind Taft dies in the summer of 1953 and Styles Bridges becomes president.

[gorkay]

May I ask what, in your alternative history, happened to Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson?

Keep in mind the 1952 conventions (for both parties) went right down to the wire. It was no guarantee that either Dwight Eisenhower or Adlai Stevenson were going to be the nominees until the ballot voting so this match up is very realistic for 1952.

As for the map, Harriman doesn't bring much to the table and I think Taft also wins NY, NJ, DE and MD. Kefauver only wins the south. Keep in mind Taft dies in the summer of 1953 and Styles Bridges becomes president.

I know that the conventions went down to the wire, but what I was wondering was the reactions Ike and Adlai had over losing so narrowly. Did they support their parties' candidates, and if so, how enthusiastically? Or did they take a walk? The degree of their support, particularly in Eisenhower's case, could have had a big effect on the election.

[Kaine for Senate '18]

May I ask what, in your alternative history, happened to Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson?

Keep in mind the 1952 conventions (for both parties) went right down to the wire. It was no guarantee that either Dwight Eisenhower or Adlai Stevenson were going to be the nominees until the ballot voting so this match up is very realistic for 1952.

As for the map, Harriman doesn't bring much to the table and I think Taft also wins NY, NJ, DE and MD. Kefauver only wins the south. Keep in mind Taft dies in the summer of 1953 and Styles Bridges becomes president.

I know that the conventions went down to the wire, but what I was wondering was the reactions Ike and Adlai had over losing so narrowly. Did they support their parties' candidates, and if so, how enthusiastically? Or did they take a walk? The degree of their support, particularly in Eisenhower's case, could have had a big effect on the election.

Eisenhower gave a strong endorsement to Taft, but did not campaign for him.  Stevenson gave an equally strong endorsement to Kefauver, and did campaign for him.

[gorkay]

Taft probably wins, then, by a margin that is comfortable but nowhere near the dimensions of the landslide Eisenhower enjoyed. After 22 solid years of Democratic rule interrupted only by the two years of the Republican-controlled 80th Congress, the country was ready for a change, and it would have taken a lot to keep it from happening. Taft, while clearly not the strongest GOP candidate, would have been strong enough to win, especially against Kefauver. The only scenario in which Taft might have had some trouble was if he had run against Stevenson and without Eisenhower's endorsement, or if his health had started to fail during the campaign.

In my alternative history thread, BTW, Taft beat Dewey for the 1948 GOP nomination and chose MacArthur as his running mate, while Henry Wallace, who had won the 1944 Vice-Presidential nomination and thus become President when FDR died, ran with Truman as his running mate. Thurmond and Wright, as in RL, ran as Dixiecrats. The election went to the House, and a deal was struck whereby Taft was chosen President and Truman V-P. Any opinion on what might happen in a 1952 election between Taft and Truman, with Thurmond and Wallace sitting it out?

[mianfei]

I’ve long thought that if Taft had ran in 1952 we might have seen something like the “Reagan Revolution” even in the 1950s. The Democrats were very unpopular and I could see them losing just as badly as Stevenson did:

Taft/Bridges: 413 EV (57 percent)
Kefauver/Harriman: 118 EV (42 percent)

With a more conservative candidate the GOP would have carried the Dixiecrat states of South Carolina and Louisiana where Stevenson only won narrowly, and Taft was so isolationist that I imagine Arkansas would have suffered the same fate. As a midwestern conservative, Taft would do less well in the Northeast than Eisenhower, but I am not sure he would have lost more than Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New York.

The effect of an economically and culturally conservative GOP administration on politics and culture of this era raises serious questions. When I read this quote from Sean Wilentz’ introduction to the 2014 reissue of The Emerging Republican Majority:

Viewed more coldly, though, Phillips’s analysis pointed to a palpable reality that Democrats and liberals either tried to wish away or simply denounced as racist—that in forthrightly embracing civil rights, the Democratic liberalism of the 1960s and after, fairly or unfairly, left itself vulnerable to the perception that it had turned away from the interests and values of the broad white middle and working classes. That perception, albeit mutated, still remains a feature of American politics; for a quarter century, it proved essential to the conservative national majority that Phillips perceived so clearly.

I ask myself whether a Republican Party that forthrightly and constantly rejected civil rights from the 1950s onwards would have gained hegemony over whites outside the intelligentsia early enough to monopolize federal power by preventing large-scale nonwhite registration at any stage and attracting Southern Democrats to switch parties. Phillips expected this to occur en masse in the early 1970s but it was actually delayed until generational turnover in the 1990s.

The main problem with this theory is that even after the Dixiecrat revolt the Democrats maintained powerful loyalty amongst poor whites in the Deep South upcountry and Appalachia. If no voting rights legislation was ever passed and black voter registration in the South stalled or declined, it is quite plausible that poor white Democratic loyalties could have been maintained indefinitely. This could have changed if black voters gained greater influence in the North and poor white hostility overshadowed their dislike of wealthier suburban and landowning whites. However, anti-black hostility outside the South, especially the Midwest, Plains and Mountain States, however, was in many ways greater than in the plantation South: since 1890 blacks had been driven out of virtually all settlements there except urban ghettoes, and by 1970 most counties in the Plains and Mountain States did not have a single black household. Thus, a larger migration would have probably caused more racial violence than actually observed, and quite possibly turned white Northerners more explicitly against civil rights, creating a more extreme racial backlash than actually observed.

[MATTROSE94]

I’ve long thought that if Taft had ran in 1952 we might have seen something like the “Reagan Revolution” even in the 1950s. The Democrats were very unpopular and I could see them losing just as badly as Stevenson did:

Taft/Bridges: 413 EV (57 percent)
Kefauver/Harriman: 118 EV (42 percent)

With a more conservative candidate the GOP would have carried the Dixiecrat states of South Carolina and Louisiana where Stevenson only won narrowly, and Taft was so isolationist that I imagine Arkansas would have suffered the same fate. As a midwestern conservative, Taft would do less well in the Northeast than Eisenhower, but I am not sure he would have lost more than Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New York.

The effect of an economically and culturally conservative GOP administration on politics and culture of this era raises serious questions. When I read this quote from Sean Wilentz’ introduction to the 2014 reissue of The Emerging Republican Majority:

Viewed more coldly, though, Phillips’s analysis pointed to a palpable reality that Democrats and liberals either tried to wish away or simply denounced as racist—that in forthrightly embracing civil rights, the Democratic liberalism of the 1960s and after, fairly or unfairly, left itself vulnerable to the perception that it had turned away from the interests and values of the broad white middle and working classes. That perception, albeit mutated, still remains a feature of American politics; for a quarter century, it proved essential to the conservative national majority that Phillips perceived so clearly.

I ask myself whether a Republican Party that forthrightly and constantly rejected civil rights from the 1950s onwards would have gained hegemony over whites outside the intelligentsia early enough to monopolize federal power by preventing large-scale nonwhite registration at any stage and attracting Southern Democrats to switch parties. Phillips expected this to occur en masse in the early 1970s but it was actually delayed until generational turnover in the 1990s.

The main problem with this theory is that even after the Dixiecrat revolt the Democrats maintained powerful loyalty amongst poor whites in the Deep South upcountry and Appalachia. If no voting rights legislation was ever passed and black voter registration in the South stalled or declined, it is quite plausible that poor white Democratic loyalties could have been maintained indefinitely. This could have changed if black voters gained greater influence in the North and poor white hostility overshadowed their dislike of wealthier suburban and landowning whites. However, anti-black hostility outside the South, especially the Midwest, Plains and Mountain States, however, was in many ways greater than in the plantation South: since 1890 blacks had been driven out of virtually all settlements there except urban ghettoes, and by 1970 most counties in the Plains and Mountain States did not have a single black household. Thus, a larger migration would have probably caused more racial violence than actually observed, and quite possibly turned white Northerners more explicitly against civil rights, creating a more extreme racial backlash than actually observed.

Interesting. I know that Robert Taft was somewhat neutral on civil rights, whereas Styles Bridges was openly hostile to civil rights, being the only Republican Senator to vote against the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts. Had he been President in the 1950s, the Republican Southern Strategy definitely would have began decades earlier and the Civil Rights laws of the 1950s and 1960s would have been delayed until at least the 1970s or even later.  I am sure that Estes Kefauver would win a majority of the African American vote in this scenario, as he was one of the few Southern Democrats who was pro-civil rights.

[mianfei]

Interesting. I know that Robert Taft was somewhat neutral on civil rights, whereas Styles Bridges was openly hostile to civil rights, being the only Republican Senator to vote against the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts. Had he been President in the 1950s, the Republican Southern Strategy definitely would have began decades earlier and the Civil Rights laws of the 1950s and 1960s would have been delayed until at least the 1970s or even later.  I am sure that Estes Kefauver would win a majority of the African American vote in this scenario, as he was one of the few Southern Democrats who was pro-civil rights.

I am actually surprised to know Styles Bridges was against civil rights, which most Northeastern Republicans in that era favoured. He actually did not vote at all on the 1957 Civil Rights Act.

If the Republicans develop a stronger and earlier “Southern Strategy”, it could have left the Democratic Party for a very long period as a regional party confined to the relatively socially liberal Northeast unless it takes painstaking care to avoid sympathy with civil rights demands. If both major parties are hostile to or not supportive of civil rights, increasing black protest capacity could either have been turned to far more radical and more violent demands or been permanently suppressed with a return to the pre-Smith v. Allright era. The latter would have been acceptable, even preferred, by most white Americans outside academia and government, but would have undoubtedly driven anti-American sentiments on a massive scale globally, unless the US spends much more money than it did suppressing democratization movements around the globe.

[Alben Barkley]

Taft probably wins, then, by a margin that is comfortable but nowhere near the dimensions of the landslide Eisenhower enjoyed. After 22 solid years of Democratic rule interrupted only by the two years of the Republican-controlled 80th Congress, the country was ready for a change, and it would have taken a lot to keep it from happening. Taft, while clearly not the strongest GOP candidate, would have been strong enough to win, especially against Kefauver. The only scenario in which Taft might have had some trouble was if he had run against Stevenson and without Eisenhower's endorsement, or if his health had started to fail during the campaign.

In my alternative history thread, BTW, Taft beat Dewey for the 1948 GOP nomination and chose MacArthur as his running mate, while Henry Wallace, who had won the 1944 Vice-Presidential nomination and thus become President when FDR died, ran with Truman as his running mate. Thurmond and Wright, as in RL, ran as Dixiecrats. The election went to the House, and a deal was struck whereby Taft was chosen President and Truman V-P. Any opinion on what might happen in a 1952 election between Taft and Truman, with Thurmond and Wallace sitting it out?

Truman wins that election. Isolationism was on the way out. I can’t imagine Taft’s term would have gone over well.

[mianfei]

Another issue I forgot about earlier, “MATTROSE94”, is the effect of Presidents Taft and Bridges on Brown v. Board of Education. In a documentary on the case, I read that several of the sitting justices were uncertain about accepting that separate was inherently unequal. If a much more conservative Republican was elected in 1952, that might have produced a Supreme Court that says separate is not inherently unequal in Brown, which was already under discussion when the 1952 election was held but was not decided until after Chief Justice Vinson died.

One would expect Taft and/or Bridges to nominate much more conservative Justices, but who they would be – and even whether the Senate would vote for them – I have done nothing to examine. Given that three of the four nominations rejected by the Senate over the past century-and-a-quarter have been directly associated with Herbert Hoover’s and Richard Nixon’s “Southern Strategy”, it is  tempting to imagine Taft’s or Bridges’ Chief Justice nominee suffering the same fate as John J. Parker, Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell. A Brown case decided with no sitting Chief Justice would be an interesting what-if in itself.

The effects of a Brown ruling that legitimised segregation on Civil Rights I have never seen discussed in alternate history, but I have a very strong feeling it would have driven black civil rights to a more militant position much earlier. That might likely have turned white opinion – always excluding a tiny minority in academia powerfully against black civil rights – much more vicious, with demands made early in the century like repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment (and perhaps the Fourteenth) becoming publicly expressed en masse and put under the legislative agenda to a much greater extent than even during the Wilson years.

The effects of that on America’s image abroad could be frightening, and might have required a much more militaristic posture to keep the country secure.

[Huey Long is a Republican]

IIRC, Taft was actually in the process of crafting several forms of Civil Rights legislation prior to his death. The true bane of his existence were labor unions, so we might see a greater push for RTW laws being passed nation wide.

[mianfei]

I was reading earlier today [Melbourne time, so almost a day ahead of the United States] that it was a series of lucky breaks that allowed Brown v. Board of Education to be decided as it was. Ian Millhiser, author of Injustices: The Supreme Court's History of Comforting the Comfortable and Afflicting the Afflicted, argues in ‘Brown v. Board of Education Came Very Close To Being a Dark Day In American History’ that had any of several nominations been reversed from as far back as the rejected nomination of John Johnston Parker in 1930, then the justices would have argued together than separate was equal and made segregation permanently legal.

Taft died one month before Chief Justice Vinson was to be replaced, and this would mean that President Bridges would have had the opportunity to nominate a much more conservative Chief Justice. Parker himself was seen as a possibility, but if Styles Bridges was as conservative as you are saying then he might have looked to someone more conservative than Judge Parker or Orie Leon Phillips, a Tenth Circuit Judge of similar views to Parker who lived until 1974?

The thing that stands against an exceptionally conservative successor to Vinson is twenty years of Democratic administrations leaving almost no judges appointed by Republican presidents neither too old nor too young – not to mention possible confirmation issues. So President Bridges might have appointed Phillips anyway, or Parker if Bridges thought that he would get him past the Senate and that he might have a chance to appoint another more conservative Chief Justice in a second term. No President has ever appointed two Chief Justices, but if President Bridges elevated Parker, and was re-elected in 1956, he would have been able to accomplish just that when Parker died in 1958. A more conservative Chief Justice appointed in 1958, of course, leaves a multitude of unanswered questions about the future of the United States, particularly if this Chief Justice served until the 1980s.

Although Phillips (and Parker) supported separate but equal Millhiser says he would have had trouble getting more than Stanley Reed, Robert H. Jackson, and Tom C. Clark onside. So Brown might have been decided as it was, but by a 5—4 vote not a 9—0 one, and this would have reduced pressure to actually desegregate.