Are people overhyping how much of a re-alignment election this was?

[ProgressiveModerate]

We hear a lot of discussion about how Trump overperformed with Hispanic and Asian voters, while Harris held her ground better with some college educated whites, and Seniors, but in general, the swings this election were remarkably universal by historical standards.

Even when it comes to these Hispanic and Asian communities, many actually had less aggressive swings to the right than 2016-->2020, not to mention trends were less aggressive. The 2016-->2020 shift map is generally far more dynamic despite a much smaller swing in the NPV, with many communities swinging double-digits in both directions.

Also a lot of the communities with the strongest swings in either direction this cycle can be explained at least in part by factors other than re-alignment. Many of the strongest shifts to Harris can be attributed to Demographic changes, while many of the strongest shifts to Trump can be attributed to more local issues (i.e. the border, NYC) and uneven turnout differentials.

I definitely think there was some re-alignment, but people are overhyping it compared to historical standards - this was a remarkably stable election, and the coalitions are still pretty similar to what they were pre-2020. I think Trump overperforming nationally gave the illusion of a greater re-alignment than there actually was.

[Arizona Iced Tea]

Re-alignment is a long term process not a sudden change between elections. If you compare the coalitions to 2012, the shift and trends with demographics, education, and income are insane.

[Secretary of State Liberal Hack]

Yes, the sheer uniformity of the swing away from harriscompletely discredits the trend school of analyse that had become dogmatic here and on on Election twitter. The electorate is far more flexible and liable to swing.

[ProgressiveModerate]

Re-alignment is a long term process not a sudden change between elections. If you compare the coalitions to 2012, the shift and trends with demographics, education, and income are insane.

Fair, but I'd argue that 2016 and 2020 contributed to 90% of the re-alignment we've seen since 2012 while 2024 just added on a little bit.

[Agafin]

Many of the strongest shifts to Harris can be attributed to Demographic changes, while many of the strongest shifts to Trump can be attributed to more local issues (i.e. the border, NYC) and uneven turnout differentials.

One thing I've noticed is that whenever people try to downplay a bad result by blaming turnout differentials, the next electoral cycle comes in like a wrecking ball to slap back reality into their faces. The 2022 results in states like New York and Florida were largely handwaved by some on this website as being due to low dem turnout. Now that the 2024 results are in, we actually see that no, those states were just trending republican and fast. Harris did about as well as the senate candidates from 2022 in those two states (slightly worse than Schumer, slightly better than Demings) despite the higher, presidential turnout.

And it makes sense. The reasons that would cause part of your base to be unenthusiastic about turning out for you are going to be correlated to the reasons  why that base might just switch over to your opponent. Are democrats going to come out against affirmation action? Are they going to endorse tough on crime policies? No? Then why exactly would they expect the asian Americans in NYC who boycotted them in 2022 to all of a sudden vote for them in 2024? Yes turnout among those democratic leaning asian Americans was up in 2024 compared to 2022. But they came to vote for Trump, not Harris.


tldr: There is not a single result in this election that can be explained by turnout differentials.

[ProgressiveModerate]

Many of the strongest shifts to Harris can be attributed to Demographic changes, while many of the strongest shifts to Trump can be attributed to more local issues (i.e. the border, NYC) and uneven turnout differentials.

One thing I've noticed is that whenever people try to downplay a bad result by blaming turnout differentials, the next electoral cycle comes in like a wrecking ball to slap back reality into their faces. The 2022 results in states like New York and Florida were largely handwaved by some on this website as being due to low dem turnout. Now that the 2024 results are in, we actually see that no, those states were just trending republican and fast. Harris did about as well as the senate candidates from 2022 in those two states (slightly worse than Schumer, slightly better than Demings) despite the higher, presidential turnout.

And it makes sense. The reasons that would cause part of your base to be unenthusiastic about turning out for you are going to be correlated to the reasons  why that base might just switch over to your opponent. Are democrats going to come out against affirmation action? Are they going to endorse tough on crime policies? No? Then why exactly would they expect the asian Americans in NYC who boycotted them in 2022 to all of a sudden vote for them in 2024? Yes turnout among those democratic leaning asian Americans was up in 2024 compared to 2022. But they came to vote for Trump, not Harris.


tldr: There is not a single result in this election that can be explained by turnout differentials.

This cycle muddies the waters a lot for 2 reasons: mainly Trump disproportionately gained amongst lower propensity voters and many states did have much larger turnout D v R turnout differentials than usual using traditionally metrics. Relative to 2020, turnout generally held up much better in R leaning areas.

However, turnout differentials are certainly real. A good example of this would be the Central Valley where Democrats always struggled in midterm elections because turnout amongst Hispanics in these House seats would just be bad, but then would shoot back up in the next Presidential cycle. However, this cycle Trump made large gains with Hispanics so even if Hispanic turnout is up it didn't matter that much in terms of topline partisanship.

One way clear evidence turnout differential shows up in the results this year is in the southeastern "black belt" where the counties with the largest swings right tended to be closer to 50/50 between white and black population - counties that were more racially homogenous generally had smaller shifts right. Sure, we technically don't know if these black voters who sat out this election are still D-friendly, but in the absence of other evidence, it seems like Dems have more potential with them going forwards than otherwise. The story might be different if amongst those that did turn out, we saw southeastern black voters shift hard right, but that's not what happened.

Say it was flipped and Harris won because turnout in rural white areas was really bad - I doubt people would be assuming that all these rural whites that didn't show up this cycle are now potential Dem voters.

[Tekken_Guy]

Many of the strongest shifts to Harris can be attributed to Demographic changes, while many of the strongest shifts to Trump can be attributed to more local issues (i.e. the border, NYC) and uneven turnout differentials.

One thing I've noticed is that whenever people try to downplay a bad result by blaming turnout differentials, the next electoral cycle comes in like a wrecking ball to slap back reality into their faces. The 2022 results in states like New York and Florida were largely handwaved by some on this website as being due to low dem turnout. Now that the 2024 results are in, we actually see that no, those states were just trending republican and fast. Harris did about as well as the senate candidates from 2022 in those two states (slightly worse than Schumer, slightly better than Demings) despite the higher, presidential turnout.

And it makes sense. The reasons that would cause part of your base to be unenthusiastic about turning out for you are going to be correlated to the reasons  why that base might just switch over to your opponent. Are democrats going to come out against affirmation action? Are they going to endorse tough on crime policies? No? Then why exactly would they expect the asian Americans in NYC who boycotted them in 2022 to all of a sudden vote for them in 2024? Yes turnout among those democratic leaning asian Americans was up in 2024 compared to 2022. But they came to vote for Trump, not Harris.


tldr: There is not a single result in this election that can be explained by turnout differentials.

Democrats should be thankful Harris was able to keep it down to Schumer/Demings numbers. Had Biden stayed in his performance would instead look like Hochul and Crist.

(Also she seems to be matching Padilla in California.)

[Don't Tread on Me]

If Trump doesn't exceed his first term deportation policies, we could see a long term realignment in the RGV that's not unlike what happened in Appalachia 20 years earlier where the GOP manages to hold its ground even during a Dem wave. Other than there and adjacent areas (parts of the Southwest, Miami, isolated urban neighborhoods), it was just a swing.  Although I'm not sure about Nevada. Demographically it seems like the GOP will be favored, although I'm not sure if increased turnout in Reno & Vegas could keep it as a swing state. Arizona is a bit dicey as well. If Dems work to improve in Maricopa County I suppose it's possible, but the latino losses makes it less likely that it'll go the way of Colorado or even neighboring New Mexico (which also could flip within the next few cycles unless trends change). It also confirms that North Carolina has potential to flip in the next Dem wave given how it trended to the left. #Blexit happening which is still a possibility in the 2030's if the Dem's don't stablize in their popularity could've caused a realignment as that alone might've caused states like Georgia & Virginia to revert back to pre-Trump GOP levels like what happened in the Southwest.

[有爭議嘅領土 of The Figgis Agency]

Many of the strongest shifts to Harris can be attributed to Demographic changes, while many of the strongest shifts to Trump can be attributed to more local issues (i.e. the border, NYC) and uneven turnout differentials.

One thing I've noticed is that whenever people try to downplay a bad result by blaming turnout differentials, the next electoral cycle comes in like a wrecking ball to slap back reality into their faces. The 2022 results in states like New York and Florida were largely handwaved by some on this website as being due to low dem turnout. Now that the 2024 results are in, we actually see that no, those states were just trending republican and fast. Harris did about as well as the senate candidates from 2022 in those two states (slightly worse than Schumer, slightly better than Demings) despite the higher, presidential turnout.

And it makes sense. The reasons that would cause part of your base to be unenthusiastic about turning out for you are going to be correlated to the reasons  why that base might just switch over to your opponent. Are democrats going to come out against affirmation action? Are they going to endorse tough on crime policies? No? Then why exactly would they expect the asian Americans in NYC who boycotted them in 2022 to all of a sudden vote for them in 2024? Yes turnout among those democratic leaning asian Americans was up in 2024 compared to 2022. But they came to vote for Trump, not Harris.


tldr: There is not a single result in this election that can be explained by turnout differentials.

The California (and metropolitan Texas) county-level results are pretty indicative of partisan turnout differentials.

[Annatar]

In my view 2016 was the realignment election, there were 8 states that had double digit swings towards Trump in 2016, hundreds of counties flipped and counties that had been static or even trending democratic in states like Ohio swung massively Republican and have only gotten more Republican.

[GAinDC]

I don’t really see a lot of people claiming this is a realigning election since it was still pretty close and there was more of a uniform swing.

[Meclazine for Israel]

Yes.

Way overhyped.

It wasn't a realignment at all when you consider that Donald Trump won all three elections.

[Samof94]

Yes.

Way overhyped.

It wasn't a realignment at all when you consider that Donald Trump won all three elections.

He lost in 2020.

[He's turned to dust now, one of the chosen few]

Nothing that happened this year can be called a realignment until at least the next presidential election, let alone three weeks later.

[ProgressiveModerate]

If Trump doesn't exceed his first term deportation policies, we could see a long term realignment in the RGV that's not unlike what happened in Appalachia 20 years earlier where the GOP manages to hold its ground even during a Dem wave. Other than there and adjacent areas (parts of the Southwest, Miami, isolated urban neighborhoods), it was just a swing.  Although I'm not sure about Nevada. Demographically it seems like the GOP will be favored, although I'm not sure if increased turnout in Reno & Vegas could keep it as a swing state. Arizona is a bit dicey as well. If Dems work to improve in Maricopa County I suppose it's possible, but the latino losses makes it less likely that it'll go the way of Colorado or even neighboring New Mexico (which also could flip within the next few cycles unless trends change). It also confirms that North Carolina has potential to flip in the next Dem wave given how it trended to the left. #Blexit happening which is still a possibility in the 2030's if the Dem's don't stablize in their popularity could've caused a realignment as that alone might've caused states like Georgia & Virginia to revert back to pre-Trump GOP levels like what happened in the Southwest.

I think long term, Nevada will come down to if the increased cost of living in the greater Vegas area starts forcing educational attainment to rise such that you start to have a more substantial base of college educated liberals in Vegas. Part of the reason Clark County has been able to continuously drift right since 2008 has been because Vegas currently lacks educated pockets to offset Dem losses with working class and nom-white voters.

[President Johnson]

Probably, but I feel like that's the case after every election.

2024 feels a lot like a Republican version of 2012.

[The Mikado]

The realignment happened in 2016. This is just what a narrow-but-solid GOP win looks like in the Seventh Party System.

[Don't Tread on Me]

Probably, but I feel like that's the case after every election.

2024 feels a lot like a Republican version of 2012.

Depending on how the country goes, it feels like either a repeat of 1968 or 2004. In the former case, Vance should win easily in '28. If it's the later case, we could see the biggest Dem landslide in decades.

[LBJer]

Probably, but I feel like that's the case after every election.

2024 feels a lot like a Republican version of 2012.

Obama's victory that year was significantly larger than Trump's this year, though.

[EpicHistory]

The realignment happened in 2016. This is just what a narrow-but-solid GOP win looks like in the Seventh Party System.

Hot take: The re-alignment was actually in 2004 with Bush II, the 2008 Recession and Obama years obscured it however. Bush's "Compassionate Conservatism" laid the base for Trump's Populism, and lead to serious gains among White Working Class voters and Hispanics. 2016 and the cycles since then was the trends returning to that of the Bush years, with White college grads going to the Dems while other groups trended GOP.

[Roll Roons]

Many of the strongest shifts to Harris can be attributed to Demographic changes, while many of the strongest shifts to Trump can be attributed to more local issues (i.e. the border, NYC) and uneven turnout differentials.

One thing I've noticed is that whenever people try to downplay a bad result by blaming turnout differentials, the next electoral cycle comes in like a wrecking ball to slap back reality into their faces. The 2022 results in states like New York and Florida were largely handwaved by some on this website as being due to low dem turnout. Now that the 2024 results are in, we actually see that no, those states were just trending republican and fast. Harris did about as well as the senate candidates from 2022 in those two states (slightly worse than Schumer, slightly better than Demings) despite the higher, presidential turnout.

And it makes sense. The reasons that would cause part of your base to be unenthusiastic about turning out for you are going to be correlated to the reasons  why that base might just switch over to your opponent. Are democrats going to come out against affirmation action? Are they going to endorse tough on crime policies? No? Then why exactly would they expect the asian Americans in NYC who boycotted them in 2022 to all of a sudden vote for them in 2024? Yes turnout among those democratic leaning asian Americans was up in 2024 compared to 2022. But they came to vote for Trump, not Harris.


tldr: There is not a single result in this election that can be explained by turnout differentials.

Another thing is that people are trying to explain Harris' poor showing in big blue states as a result of "poor turnout." Have they considered that maybe 2020 was the real anomaly in terms of having abnormally high turnout, and this election's turnout is closer to what people should expect going forward?

[Skill and Chance]

Many of the strongest shifts to Harris can be attributed to Demographic changes, while many of the strongest shifts to Trump can be attributed to more local issues (i.e. the border, NYC) and uneven turnout differentials.

One thing I've noticed is that whenever people try to downplay a bad result by blaming turnout differentials, the next electoral cycle comes in like a wrecking ball to slap back reality into their faces. The 2022 results in states like New York and Florida were largely handwaved by some on this website as being due to low dem turnout. Now that the 2024 results are in, we actually see that no, those states were just trending republican and fast. Harris did about as well as the senate candidates from 2022 in those two states (slightly worse than Schumer, slightly better than Demings) despite the higher, presidential turnout.

And it makes sense. The reasons that would cause part of your base to be unenthusiastic about turning out for you are going to be correlated to the reasons  why that base might just switch over to your opponent. Are democrats going to come out against affirmation action? Are they going to endorse tough on crime policies? No? Then why exactly would they expect the asian Americans in NYC who boycotted them in 2022 to all of a sudden vote for them in 2024? Yes turnout among those democratic leaning asian Americans was up in 2024 compared to 2022. But they came to vote for Trump, not Harris.


tldr: There is not a single result in this election that can be explained by turnout differentials.

Another thing is that people are trying to explain Harris' poor showing in big blue states as a result of "poor turnout." Have they considered that maybe 2020 was the real anomaly in terms of having abnormally high turnout, and this election's turnout is closer to what people should expect going forward?

Totally agree with that! 

We've seen other situations where turnout goes up because people are "bored out of their mind" and work/social obligations are greatly reduced, e.g. when an extreme weather event knocks out power to an area shortly before the election.  COVID was exceptional in that it applied similar conditions to the entire country at once.  The 2020 turnout record may stand for quite a while.

[पिकाचु]

Probably cope on my end, but polisci research on Latino/Asian voters has said that they tend to start at a baseline of less partisan attachment than white and black voters. Considering immigration trends and the relative youth of the those populations, I would be wary of confidently declaring a realignment.

[Agafin]

Many of the strongest shifts to Harris can be attributed to Demographic changes, while many of the strongest shifts to Trump can be attributed to more local issues (i.e. the border, NYC) and uneven turnout differentials.

One thing I've noticed is that whenever people try to downplay a bad result by blaming turnout differentials, the next electoral cycle comes in like a wrecking ball to slap back reality into their faces. The 2022 results in states like New York and Florida were largely handwaved by some on this website as being due to low dem turnout. Now that the 2024 results are in, we actually see that no, those states were just trending republican and fast. Harris did about as well as the senate candidates from 2022 in those two states (slightly worse than Schumer, slightly better than Demings) despite the higher, presidential turnout.

And it makes sense. The reasons that would cause part of your base to be unenthusiastic about turning out for you are going to be correlated to the reasons  why that base might just switch over to your opponent. Are democrats going to come out against affirmation action? Are they going to endorse tough on crime policies? No? Then why exactly would they expect the asian Americans in NYC who boycotted them in 2022 to all of a sudden vote for them in 2024? Yes turnout among those democratic leaning asian Americans was up in 2024 compared to 2022. But they came to vote for Trump, not Harris.


tldr: There is not a single result in this election that can be explained by turnout differentials.

Another thing is that people are trying to explain Harris' poor showing in big blue states as a result of "poor turnout." Have they considered that maybe 2020 was the real anomaly in terms of having abnormally high turnout, and this election's turnout is closer to what people should expect going forward?

You're absolutely right. In fact I believe there are very few places where turnout in 2024 (adjusting for population change) was less than 2016 and that was not considered a low turnout election at the time (it was the second highest of the century at that point). That's why I don't believe turnout differentials can really explain these results.

That being said, even if the higher turnout of 2020 was not an anomaly and is in fact the new normal, my broader point remains unchanged. When a demographic group is realigning, a portion of it would first shun  their previous party (by either abstaining or voting third party) before feeling comfortable enough to vote for the opposition in the next cycle. This means that you would expect the benefitting party to gain fewer votes than their opponent loses.

This assumes that turnout overall stays relatively stable between both cycles and that population growth is normal. If the turnout drops or the state/county experiences steep population decline, then the effect is exacerbated. In fact you could even have both candidates losing votes but with one candidate losing much more (eg Wisconsin 2012 -> 2016). If turnout rises or the population grows appreciably, you would have the reverse effect with the benefitting party gaining more votes than the opponent loses (eg Miami Dade 2016 -> 2020) or both even gaining votes but the benefitting party gaining more.

For a textbook example of this, we can look at what happened in some of the midwestern states from 2012 to 2016. In Michigan and Ohio, you had Clinton getting (respectively) 295730 and 433545 fewer votes than Obama while Trump "only" got 164287 and 179568 more votes than Romney. At least part of the difference could be explained by lower turnout in cities like Detroit or Columbus. Surely there's nothing to worry about here, dems just stayed home. If more of them actually get out and vote, those states will go back to their 2012 pattern right? Well obviously not, as 2020 showed. Just like back then, we'll probably have to wait for 2028 for some people to acknowledge the change that is already visible right now.

[有爭議嘅領土 of The Figgis Agency]

Probably cope on my end, but polisci research on Latino/Asian voters has said that they tend to start at a baseline of less partisan attachment than white and black voters. Considering immigration trends and the relative youth of the those populations, I would be wary of confidently declaring a realignment.

This is also why it's completely unrealistic to expect either group to ever vote more than 75% D. It would be very bad for any sort of widespread, systemic discrimination to happen that would polarize either group into voting >=80% D.

That being said, the D floor among Asians is probably higher than that among Latinos in part because there's no real "pre-US native" analogue to Tejanos or Neomexicanos, notwithstanding the fact that Neomexicanos have a pretty high D baseline. Being a more overwhelmingly recent immigrant origin group raises both the D and R floors.