I/P News Reports, Terrorist Leadership Status, War Updates, etc

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

I wanted to try to create a thread strictly for factual updates about what’s happening with the conflict with minimal opinion, so folks who want to know what’s going on can check without drowning in arguments between folks who’ve made up their minds.  Twitter updates are fine, but I’d ask that folks only post ones here that don’t contain potentially inflammatory side commentary or stuff about things happening outside Israel/Gaza.  

Anyway, to kick things off I will be doing a MegaPost about the status of the various terrorist groups leaderships followed by a news roundup of recent developments in the military conflict itself and a breakdown of the key players on the Israeli side and what they’ve been up to/how much power they actually have.

I think the Israel-Gaza thread has really become a thread for debating the conflict, which side is right, arguing about which side is worse, whether Israel is committing genocide/ethnic cleansing, the college protestors, etc to the point that this project may need a new thread.  That’s very much not what this thread is for; it’s for calmly and objectively discussing what is happening on the ground without needlessly inflammatory language.  

Hopefully this thread will be informative, interesting, and substance focused.  My updates will generally be in the vein of those strictly fact-focused mega-posts I was making at one point that were largely free of personal opinions (aside from some fact-focused analysis).  Anyway, time to write up the terrorist group leadership status post to get things started.

[CumbrianLefty]

You are probably right in thinking this thread a good idea - looking forward to the factual updates

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

Notable Terrorist Leaders and their Status: Part 1/3

Palestinian Terrorist Group Leadership Status

Key:

* = May need to be taken out for the war to end
** = Definitely needs to be taken out for the war to end
+ = Directly involved in planning 10/7
# = Personally commanded Hamas troops participating in 10/7 and directly oversaw their atrocities
Name in red = Killed
Name in green = Captured
Name in blue = Known to have fled to and/or be living in another country

Hamas Political Leadership:

Top-Tier:

- Ismail Haniyeh* - Leader of Hamas - Living in luxury under government protection in Qatar

- Salah Al-Arouri** - Second in Command of Hamas, Deputy Head of Hamas’ Political Wing, Leader of Hamas in Lebanon, Turkey, and the West Bank, Commander of Hamas’ military forces in the West Bank, Co-Founder of Hamas’ military wing, Chief Hamas Envoy to Hezbollah and Iran, de facto leader of Hamas’ pragmatist faction - Killed in Airstrike

- Khaled Mashal* - Former Head of Hamas, Special Adviser to Haniyeh, De facto liaison between Haniyeh and Hamas’ pragmatist faction, replaced Al-Arouri as de facto leader of Hamas’ pragmatist faction - Living in luxury in Qatar under government protection

- Yahya Sinear**+ - Head of Hamas in Gaza, de facto leader of Hamas’ hardliner faction - Hiding in Gaza

- Essam Al-Da’alis - Head of the Hamas Government Administrative Committee in Gaza (Hamas Prime Minister of Gaza), close ally of Haniyeh - Hiding in Gaza

- Rawhi Mushtaha+ - Chairman of Hamas’ Economic Committee, close ally of Yahya Sinwar, Hardliner - In Hiding

- Khalil Al-Hayya - Replaced Al-Arouri as Deputy Head of Hamas’ Political Wing (albeit less effective than Al-Arouri was) - Living in luxury in Qatar under government protection

- Zaher Jabarin - Chief money man for Hamas, Replaced Al-Arouri as Head of Hamas in the West Bank (but has thus far proven to be far less effective than Al-Arouri was to the point that initial plans to give him all of Al-Arouri’s former responsibilities were scrapped), Pragmatist - Hiding outside Gaza

Mid-Tier:

- Husam Badran - Hamas’ Chief Emissary to Qatar, International Spokesman for Hamas, Former Head of Hamas’ Armed Forces in North Gaza - Living in luxury in Qatar

- Osama Hamdan - Chief of Hamas’ Foreign Relations Office, Hardliner - Hiding outside of Gaza

- Zakaria Abu Maamar - Gaza Finance Minister - Killed in Airstrike

- Mohammed Ouda+ - Hamas Intelligence Chief - Hiding in Gaza

-  Shadi Baroud + - Hamas Deputy Intelligence Chief - Killed in Airstrike

- Jawad Abu Shammala - Head of Hamas’ National Relations Office, Chief political liaison between Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups - Killed in Airstrike

- Jehad Mheisen - Head of the Gaza National Security Forces, Hardliner - Killed in Airstrike

- Aziz Dweik - Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, President of the Palestinian National Authority according to Hamas - Arrested by Israel

- Mousa Abu Marzook - Former Deputy Head of Hamas’ Political Wing, Khaled Mashal’s right hand man, heavily involved in Hamas’ money laundering operations, Pragmatist - Living in luxury in Qatar under government protection

- Nizar Awadallah - Secretary of Hamas’ Political Bureau - In Hiding

- Fathi Hamad - Head of Hamas’ Executive Committee Office, Former Gaza Interior Minister, Such an extreme hardliner that he basically got put in timeout b/c his rhetoric was too aggressive and violently anti-Semitic for even most of Hamas’ leadership - Hiding in Turkey under government protection, but believed to periodically travel to Lebanon as well

- Sameh Al-Siraj - Head of Internal Security for Gaza - Hiding in either Gaza or Egypt

- Vahi Moshtaha - Senior Advisor to Yahya Sinwar - Hiding in Gaza

Low-Tier:

- Ghazi Hamad - Former Hamas Chief of Bordering Crossing, Former Gaza Deputy Foreign Minister - Hiding in Lebanon or Turkey

- Osama Mazini - Gaza Education Minister, Former Chief Hamas Prisoners for Hostages Negotiator - Killed in Airstrike

- Ali Al-Amoudi - Head of Hamas’ Media (Propaganda) Department - In Hiding

- Mahmoud Al-Zahar - Former Hamas Foreign Minister, Co-Founder of Hamas, Was a hardliner (unclear if he still is or has switched to the pragmatist faction) - In Hiding (likely outside Gaza)

- Ahmad Bahar - Deputy Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Hardliner - Killed in Airstrike

- Mohammed Dababash - Former Hamas Intelligence Chief - Killed in Airstrike

- Tayseer Al-Batch - Head of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Civil Police - Hiding in Gaza

- Hassan Yousef - Second in Command of Hamas in the West Bank - Arrested and in Israeli custody

Conclusions: We can see that Israel hasn’t been all that successful in taking out Hamas’ political leadership (at least in Gaza, they’ve had more success in Lebanon, but more on that later).  Al-Arouri was huge, but aside from that admittedly huge win, Israel has embarrassingly little to show for its efforts on the political front.  Admittedly, a lot of these guys operate outside Gaza under Qatari government protection (causing huge tension with the military wing), but even so, you’d expect more progress on this front after all this time.

Edit: I added a notation (names in blue, see color key) to illustrate this, but one reason Israel may be having so much trouble with the political wing is that a lot of these guys live abroad under government protection.  Plus, while some did travel back and forth a bit at first, after Al-Arouri was killed (and Israel was absolutely right to make sure that they saved their one shot in Lebanon for Al-Arouri), that both ground to a halt and they’re now pretty cautious about even going to Lebanon (although there are signs that at least some are starting to get a tad complacent about Lebanon again).  

Plus, Qatar and Turkey pose unique issues that almost certainly gave Israel serious pause before seriously considering targeted assassinations against Hamas officials hiding there.  Turkey is unofficially off limits right now for targeted assassinations due to being part of NATO and the tensions that could cause are simply not worth taking out Fathi Hamad, especially since he’s not exactly the most influential Hamas leader anyway.

Qatar is even trickier because 1) they’re heavily involved in mediating peace talks and Israel doesn’t want to piss them off without d*** good reason and guaranteed success re: your objective; 2) You only get one shot at an operation in Qatar and you’re not gonna get Haniyeh and Mashel at once so it’s better to take out Haniyeh’s plane on one of his trips abroad and then focus on Mashel if you’re gonna go that route; 3) If Qatar kicks Hamas out, these folks will need to find and get to a new hiding place and that’ll make targeting them much easier; and 4) most importantly surveillance technology has changed a lot since the days of Operation Wrath of God (good luck doing anything in Qatar itself without being observed by the government these days).

[LAKISYLVANIA]

Can we also have an update on what Israeli political leaders need to be taken out in order for the war to end and what their status is, in particularly the one that is responsible for a wide amount of war crimes.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Notable Terrorist Leaders and their Status: Part 1/3

Palestinian Terrorist Group Leadership Status

...

Conclusions: We can see that Israel hasn’t been all that successful in taking out Hamas’ political leadership (at least in Gaza, they’ve had more success in Lebanon, but more on that later).  Al-Arouri was huge, but aside from that admittedly huge win, Israel has embarrassingly little to show for its efforts on the political front.  Admittedly, a lot of these guys operate outside Gaza under Qatari government protection (causing huge tension with the military wing), but even so, you’d expect more progress on this front after all this time.

Deaths in leadership just create openings for people lower on the totem pole to climb up to. If the goal is to completely eliminate Hamas as Israel have stated, whacking leadership makes them less effective, but does not eliminate them.

Therefore in line with what the stated Israeli goals are, focusing on leadership like you are in your post is at best an ancillary device toward overall war conduct and Israel's stated goals.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Can we also have an update on what Israeli political leaders need to be taken out in order for the war to end and what their status is, in particularly the one that are orchestrating genocide and are responsible for a wide amount of war crimes.

Well you can list all the political leadership and top generals, sure.

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

Notable Terrorist Leaders and their Status: Part 1/3

Palestinian Terrorist Group Leadership Status

...

Conclusions: We can see that Israel hasn’t been all that successful in taking out Hamas’ political leadership (at least in Gaza, they’ve had more success in Lebanon, but more on that later).  Al-Arouri was huge, but aside from that admittedly huge win, Israel has embarrassingly little to show for its efforts on the political front.  Admittedly, a lot of these guys operate outside Gaza under Qatari government protection (causing huge tension with the military wing), but even so, you’d expect more progress on this front after all this time.

Deaths in leadership just create openings for people lower on the totem pole to climb up to. If the goal is to completely eliminate Hamas as Israel have stated, whacking leadership makes them less effective, but does not eliminate them.

Therefore in line with what the stated Israeli goals are, focusing on leadership like you are in your post is at best an ancillary device toward overall war conduct and Israel's stated goals.

I actually disagree with you on that.  Hamas doesn’t have an endless supply of equally competent leaders.  No one has really been able to come remotely close to filling Al-Arouri’s shoes, so they’ve divided up his responsibilities among various significantly less competent individuals and the highly effective Lebanese Hamas wing he built has been largely dismantled and is now fast approaching a weak rump outfit whose continued existence depends entirely upon the goodwill of Hezbollah.  Hamas’ efforts to organize in the West Bank have also crumbled since his death.  Or take Marwan Issa - Hamas’ second most important military leader and the strategic brain of its military wing - after over a month they still haven’t even found someone to replace him afaik.  Ayman Nofal’s death also cost Hamas one of its most effective military commanders and arguably the best organizational mind in the group’s military wing. 

It really depends on the individual in question imo.  Plenty of these guys are replaceable, but there isn’t a bottomless pit of equally competent and experienced leaders.  Additionally, a number of the top and even some of the mid-level guys don’t really have anyone who can effectively fill their shoes, so taking them out does meaningfully reduce Hamas’ effectiveness and damage the group long-term.

Can we also have an update on what Israeli political leaders need to be taken out in order for the war to end and what their status is, in particularly the one that are orchestrating genocide and are responsible for a wide amount of war crimes.

I am going to eventually do a post regarding major Israeli leaders, how much influence they have, how significant an obstacle they pose to peace/whether peace is viable while they remain in office, etc.  However, for many reasons, I don’t think this anywhere near the same as Hamas or that there are Israeli leaders who need to be assassinated for peace to be viable (voted out of office, OTOH…).  I’m hesitant to get too far into personal opinion regarding war crimes culpability in this thread, but I’d be happy to discuss my thoughts on that with you on discord over the weekend.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Notable Terrorist Leaders and their Status: Part 1/3

Palestinian Terrorist Group Leadership Status

...

Conclusions: We can see that Israel hasn’t been all that successful in taking out Hamas’ political leadership (at least in Gaza, they’ve had more success in Lebanon, but more on that later).  Al-Arouri was huge, but aside from that admittedly huge win, Israel has embarrassingly little to show for its efforts on the political front.  Admittedly, a lot of these guys operate outside Gaza under Qatari government protection (causing huge tension with the military wing), but even so, you’d expect more progress on this front after all this time.

Deaths in leadership just create openings for people lower on the totem pole to climb up to. If the goal is to completely eliminate Hamas as Israel have stated, whacking leadership makes them less effective, but does not eliminate them.

Therefore in line with what the stated Israeli goals are, focusing on leadership like you are in your post is at best an ancillary device toward overall war conduct and Israel's stated goals.

I actually disagree with you on that.  Hamas doesn’t have an endless supply of equally competent leaders.  No one has really been able to come remotely close to filling Al-Arouri’s shoes, so they’ve divided up his responsibilities among various significantly less competent individuals and the highly effective Lebanese Hamas wing he built has been largely dismantled and is now fast approaching a weak rump outfit whose continued existence depends entirely upon the goodwill of Hezbollah.  Hamas’ efforts to organize in the West Bank have also crumbled since his death.  Or take Marwan Issa - Hamas’ second most important military leader and the strategic brain of its military wing - after over a month they still haven’t even found someone to replace him afaik.  Ayman Nofal’s death also cost Hamas one of its most effective military commanders and arguably the best organizational mind in the group’s military wing.  

Making Hamas less effective does not completely eliminate them, and effectiveness is gained back over time. You might see this as a semantic argument but I don't considering it's Israel's stated #1 goal in this war is to prevent Hamas from ever attacking Israel again. It's the main problem I've had with Israeli strategy since a couple weeks into this war: what is Israel doing that is stopping Hamas operations against the country 10 years from now? Killing a leader now does nothing to stop that potential 2034 attack.

Cross-posting this from the main thread, here's my geopolitical take on what the real Israeli goal is since I think their stated goal is unachievable:

Was reading about this conflict yesterday combined with Russia-Ukraine from a geopolitical perspective and what this does to "rules-based order". Here's my amateur armchair geopolitical take on what Netanyahu's grand goal in this is:

Netanyahu has stated complete elimination of Hamas is his goal, that cannot be achieved in my opinion for the same reasons the U.S. discovered carrying out the Afghan and Iraq wars against their own asymmetrical opponents. Therefore, Netanyahu's real goal in my opinion is to keep the conflict going until November. If the war is still going in November, it's a salient issue and Biden is put into a tough spot of any hard position he takes will be opposed by people that should be voting for him. In the event of a Trump victory, a new Trump administration would probably agree to Israel setting up a buffer zone in northern Gaza manned by Israeli military a la the Golan Heights with Syria. The buffer zone would be large enough to prevent Hamas incursions into Israel via underground tunnels or tube artillery. This would be almost universally condemned everywhere else, but Israel have clearly made the calculation that as long as the U.S. has their backs, no one else matters.

The future with a Biden victory in November is less clear, but I see Biden's clear both sides-ism he's displaying currently completely disappearing once the election is over, probably to drive harder bargains with Netanyahu. However, pro-Israel post-November will still have a clear majority in Congress regardless of election results, and I think that drives some of Netanyahu's calculus in U.S. relations is he knows Biden is outvoted by Congress, could maybe even override a veto, if a near 50/50 body you only need a third of Democrats to override a potential Biden veto.

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

Palestinian Terrorist Group Leadership: Part 2/3

Hamas Military Leadership:

Top-Tier:

- Mohammed Deif**+ - Head of Hamas’ Military Wing, Second in Command of Hamas in Gaza, Extreme hardliner - Hiding in Gaza

- Marwan Issa**+ - Second in Command of Hamas’ Military Wing, Third in Command of Hamas in Gaza, De facto Chief of Staff of Hamas’ Armed Forces, Mohammed Deif’s right hand man - Killed in Airstrike

- Ahmed Ghandour* - Third in Command of Hamas’ Military Wing, Commander of Hamas forces in Northern Gaza, Close ally of Mohammed Deif - Killed in Airstrike

- Ayman Nofal**+ - Fourth in Command of Hamas’ Military Wing, Commander of Hamas forces in Central Gaza, Commander of Hamas’ Naval Commando Units, Co-founder of Hamas’ military wing, Creator of the Palestinian Joint Operations Room, Chief Hamas Military Liaison with other Palestinian Terrorist groups, Hardliner - Killed in Airstrike

- Mohammed Sinwar**+ - Commander of Hamas Forces in Southern Gaza, Yahya Sinwar’s right hand man, Hardliner - Hiding in Gaza

- Asem Abu Rakaba - Head of Hamas’ Air Force, Head of Hamas’ Drone Operations - Killed in Airstrike

Mid-Tier:

- Alaa Shreiteh - Commander of Hamas forces in the West Bank - Killed in gunfight with IDF troops

- Mohammad Shebana - Commander of Hamas forces in Rafah - Hiding in Gaza

- Raad Thabat - Head of Hamas’ Weapons Production Unit, Hamas Head of Weapons Research, Member of Hamas’ Politburo - Killed in gunfight during the second raid on the Al-Shaifa hospital complex

- Raad Saad - Chief of Operations for Hamas’ Military Wing - Hiding in Gaza

- Wael Rajeb - Deputy Commander of Hamas Forces in Northern Gaza - Killed in Airstrike

- Az Al-Din Haddad - Commander of Hamas forces in Gaza City (note: his troops were basically wiped out) - Hiding in Gaza

- Ayman Siam+# (spelling?) - Head of Hamas’ Mortar and Artillery units, Head of Hamas’ Rocket Array - Killed in Airstrike

- Rafah Salama - Commander of Hamas Forces in Khan Younis - Hiding in Gaza

- Samir Fendi - Commander of Hamas forces in Southern Lebanon, Close ally of Al-Arouri - Killed in Airstrike

- Razi Abu Tama’ah - Chief of Hamas’ Combat Support Array - Killed in Airstrike

- Nasim Abu Najina# - Commander of Hamas Forces in Beit Lahiya - Killed in Airstrike

- Ismail Siraj# - Commander of Hamas forces in Nuseirat - Killed in Airstrike

Low-Tier:

- Abu Obaida - Spokesman for Hamas’ Military Wing - In Hiding

- Ahmed Ali - Commander of Hamas’ Naval Forces, Replaced Ayman Nofal as Head of Hamas’ Naval Commando units - Killed in Airstrike

- Muhammad Atzar - Head of Hamas’ Anti-Tank forces - Killed in Airstrike

- Jehad Mheisen - Head of Hamas’ National Security Forces - Killed in Airstrike

- Ahmad Shamali - Deputy Commander of Hamas forces in Gaza City - Hiding in Gaza

- Taysir Mubasher - Commander of Hamas forces in northern Khan Younis - Killed in Airstrike

- Madhat Mubasher - Commander of Hamas forces in western Khan Younis - Killed in Airstrike

- Madhi Khuwara# - Commander of Hamas forces in southern Khan Younis - Hiding in Gaza

- Haitham Khuwajari - Commander of Hamas forces in and around the Shati Refugee Camp, Commander of Hamas forces in the Al-Shaifa Hospital - Killed in Airstrike

- Ibrahim Biari# - Commander of Hamas forces in Central Jabalia - Killed in Airstrike

- Wissam Farhat# - Commander of Hamas forces in Gaza City’s Shuja'iyya District - Killed in Airstrike

- Mustafa Dalul - Commander of Hamas forces in Gaza City’s Tel Al-Hawa District - Killed in Airstrike

- Ibrahim Al-Saher - Commander of Hamas’ Anti-Tank Units - Killed in Airstrike

- Jaber Aziz - Commander of Hamas forces in Gaza City’s Sheikh Radwan District (note: His troops have basically been wiped out) - Hiding in Gaza

Conclusions: In contrast to Hamas’ political leadership, Israel has been highly successful at crippling Hamas’ military leadership.  This is not to say the war is over and Deif, Mohammed Sinwar, and a few other significant folks remain at-large to be sure.  However, the military wing has seen both numerous significant leaders killed as well as many of those who would typically be next in line to replace them.  

Hamas’ military wing is starting to run out of experienced, highly competent commanders and that’s not a problem you can fix simply by passing an office to some random replacement.  This is going to be a big problem for them, especially if Deif and/or Mohammed Sinwar are killed.  If both are taken out, then the entire top-tier leadership of Hamas’ military wing will be dead and that’s not nothing.

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

Notable Terrorist Leaders and their Status: Part 1/3

Palestinian Terrorist Group Leadership Status

...

Conclusions: We can see that Israel hasn’t been all that successful in taking out Hamas’ political leadership (at least in Gaza, they’ve had more success in Lebanon, but more on that later).  Al-Arouri was huge, but aside from that admittedly huge win, Israel has embarrassingly little to show for its efforts on the political front.  Admittedly, a lot of these guys operate outside Gaza under Qatari government protection (causing huge tension with the military wing), but even so, you’d expect more progress on this front after all this time.

Deaths in leadership just create openings for people lower on the totem pole to climb up to. If the goal is to completely eliminate Hamas as Israel have stated, whacking leadership makes them less effective, but does not eliminate them.

Therefore in line with what the stated Israeli goals are, focusing on leadership like you are in your post is at best an ancillary device toward overall war conduct and Israel's stated goals.

I actually disagree with you on that.  Hamas doesn’t have an endless supply of equally competent leaders.  No one has really been able to come remotely close to filling Al-Arouri’s shoes, so they’ve divided up his responsibilities among various significantly less competent individuals and the highly effective Lebanese Hamas wing he built has been largely dismantled and is now fast approaching a weak rump outfit whose continued existence depends entirely upon the goodwill of Hezbollah.  Hamas’ efforts to organize in the West Bank have also crumbled since his death.  Or take Marwan Issa - Hamas’ second most important military leader and the strategic brain of its military wing - after over a month they still haven’t even found someone to replace him afaik.  Ayman Nofal’s death also cost Hamas one of its most effective military commanders and arguably the best organizational mind in the group’s military wing.  

Making Hamas less effective does not completely eliminate them, and effectiveness is gained back over time. You might see this as a semantic argument but I don't considering it's Israel's stated #1 goal in this war is to prevent Hamas from ever attacking Israel again. It's the main problem I've had with Israeli strategy since a couple weeks into this war: what is Israel doing that is stopping Hamas operations against the country 10 years from now? Killing a leader now does nothing to stop that potential 2034 attack.

Cross-posting this from the main thread, here's my geopolitical take on what the real Israeli goal is since I think their stated goal is unachievable:

Was reading about this conflict yesterday combined with Russia-Ukraine from a geopolitical perspective and what this does to "rules-based order". Here's my amateur armchair geopolitical take on what Netanyahu's grand goal in this is:

Netanyahu has stated complete elimination of Hamas is his goal, that cannot be achieved in my opinion for the same reasons the U.S. discovered carrying out the Afghan and Iraq wars against their own asymmetrical opponents. Therefore, Netanyahu's real goal in my opinion is to keep the conflict going until November. If the war is still going in November, it's a salient issue and Biden is put into a tough spot of any hard position he takes will be opposed by people that should be voting for him. In the event of a Trump victory, a new Trump administration would probably agree to Israel setting up a buffer zone in northern Gaza manned by Israeli military a la the Golan Heights with Syria. The buffer zone would be large enough to prevent Hamas incursions into Israel via underground tunnels or tube artillery. This would be almost universally condemned everywhere else, but Israel have clearly made the calculation that as long as the U.S. has their backs, no one else matters.

The future with a Biden victory in November is less clear, but I see Biden's clear both sides-ism he's displaying currently completely disappearing once the election is over, probably to drive harder bargains with Netanyahu. However, pro-Israel post-November will still have a clear majority in Congress regardless of election results, and I think that drives some of Netanyahu's calculus in U.S. relations is he knows Biden is outvoted by Congress, could maybe even override a veto, if a near 50/50 body you only need a third of Democrats to override a potential Biden veto.

Don’t get me wrong, trying to eliminate Hamas completely is a fool’s errand.  However, I do think it is very possible to cripple Hamas long-term and reduce them to a nuisance for the foreseeable future rather than a serious threat.  In other words, you can do to Hamas what the US did to Al-Qaeda.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Notable Terrorist Leaders and their Status: Part 1/3

Palestinian Terrorist Group Leadership Status

...

Conclusions: We can see that Israel hasn’t been all that successful in taking out Hamas’ political leadership (at least in Gaza, they’ve had more success in Lebanon, but more on that later).  Al-Arouri was huge, but aside from that admittedly huge win, Israel has embarrassingly little to show for its efforts on the political front.  Admittedly, a lot of these guys operate outside Gaza under Qatari government protection (causing huge tension with the military wing), but even so, you’d expect more progress on this front after all this time.

Deaths in leadership just create openings for people lower on the totem pole to climb up to. If the goal is to completely eliminate Hamas as Israel have stated, whacking leadership makes them less effective, but does not eliminate them.

Therefore in line with what the stated Israeli goals are, focusing on leadership like you are in your post is at best an ancillary device toward overall war conduct and Israel's stated goals.

I actually disagree with you on that.  Hamas doesn’t have an endless supply of equally competent leaders.  No one has really been able to come remotely close to filling Al-Arouri’s shoes, so they’ve divided up his responsibilities among various significantly less competent individuals and the highly effective Lebanese Hamas wing he built has been largely dismantled and is now fast approaching a weak rump outfit whose continued existence depends entirely upon the goodwill of Hezbollah.  Hamas’ efforts to organize in the West Bank have also crumbled since his death.  Or take Marwan Issa - Hamas’ second most important military leader and the strategic brain of its military wing - after over a month they still haven’t even found someone to replace him afaik.  Ayman Nofal’s death also cost Hamas one of its most effective military commanders and arguably the best organizational mind in the group’s military wing.  

Making Hamas less effective does not completely eliminate them, and effectiveness is gained back over time. You might see this as a semantic argument but I don't considering it's Israel's stated #1 goal in this war is to prevent Hamas from ever attacking Israel again. It's the main problem I've had with Israeli strategy since a couple weeks into this war: what is Israel doing that is stopping Hamas operations against the country 10 years from now? Killing a leader now does nothing to stop that potential 2034 attack.

Cross-posting this from the main thread, here's my geopolitical take on what the real Israeli goal is since I think their stated goal is unachievable:

Was reading about this conflict yesterday combined with Russia-Ukraine from a geopolitical perspective and what this does to "rules-based order". Here's my amateur armchair geopolitical take on what Netanyahu's grand goal in this is:

Netanyahu has stated complete elimination of Hamas is his goal, that cannot be achieved in my opinion for the same reasons the U.S. discovered carrying out the Afghan and Iraq wars against their own asymmetrical opponents. Therefore, Netanyahu's real goal in my opinion is to keep the conflict going until November. If the war is still going in November, it's a salient issue and Biden is put into a tough spot of any hard position he takes will be opposed by people that should be voting for him. In the event of a Trump victory, a new Trump administration would probably agree to Israel setting up a buffer zone in northern Gaza manned by Israeli military a la the Golan Heights with Syria. The buffer zone would be large enough to prevent Hamas incursions into Israel via underground tunnels or tube artillery. This would be almost universally condemned everywhere else, but Israel have clearly made the calculation that as long as the U.S. has their backs, no one else matters.

The future with a Biden victory in November is less clear, but I see Biden's clear both sides-ism he's displaying currently completely disappearing once the election is over, probably to drive harder bargains with Netanyahu. However, pro-Israel post-November will still have a clear majority in Congress regardless of election results, and I think that drives some of Netanyahu's calculus in U.S. relations is he knows Biden is outvoted by Congress, could maybe even override a veto, if a near 50/50 body you only need a third of Democrats to override a potential Biden veto.

Don’t get me wrong, trying to eliminate Hamas completely is a fool’s errand.

That is what Netanyahu has defined success for Israel as! Therefore if Hamas still exists in some form after conclusion of this conflict, Israel will have failed its core objective and Hamas can claim victory simply by not being vanquished.

It's why I harp on what are the real goals of Ukraine and the West in its conflict with Russia. Ukraine's publicly stated goals are they take back control of all land they held pre-2014. Nothing that has happened the past 2 years shows we're any closer to that happening.

When it comes to war I believe in Clausewitzian philosophy, and the Israeli government are simply failing their military at the moment in that regard. What the hell's the high-level plan?

[CumbrianLefty]

Yes, but that is Netanyahu's problem.

The rest of us shouldn't indulge his delusions.

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

So my plan is to finish part three of my mega-post trilogy on the terrorist leadership and then jump straight to a news updates b/c a lot has happened lately.  There will be updates on….

The status of military clashes in Gaza City, Jabalia (spelling?), and Rafah;

Yahya Sinwar’s status;

The divisions within the Israeli government;

How Hamas is currently viewed by Palestinians in Gaza (spoiler alert: people acting like Palestinians mindlessly support Hamas owe Gazans an apology);

Israeli misinformation and possible pro-Palestinian misinformation;

Some new details on that whole business of Hamas accepting a mystery ceasefire proposal and then suddenly talks becoming deadlocked;

The current Israeli military strategy re: Rafah (so far - and I’m probably giving certain folks in the Israeli government too much credit - but if the current offensives are anything to go by, there may be some very interesting things going on beneath the surface);

Some thoughts on why Hamas successfully regrouped in places like Jabalia and Gaza City (hint: it’s a perfect - if under-discussed - example of how Netanyahu has been actively insisting on a strategy that will pointlessly drag out the war while deliberately squandering opportunities for a much earlier/more decisive military victory on key fronts)

Posting this partly so I don’t forget all the ground I have to cover if even newer stuff pops up between now and then  For a while there weren’t that many truly substantive updates about the conflict itself and now there’s suddenly been a flurry of major activity in the past week/week and a half or so.

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

Part 3/3: Hamas’ Allies in the Ongoing War

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ):

Key differences from Hamas: The PIJ is significantly more extreme and rabidly opposed to any compromise than even Hamas.  Sort of like Hamas if the most moderate and pragmatic member of its leadership was Fathi Hamed.  The PIJ really lacks anything remotely resembling a pragmatist wing and is also much more decentralized than Hamas.  

However, it was badly weakened when many of its top leaders and most experienced commanders were taken out by Israel in an early-to-mid 2023 flare up and is in general both much weaker and less organized than Hamas.

That said, still easily the second most powerful terrorist group in Gaza and has arguably eclipsed Hamas as the chief Palestinian rival to Fatah in the West Bank during the months following Al-Arouri’s death.  

While the PIJ’s official headquarters is technically in Syria in much the way Hamas’ is technically in Qatar, since Al-Nakhalah became leader in late 2018, the group has come far more under Iran’s influence than in the past to the point that Al-Nakhalah’s rivals within the PIJ have waged a pretty successful whisper campaign claiming he converted from Sunni to Shia Islam at Iran’s behest.

Top-Tier:

- Ziyad Al-Nakhalah* - Head of the PIJ - Hiding in Lebanon or (more likely) under government protection in Syria

- Akram Al-Ajouri*+ - Second in command of PIJ, Head of PIJ’s military wing - Hiding in Syria under government protection

- Muhammed Al-Hindi - Third in Command of the PIJ, Chairman of the  PIJ’s Political Bureau - Living in luxury in Turkey under government protection

- Nafiz Azzam - Second in Command of the PIJ’s Political Bureau - Hiding in Lebanon or Syria

- Khaled Al-Batsh - Head of the PIJ in Gaza, Member of the PIJ’s Politburo - Captured in the second raid on the Al-Shaifa Hospital Complex

- Khalil Bathani - Commander of PIJ forces in Gaza - In Hiding

- Bassem Al-Saadi - Head of the PIJ in the West Bank - Serving a 22 month sentence (arrested in 2022)

Mid-Tier:

- Ishan Ataya - Head of the PIJ in Lebanon - In Hiding

- Nasser Abu Sharif - Chief money man for the PIJ, Chief Emissary to Iran - In Hiding

Low-Tier:

- Abd Al-Aziz Awda - Co-Founder of the PIJ - Hiding in Lebanon

- Abu Hamza - Spokesman for PIJ’s Military Wing - In Hiding
———————-
The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC):

Key Differences from Hamas: The PRC was the third strongest Palestinian terrorist group in Gaza, but it is far, far, far weaker than the PIJ (to say nothing of Hamas).  The gap in strength, organization, and general effectiveness is massive.  However, they were still an active and dangerous military force with some real pull in Gaza.  Note the use of past tense.

In many ways, this group is less a truly independent organization and more Hezbollah’s direct proxy/military wing in Gaza in everything but name.  As such, they’ve been historically been fierce rivals of Hamas and Fatah alike, but teamed up with Hamas during the October 7th massacre.  Historically, their rivalry with Hamas was very dangerous because the PRC was strong enough to get Hamas’ attention, but unlike the PIJ,  the PRC was never strong enough that Hamas would face a potentially lethal civil war in Gaza if it seriously went after them.

However, their capacity to assist Hamas is limited as Hamas took out most of their best military commanders and many of the group’s leaders last decade, something the PRC never really recovered from.  Hamas’ takeover of Gaza also brought an end to the PRC’s historically extremely close ties with Gaza’s Civil Police.  

Most importantly, Hezbollah has been increasingly disinclined to expend resources arming or funding the PRC the way it had before October 7th leading me to wonder if PRC went off the reservation by agreeing to participate in the massacre without getting Hezbollah’s sign-off.  

In any case, the PRC has basically been decimated to the point that they’re no longer much of a factor in the war and I suspect the group will collapse entirely and permanently if their current leader is killed.  He’s barely holding the remnants of the PRC together with some band-aids and a few pieces of used scotch tape.  

Hezbollah clearly no longer cares about the PRC anymore and Israeli troops have taken out most of the PRC’s troops.  Regardless of the outcome, the PRC are definitely one of the big losers of the war.

- Abu Shashnyeh+ - Head of the PRC, Replaced Hilal as Head of the PRC’s Military Wing because they have no truly competent and experienced commanders left - In Hiding

- Rafat Abu Hilal - Head of the PRC’s Military Wing - Killed in Airstrike
—————
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP):

Key Differences from Hamas: The PFLP is technically part of the PLO and Fatah’s chief rival within the organization.  However, where Fatah’s leadership is generally content to enjoy the financial fruits of its corruption in its West Bank fiefdom, the PFLP is an extremely violent group that has historically punched above its weight in terms of terrorist attacks although they’re nowhere near as good at it as Hamas, Hezbollah, or the PIJ.  

The PFLP is probably best known for assassinating the then-Israeli Minister of Agriculture in 2001.  This seems to have impressed Hamas because the groups have generally had a bit of an odd couple friendly-ish relationship.  I say this because the PFLP is at least officially a secular Marxist-Leninist group that kinda flailed around aimlessly after the USSR collapsed until the aforementioned assassination.  

And yet despite these major ideological differences (at least on paper, PFLP has very much rebranded itself as an uncompromisingly hardline militant terrorist group), Hamas has generally at least tolerated the active presence of the PFLP in Gaza.  At one point Hamas was even planning to break the PFLP’s leader out of a prison in the West Bank, but this was scrapped when he was forcibly moved to a far more secure Israeli prison.  For its part, the PFLP has sung Hamas’ praises and actively participated in the October 7th massacre.

Then again, the PFLP was never a competitor to Hamas, so that’s probably part of it.  The PFLP is a relatively small group whose membership shrunk dramatically after the USSR’s collapse and it never recovered.

- Ahmed Sa’adat - Head of the PFLP - Serving a 30 year sentence that began in December 2008

- Jamil Mazhar - Second in Command of the PFLP - Living in Syria under government protection

- Abu Fouad - Third in Command of the PFLP - Living in Syria under government protection
—————
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP):

Key Differences from Hamas: In 1969, the PFLP’s Maoist faction had a real People’s Front of Judea moment and split off to form the DFLP.  Today, the DFLP is a small, weak, and largely insignificant de facto Syrian proxy that’s so irrelevant that the US dropped it from its list of designated terrorist groups back in 1999.  I was on the fence about whether to even include them.

This poorly equipped, disorganized, and generally weak group participated in the October 7th massacre as a Hail Mary attempt to regain some shred of relevance.  How are they doing now?  I’ll just say that the war has been going exactly as well for them as you’d expect and leave it at that.

- Nayef Hawatmeh - Head of the DFLP - Living in Syria under government protection

- Qais Al-Karim - Second in Command of the DFLP - Hiding in the West Bank or Syria
—————-
Military Allies from Outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

Iran’s Quds Force:

- Esmail Qaani - Head of the Quds forces - Living in Iran

- Mohammad Fallahzadeh - Second in Command of the Quds forces - Living in Iran

- Razi Mousavi - Commander of Quds Forces in Syria - Killed in Airstrike

- Mohammed Zahedi - Commander of Quds forces in Syria and Lebanon - Killed in Airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus

- Sadegh Omidzadeh - Intelligence Chief for the Quds forces in Syria - Killed in Airstrike
—————
Hezbollah:

- Hassan Nasrallah - Head of Hezbollah - Hiding in Lebanon

- Naim Qassem - Second in Command of Hezbollah - Hiding in Lebanon

- Hashim Safi Al-Din - Third in Command of Hezbollah, Head of Hezbollah’s Military Wing, Head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council - Hiding in Lebanon

- Mohammad Yazbek - Head of Hezbollah’s Religious Council (which also functions as its legal committee) - Hiding in Lebanon

- Ibrahim Aqil - Head of Internal Security for Hezbollah’s Military Wing - In Hiding

- Talal Hamiyah - Chief of Foreign Operations for Hezbollah’s Military Wing - In Hiding

- Fu’ad Shukr - Chief Military Affairs Advisor to Hassan Nasrallah - In Hiding

- Mohammed Aknan - Head of Hezbollah’s Lebanese Resistance Brigades militia - In Hiding

- Mohammed Saleh - Second in Command of Hezbollah’s Lebanese Resistance Brigades militia - Killed in Airstrike, but I couldn’t find if it was in this war or not

- Mohammed Raad - President of Hezbollah’s pro-Syrian Parliamentary Wing (the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc), Member of the Lebanese Parliament - Living in Lebanon

- Khalil Shahimi - Commander of Hezbollah’s Elite Special Operations Forces units - Killed in Airstrike

- Wissam Al-Tawil - Deputy Commander of Hezbollah’s Elite Special Operation Forces units - Killed in Airstrike

- Ali Hussein Barji - Commander of Hezbollah’s Air Force in southern Lebanon - Killed in Airstrike
—————
The Houthi Movement:

Abdul Malik Badruldeen Al-Houthi - Leader of the Houthi Movement - Living in Yemen

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

Okay, finally time for our first news update.

 - Jabalia: Over the past 1-2 weeks or so, Israel has made a big offensive push into Jabalia and has been making considerable progress.  As of today, Israel controls roughly half of the city proper, but none of the Jabalia refugee camp (which is notable considering that Israel has repeatedly claimed Hamas has a large network of secret tunnels beneath it, so you’d think they’d have made more of an on-the-ground push there during the battle for northern Gaza last year).  

Interestingly, while Jabalia is one of Gaza’s (relatively speaking) larger cities aside from the big three* and for all the the talk about a Hamas resurgence in the city, the truth is that Israel didn’t really ever commit until now to a truly serious major offensive push to take Jabalia (or the Jabalia refugee camp/tunnels beneath it).  I’ll get into my theory on why that is a little later in the post, but for now I’ll just say that if it’s not pretty.

- Gaza City: Israel made a major offensive push about 2 weeks ago into southern Gaza City.  These are areas that Hamas actually retook once Israeli troops left.  The bodies of at least four hostages whom Hamas had executed have been recovered.  Hamas forces have been expelled from these areas and fled to the large Old City district of Gaza City which, despite it being the heart of the city in a key location and one of its largest district, Israel has seemingly ceded to Hamas from day one.  Why and for that matter, how did Hamas completely regroup in Gaza City?  Again, I have a theory and it’s pretty bad.  

- Rafah: Israel is continuing to push into Rafah.  However, while there have certainly been civilian casualties, this has not been the catastrophe many feared thus far.  Israel has been moving very slowly and while there has certainly been intense fighting, I am starting to wonder if Biden drawing a line here actually made a bigger impact than it seemed and if that’s the real reason for Netanyahu’s tantrum.  

It’s early, but Israeli troops seem to be taking care to stay on the right side of the fine print of Biden’s red line and are moving much more slowly than expected by choice.  I think Netanyahu wants to be seen as aggressively ignoring Biden, but may have privately blinked (at least to some degree).

- I have a theory, and this is pure speculation, that Netanyahu deliberately avoided early offensives in key areas like southwestern and southern Khan Yunis (where Yahya Sinwar has long been believed to be hiding), Gaza City’s Old City district, Jabalia and the Jabalia camp, the Nuseirat Camp, and Deir Al-Balah specifically because he is trying to make sure the war goes on as long as possible.  If you leave Hamas with areas to regroup, then the war goes on longer.  I think Hamas popped up again in Gaza City because the Old City district is the centrally located heart of the city (it’s one of Gaza City’s largest districts), yet Israeli troops inexplicably never made a big offensive push to expel Hamas from there.  

So the battered remnants of Hamas’ Gaza City forces have plenty of time to regroup and rebuild their strength somewhat in one central location while Israeli troops leave Gaza City.  The same thing is already starting to happen in Khan Yunis.  Whether intentional or not, this is definitely happening and the effect is that it needlessly guarantees at least a second round of intense fighting in an area Israel theoretically already captured.  Incompetence is also a possibility, but that would surprise me.

- Polls have started popping up showing that while they still hate Israel, Palestinians have gotten extremely pissed at Hamas and also increasingly blame them for the fact that conflict has gone on this long and just want the whole thing to be done already.  Idk how you do a poll under the conditions in Gaza, but there you have it.  

- Israel is claiming Yahya Sinwar is in Rafah, but I’m pretty sure this is propaganda.  During the Gaza City battle, he was “trapped in a bunker and surrounded on all sides by IDF troops.”  During the Khan Yunis campaign, he was “surrounded and trapped in his house with the IDF only a day away from capturing it.”  Now he’s supposedly in Rafah.  It seems pretty clear to me that Israel has no idea where he is beyond that he’s hiding somewhere in Gaza and that he never goes anywhere without a number of hostages right next to him as human shields.  

The US is saying he’s in a tunnel in southern Khan Yunis, but I feel like if we were actually confident about that then we’d have very quietly told Israel rather than blabbing about it in public so he moves to a new hiding place.

- Benny Gantz gave Netanyahu 3 weeks to give a detailed and satisfactory plan for post-war Gaza that does not involve Israel occupying Gaza or he’ll leave the unity government (so he’s out in three weeks).  More importantly, Galant came out publicly against postwar Israeli occupation of Gaza and is demanding Netanyahu provide a substantive plan for handling post-war Gaza.  

If Galant (a Likud MK) is willing to leave Netanyahu’s coalition/yank support for Netanyahu over this and can bring three other MKs from the coalition with him (both of which are universe-sized ifs), then theoretically that would be enough to deny Netanyahu a majority and force an early election.  I’d love to hear thoughts from some of our Israeli posters on whether there’s any chance of this actually happening.

- I had a neat theory about Rafah, but it turned out to be wrong

- So the “peace deal” Hamas had reportedly accepted was that there be a permanent unconditional ceasefire, Hamas retain full control of Gaza, Hamas returns the bodies of hostages and any living hostages (without specifying how many hostages remain alive) over the span of (IIRC) over 130 days, and (depending on the source) possibly that Israel agree to a full right of return for Palestinians throughout Israel.  

This was “negotiated” without any involvement or participation by Israel.  Instead, it seems to have been a poison pill publicly stunt “negotiated” between Hamas and the Turkish government.  Israel rejected it because…well…it was insane and a laughably bad deal.  

- Speaking of insanely bad deals, Saudi Arabia has been attempting to push (and doing a lobbying campaign in the U.S. to attempt to build support for) a proposal where Israel would agree to a permanent ceasefire in exchange for normalized relations with Saudi Arabia, Hamas would return any living hostages, and - to reward Saudi Arabia - the U.S. would form a military alliance with Saudi Arabia as well as fully cooperate with Saudi Arabia’s nuclear weapons (sorry, nuclear power) program.  I know I said I’d try to stick to facts, but this proposal is so beyond delusional that I think I am on safe ground.  

Fortunately, despite claims to the contrary by a few reporters breathlessly repeating Saudi talking points about how unnamed U.S. officials support this and a deal has been just around the corner since January, no one seems to have any interest in this nonsense except the Saudi government and Thomas Friedman.

*The big three being Gaza City, Khan Yunis, and Rafah

[Chancellor Tanterterg]

Given how long these are, I’m going to do more of a deep dive to the week’s events every weekend with periodic other subjects during the week (including a deep dives into the leadership of the Israeli side of the conflict, the status of efforts to distribute aid to Palestinian civilians and of various bad actors’ - from fanatical Israeli settlers to the Egyptian government - efforts to hinder it, etc).  Quick preview of some of what I will cover this weekend:

- A strictly fact-based, largely personal opinion free analysis of the ICC warrants, alleged jurisdictional issues, how European countries are reacting, and the reaction in Israel itself.

- An analysis of why some rather notable names likely weren’t included on the warrant list (not everyone I’m about to mention on either side deserved a warrant and I’d argue multiple folks on both sides did not, but I’ve seen or heard someone question their absence from warrant list or initially wondered that about it myself until doing some more research).  Specifically Khaled Mashel, Rawhi Mushtaha, Mohammed Sinwar, Mohammed Ouda, Mahdi Khuwara, Ziyad Al-Nakhalah, and Abram Al-Ajouri on the Palestinian side and Benny Gantz, Bezalel Smotrich, Orit Strook, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Herzi Halevi

- A rather frustrating update on the Rafah offensive (one that upsets me so much that part of me really wants to say “screw the jurisdictional and myriad other issues, let the ICC arrest Netanyahu)

- Updates on the on-the-ground fighting in Gaza City and Jabalia

- Meanwhile, in Khan Yunis…