Venezuela Politics and Elections - Presidential Election (July 28, 2024)
MRCVzla:
There is just over a year left until the Presidential Elections can be held in Venezuela for 2024, depending on whether the basic guarantees that the democratic opposition always demands are met, the elections could be a little more "free" and competitive, without excessive persecution (in the form of disqualifications) of their leaders or of "kidnapping" of parties through judicial means, otherwise it will be like in 2018, an "electoral type event" where President Nicolás Maduro and the ruling party PSUV are guaranteed to extend for 6 more years for the so-called "Bolivarian Revolution" regime until 2031, it has even been rumored that, as in 2018, the date of the presidential election will be called early forward to "catch the opposition unexpectedly", although it is generally expected that the election is held around Q4 (mainly December) of 2024, in total, whoever is elected must take the oath of office no matter what on January 10, 2025 as is said in the 1999 Constitution.
First of all, in less than two weeks, in principle on October 22, the Primaries of the opposition Unitary Platform will be held to elect a candidate to face Maduro in 2024. The event will be self-managed by the platform itself, which has its own Electoral Commission, the process will be manual and public places will be used primarily as voting centers, with a total of more than 3,000. The diaspora of Venezuelans abroad will also be able to participate, but only those who are in the "Permanently Electoral Register." official in more than 85 cities in 32 countries (15 of them in the United States), it was originally planned that there would be at least technical help from the CNE to facilitate the use of schools and other educational institutions as voting centers as well as the management of a security plan with the military of the "Republic Plan", in fact a request was submitted in June to the electoral power, but in one of the regime's strategies of doing what they wanted, the CNE board resigned, forcing a new renewal of the entity by the National Assembly of the Chavista supermajority with the mediation of the "co-opted" opposition, the renewal resulted in maintaining the 3:2 relationship of control of the CNE by the ruling party with the until then Comptroller General and long-serving official Chavista rank Elvis Amoroso as the new President of the Electoral Power. A few weeks ago at the beginning of October, the new CNE belatedly "responded" to the request of the National Primary Commission, expressing its willingness to provide the necessary technical help, but in exchange for delaying the date of the Primaries, the background would also be include more candidacies and cancel those where politicians are presented who, in the eyes of the institutions, are disqualified from holding public office, either due to alleged corruption or "having supported the sanctions or being behind plans against the Government/considered Traitors to the Homeland", etcetera.
The latter has been the thorniest issue of the entire Primary process since some of the 13 candidates who registered at the end of June have this type of impediments to finally be a potential candidate for the 2024 election (and de facto, the main opposition leader). According to the order from left to right on the ballot paper:
1. Andrés Caleca (independent supported by Movimiento por Venezuela, MPV, center-left): Economist and frequent electoral expert within the opposition, former member of the CNE between 1998 and 2000.
2. Freddy Superlano (Voluntad Popular of Leopoldo López, center to center-right): former AN Deputy elected in 2015 and the original winner of the election for Governor of the state of Barinas in 2021, he is one of the candidates who has a disqualification ( the same one that did not let him take office and force a partial election where the opposition still won), a faction of the historic left-wing Bandera Roja party also supports him.
3. Andrés Velásquez (La Causa R, very critical center-left), eternal presidential candidate in the 80s and 90s (specially at 1993), former Governor of the state of Bolívar (from whom he alleges that the 2017 election was stolen) and also a former parliamentarian, his party has been in of the opposition's hard line in favor of abstentionism.
4. Gloria Pinho (independent): Doctor in Constitutional Law who even presented a TV show, she was a candidate in 2021 for Mayor of the Chacao municipality (Caracas metropolitan area) for the co-opted opposition (obtaining 4.6%), she has denied having ties with other presidential candidates not present in the primaries who are against the presence of certain disqualified candidates, as most independent candidates, runs a civic platform in favor a dialogue.
5. Henrique Capriles Radonski (Primero Justicia, center) (*): former Mayor of the Baruta municipality and Governor of Miranda, winner of the previous opposition Primaries in 2012 and defeated presidential candidate in 2012 and 2013, also disqualified for alleged involvement in the Odebrecht case but at the same time his figure within the opposition has been diminished by the most radical wing, Maduro still maintains resentment towards him for the protests after the 2013 election...
6. Luis "Baló" Farías (independent): one of the unknown candidates in the race, a veterinarian from the state of Mérida (west), was a member of the movement called "Rebellion of the regions" where several politicians from the co-opted opposition were also found, is presented with a civic, progressive and decentralized platform.
7. Carlos Prosperi (de jure Acción Democrática of Henri Ramos Allup, socialdemocrat): Lawyer from the "llanero" state of Guárico, former Deputy, he is one of the main favorites to win the primaries for his more moderate line, he is part of the official faction of the historic "tolda blanca" and one of the member parties of the so-called internal "G4" of the Unitary Platform, if he wins he would also be one of the candidates that would garner the greatest consensus among those who are not running for the primary, he also has the support of the Movimiento Futuro of former Governor of Lara and 2018 presidential candidate Henri Falcón who distanced himself from the co-opted opposition and the Ecological Movement of Venezuela (MOVEV)
8. María Corina Machado (Vente Venezuela, conservative): the former Deputy is the main favorite to win the primaries and be the new opposition leader, despite having been disqualified for years (the 15-year ban was recently renewed thanks to complaints from politicians of the opposition co-opted by her link with the Guaidó's "interim government" and support for sanctions against the Chavista regime), she and her party represent the hardest and most critical line against Chavismo, counting on strong popular support, also supported by others parties within the same line (previously abstentionist or pro-sanctions) such as Alianza Bravo Pueblo of the exiled-persecuted Antonio Ledezma, Convergencia, Gente Emergente, among others.
9. César Almeida (independent supported by the UPP89 party, dissident Chavismo): another of the unknowns candidates, computer engineer, businessman and agricultural producer, also self-represented within civil society, like almost all opposition candidates, his program specializes in recovery of both institutions and the productive sector and infrastructure to improve the economy.
10. Roberto Enríquez (COPEI-ODCA, centre-right/christian democrat): traditional "Copeyano" politician and former Deputy, he was the leader of the Christian social party COPEI before its judicialization, claiming until recently to remain leader of the "tolda verde", he was persecuted political during the 2017 protests, more recently it seems that he is putting aside the dispute to regain control of COPEI (currently in the co-opted opposition) and present himself under a new, more social conservative movement. dependent on religious sectors (pro-life, against "gender ideology"), one of its allies is the Christian evangelical party NUVIPA.
11. César Pérez Vivas (Concertación Ciudadana, center): another former politician from COPEI, former Deputy and former Governor of the state of Táchira, he presents himself under a moderate and civic platform with the support of several independents and some dissidents of Chavismo.
12. Tamara Adrián (independent): activist for women's rights and the LGBTIQ+ community, she was the first transgender representative in both Venezuela and all Latin America in 2015, previously a member of Voluntad Popular, she runs with the United for Dignity movement and an environmental platform, in favor of Human Rights and also inclusion and gender equality.
13. Delsa Solórzano(Encuentro Ciudadano, center-right/social liberal): former Deputy for the Un Nuevo Tiempo party, she founded her own party in 2018, with a liberal platform and like all candidates, in defense of Human Rights, she is also within of the hard line of the opposition in favor of sanctions and at the time also of abstention as forms of pressure against Chavismo.
Regarding Capriles (*), just this weekend, he announced his resignation as a candidate for the primaries so that the disqualification against him would not harm the election of the opposition candidate. At the moment it is rumored that he would support another candidate (mainly Prosperi), otherwise your votes will be counted as null as the ballots cannot be reimpressed. Other candidates withdrew before or during the registration period, for example one of the members of the G4, Un Nuevo Tiempo does not have its own candidate, the governor of the state of Zulia and leader of the party Manuel Rosales refused to be one and the temporary candidate of the party, José Rafael Hernández, a low-profile leader, resigned a few weeks after formalizing his registration. The comedian and businessman Benjamín Rausseo (the popular "Er Conde del Guácharo") also intended to participate, and in the end he remained an independent pre-candidate outside of the Primaries, and of course the former President of the National Assembly and controversial "Interim President" Juan Guaidó also withdrew from the race and had no choice but to finally go into exile abroad (Miami) to avoid facing political persecution by the alleged cases of corruption due to the management of money confiscated from the Chavista regime by the Western "International Community", especially with the handover of the subsidiary of the state oil company PDVSA in the USA, CITGO to Chevron as well as the "Monomeros case" in Colombia. Outside of the Primary process, the leaders of the co-opted opposition also have presidential aspirations, Bernabé Gutierrez of AD ad-hoc, Juan Carlos Alvarado of COPEI ad-hoc and José Brito of Primero Venezuela, as well as the politician Antonio Ecarri, critic of the internal management of the Unitary Platform, meanwhile some other opposition parties like Leocenis García' liberal Prociudadanos or the Fuerza Vecinal party linked to opposition mayors are very open to support the winning candidate of the primaries.
The Primaries themselves have also been threatened by other presidential precandidates, one of them, Luis Ratti, an independent who calls himself an "opposition" who attempted to run in 2018, has tried through judicial means to suspend the process so that it can be can exclude those disqualified like Machado. Whoever wins the primaries would not only be the opposition candidate in 2024 but also the de facto leader of the opposition, and would probably have influence within the negotiations of the Dialogue process with the Government currently with the main mediation of the Government of Mexico, the opposition wants guarantees for "free elections" and everything that a hypothetical democratic transition entails, the Government wants in exchange the lifting of international sanctions against it or even the release of the businessman of Colombian descent Alex Saab, currently extradited and prosecuted for corruption by USA.
In parallel, the Chavista regime with Maduro at the head, facing international sanctions against it, has focused on carrying out a serious fight against the corruption caused by the Chavista leaders themselves (such as that of former Minister Tareck el- Aissami who was in charge of the state oil company PDVSA) and also against organized crime (they recently intervened in the Tocorón prison, which was corrupted and controlled by the infamous criminal group of the "Aragua Train" that has expanded throughout Latin America by same rhythm as Venezuelan migration), the economy continues to be marked by inflation and the continuous devaluation of the Bolívar and the purchasing power of ordinary Venezuelans (the so-called "economic war"), although less serious than in other years due to the flexibility of the use of the American dollar as an everyday currency, to the point that despite the sanctions against Chavista officials, some private or foreign investment has been revitalized as well as the presence and organization of large sporting and musical events of renowned and popular artists, even so, there are still restrictions to freedom of expression with the closure and persecution of critical media outlets (mostly radio stations or newspapers/news sites), as well as the lack of basic services such as electricity, water, gasoline distribution, public transportation, better salaries for the education sector, and how we say "pare usted de contar", obviously in foreign policy they are aligned with China, Russia and other "anti-imperialist" countries or contrary to the influence of the United States and the West on their sovereignty, and in the region with their similar countries. Cuba and Nicaragua, as well as Lula's Brazil, AMLO's Mexico or the internal movements of their long time allies Rafael Correa and Evo Morales, while they have recovered and improved relations with Colombia under the government of Gustavo Petro, in the ongoing major international conflicts are on Russia's side in the invasion/War with Ukraine and Palestine against the "State of Israel", the one that Hugo Chávez "infamously" cursed against during his lifetime.
Maduro himself and the PSUV (his wife Cilia Flores and son Nicolás Maduro Guerra, Diosdado Cabello, the Rodríguez Gómez brothers, with also the implicit roles of Attorney General Tarek William Saab, the leadership of the Military High Command, among other high ranks) have been in the pre-campaign for their own re-election for a third term until 2030, they have recovered another judicialized party to their alliance such as the Communist Party (PCV) that was led by dissidents, and suddenly to rival the Primaries opposition, have once again brought out of the drawer the issue of the defense of Guyana Essequiba as part of Venezuelan territory, a long-standing territorial dispute based on the Geneva Agreement of 1966 (and in response to the Paris Arbitration Award of 1899 that ruled in favor of the United Kingdom) where Venezuela claims this territory as its own, to the point of forcing the inclusion of said territory in all official maps, the claim of Essequibo is one of the few issues where Chavismo and the Opposition are in complete agreement, many opposition leaders they have been active defenders of Essequibo (including María Corina Machado), in the face of the inaction of the Government when someone more allied to Chavismo/pink tide governs in Georgestown and which is revived when there is a more pro-USA government that is willing to open the exploitation of the present assets of the Essequibo (that is, oil or gold) to companies like ExxonMobil. Maduro and his Government, in response to a recent contrary ruling from the International Court of Justice, have shown their willingness to hold a Consultative Referendum on the defense of the Essequibo Territory within this year, 2023, and to reactivate the advancement of solutions in a manner peaceful between Caracas and Georgetown to resolve the border dispute, massive collections of signatures have previously been carried out by the ruling party but to show their rejection of the international sanctions against them, especially those dictated by the Obama and Trump administrations, in this case The regime is accused of wanting to politically use a consensus position that does not necessarily have to be supported by a referendum, but rather by diplomatic and legal defense action for the Essequibo territory.
Anyway, this is how things are going in Venezuela for 2024.
Lumine:
I'll be honest, I have stopped reading on Venezuela for a while now out of sheer despair - other than stumbling on the latest "here's how Maduro will fall tomorrow" clickbait or headlines on María Corina Machado's rather brave challenge to the regime -, so I have to ask...
Is there any hope for any improvement of the situation? Or are we to resign ourselves again to Chavismo until 2030 and beyond?
MRCVzla:
Quote from: Lumine on October 10, 2023, 04:00:09 PM
Is there any hope for any improvement of the situation? Or are we to resign ourselves again to Chavismo until 2030 and beyond?
There will be hope if the entire opposition (unitarians, scorpions and others on the outside) decides to put their things together, to achieve better electoral conditions (less advantageousness and arbitrary disqualifications, open the Electoral Registry for new voters and that the massive diaspora can also vote freely), without so much admonition to their leaders or parties, otherwise Chavista advantage will continue to prevail to 2030 or beyond and depress any option of real progress and prosperous future.
I am going to vote for Prosperi, for me Maria Corina, despite having a strong influence in the opposition electorate with her combative style against Maduro and the rest of the PSUV entourage, her desire to be the opposition leader at all costs if she wins, despite her arbitrary disqualification. It may represent a setback for some progress made by the opposition leaders for the population that still resides and can vote in Venezuela to continue maintaining the trust that has been gained again through the electoral process as a way out of Chavismo.
Because if the conditions are not achieved and the Dialogue Process fails again, whether by the opposition itself or by the Chavista regime itself (mostly the latter), I fear that they could call for abstention again and as in 2018 or 2020, because like in those "electoral type events" not all the other candidates who call themselves "opposition" are reliable for their main electorate (a mix of urban middle class voters with low-income popular sectors), allowing Chavismo to carry out its usual advantage and fraud with the voting centers, extending the closure of tables and force public officials or anyone who depends on subsidies or bonuses to vote for them or sign on the "1x10" forms of their electoral machinery, thus giving themselves another 6 years and who knows if they will return to "shaking up the street" with another round of protests with who knows how many unnecessary violent deaths and police and judicial abuses towards political leaders, the so-called "foreign intervention" with the "arrival of the American marines will not happen and will never occur" (if Trump never exercised that "action that had on the table" at the time, even less will Biden, nor again will Trump himself or another Republican if they manage to win in 2024), nor is any rebellion or desertion of the FANB military effective because of how corrupt the military leadership is. self-defined as "revolutionary and Chavista", as seen in 2019.
If Prosperi wins or is designated a consensus candidate, he is more likely to reunify all those opposition sectors that distanced themselves from the main group of the G4 (Ecarri, Rausseo, Leocenis, the MAS...), he could even reunify the own "adecos" who are with Bernabé and are in the Assembly. Fight adequately for the fair conditions and carry out a more or just fair and joyful campaign so that the alternative change can occur sooner rather than later. in the most peaceful manner possible and faith in public institutions being reestablished.
MRCVzla:
An update: both Freddy Superlano (VP) and Roberto Enríquez (COPEI de jure) have retired their candidacies to the Primary, Superlano and VP are supporting María Corina after a "long debate" with Leopoldo López (some "strong differences" between both VP figures), while Enríquez will side with "the winner of the Primary", he says there is "not time to remount in the last week of campaign" so his votes will be likely null, neither PJ, UNT and this faction of COPEI have an "official" candidate so their potential votes are probably going either MCM, Prosperi or Delsa Solorzano who are the most strongest, Andrés Caleca is also claiming that potential votes. They are rumours of other minor candidates without any chance (Almeida, Baló Farías) to dropping out in the next hours/days while other candidates in this group like Pérez Vivas are staying believing on the "citizen exercise" who the Primary is.
Fuerza Vecinal, the party of the opposition mayors questions the viability of process saying as "the primary as it is planned will lead us to the path of defeat and would be a victory for the government", similar questions come from Bernabé Gutiérrez (AD ad-hoc) about the process will be a "fiasco" for allow disqualified candidates "until the end".
Meanwhile, the usual suspects of José Brito and Luis Ratti claims to the TSJ and CNE to intervene and suspend the primary, fearing a potential MCM win who "lead into a time of violence".
Estrella:
I was about to ask if you could make a rundown of who is who among the million different non-PSUV parties, but I started wondering... do parties, like, exist in Venezuela anymore? Or is there just a bunch of intervened zombies and individual politicians who might as well be independents for how many indistinguishable and powerless one-man parties they're members of? And, for that matter, does PSUV still have some party structures or is the "campaigning" all done by the state, the army and gangs now?
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