After the Taliban takeover of Kabul (and arguably for the 1-2 years before that if not longer), it has been very up in the air as to whether the Taliban will stick to their guns ideologically, and not pursue a coalition with their historic enemies (namely Russia and the Khomeinist regime in Iran), or whether they will "moderate" and sell out foreign policy-wise in order to get as much money and foreign aid as possible from their neighbors and "everyone but the Americans." There have been developments within the last 2-3 years to support either conclusion (the career and death of Mehdi Mujahid being an example of both), but this development - if it proves itself to be part of a permanently dominant trend and not a fluke - suggests that the Taliban still have yet to abandon their traditional principles and natural inclinations.
Global South unity amirite!
Yes, it's honestly very fulfilling to see the "anti-imperialist" narratives (including both those popular on the left and those popular on the radical-right) unravel in this way.
After the Taliban was founded, Russia and Iran were always enemies thereof, but years after 2001 they began tacitly supporting the Taliban, and pushing pro-Taliban narratives in their state-run propaganda international media outlets, for no reason other than to spite America, disregarding not only their own history and civilizational interests, but also in Iran's case disregarding their own Shia Muslim brothers, the ethnic Hazaras, who are historically and to this day persecuted by the Taliban. (The Taliban for some time recently feigned "moderation" on that front by toning down their persecution of Hazaras for some time and recruiting radicalized Hazara Shias with broadly anti-Western beliefs to serve as leaders in Hazara-majority areas, such as the aforementioned Mehdi Mujahid, but after the fall of Kabul the Taliban showed their true colors, and Mehdi's playing with fire got himself burned.)
The leaders and governments of Russia and Iran absolutely deserve to eat their words, even if the Russian and Iranian people do not.
Iran would smoke the Taliban in such a war and Russia, China, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the PMF would all intervene on behalf of Iran.
Almost certainly not Hamas, considering that Hamas has made significant overtures towards the Taliban seeking friendship, and that Hamas is primarily supported by and ideologically associated with the anti-Khomeinist Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar, and Turkey under the AKP and Erdogan, whereas Hamas's relationship with Iran is more one of necessity and realpolitik. Hamas is too ultimately preoccupied with Israel, and has too many complicated entanglements (such as supporting the FSA - who are also supported by the Taliban - against Khomeinist Iran's ally, the Assad regime in Syria) to comfortably provide unresolute support to Iran in a conflict with the Taliban (although I concede there is a possibility that they might, depending on how desperate they will be for Iranian money - something which fluctuates depending on the status of their relationship with Turkey, Qatar, and the Brotherhood - at the moment when they would be faced with that choice).
Russia has established contacts with the Taliban no less than with Iran. Russian Muslims are all Sunnis, so in a war between Shiites and Sunnis, Russia is more likely to take the side of the Sunnis. But Iran is too valuable for the Kremlin.
I don't think that matters too much, considering that it has never stopped Russia (at least following Putin's rise to power in the early 2000's) from openly or tacitly supporting Khomeinist Iran in almost every one of its conflicts with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, ISIL, the UAE, the GCC, America, and Israel.
The peace simmers, but I expect a tepid peace to hold. Iran does not want war as of this moment with a state actor, never really did for two decades, and the Taliban doesn’t want to threaten their regime given if they are distracted with Iran, how will they assist their partners in Pakistan?
The Taliban don't really seek to "assist" Pakistan so much as they seek assistance
from Pakistan in exchange for not attacking or threatening the interests of Pakistan.
The Pakistan-Taliban relationship is often misunderstood, and is more shaky than many think. Pakistan controls a large swath of territory ("Pashtunistan") in which the majority of the population are ethnic Afghans (Pashtuns). Much of this territory was actually controlled by Afghanistan before being conquered by the British and made part of British India; the independence leaders in India, both the secular/Hindus and the Muslims/soon-to-be-Pakistanis, had a platform of keeping the colonial borders, and so the UK gave independence to all of Pakistan including Pashtunistan, rather than giving it back to Afghanistan or holding some sort of vote. Multiple times after the independence of Pakistan, Afghan governments and politicians frequently voiced their frustration on the Pashtunistan issue. Afghanistan under different regimes, frequently allying with Soviet Russia and India, often engaged in direct actions to weaken Pakistan, especially under the Daoud Khan regime that directly preceded the Communist takeover, such as supporting the 1970s insurgency in Balochistan (a region which many Afghan nationalist irredentists also consider parts of or all of to be rightful Afghan territory). Therefore, having an Afghan regime favorable to Pakistani interests and not posing a threat to Pakistan has always been a crucial objective of Pakistani foreign policy. The reason why Pakistan helped create and supported the Taliban is because an extremist and isolationist group, hostile to the whole world at large, of whom you are the only real partner, is much easier to control and make beholden to yourself than is a moderate regime that is willing to ally with your enemies if they share interests. Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban is more about permanently pacifying and subjugating Afghanistan (and preventing India from having any influence in Afghanistan and using it to create a second front for Pakistan in a future Indo-Pakistani war) than it is about procuring support from Afghanistan in future foreign wars.
That said, the decentralized nature of the Taliban's command structure, along with their anti-Western and Pashtun-nationalist ideological bent, make the Taliban nonetheless a potential threat to Pakistan's control over Pashtunistan, and the Pakistanis have always known that the Taliban are not totally reliable, hence the lack of 100% absolute support (and instead more of a "carrot-and-stick" strategy) for the Taliban from Pakistan.
I am pretty sure that the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Gulf States would give support to the Taliban in this war as a way to weaken Iran as a state and push for Reza Pahlavi or the MEK to come to power in a fully cucked Iran.
I disagree with Israel supporting the Taliban. They know full well the Taliban would like to see them (and Jews everywhere), exterminated just as much as Iran would, so it's likely Israel would figure out a way to directly intervene to end the fighting and occupy both Iran and Afghanistan if it can.
If not, they'll likely take whichever path bleeds both sides dry for the longest period of time.
I got that that impression of the Taliban from the fact they were very willing to give shelter to Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. I doubt anyone in Israeli leadership has forgotten that.
The very idea that Israel would back the Taliban, genuine lmao.
Ethnic Afghans (Pashtuns, from whom the Taliban draws extremely disproportionate support relative to their very small support from minorities) are traditionally considered in Afghan folklore and popular mythology to be long-lost descendants of Israelites/Hebrews* (presumably via the "lost tribes") - and there is indeed archeological evidence to support that conclusion. Afghanistan (even following the introduction/adoption/imposition of Sunni Islam in the nation) was historically not particularly anti-Jewish** at all (both by the standards of the Contemporary Islamic World and especially when compared to the pre-Enlightenment Christian World), nor was it any more anti-Jewish** than Shia Iran - in fact, Afghanistan for centuries was often a sanctuary for Jews fleeing Shia/Iranian or Russian/Soviet persecution. Furthermore, Israel supported the Afghan Sunni Mujahideen (the direct predecessors both of the Taliban and of the anti-Taliban internationally-recognized post-Communist governments) during the Soviet-Afghan War. Israel supporting the Taliban, in a conflict between the Taliban's Afghanistan and the Khomeinist regime in Iran, is not only to reason in the context of contemporary geopolitics, it is also historically well-reasoned and with precedent, and indeed not ironic at all.
*even though using "Jews" might have been more powerfully illustrative, I use "Israelites/Hebrews" instead because the word "Jew" technically does specifically refer to the descendants of the two Israelite tribes which were not "lost," and therefore cannot technically correctly be used to refer to hypothetical or theoretical "descendants of the ten lost tribes."
**I use "anti-Jewish" instead of "anti-Semitic" because, in the context of topics pertaining to the Islamic World and the Greater Middle East, "anti-Jewish" is generally less confusing and problematic than "anti-Semitic," considering that the majority of "Semitic Peoples" are not only non-Jewish, but contain significant proportions of their populations who themselves harbor anti-Jewish beliefs and sentiments. (This primarily is concerning Arabs; although neither Iranians/Persians nor Afghans/Pashtuns are "Semitic" per se, the geopolitics and society of Iran are immediately and intimately intertwined with the Arab World's geopolitics and society, and furthermore Afghans/Pashtuns would indeed be "Semitic" if the Israelite origin hypothesis is correct.)
