Computer89 v. The Atlasian Senate

[Associate Justice PiT]

     We've been waiting for the Senate for some time, but given that there are time concerns involved I think I will go ahead and prepare questions for the petitioner to ask tomorrow. The Senate is still welcome to file an official response brief if it wishes, but it is not feasible for the Court to wait forever.

[Associate Justice PiT]

     Counsel, do you see any practical implications of how the Court rules in this matter on the vote of the Senate that has already concluded on this matter?

[reagente]

     Counsel, do you see any practical implications of how the Court rules in this matter on the vote of the Senate that has already concluded on this matter?

The main distinction between expulsion and impeachment is that impeachment may carry an accompanying disqualification from "any office under the Republic of Atlasia for a period not exceeding two years."

As the Senate did not specify a term of disqualification (merely stating "all constitutional penalties" which does not specify an actual term of years, indeed a term of zero years would be just as constitutional as two years), I would assume that none apply to OSR (indeed, I think it would be strange to assume that in the case of an explicitly variable penalty, that the maximum penalty automatically gets applied when there is ambiguity regarding what the penalty should be).

If I can be correct in making that assumption, then no, there wouldn't be much of a practical implication for how the court rules, since the case would quickly be mooted by the upcoming elections this weekend. However, if I am incorrect regarding that, then how this court rules would have an impact insofar as it would impact my client's ability to run for federal office in the future.

[Associate Justice PiT]

     Thank you, counsel, that is all the questions I had. Reading your brief thoroughly answered most of the ones I was thinking about.

[ilikeverin]

How do you think the Senate would effectuate this part of the clause:

the Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members

What would it look like for the Senate to "adopt rules"? Could the impeachment trial convened by the Senate in this case be said to be an instance of the Senate "adopting rules" that would allow it to expel a member?

[reagente]

How do you think the Senate would effectuate this part of the clause:

the Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members

What would it look like for the Senate to "adopt rules"? Could the impeachment trial convened by the Senate in this case be said to be an instance of the Senate "adopting rules" that would allow it to expel a member?

Given the enumerated discretion of the Senate to adopt its own rules and proceedings, I would imagine that the adoption of rules need not be explicit or even done ex ante, so long as it is sufficiently clear to the Senate as a body what "rules" are being adopted. Past practice or conduct not objected to could implicitly create the adoption of rules.

To that end, I don't think there is a constitutional bar to implicitly "adopting rules" that structure an expulsion like an impeachment trial, so long as the impeachment-specific penalties that go beyond the scope of the Senate's powers do not attach in the end (i.e. ban on running for offices under the Atlasian Constitution). If the Senate meant the impeachment as a simple expulsion, then I think that expulsion would be valid, but I can't speak for the Senate on this front.

[ilikeverin]

How do you think the Senate would effectuate this part of the clause:

the Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members

What would it look like for the Senate to "adopt rules"? Could the impeachment trial convened by the Senate in this case be said to be an instance of the Senate "adopting rules" that would allow it to expel a member?

Given the enumerated discretion of the Senate to adopt its own rules and proceedings, I would imagine that the adoption of rules need not be explicit or even done ex ante, so long as it is sufficiently clear to the Senate as a body what "rules" are being adopted. Past practice or conduct not objected to could implicitly create the adoption of rules.

To that end, I don't think there is a constitutional bar to implicitly "adopting rules" that structure an expulsion like an impeachment trial, so long as the impeachment-specific penalties that go beyond the scope of the Senate's powers do not attach in the end (i.e. ban on running for offices under the Atlasian Constitution). If the Senate meant the impeachment as a simple expulsion, then I think that expulsion would be valid, but I can't speak for the Senate on this front.

I would also be very curious to hear the Senate's thoughts about that issue rather than having you conjecture about them. *clears throat, stares expectantly at the blank space where the Senate should have someone*

[Sestak]

The Court has determined that if the Senate does not post its brief by end of day Eastern Time on the Second of July, the plaintiff will be declared the winner of this case by default.

This policy shall also apply to all future deadlines for briefs set by this Court unless an extension is explicitly asked for and granted.

[ilikeverin]

The Court has determined that if the Senate does not post its brief by end of day Eastern Time on the Second of July, the plaintiff will be declared the winner of this case by default.

This policy shall also apply to all future deadlines for briefs set by this Court unless an extension is explicitly asked for and granted.

Hear, hear!

[Lumine]

I understand that, for various reasons, no one has been able to take up representation on behalf of the Senate. As I also understand it, said reasons have been reasonable and/or personal, but I nonetheless express an apology to the Court for any inconveniences and to remove any impression of disrespect or disregard for the case.

As a current - if not for long - Senator, and if it pleases the Court, I am willing to make an attempt to post a brief. I must note, however, that I am not trained at law (historian by profession in RL), which poses an intellectual challenge. Without wanting to overextend matters and in due deference to the need for a verdict, I humbly ask the Court for a final 24 hour extension - starting on midnight today - to give me sufficient time to prepare something.

If this is judged inadvisable, I nonetheless thank the Court for its time.

[Sestak]

Extension is granted through end of day, Eastern time on July the 3rd.

[Lumine]

I thank the Court for its understanding, and am writing now in order to meet the deadline.

[Lumine]

1.- INTRODUCTION

In order to appropriately consider the impact of this case and its implications, we must not make the mistake to restrict ourselves to a war of semantics about the literal meaning of a single expression. We must consider the context in which the Senate of the Republic of Atlasia made a decision and the justifications and believes that it had in doing so. It is then that we will get a clearer understanding of this case, which is far removed from mere procedural quibbles while having more to do with a specific tactical approach to the ordeal our Republic – and the rule of law itself - has faced over the past few weeks and months.

2.- THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL

On May 16th, 2023, Articles of Impeachment against Old School Republican (hereafter OSR) were introduced before the Senate.

These were introduced by members of the Senate in order to uphold the Union, the Constitution and the Rule of Law, taking action against an officer of the government who had willingly and voluntarily placed himself outside of those boundaries through overt endorsement, support and aid to violent and unlawful secession. An officer which, in effect, had committed treason and disgraced the dignity of his august office only shortly before.

Said impeachment trial did not emerge out of nowhere, a made up invention for the purposes of the abuses of power that some actors would prefer to attribute to the Senate. It was, from its very beginning, deeply rooted in the Fifth Constitution of the Republic of Atlasia, following three simple but key precepts:

-The Senate has the power to discipline its members. (Art. III, Section 1.6)

-The Senate has the sole Power to adopt and try Articles of Impeachment. (Art. III, Section 1.7)

-Officers (noted as “civil officers”) of the government – among others – can be removed from office via impeachment in case of certain high crimes and misdemeanors. (Art. IV, Section 4)

Precepts two and three are further clarified earlier in our Constitutional text, for the Senate has the power to impeach the officers of this government (Art. III, Section 3).

The Senator was impeached, then tried and convicted in a period of three weeks. At all points, all regulations regarding impeachment outlined in our Constitution were followed. The charges were debated, and the Senators reached a clear cut conclusion: Senator OSR had committed high crimes and misdemeanors, understood to be treason through his overt endorsement of violent and unlawful secession. Therefore, the Senate, backed up by several articles of the Constitution, had to do its duty and remove this officer from the responsibilities he had willingly abandoned.

3.- THE CHARGES

The opposing counsel who has decided to take legal action to reverse this measure, stands before us with a fascinating interpretation of the Constitution. He also stands indicted of several charges related to the actions taken by the impeached Senator, including Refutation of Federal Supremacy in Law, Secession, Aiding a Rebellion, and Obstruction of Justice.

Justices, I do not point this out to invoke prejudices against the opposing counsel, a talented and eloquent voice in defense of OSR. But I do point them out in the context of the impeachment trial that took place in the first place, a necessary action at one of the darkest moments of the history of our nation.

The opposing counsel has every legal right to challenge the Senate’s actions. But we would be remiss not to mention that this case is not born out of a genuine alternative interpretation of the Constitution. It is there to halt the work of Senate when trying to take legal and constitutional action to defend the rule of law. And it is there to derail the response of the Government and its officers when crimes are being committed, responsibility must be determined, and consequences as stated by the Constitution put in place.

The main charge laid upon by opposing counsel is that impeachment as enacted by the Senate against Senator OSR is unconstitutional, because the Senate has no impeachment power over its members.
This interpretation, when we get to the real semantic point of the matter, rests on the opposing counsel’s own interpretation of what an officer of the government, in this case a “civil officer”, means. It attempts to make different classifications of officers by citing various constitutional provisions, in the hopes of proving that different groupings of specific offices are to be read as a restrictive understanding of what a civil officer means. If the Constitution mentions in otherwise unrelated passages these specific executive and/or judicial officers, then it means it only considers them as civil officers, even though said term is not used in those articles.

Following on a similar procedural behavior unsuccessfully employed before this court before, it rests much of its case on interpretations or understandings based on the Constitution of the United States of America, a currently defunct text. I think we can say with confidence that, much as there are undeniable influences, constitutional tradition in Atlasia has sufficiently evolved over twenty years of existence so as to not instantly bind us upon invoking those interpretations as valid precedents.

The case for the Senate, expertly and ably defended by several citizens of good standing – who have done a far better job than I could possibly hope for – has been clear enough.

The impeachment of OSR had solid foundation on several Articles of the Constitution, was conducted lawfully in accordance to the Constitution, was justified on account of the charges laid before the Senator, and it was necessary and urgent on account of the ongoing crisis as a result of the actions of a secessionist group.

The Senate has the authority to discipline its members. It did so, by using a constitutional mechanism which is entirely compatible with said authority.

The Senate has the authority to impeach officers of the government, of which we firmly believe Senator OSR constitutes one of them. Again, the Senate did so.

I do not wish to test this honorable Court’s patience by dwelling on the matter of oversight. Rather, and with the kind forgiveness of those who have pressed that point with skills, I would like to emphasize the reasons why the inherent flaw that opposing counsel wishes to identify is not there, nor is there such a flaw to warrant the reversal of a necessary and lawful measure as unconstitutional. Procedure was flawed, with proper invocation of the specific articles of the Constitution that sustained them.

Even if the arguments being put forward were in good faith, rather than rooted in obstructionism disguised via a discussion on semantics focused on a single expression, they would still rest on a vague interpretation of the Constitution that rests solely on suppositions. The case that the Senate is making rests and sustains itself on the next, and not its spurious interpretation for ulterior motives.

Impeachment of a Senator, unlike what is suggested – or stated – by opposing counsel, does not make expulsion of a Senator redundant. They may bring similar thresholds, but not similar penalties. I think we can reasonably agree that in the middle of a secession crisis – which is not yet fully solved – choosing one’s mechanisms carefully for the sake of upholding the Constitution and the rule of law is important. And impeachment is indeed appropriate for a Senator nakedly and willfully endorsing treason.

4.- CONCLUSION

Distinguished Justices, I cannot claim ignorance of judicial procedure as a suitable justification for any shortcomings my arguments may have. But even in said ignorance, I see a clear-cut dilemma facing us. Do we allow for the derailment of Senate proceedings in a matter of grave urgency out of an interpretation of the Constitution tailored to suit officers of the government endorsing treason against it? Do we allow said interpretation to directly affect a key institution of our Republic, rendering it less capable of defending itself and the Constitution against said acts of treason? Do we deny the Senate a right based on the Constitution to discipline its members and take action against officers who engage in high crimes or misdemeanors?

Such notions are what’s at stake should the opposing counsel’s interpretations be followed.

The Supreme Court is and must be an impartial actor. Perhaps in defiance of that, the position that opposing counsel upholds seeks to assign a mission to the Court, hoping to enforce an arbitrary interpretation to obstruct and derail perfectly constitutional procedures. I humbly beg the Court not to allow that interpretation, based on the interpretation of yet another document, to do so.

As a final word, I wish to extend my apologies once again for the delay in the presentation of a brief on behalf of the Senate, and thank the Justices for their patience.  

[reagente]

With leave the court, I request to file a response brief by 11:59:59pm EST on July 7th.

[FairBol]

Requesting leave to file as a concerned party/citizen, Mr. MILLHOUSE submits this brief.

I. Through counsel, Plaintiff continues to argue that they are not subject to impeachment because the party is not a "civil officer" of the government. 

The Free Dictionary describes a "civil officer" as thus:

"A person who exercises authority over civilian affairs". 

Logic suggests that as an elected senator, the plaintiff has such authority, and has used it in the performance of their lawful duties.  As such, it must properly be found that plaintiff is indeed a "civil officer". 



II. This is a matter involving enumerated powers, and if the Atlasian Senate has the power to discipline (and possibly impeach) its own members.  Article III of the Constitution makes clear that the Senate does indeed have this power. 

To this end, Plaintiff's case relies on an assertion that "impeachment" means the same thing as "expulsion", even as counsel concedes the issue concerning "discipline".

In this, they are in error.  The legal definition of impeachment is not the removal of a sitting official (which rightly can be described as expulsion), but rather the formal charging of that official with "high crimes and misdemeanors".  The two words simply do not share a common meaning. 

Also, it is not "redundant" or a sure thing that allegations of committing "high crimes" will result in expulsion.  As with any legal case, accusations must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before judge and/or jury. 

Only then may the accused be removed from office, and thus "expelled". 



III. It is clear that Plaintiff believes their impeachment, and subsequent removal, to be unconstitutional. 

Yet the impeachment process, and as such expulsion, was determined and carried out in a lawful manner.  At all times, it was consistent with the blueprint of law, and in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers.   

Plaintiff is now asking this Court to "throw out the baby with the bath water", and effectively ignore key principles of the Constitution. 

Brief filing party believes this to be inadvisable, and prays that this Court will find for the defendant Senate. 

--

[NewYorkExpress]

Requesting leave to file a brief as a citizen:

As both Mr. Reactionary and OSR's terms will end in three days, and neither officeholder will be sworn in for a new term, petitioner requests the court dismiss the suit as moot.

[GM Team Member and Senator WB]

Requesting leave to file a brief as a citizen:

As both Mr. Reactionary and OSR's terms will end in three days, and neither officeholder will be sworn in for a new term, petitioner requests the court dismiss the suit as moot.

Requesting leave to file a respondent brief:

As this case may set a very important precedent, the question of mootness is irrelevant. The question should be whether the senate has this power, not whether it will matter in this incident.

[Sestak]

With leave the court, I request to file a response brief by 11:59:59pm EST on July 7th.

Granted.

[ilikeverin]

Same question for you, Lumine, if you please:

How do you think the Senate would effectuate this part of the clause:

the Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members

What would it look like for the Senate to "adopt rules"? Could the impeachment trial convened by the Senate in this case be said to be an instance of the Senate "adopting rules" that would allow it to expel a member?

[reagente]

Mootness
Amici by NewYorkExpress and weatherboy1102 have raised the question of Mootness, so I thought I would say a few words on the matter. As I see it, this case raises two fundamental questions:

1) Does the Senate have the enumerated power to impeach a Senator?

2) Assuming the Senate does not possess that enumerated power, did the “impeachment” of Computer89 function as a constructive expulsion?

I do not believe that the first issue is moot. Impeachment carries penalties beyond simple expulsion – an impeached person also faces “disqualification from any office under the Republic of Atlasia” (i.e. Federal Offices) for a period not exceeding two years. In the case of Computer89, a defined term of disqualification was not specified in the articles of “impeachment” presented against him (leaving it unclear if my client faces a disqualification penalty and if so for how long) – so my client cannot be certain that an election administrator wouldn’t try to disqualify him as a candidate for federal office in the future. As such, the issue is very much live.

As to the second issue, as Computer89’s term for Senator expired today at noon, I do agree that the question of whether an invalid “impeachment” can act as an expulsion is moot as to the fact-specific case of Computer89. However, as weatherboy1102 notes, it may still be useful for this court to decide that question, as it could provide helpful constitutional guidance to future Senates, and it seems possible that due to the duration of litigation, that situations like this could escape judicial review in the future, so it may be proper to find sustained standing in this case and try that second question.

While my initial brief did not address this question in much detail, my reply to the Honorable Justice ilikeverin on June 25th offers some of my thoughts on what it would look like for the Senate to “adopt its own rules and proceedings”.

Now, onto my response to Lumine’s brief – organized by opposing counsel’s subheadings:

Response Brief

1. Introduction

I think opposing counsel is fundamentally wrong to characterize this case as one involving “procedural quibbles” and to suggest it is a mistake to limit ourselves to “war of semantics about the literal meaning of a single expression.” Atlasia is a government of limited powers, and this case concerns enumerated powers. That “single expression” which opposing counsel references is the sole and only authority from which the Atlasian Senate derives impeachment power from. As such, the meaning of that clause takes supreme precedence over any other situational “context” – the Senate either has the power or it doesn’t.

2. The Impeachment Trial

Opposing counsel dedicates much into the history of the “impeachment” trial of Computer89 – I believe such information has no relevance to this case. However noble the motivations of the Senate may or may not have been, it matters nothing if they lack the enumerated power to impeach legislators. Likewise, if the Senate has an unqualified enumerated power, it matters little to look at their justification. For example, my client and I have never disputed the Senate’s authority to expel and discipline its members (derived from Article III, Section 1, Clause 6). Just as it would be improper to consider the motives behind actions unsupported by an enumerated grant of power, it would be just as inappropriate to look at the motivations of a body acting according to an unqualified grant of enumerated power. If the Senate wanted to expel Computer89 for his bad Star Wars takes, that would be just as valid if they wanted to expel him for missing votes or criminal conduct. The expulsion clause is only qualified by the condition that two-thirds of members sign onto an expulsion, there is no requirement that it be justified.

Among other things, the impeachment power is qualified by limiting it to a certain class of persons (Article III, Section 3, Clause 17) – “the President, Vice President, Justices and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and other officers of this government.” An impeachment against a class of persons not on this list cannot be made valid just because it had an allegedly good justification. Would this court sanction the Senate “impeaching” an ordinary citizen who had never served in any elected office because the Senate made a persuasive case that they had committed high crimes and misdemeanors? I think not.

3. The Charges

Regarding the first two paragraphs of this section, I remind opposing counsel that in Atlasia there is a presumption of innocence until proven guilty. I further take issue with the insinuation that this case was “not born out of a genuine alternative interpretation of the Constitution.”
This is preposterous for a number of reasons. First, the idea that the Senate lacks impeachment power as it relates to legislators is not an idea unique to my client or myself as his counsel. Take this for exhibit for example:

Correction:

Since one cannot impeach a senator, impeachment will be defined as expulsion from the senate. The procedures are operating under expulsion rather than impeachment

What?

A "senator" cannot be impeached", a senator can only be expelled or censored.

Second, as my initial brief (filed on June 10th) demonstrates, there are several textual and structural reasons in the Atlasian to come to the conclusion that impeachment power cannot extend to ordinary senators. I find it curious that opposing counsel didn’t bother to rebut any of those arguments directly, but instead chose to primarily attack the supposed motivations of the arguments. The closest opposing counsel comes to directly rebutting arguments is to suggest that it is improper to look at other clauses and structure of the Constitution containing “officer” in order to determine the meaning of a term not defined in a certain clause. Such a suggestion runs contrary to past practice of this court. If an ambiguous term is used elsewhere in a document, how else is the court to determine its meaning but by looking at the rest of the document?

Third, as far as I am aware “impeachment” has never been used against a legislator before in Atlasian history. Prior to this current case, I’ve only found examples of impeachments or attempted impeachments against executives, judges, or game moderates – never a legislator. Additionally, impeachment of legislators isn’t recognized in any of the regional constitutions either. Thus, if anything, opposing counsel is the one offering an alternative interpretation.

Finally, while it is well acknowledged that the U.S. Constitution is not controlling over Atlasia, does is not raise questions when text is directly lifted from the U.S. Constitution and is purported to have the exact opposite effect with little justification?

As far as I can gather, the opposing argument regarding the meaning of “other officers” boils down to “a Senator is an ‘other officer’ because we say so.” There is no explanation for why “civil officers” appears in a section of the Constitution concerning executive branch officials. There is no explanation for why “officers of this government” is modified with the qualifier “executive and judicial” in Article VIII, Section 8.

And perhaps most importantly, there is no explanation for why Article III, Section 3, Clause 17 (which decided to separately list associate and chief justices as covered by the impeachment power) decided under opposing counsel’s interpretation to group together Senators and non-elected executive branch figures in the same category despite not doing so anywhere else in the Constitution out of some supposed economy of words.

Also, opposing counsel seems to have gotten my argument regarding the redundancy of expulsion power backwards. The expulsion power doesn’t make impeachment power redundant (since as opposing counsel correctly noted, they can carry different penalties) but opposing counsel’s interpretation of the impeachment clause would make the expulsion power redundant. Under the impeachment power, the Senate may, but is not required to, impose a term of disqualification from offices under the Atlasian Constitution. If we were to adopt opposing counsel’s view of the impeachment power, every single conceivable expulsion could have been brought as an impeachment. As such, why would the framers of the Atlasian constitution include such a redundant power? (the answer is simple – the expulsion power exists and is not actually redundant because the impeachment power doesn’t apply to senators).

4. Conclusion

Opposing counsel is incorrect that a ruling in my client’s favor would deny the Senate the right to “discipline its members” – the Senate retains that power through the expulsion clause. Further, I contend that the Constitution is not “defended” by sanctioning the Senate usurping powers beyond those explicitly enumerated to it. The text of the Atlasian Constitution is clear – the Senate lacks the power to impeach ordinary senators, and the “impeachment” (and associated penalties) against my client, former Senator Computer89, should be voided from having any legal effect.
I thank the Justices for their time.

[FairBol]

Requesting leave to file as a concerned party/citizen, Mr. MILLHOUSE submits this additional brief.

I.  On the question of mootness, counsel for the Plaintiff has stated that they believe that the matter of impeachment remains "live".  Brief filing party strongly suggests that this is incorrect.  

For a moment, let us examine the "mootness doctrine", which holds as such:

"If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a 'personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit' at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed, and must be dismissed as moot"

To clarify, the precedent is that where a question/issue ceases to be relevant, courts no longer have the authority to deliver rulings in regard to such matters.  

As prior amicus briefs have pointed out, the prescribed terms of office for the Plaintiff(s) in this case have now expired.  Therefore, there is no longer any relevance to the issue in question.  


II.  Bolstering this point is the question of recurrence.  

The Plaintiff was elected to office by a majority vote, then removed from such office by vote of the Senate.  Opposing counsel's position is that this removal was unconstitutional, and thus should be declared invalid as a "violation".  

To this, brief filing party refers back to the Doctrine as presented, asking, can it be "said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur"?

It is clear that since the expiration of the term, Plaintiff can no longer be considered in any way to be a member of the Atlasian Senate.  As such, Plaintiff cannot be removed from office again, at least not for the term in question.  That is to say that the "violation" (unconstitutional removal from office) alleged by counsel cannot reasonably be expected to recur.  


III.  Even if this Court was to decide in the petitioner's favor, it could not "fashion (any) form of meaningful relief" in this case.  The elected term of office has ended; begging your pardon of the use of a cliche, that ship has sailed.  

As such, brief filing party strongly suggests that the issue should be regarded as moot, and the case subsequently dismissed in its entirety.  

[Lumine]

Same question for you, Lumine, if you please:

How do you think the Senate would effectuate this part of the clause:

the Senate may adopt rules concerning the discipline and expulsion of its members

What would it look like for the Senate to "adopt rules"? Could the impeachment trial convened by the Senate in this case be said to be an instance of the Senate "adopting rules" that would allow it to expel a member?

Apologies for the delay!

I think it could, yes, and the opposing counsel seems to agree with that assessment, although our interpretation diverges on whether the Senate has impeachment power over its own members. Since we maintain that it does, and on account of the urgency of the crisis, we believed - and still do so - that the mechanisms adopted were consistent with the concept of adopting rules to both expel AND discipline a member.

That we did not mean impeachment as a simple expulsion can be drawn from the stance we've defended and the actions that we took, which is where we have yet another point of divergence.

As the new constitutional President of the Senate, I do think there are grounds to update the rules to further clarify proceedings and prevent any sort of future ambiguity being claimed to justify a court case, in the understanding that we maintain that the Senate had the constitutional power to do what it did in the first case.

[Associate Justice PiT]

     To the respondent, what are your thoughts on the mootness question? I recognize that you did not raise that issue, but the original amicus brief that did raise it came after your response, so I am curious if you would like to comment on it.

[Lumine]

     To the respondent, what are your thoughts on the mootness question? I recognize that you did not raise that issue, but the original amicus brief that did raise it came after your response, so I am curious if you would like to comment on it.

At the risk of disagreeing with a citizen who took it upon himself to try and help with this case (for which I'm immensely grateful, and I think it's a sign of civic virture), and though I think he has a point in that any resolution to this case will not have practical effects in terms of the Senate term that ended a week ago, I think there's merit to be had in resolving this dispute to clear up any possible ambiguity.

I, for one, have no objections to this Court issuing a ruling from which we as legislators - or myself as President of the Senate - can either react to, or consider as a meaningful precedent.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

As Attorney General, I encourage the clearing up the ambiguity over the matters that were the substance over which this case was argued over. Whether that be done by this court or by the Senate itself, either is fine.