The thread on thoughts over time as to how and when the Ukraine war will end

[Storr]

What I think will happen:

I believe the war will grind into even more of a stalemate than it already is. I don't know if there will be a formal stop to the fighting anytime soon (unlikely imo), but fighting will settle into static warfare. There will be very miniscule to no advancements by either side, like what the war in Donbass settled into after the fall of Debaltseve in early 2015. Most people will consider the war to have come to a stalemate, with neither side willing to stop the fighting or make peace until next year.

Maybe in 2024 or 2025 a Korea-style ceasefire is agreed to. Neither side recognizes the territorial claims of the other, but at least the killing has stopped. The border between Russian and Ukrainian controlled territory is heavily reinforced, similar to the Korean DMZ.

Ukraine is already a de facto NATO country due to the war. I doubt Russia would try such a large scale multi axis invasion again. Ukraine's military will be more than capable of defending itself, molding itself into a "always ready" defensive force similar to Finland or Israel. The future of the country is much more dependent on EU membership than NATO membership. It certainly deserves it, but Brussels is going to be Brussels and make the process last at least 15 years.

What I hope will happen, but know has a very tiny chance of happening:

Ukraine retakes territory up to its 1991 borders, except for Crimea. I don't think if Ukraine would be able to retake Crimea in any scenario. The population there (except for the small remaining population of Crimean Tatars) is very pro-Russian, much more so than even in the Donbass. Thus Ukraine loses one of its best and strongest advantages in this war: fighting on friendly (at least more or less friendly in the Donbass) home turf in Crimea.

The EU gives Ukraine membership in 5 years through an accelerated process, in light of the extraordinary circumstances. Ukraine adopts the Euro in 2035.



More assorted thoughts on the war:

We are reaching a point where it's very difficult for either side to conduct offensive operations. We've seen how long it has taken the Russians to make progress in Bakhmut, and the Ukrainians haven't had any significant offensives since the Russians withdrew from the right bank of the Dnipro River. Maybe Ukraine will gain a significant advantage due to western weapons and technology, but I'm very skeptical.

Neither side is willing to compromise at the moment. Russia thinks it can outlast the West's support for Ukraine, believing public support for aiding Ukraine will decline if no end seems in sight. They feel this will lead western countries to putting pressure on Ukraine to make peace on less than favorable terms. Ukraine thinks it can retake more territory from the Russians, possibly even to the country's 1991 borders. They feel that if they do not retake occupied territory during the current conflict where Russia's military has been significantly weakened, Russia will consolidate its control over those lands and regain its strength, ceding those lands to Russian control.

There will be no negotiated peace as long as Putin is in power. Once he annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson Oblasts, he staked his entire regime on the outcome of this war.

Ukraine won't entertain any idea of a ceasefire because they believe any pause in fighting will simply allow Russia to rebuild its forces. If not in the current conflict, the Ukrainians believe these re-strengthened units would simply be used to attack Ukraine again in a few years.

I believed the Donbass would become another example of a classic Russian "frozen conflict". Putin had other ideas. He seems to truly believe in the "Slavic Trinity" of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians as one people. This war isn't about NATO. You don't go to war over one country planning to join a military alliance, with said alliance keeping that country decades away from receiving actual membership. Unless Putin has truly lost his marbles, there's no way he truly thought "the West" was planning to invade or attack Russia. More than anything this is about Putin not wanting to be the Russian leader to "lose" Ukraine. This applies in both the geopolitical/strategic (losing economic and political influence to the EU/NATO) and cultural contexts (losing a brother people, part of the "Greater Russian nation").

I simply don't believe Ukrainian forces are strong enough to retake all territory up to their 1991 borders or even pre-Feb. 24 territory unless the Russians decide to leave (like in the Kyiv and Kherson areas), which they aren't going to. 100 Leopard 2's won't enable Ukraine to retake Donetsk city. Maybe Melitopol and Berdyansk (with all of the other western military aide), but that's still a huge maybe.

[Storr]

...and a fast track EU application process.

There is no such thing as a fast track EU application process; and if there were, I don't see how Ukraine would qualify for it. In fact, I don't think it is likely that Ukraine will join the EU in the next 20+ years. Regardless of the war, it is a poor and deeply corrupt (Rank 116 in Transparency International's CPI – below the likes of Malawi, Morocco and Peru) country with countless structural flaws and a population large enough to be of serious concern. Given the heated debates about free movement rights and social benefits for 19 million Romanians and 7 million Bulgarians, I honestly fail to see how a majority in the European Council would be happy to have 43+ million Ukrainians joining the club. Especially since this would impose an enormous financial strain on the EU's budget.

Creating the impression that Ukraine may be joining the EU as some sort of reward (for what? for being attacked?) is certainly a nice performative gesture. But once the war is over – or has disappeared from the headlines – the priorities in Brussels will be different ones.

Ukraine joining the EU will certainly take a long time. The benchmarks countries must meet to join the bloc aren't easy to reach.

In my opinion corruption isn't as big of an issue as how poor Ukraine is, to joining the EU. 116th is certainly bad, but it's not that far from other EU candidate countries. North Macedonia 85th, Moldova 91st, Albania and Serbia 101st, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 111th in Transparency International's CPI. 

Meanwhile, Ukraine (and Moldova) are significantly poorer than the Balkan candidate countries. Brussels would be very hesitant to grant membership to such a poor populous country, for the reasons you already mentioned. In fact, the only country to join the EU with a population similar to the size of Ukraine since the fall of communism is Poland. The worst outcome would be a larger Hungary, where an entrenched corrupt Ukrainian political elite uses EU funds for their own enrichment, not having any credible political opposition to keep them in check. The fear of an outcome like that would be another reason why the European Council would be weary of allowing Ukraine into the EU.

2021 GDP per capita, active EU candidate countries (from the World Bank, in USD):

Montenegro:                  $9,466
Sebia:                           $9,230
Bosnia and Herzegovina: $7,143
North Macedonia:           $6,695
Albania:                         $6,493
Moldova:                       $5,231
Ukraine:                        $4,836

[Storr]

...and a fast track EU application process.

There is no such thing as a fast track EU application process; and if there were, I don't see how Ukraine would qualify for it. In fact, I don't think it is likely that Ukraine will join the EU in the next 20+ years. Regardless of the war, it is a poor and deeply corrupt (Rank 116 in Transparency International's CPI – below the likes of Malawi, Morocco and Peru) country with countless structural flaws and a population large enough to be of serious concern. Given the heated debates about free movement rights and social benefits for 19 million Romanians and 7 million Bulgarians, I honestly fail to see how a majority in the European Council would be happy to have 43+ million Ukrainians joining the club. Especially since this would impose an enormous financial strain on the EU's budget.

Creating the impression that Ukraine may be joining the EU as some sort of reward (for what? for being attacked?) is certainly a nice performative gesture. But once the war is over – or has disappeared from the headlines – the priorities in Brussels will be different ones.

Ukraine joining the EU will certainly take a long time. The benchmarks countries must meet to join the bloc aren't easy to reach.

In my opinion corruption isn't as big of an issue as how poor Ukraine is, to joining the EU. 116th is certainly bad, but it's not that far from other EU candidate countries. North Macedonia 85th, Moldova 91st, Albania and Serbia 101st, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 111th in Transparency International's CPI.  

Meanwhile, Ukraine (and Moldova) are significantly poorer than the Balkan candidate countries. Brussels would be very hesitant to grant membership to such a poor populous country, for the reasons you already mentioned. In fact, the only country to join the EU with a population similar to the size of Ukraine since the fall of communism is Poland. The worst outcome would be a larger Hungary, where an entrenched corrupt Ukrainian political elite uses EU funds for their own enrichment, not having any credible political opposition to keep them in check. The fear of an outcome like that would be another reason why the European Council would be weary of allowing Ukraine into the EU.

2021 GDP per capita, active EU candidate countries (from the World Bank, in USD):

Montenegro:                  $9,466
Sebia:                           $9,230
Bosnia and Herzegovina: $7,143
North Macedonia:           $6,695
Albania:                         $6,493
Moldova:                       $5,231
Ukraine:                        $4,836

What did these numbers look like in 1989?

GDP per capita based on the constant of the 2015 USD (using this statistic because looking at GDP per capita based on the USD value current to the year being looked at, doesn't adjust for inflation):
                                    
Montenegro (earliest year available 1997): $4,489        2021: $7,351  
Sebia (e.y.a 1995):                                  $2,781         2021: $7,114
Bosnia and Herzegovina: (e.y.a 1994):      $648            2021: $5,893
(1994 was in the middle of the Bosnian War of Independence)
North Macedonia (e.y.a 1990):                 $3,568         2021: $5,287
Albania (1989):                                       $1,809         2021: $4,831
Moldova (e.y.a 1995):                              $1.502         2021: $3,695
Ukraine (1989):                                       $3,330         2021: $2,452
(The GDP per capita decrease in Ukraine happened in the 90s, by 1998 the GDP per capita reached its low point at $1,318.)