Ecuadorian elections (referendum, 21 April 2024)

[Sir John Johns]

What a night for Correa and Revolución Ciudadana! Incredibly surprising!

Yeah, the RC is the big winner of the locals, having won the prefectures of the two most-populated provinces and the mayorships of the two most-populated cities, an unprecedented feat Correísmo didn’t managed to accomplish when leading the country and having full control over the state’s resources to help their candidates. Additionally, it has kept the prefecture of Manabí (about 42.8% for Orlando) and Santo Domingo (41.2% for Johana Núñez, the opportunist incumbent elected in 2019 for an alliance between the MDS and a local movement), and are on track to win in Sucumbíos (33.0% for Yofre Poma, who had been prosecuted over his involvement in the 2019 protests), Imbabura (33.6% for Richard Calderón with over a half of the votes counted) and even Azuay (20.3% for Lloret against 19.6% for Cabrera).

Factors specific to the RC such results are:

- The RC has kept a strong and loyal voting base and is not facing competition on the ‘left’ in the coastal provinces where Pachakutik and the ID are non-factors.

- The RC is de facto incarnating the opposition to the government, having the largest caucus, having remained largely united (unlike the ID and Pachakutik) and being the primary and constant target of the attacks from Lasso, CREO and the right-wing medias. As the whole election has clearly turned into a referendum on Lasso government, this has largely benefited the RC candidates.

- Pabón and Múñoz are certainly the candidates best fit for the positions they were running for, having proven both loyal politicians (they have always been in Correa’s party since the beginning) and politicians able to distance themselves from the leader on certain issues (abortion for Pabón; mining for Múñoz). This has been important in a province, Pichincha, not much enamored with political opportunism (at least at a lesser extent than in the coastal provinces) nor with Correa’s authoritarian style.

- Múñoz and Aquiles Álvarez made a good job appearing as the most competent candidate in their respective race (in spite of weak platforms and a lack of experience for Álvarez): Múñoz by highlighting his government and parliamentarian experience and by posturing as the ‘safe pair of hands’ against Yunda, his populist rhetoric and his non-existent platform; Álvarez by keeping a low profile and campaigning on relatively concrete and realist stuff when Jairalá was desperate selling his absurd electric train project.

- A relative renewal of the candidates (at least for the big prizes): Álvarez is a newcomer, Múñoz, Lloret and Pabón are at the political forefront since only a decade or so, contrasting with the likes of Viteri or Cabrera who have been in politics since the 1990s.

- Accusations of corruption and ties with narco-trafficking have absolutely no influence in the choice of voters as exemplified by the election/reelection of a lot of candidates accused of being in bed with criminals: Agustín Intriago in Manta (with 61.2% against 32.5% for the RC candidate, Jaime Estrada Medranda); Johana Núñez in Santo Domingo (despite Villavicencio having denounced her for a suspicious increase in personal wealth); Adis Solis (RC) in San Lorenzo, Esmeraldas (in spite of the leaking of photos of her presumed nouveau riche living room featuring a suitcase full of banknotes and her young daughter alongside, playing with bank notes), who is leading with 36.0% and about 60% of votes counted; or, the ‘best’, the CREO-Avanza candidate in Muisne, Esmeraldas, Paul Vélez, who is currently leading with a third of the votes counted in spite of having been sentenced for his involvement in the murder of a political rival in 2014.

Then, there are also external factors:

- The latter part (CREO running a candidate sentenced for murder) combined with the recent revelations about the corruption network led by Lasso’s brother-in-law, the government’s attacks against the medias in the wake of the revelation of that scandal as well as its refusal to accept the suggestion of the Villavicencio-led self-proclaimed anti-corruption parliamentary group that members of CREO are also suspected of narco-politics, are painting the government as insincere and selective in its fight against criminality and corruption. Hence neutering accusations of corruption made against the RC and other opposition parties (see the largely baseless allegations made against the CONAIE).

- The right-wing candidates clearly did a good job to portrait themselves as a bunch of unlikable violent and demagogic lunatics between La Bombón’s videos promising ‘ratatatatatata’ to the PSC’s rivals, Viteri’s bizarre references to GTA and Páez impersonating the Joker in a video also featuring an atomic explosion. How could you pretend after this that it is the RC candidates the populist and aggressive ones.

- Divisions inside the Ecuadorian right, which can’t unite behind a single candidacy and faced dissident candidacies, some motivated only out of resent against their own political party (I mean, what was the point of the candidacy of Lapentti, beside of provoking the defeat of Susana González? The guy is an old dinosaur, has no platform and spent his time trashing the official PSC candidate).

- a sizable null/blank vote (the CNE website is now down, but this was about 20% in Quito IIRC) that benefited the candidate with the largest solid voting base.

- The errors of Lasso and the CREO/PSC which have learned absolutely nothing from the twenty years they have been in the opposition or from the 2021 first round and just decided to repeat the same sh**t than before: the pro-business policies combined with an obsession to reduce the government’s deficit when the population at large is suffering from unemployment, poverty and malnutrition for Lasso; the sterile parliamentary games and machinations for the PSC. In the absence of candidates offering a serious platform, this is the party brand that proved decisive and the CREO and PSC brands have been seriously, if not fatally, damaged by their return to power.

Wow.

Lasso was a dead man walking anyway so honestly I don't see how much this matters outside of the pointing to an RC victory at the next pres election. What does this even mean?

Judging by the move in Ecuadorian financial markets you'd think that there'd been an armed coup lol

I agree that, in case the 'no' win the referendum, Lasso is politcally dead and CREO would become just the third right-wing party to not survive its time in power (after the PUR and the DP and contrasting about how the PRE and the PSP managed to survive for a long the removal of their leader from presidency). However, I would be aware not drawing definitive conclusions about the outcome of the next presidential election. Back in 2019, the PSC emerged as the winner of the locals and Nebot appeared to have the presidency in the pocket. Four years later, his party is dying.

[Sir John Johns]

With between 62.4% (question 1) and 15.5% (question eight) of the votes counted, the ‘no’ is still leading at every eight questions. It is currently at 53.0% for question 1, 58.1% for question 2 (55.8% counted) and 59.9% for question 5 (33.4% counted). The hope of supporters of the ‘yes’ is that the results in the some large provinces haven’t yet counted: less than 1% in Guayas for all questions; and Pichincha, but that was before 98.0% of the votes had been counted for the three first questions and with the ‘yes’ only leading in question 1 and 3 with unimpressive margins (52.5% for question 1; 51.3% for question 3).

Also, with 97% of the results counted in the Galápagos (not the most unfriendly province for Lasso), question 1 is approved (55.9% of ‘yes”) but not question 5, the one that matters the most for the government (49.6% of ‘yes’). So, yes, this is really not a good sign for Lasso.

Some results in the Sierra.

Azuay

Prefect (99.9% counted)

Juan Cristóbal Lloret (RC) 20.2%
Marcelo Cabrera (Igualdad+Participa) 19.6%
Sebastián Cevallos (UP) 13.7%
Dora Ordóñez (MDS+Pachakutik) 10.8%
Diego Monsalve (CD+RETO+PID+CREO) 8.1%
Ruth Caldas (SUMA+Construye) 7.4%
Diego Morales (MNG) 7.0%
Diego Matovelle (ID+MOVER) 6.4%

The RC candidate is elected defeating old-timer Cabrera who, hopefully, will go into retirement.

Mayor of Cuenca (99.9% counted)

Cristian Zamora (ID+MOVER) 18.6%
Pedro Palacios (MDG) [inc.] 17.5%
Adrián Castro (MDS+Pachakutik) 17.0%
Paúl Carrasco (CD+RETO+PID+CREO) 16.7%
Roque Ordóñez (RC) 14.0%
Omar Álvarez (Renace+PSE) 5.7%
Verónica Abad (AMIGO) 5.3%

Incumbent mayor Palacios is defeated in a five-way race.

Tungurahua

Prefect (99.7% counted)

Manuel Caizabanda (Pachakutik) [inc.] 38.6%
Jaime Astudillo (CD+Movimiento Cívico por Ambato y Tungurahua) 21.6%
Ana Galarza (RETO) 11.9%
Luis Morales Solis (CREO+SUMA+Construye+Avanza) 7.8%

The Pachakutik incumbent is reelected with a largely increased result compared to 2019 (21.6%), defeating Jaime Astudillo, a public administrator supported by former ID-turned-Alianza PAIS prefect (2000-19) Fernando Naranjo and Ana Galarza, a former CREO assemblywoman expelled from parliament over allegations of illicit enrichment. The PSC-Tiempo de Cambio candidate, Saida Haig (elected the vice-prefect in 2019 as the running-mate of Caizabanda), received only 3.8% of the vote and the RC candidate, Efraín Caina, 2.6%.

Mayor of Ambato (99.7% counted)

Diana Caiza (Pachakutik) 32.2%
Luis Amoroso (RETO) 29.7%
Salomé Marín (CREO+SUMA+Construye) 13.7%
Javier Altamirano (Solidariamente) [inc.] 9.5%
Sebastián Dávalos (UP+PSE) 6.1%
Felipe Bonilla (PSC-Tiempo de Cambio) 4.0%

Incumbent Javier Altamirano (elected in 2019) is soundly defeated while the attempt of former mayor Amoroso (2014-19, elected for Avanza) to regain the office of mayor has failed. The new mayor is the first woman, the first indigenous and the first Pachakutik member to be elected at the helm of Ambato. The disastrous result of Bonilla in a city that used to be led by local PSC baron Luis Fernando Torres (mayor in 1992-2000) who was still able to receive 25.2% of the votes in 2019 is a bad news for the PSC and for its parliamentary leader, the insufferable Esteban Torres (the son of Luis Fernando). A candidate named Fidel Castro (AMIGO-MDS-Tungurahua Unido) received 2.1% of the vote.

Chimborazo

Prefect (99.7% counted)

Hermel Tayupanda (ID-Amauta Yuyay) 29.7%
Juan Pablo Cruz (Cambio) [inc.] 25.7%
Santiago Oviedo (MINGA+Avanza) 14.5%
Carmen Tiupul (CD+RETO) 10.5%
Martha Simbaña (Pachakutik) 9.4%
Hugo Quiroz (RC-AMIGO) 4.3%

Incumbent Juan Pablo Cruz, elected in 2019 for the provincial Cambio movement, is defeated by Hermel Tayupanda, the former Pachakutik mayor of Colta, now running for an alliance between the ID and the Amauta Yuyay evangelical indigenous provincial movement.

Riobamba (mayor) (100% counted)

John Vinueza (CD-RETO) 22.0%
Doryan Jara (Pachakutik) 15.6%
Luis Falconi (Cambio) 13.8%
Edison Cepeda (ID-Amauta Yuyay) 10.0%
Carlos Jara (SUMA-Construye-Renovación) 8.1%
Luis Carvajal (PID) 6.7%
Rocío Pumagualli (PSE-PSP) 6.0%
José Tenesaca (MINGA-Avanza) 5.6%
César Daqui (UP-MDS) 5.1%

Former assemblyman John Vinueza (elected in 2021 for the late Ecuadorian Union) is elected mayor of the capital of Chimborazo.

Cotopaxi

Prefect (96.8% counted)

Lourdes Tibán (PK) 19.2%
César Umajinga (SUMA) 18.0%
Tania Vásquez (CREO) 17.8%
Arturo Ugsha (UP) 15.2%
Janio Bustillo López (ID) 11.4%
Ángel Tipantuña (RC) 11.1%

Lourdes Tibán, belonging to the moderate and anti-Correa wing of Pachakutik, appears to be elected the new prefect of Cotopaxi, defeating former Pachakutik prefect (2000-12) César Umajinga, the pro-government candidate and Arturo Ugsha, the UP candidate presumably supported by Leonidas Iza.

Latacunga (mayor) (100% counted)

Fabricio Tinajero (UP-PID-PSE) 26.2%
Rodrigo Espín (PSP-SUMA) 25.2%
Jorge Guamán (PK-AMIGO) 13.9%
Aníbal Culqui Terán (ID) 11.3%
José Iturralde (RETO-Organización Progresista Ciudadana) 11.0%
José Rivadeneira (RC) 7.5%

Fabricio Tinajero, the rector of the Technical University of Cotopaxi, is elected mayor of Latacunga, defeating former Alianza PAIS mayor (2009-13) Rodrigo Espín and Jorge Guamán, the former prefect of Cotopaxi (2014-22) currently investigated for corruption.

[Sir John Johns]

Guayas

Prefect (93.2% counted)

Marcela Aguiñaga (RC) 34.4%
Susana González (PSC-MDG) [inc.] 25.5%
Andrés Guschmer (RETO) 11.6%
Nicolás Lapentti (PID-PSP-AMIGO) 6.3%
Hector Vanegas (MOVER) 6.24%
Francesco Tabacchi (CREO) 6.1%

Mayor of Guayaquil (93.6% counted)

Aquiles Álvarez (RC) 39.7%
Cynthia Viteri (PSC-MDG) [inc.] 30.3%
Pedro Pablo Duart (SUMA) 14.4%
Jimmy Jairala (CD-PSE) 10.3%

Viteri and González have both conceded after a long period of silence.

Mayor of Durán (98.1% counted)

Luis Chonillo (RETO-Construye-Avanza-Movimient Ciudadano-Durán Puede Más-Renovación) 36.3%
Alexandra Arce (RC) 24.5%
Rodrigo Aparicio (PSC-MDG) 21.0%
Pablo Ayala (Pachakutik-Duraneños en Marcha) 6.2%

Mayor of Milagro (98.9% counted)

Pedro Solines (RC) 31.5%
Francisco Cevallos (CD-CREO-Construye-RETO-Renovación) 22.9%
Daniela Asán (PSC-MDG-Milagreños Renacen) 20.1%
José Francisco Cevallos (PID-Pachakutik) 16.2%

Mayor of Samborondón (95.3% counted)

Juan José Yúñez (PSC-MDG) [inc.] 62.8%
Andrés Safadi (RC) 25.4%
Nicolás Rodríguez (RETO) 10.9%

The incumbent PSC mayor is reelected in this suburb of Guayaquil that comprised La Puntilla ‘satellite city’, a super-wealthy neighborhood which was Lasso’s best parish in 2021 in both rounds.

Mayor of Simón Bolívar (96.8% counted)

María Fernanda Vargas (RC) 41.8%
María Cisneros (CREO) 16.8%
Katty Sánchez (PSC) 15.3%
Mery Troya (Pachakutik) 11.1%
Paúl Montalvo (PSP) 6.1%
Alexander Mejía 5.7%

OnlyFans model Marfa Vargas is elected in a landslide in a canton that has been held by right-wing mayors (PLRE/DP/PSC/CREO) since the 1990s and was led by a PSC mayor since 2019. The four most-voted candidates are all women.



El Oro

Prefect (99.0% counted)

Clemente Bravo [inc.] (SUR) 59.5%
Carlos Víctor Zambrano (RC-PLAN) 15.1%
Esteban Quirola (CD-Somos Igualdad Impulso e Integración-RETO-Construye-PID) 12.0%

Incumbent prefect Clemente Bravo is reelected in a landslide as the candidate of his provincial movement. Former SUMA prefect (2014-19), Esteban Quirola, is defeated (hopefully he disappear forever from both politics and comedy sketches) while the comeback of Mario Minuche, the longtime PRE mayor of Machala (1992-2005), proves a disaster with only 1.4%.

Mayor of Machala (99.7% counted)

Darío Macas (RC-PLAN) [inc.] 40.8%
Carlos Rodríguez (Amor, Fé y Esperanza) 26.0%
Carlos Falquez (PSC-SUR-Cambio Positivo) 15.5%

The attempt of the 80-year-old PSC baron Carlos Falquez to regain the municipality, lost in 2019 when his son failed to get reelected, also ended in a failure against the incumbent mayor, Darío Macas, elected in 2019 as an UP-Avanza candidate but running for reelection under the colors of Correísmo. The 29-year-old Rodríguez, who is running for his ridiculously named movement (‘Love, Faith and Hope’), placed second after having cosplayed as the local version of Nayib Bukele.

In El Guabo, mayor Hitler Álvarez (SUR) is reelected with 37.4% of the vote in spite of having made headlines by mispronouncing the name of the canton he governs.



Santa Elena

Prefect (47.6% counted)

Verónica Palma Lindao (Pachakutik) 54.9%
Melina Villacres (SUMA) 27.4%
José Álava Jiménez (CREO-Somos-Península Positiva) 9.4%

Pachakutik is on track to win its first coastal province, even if with a candidate who was previously active in Abdalá Bucaram’s parties, meaning she is certainly a criminal (as a Fuerza Ecuador candidate in 2019, she only received 0.5% of the vote). The incumbent prefect, José Daniel Villao, elected in 2019 for an alliance between his Creyendo en Nuestra Gente and the PSC, was this time running in alliance with the RC and RETO, but only received (so far) 5.4% of the vote. The SUMA candidate was supported by Daniel Noboa.

Mayor of Santa Elena (54.6% counted)

Gonzalo Menoscal (UP-PSP-Pachakutik-MOVER) 30.9%
Gino González Barzola (SUMA) 24.4%
Jimmy Candell Rubira (PSC) 23.1%
Dionicio Gonzabay (ID-Frente de Lucha Ciudadana) 9.0%
Fernando Rodríguez (PSE) 8.8%

Menoscal, the candidate of a bizarre alliance, is currently leading over Gino González, a former governor in the Correa administration now endorsed by Daniel Noboa, Candell Rubira, a former PSC mayor (1996-2000) and Dionicio Gonzabay, also a former mayor (2000-09, 2014-18, firstly for the PRE then for his Frente de Lucha Ciudadana personalist movement). One can however noticed the very bad career choice made by María del Carmen Aquino, who, elected an assemblywoman in 2021 for an alliance between the PSC and the Renacer local movement, resigned her seat to run for mayor as the candidate of a RC-RETO coalition, a choice that seemingly angered local Correístas who decided instead to endorse Menoscal: Aquino is currently placed fifth with 1.5% of the vote. Still, a lot of votes to count, so this could change.



Los Ríos

Prefect (99.5% counted)

Johnny Terán (PSC) [inc.) 37.8%
Eduardo Mendoza Palma (CD-PSP-PID-PSE-MDS-CREO-SUMA-Construye-Crecer) 32.2%
Humberto Alvarado (RC-RETO) 24.4%

Terán is reelected and improving from his 2019 result (26.3%), one of a few bright spot for the PSC.

Mayor of Babahoyo (98.5% counted)

Gustavo Barquet (RC-RETO) 41.4%
César Troya (PSC-MRB) 22.2%
Pablo Arias Amaya (CD-PID-PSE-MDS-CREO-SUMA-Construye) 20.3%
Javier Nagua (Crecer) 9.8%

The PSC lost this canton in spite (because?) of having nominated Troya, its main 2019 opponent until replaced on the ballot as the MRB candidate by Barquet, the latter being this year the RC candidate.

Mayor of Quevedo (100% counted)

Alexis Matute (RC-RETO) 41.9%
Galo Lara (PSP-ID-Pachakutik) 18.2%
Alfons Teixidor (PSC-Pensemos en Grande) 16.8%
Marco Franco Cortez (UP) 12.7%

Another city in Los Ríos won by the RC over the PSC thanks to the PSC having no candidate for succeeding the incumbent mayor and choosing instead to pick a 2019 rival candidate.



Manabí

Prefect (98.5% counted)

Leonardo Orlando (RC-Sí Podemos) [inc.] 42.8%
Agustín Casanova (CAMINANTES-Unidad Primero-PSC-SUMA) 32.9%
Jorge Zambrano (CREO-Construye) 7.7%

Easy reelection for Orlando, who increased his support compared to 2019 (28.5%). Casanova was considered as an efficient mayor of Portoviejo (overseeing the reconstruction after the earthquake) and a strong candidate but may have been hampered by the unpopularity of Lasso. Or he may just have been overrated by the medias because...

Mayor of Portoviejo (99.7% counted)

Javier Pincay (Avanza-MACHETE) 27.8%
José Miguel Mendoza (Movimiento Gente Nueva) 21.6%
Rafael Saltos (RC-Sí Podemos) 17.1%
Byron Joza (CAMINANTES-Unidad Primero-PSC-SUMA) 16.7%

Byron Joza, the handpicked successor of Casanova, only placed fourth. The winning candidate is Javier Pincay who survived an assassination attempt last month, saw his campaign headquarter being the target of a bomb and is now living under police protection. The attempted return of PSC dinosaur and former prefect Clemente Vásquez, now as a CREO-Construye candidate, is a pathetic failure as he got only 1.5% of the votes.

Mayor of Manta (99.5% counted)

Agustín Intriago (Mejor Ciudad) [inc.] 61.2%
Jaime Estrada Medranda (RC-Sí Podemos) 32.5%

The young incumbent Intriago is reelected in a landslide in spite of revelations in the press about the public contracts he gave to companies suspected of laundering money from drug trafficking.

Mayor of Chone (97.8% counted)

Leonardo Rodríguez (CAMINANTES-Unidad Primero-PSC-SUMA) [inc.] 43.2%
Fausto Cobo (CREO-Construye) 19.6%
Marlon Vera (RC-Sí Podemos) 14.7%
Narcisa Alcivar (ID) 12.3%
Italo Colomarco (CD-UP-RETO) 6.7%

In spite of winning the prefecture, the RC will govern none of the three most-populated cities of the province. The PSC incumbent is here easily reelected against the pro-government candidate, Fausto Cobo.

Mayor of Puerto López (100% counted)

Omar Menéndez, the deceased RC candidate, killed the day before the election, is elected mayor with 46.22% of the vote, defeating, in a bizarre coincidence, the incumbent mayor named Javier Pincay, like the new mayor of Portoviejo. The new mayor should be (providing she met the legal requirements that should be examined by the CNE) Verónica Lucas, designated by the RC as its candidate few hours before polls closed.



Santo Domingo

Prefect (100% counted)

Johana Núñez [inc.] (RC-Construir) 41.2%
Verónica Zurita (CD-UP-PSP-PID-Avanza-Positivo) 28.9%
Freddy Mora (MDS) 10.3%
Henry Álvarez (PSC) 6.5%

Incumbent prefect Johana Núñez is reelected while only marginally improving her 2019 result (39.0%), defeating Verónica Zurita, a former mayor of Santo Domingo (elected for Alianza PAIS in 2009 and a candidate for mayor in 2019 for a Pachakutik-CREO-Concertación alliance). A businesswoman and a former TV journalist, Núñez has been previously a candidate for the UDC (the dying successor of the DP), the local indigenous Alianza Tsáchila and for Alianza PAIS before being elected a prefect in 2019 for a MDS-Construir alliance. She has been investigated in 2021 in a case of presumed embezzlement and accused the following year by a Santo Domingo counselor and witness in the case of having order the shooting death of his father, killed while driving his car, and supposedly confused by hitmen with the said counselor. Villavicencio has also called in the week before the election the Fiscalía to investigate the alleged recent important increase in wealth of Núñez.

Mayor of Santo Domingo (99.9% counted)

Wilson Erazo (RC-Construir) [inc.] 60.7%
Geovanny Benítez (CD-UP-PSP-PID-Avanza-Positivo) 20.4%

Like Núñez, Erazo has been elected in 2019 for a MDS-Construir alliance and is running for reelection with the support of the RC. He has almost doubled his vote compared to 2019 (30.9%) while he already defeated Benítez, then supported by the PSC. Erazo has previously been a member of the Alfarist Radical Front, the PSC and Alianza PAIS while Benítez has been the first prefect of the province (2008-18) when elected for... the Alianza PAIS (there is clearly parts of Ecuador where elections aren’t a competition between real parties but rather feuds between perennial candidates rotating party label each new election).



Esmeraldas

Prefect (93.5% counted)

Roberta Zambrano (PSC) [inc.] 51.5%
Janeth Bustos (RC-AMIGO) 24.8%
Rider Sánchez (CREO-Construye) 11.1%
Linder Altafuya (UP) 5.8%

The incumbent prefect, Roberta Zambrano, has been reelected, improving from her 2019 result (33.6%). She previously ran unsuccessfully for mayor of Esmeraldas in 2009 and 2014 as a candidate of the PRE before joining the PSC to be elected an assemblywoman in 2017.

Mayor of Esmeraldas (97.5%)

Vicko Villacís (RC-AMIGO) 29.5%
Frickson Erazo (CREO-Construye) 26.2%
Rocío Ávila (PSC) 14.5%
Lucia Sosa (UP) [inc.] 8.2%
Miguel Ruiz (CD-SUMA) 7.9%
Ernesto Estupiñán (ID) 6.5%

Vicko Villacís, a 2019 candidate for prefect but for the MDS, was running this year for the RC after having publicly asked Correa’s forgiveness for having called in 2018 the Correa government as ‘the most corrupt in history’ and described the former president as ‘a coward’.

https://twitter.com/lahistoriaec/status/1584609832703000576

He appears to have defeated his strongest rival, Frickson Erazo, a former professional soccer player whose house was bombed twice and one of the relatives murdered during the campaign, forcing Erazo to live under police protection. Incumbent mayor (and former prefect in 2005-13 and 2014-18) Lucia Sosa suffered a major defeat, receiving only 8.2% against 45.0% in 2019. Former mayor Ernesto Estupiñán (2000-14), also a former member of the same party (MPD and later UP) than Sosa, tried to come back as an ID candidate but received a very bad result. This may spell the end of the exceptional strength of the MPD/UP in Esmeraldas province.

[Sir John Johns]

In a TV broadcast, Lasso has conceded defeat in the eight referendum questions and described the result ‘a call from the people to the government’ and that the government ‘will not evade that responsibility’ while urging political leaders to ‘build a large agreement’ because according to Lasso ‘the Ecuadorian people has asked all parties and groups to stop nourishing quarrels’ and ‘solve for once the urgent and concrete problems of our people’.

Correa disagreed, tweeting that the ‘national large agreement’ should be to remove Lasso from office and call early elections because ‘we must overcome the over-simplification that democracy means waiting for the elections every four years’. This would however required a two-third votes in the National Assembly and neither the PSC nor the ID would be eager to go to the polls.

Political and image consultant Jaime Durán Barbo, who masterminded the 2021 runoff campaign of Lasso, is attributing the defeat of the government in the referendum to the fact that electors ‘voted on the messenger not on the message’. He also indicated that the defeat didn’t surprised him as ‘there never has been a president with a worse image’ than Lasso because the president has been ‘inefficient, pedantic and has contradicted the climate of encounter and humility which existed during the election runoff’.

Comparisons have been drawn with the defeat of Boric in the referendum for a new constitution but a better comparison may be the December 2022 failed autogolpe of Castillo: an ill-designed and poorly implemented attempt by an impotent president to circumvent a hostile parliament that end in a political suicide. Except, this one has cost $20 million and has been engineered by an establishment insider in national politics since over twenty years.

Now Lasso is finding himself with a further diminished political legitimacy, with a political party that has been wiped out in the locals and with a new CPCCS, where will be seated (according to provisional results) three RC members, two PSC members and two members without a known political orientation (the one elected on the list of minorities is an attractive young blonde woman, who spent the campaign posting sexy photos and vapid messages that are looking more like the ones of an Instagram influencer than a legal expert) while still in charge of making the key appointments.

https://twitter.com/ivoverdezoto/status/1614769665057689607

This could as well been a presentation from a candidate to Miss Ecuador. She is currently the most voted candidate on the list with 1,096,060 votes (19.5% of the valid votes), which is less than the 1,572,239 blank votes and the 2,390,444 null votes cast in the election of the CPCCS counselor for peoples and nationalities (Verdezoto is claiming to be a Montubia).

[Sir John Johns]

The CNE is currently recounting some 69,947 out of 326,192 voting reports (actas) in vote to the eight referendum results (about 20% of the voting reports for each question) over inconsistencies, meaning the complete results would not be known before several days if not weeks.

But there is more.

Santa Elena

Prefect (47.6% counted)

Verónica Palma Lindao (Pachakutik) 54.9%
Melina Villacres (SUMA) 27.4%
José Álava Jiménez (CREO-Somos-Península Positiva) 9.4%

Pachakutik is on track to win its first coastal province, even if with a candidate who was previously active in Abdalá Bucaram’s parties, meaning she is certainly a criminal (as a Fuerza Ecuador candidate in 2019, she only received 0.5% of the vote). The incumbent prefect, José Daniel Villao, elected in 2019 for an alliance between his Creyendo en Nuestra Gente and the PSC, was this time running in alliance with the RC and RETO, but only received (so far) 5.4% of the vote. The SUMA candidate was supported by Daniel Noboa.

So these are the results with 100% counted:

José Daniel Vilao (RC-RETO-Creyendo en Nuestra Gente) 57.6%
Otto Vera (CD-Avanza-MDS-Únete) 26.8%
Melina Villacres (SUMA) 8.2%
José Álava Jiménez (CREO-Somos-Península Positiva) 4.7%
Verónica Palma Lindao (Pachakutik) 1.6%
Luis Martín Suárez Yépez 1.1%

One can asked himself how the Pachakutik candidate managed to go from 54.9% when half of the votes had been counted to just 1.6%

Same thing for the mayorship of Santa Elena:

Mayor of Santa Elena (54.6% counted)

Gonzalo Menoscal (UP-PSP-Pachakutik-MOVER) 30.9%
Gino González Barzola (SUMA) 24.4%
Jimmy Candell Rubira (PSC) 23.1%
Dionicio Gonzabay (ID-Frente de Lucha Ciudadana) 9.0%
Fernando Rodríguez (PSE) 8.8%

Menoscal, the candidate of a bizarre alliance, is currently leading over Gino González, a former governor in the Correa administration now endorsed by Daniel Noboa, Candell Rubira, a former PSC mayor (1996-2000) and Dionicio Gonzabay, also a former mayor (2000-09, 2014-18, firstly for the PRE then for his Frente de Lucha Ciudadana personalist movement). One can however noticed the very bad career choice made by María del Carmen Aquino, who, elected an assemblywoman in 2021 for an alliance between the PSC and the Renacer local movement, resigned her seat to run for mayor as the candidate of a RC-RETO coalition, a choice that seemingly angered local Correístas who decided instead to endorse Menoscal: Aquino is currently placed fifth with 1.5% of the vote. Still, a lot of votes to count, so this could change.

Forgot the joke I made about Aquino because, guess what, she has been elected the new mayor.

Mayor of Santa Elena (100% counted)

María del Carmen Aquino (RC-RETO-Creyendo en Nuestra Gente) 32.6%
Andrés Aguilar (CD-Avanza-MDS-Únete-listas 106-111) 22.3%
Gino González Barzola (SUMA) 21.7%
Gonzalo Menoscal (UP-PSP-Pachakutik-MOVER) 9.9%
Dionicio Gonzabay (ID-Frente de Lucha Ciudadana) 9.7%
Mireya Vélez Zámora (?) 1.6%
Jimmy Candell Rubira (PSC) 1.5%
Fernando Rodríguez (PSE) 0.7%

How is such remontada has been possible. Well, this is just unbelievable.

https://twitter.com/CNEGuayas/status/1623355873115402240

Turns out candidates were arranged on the wrong order on the voting report papers meaning that, the order not being the same in the CNE software, there was a mismatch candidates were assigned the results of other ones on the CNE website. And not only in Santa Elena. In five other provinces (Cañar, Loja, Morona Santiago, Napo and Zamora Chinchipe), the voting report papers have been misprinted by the Military Geography Institute delaying the publication of the results for the election of prefects and mayors in these provinces and their 45 cantons. Now, recounts are taking place with new and (hopefully) accurate voting reports having been printed and sent before accurate results being reentered into the software. Several right-wingers are now alleging fraud (Villavicencio is 'only' talking about suspicions of fraud) when this is obviously due the usual incompetence of the CNE (in January 2021, six million of blank presidential ballot papers had to be destroyed because a political party was assigned a wrong logo on it).

Also a lot of complaints about the new software used to prevent the results on the dedicated website as, unlike previous years, the political affiliation of the candidates is no longer mentioned, gender breakdown isn’t given nor results at sub-parish level (for ‘special electoral zones’) and the lack of many other features previously available (like the results being provided in the form of table).


On the political front, the ID and the PSC have both rejected the ‘national agreement’ proposed by Lasso. Salvador Quishpe (Pachakutik parliamentary leader) has called for the resignation of Lasso while Villavicencio has urged for a muerte cruzada (when having recognized the victory of the ‘no’ that he is now disputing) and is preparing the ground for a presidential bid, hoping building on the ruins of PSC and CREO which haven't a strong candidate to run (it is pretty obvious that Lasso would be defeated in a presidential rerun). With a new assembly of the indigenous movement in the next days to probably decide a new paro, additional new accusations of corruption thrown by La Posta and the insurmountable parliamentary and institutional stalemate, I have hard time seeing Lasso remaining for long in the Carondelet Palace.

[Mike88]

Polling was a disaster, Jesus! In the Wikipedia page, the results table shows that in the referendums, around 2,3 million ballots were either blank or invalid. That's a huge amount of ballots, more than a quarter of all ballots. Is that normal in referendums in Ecuador or is it just a protest vote in this case?

[Sir John Johns]

https://twitter.com/cnegobec/status/1623857418781224961

Attention | The CNE has requested the Fiscalía to investigate an alleged parallel counting center managed the direction of the CNE’s Guayas provincial delegation.

The vice president of the CNE, Enrique Pita (representing CREO in the electoral institution), has claimed having discovered during a visit in the CNE provincial delegation in Guayas a clandestine office operating inside the premises of delegation itself where were printed voting reports differing from the official ones established in the recounting boards. According to Pita, the fake voting reports established by the parallel counting center are concerning only the referendum results (since confirmed by the CNE) and were functioning to alter the vote in favor of the ‘no’.

In parallel, the Guayas local branch of the RC has denounced a police raid in one their vote counting center in order to seize computers. According to the RC, the policemen haven’t a search warrant.

Polling was a disaster, Jesus!

Yep, but this not unseen in Ecuador. In 2006, for example, Gilmar Gutiérrez was polled at 3 or 4% in the surveys which included his name, and he ended up at 17.4%; Rafael Correa was also significantly overpolled, the latest polls placing him first with around 30% when he placed second with 22.8%. It seems that, this year again, pollsters have had massive problems to reach popular and rural voters.

To make things worse, polling companies are as a general rule politically biased or connected to political parties and business circles. The head of Market, the pollster that totally failed its exit polls, is Blasco Peñaherrera, the son of the vice-president of Ecuador under Febres-Cordero and a former president of the chamber of commerce of Quito who, at that post, was a harsh critic of Correa.

In the Wikipedia page, the results table shows that in the referendums, around 2,3 million ballots were either blank or invalid. That's a huge amount of ballots, more than a quarter of all ballots. Is that normal in referendums in Ecuador or is it just a protest vote in this case?

The number of null votes is currently reported at about 830,000, accounting for 8.5% of the total votes, which is a bit larger than the about 600,000 (5.6%) cast in the 2018 referendum and the share of null votes in the omnibus referendums organized under Correa (5.3% in 2011 and 4.1% in 2017). One should go back to 2006, when three questions (which met little opposition) were put to referendum by President Alfredo Palacio on the same day than the presidential runoff, to find similar levels of null votes (about 8%), which was less than the 9.8% of null votes in the presidential runoff. But there was then about 19% of blank votes cast, way more than the 1.0% of blank vote cast in the presidential runoff.

What is however striking is the explosion in number of blank ballots (currently 1,645,000) corresponding to 16.9% of the total votes. These numbers were 390,000 and 3.7% in the 2018 referendum. Again, one should go back to the 2006 referendum to find similar levels of blank ballots.

So it seems that a lot of voters, mostly in rural areas, didn’t bother filling the referendum ballot nor writing protest messages on it and just cast it blank. Which is probably votes either to protest the policies of the Lasso government, to object the current political system.

There are also high levels of invalid votes in local elections, but here it is the null votes that are superior to the blank votes. For example, 18.0% of null votes and 5.4% of blank votes in the election of prefect of Pichincha: the null vote alone is there the third most-voted option while the combined invalid votes are higher than the vote obtained by the most-voted candidate).

Same thing for the election of the CPCCS where over 40% of the voters cast an invalid vote. Interestingly, the share of null vote is increasing compared to 2019 while the one of blank is decreasing. The most voted candidate on the CPCCS counselor for minorities has only received 11.4% of the total votes placing third behind blank votes (16.6%) and null votes (24.8%).

Turnout has been 80.7%, similar to the one registered in 2021 general elections (81.0%) and in the 2018 referendum (80.7%).

Such numbers are a warning about the disenchantment of Ecuadorian voters with their political system, should dissuade winning candidates from too much celebrating and making predictions for the 2025 elections

[Sir John Johns]

Some results in the locals I haven’t mentioned:

Bolívar

Prefect:

Aníbal Coronel (Pachakutik) 42.2%
Javier Bosquez (SUMA-PSC) 22.0%
Felipe González (CREO-SIARI) 12.4%
William Montero (PSP) 7.4%
Ángel Pachala (RETO) 6.2%
Fausto Bayes (RC) 4.9%

Pachakutik is recapturing a province it only governed for a term (2000-05) by defeating the ruling PSC-SUMA alliance which has held the prefecture since 2014. The new prefect, Aníbal Coronel, served as a Bolívar governor in the Moreno administration and was the Alianza PAIS candidate in 2019.

In the canton of Las Naves, the Pachakutik candidate, María Angélica Aldaz, is elected mayor in spite of accusation of ties with narco-trafficking through her father, Froilán Aldaz, who served as mayor in 2000-08 and 2009-15 (for, successively, the PRE, the PSC, the PSP and again the PSC) and had been sentenced to twelve years in jail for drug trafficking after the seizure in 2015 of some 332 kilograms of cocaine in one of his estates; Froilán has been absolved in 2019 in a controversial ruling and was running for counselor on the Pachakutik list (and presumably been elected).

Cañar

Prefect:

Marcelo Jaramillo (RC-PSE) 34.1%
Belisario Chimborazo (Pachakutik) 27.9%
Diego Ormaza Andrade (MDS) 14.1%
Pedro Argudo Sarmiento (UP) 12.4%
Zoila Coronel (PSP-CREO-SUMA) 9.1%

The RC candidate (who already ran in 2019 but for an alliance between Alianza PAIS, the PSE and the MDS) prevailed over Belisario Chimborazo, the former mayor (2009-14) of the canton of Cañar. Coming third was Ormaza Andrade, a former prefect of the province between 2000 and 2009 (for the MPD). The prefecture of Cañar had been captured in 2019 by the PSC which, this year, didn’t have a candidate and apparently supported Zoila Coronel.

Carchi

Prefect:

Julio Robles Guevara (Conservative Social Movement) 60.9%
Melva Cadena (ID-PID) 27.1%
Wilson Ortega (RC) 9.1%

In that small province bordering Colombia, the prefecture has been won by Julio Robles Guevara, the former mayor (2009-18) of Tulcán (the province’s capital and largest city) and the leader of the local Conservative Social Movement, the successor of the provincial branch of the nationwide Ecuadorian Conservative Party (PCE). The leader of the PCE in Carchi was Robles Guevara's own father, Julio Robles Castillo who served as mayor of Tulcán in 1962-67, prefect of Carchi in 1978-84 and 1992-99 and a deputy in 1990-92. The victory of Robles is ending a twenty-three-year-long uninterrupted control of the ID over the prefecture of Carchi. The longtime former ID prefect (2012-22), Guillermo Herrera (also the national leader of the orange party until last year), has for his part failed in his attempt to get elected mayor of Tulcán.

Imbabura

Prefect:

Richard Calderón (RC) 34.3%
Lucia Posso (Avanza-UP) 25.2%
Jorge Martínez (Somos Libres-RETO-Construye) 11.9%
Gustavo Pareja (CD-ID) 10.4%
Marco Guatemal (Pachakutik) 10.1%

Richard Calderón, a former Correísta assemblyman and mayor of Antonio Ante canton as well as a businessman in textile sector, is capturing the prefecture of the province held by Avanza since 2014.  Former prefect Gustavo Pareja, elected at the helm of the province for three consecutive terms (1997-2009) and for three successive parties (ID, Pachakutik, PRIAN), failed his comeback (after a stint as mayor of Otavalo in 2014-19 for Avanza), placing only fourth. Marco Guatemal, an indigenous leader prosecuted for sabotage and terrorism by the Correa government, only placed fifth.

Anabel Hermosa (RC) is elected the first woman mayor of Otavalo with 21.4% of the votes while Álvaro Castillo (Avanza) is comfortably reelected mayor of Ibarra (the province’s capital) with 37.5% of the vote. Auki Tituaña is heavily defeated in his bid to get yet another term as mayor of Cotacachi, placing only fourth out of five candidates, with 16.0% of the votes.

Loja

Prefect:

Mario Mancino (SUMA-Latin American Popular Alliance) 25.3%
Kelvin Sigcho Azanza (CD) 14.4%
Darío Loja Reyes (RETO-Construye) 13.7%
Max Íñiguez (RC) 11.0%
Jorge Guevara (UP-Pachakutik) 9.6%
Nilo Córdova (PSC-Convocatoria) 9.3%

Mario Mancino, a governor of Loja in the Lasso administration between 2021 and 2022, has been elected the new prefect of this province previously held by CREO. Mancino was running for an alliance between SUMA and the APLA, a local movement and the vehicle of former prefect (2005-09) and political dinosaur Rodrigo Vivar Bermeo. The Correísta candidate barely improved from his 2019 result (10.3%). The PSC candidate, a former governor of Loja in the Correa administration, was already candidate in 2019, but then for a large alliance between the United Ecuadorian Movement, Avanza, ID, Pachakutik and the People, Change and Development Alliance.

Mayor of Loja:

Franco Quezada (Strength, Hope and Respect, SER) 29.25%
José Bolívar Castillo (Action for Equity Regional Movement, ARE) 15.2%
Patricio Valdivieso (Democratic Renovation Movement, MRD) 15.1%
Cesar Guerrero Cueva (PSC-Convocatoria) 12.9%
Nixon Granda (SUMA-APLA) 6.2%

The three most-voted candidates all belonged to local movements with the winner being Quezada, who already in 2019 ran, but for the MDS (placing then second with 18.3%). Quezada previously served as a vice-mayor (2014-17) in the administration of Mayor José Bolívar ‘El Chato’ Castillo before both men came at odds.

An influential local caudillo, Castillo has been the mayor of Loja during four terms in office (1988-92, 1996-2005, 2014-18) while alternating with stints as a national legislator. A controversial and authoritarian figure, he was in 2018 the first ever Ecuadorian mayor to be recalled in a referendum summoned after a successful campaign instigated by the taxi drivers’s local organization but also supported by street vendors, waste pickers, environmentalists and human rights organizations. All groups that El Chato had pissed off with his policies (introduction of automatic speed cameras; persecution against street vendors; judicial proceedings to silence his political opponents and force newspapers to publish his rendering of accounts; campaigns to exterminate pigeons and stray dogs and the tragedy of the three giraffes he bring to the Loja zoo at an excessive price only for the poor beasts to die because of neglect). As we can see, the comeback of the 77-year-old Castillo failed, the old caudillo having been defeated by his former ally.

Sucumbíos

Prefect:

Yofre Poma (RC) 32.8%
Guido Vargas (PSP-CREO) 29.5%
Amado Chávez [inc.] (Pachakutik-ID-SUMA-RETO-Contruye) 26.0%
César Cevallos (CD-UP-MDS) 6.4%

Prefect Amado Chávez, elected for the sole SUMA in 2019, has been defeated in his reelection bid in spite of enlarging his 'coalition' to four additional parties. Chávez has recently faced controversy because of his close connection with Luis Guerrero, a shady businessman who acted as his main financier and adviser and received many public contracts from the province in spite of being accused of money laundering. Guerrero has been murdered by hit-men in Lago Agrio (the capital of Sucumbíos) in last December. The new prefect, Yofre Poma, served previously as a Correísta assemblyman and was prosecuted under Moreno for paralysis of public services because of his participation in the October 2019 protests.

Napo

Prefect:

José Toapanta (Pachakutik) 45.4%
Gilmar Gutiérrez (PSP-Avanza-CREO-Antisuyo Ush**to) 29.0%
Ramiro Montoya (PSE-Sumak Yuyay) 13.1%
Silverio Mamallacta (CD) 5.8%

In 2019, Edison Chávez, already a prefect between 1996 and 2005 (successively for the DP and the PSC), had been elected when running for Pachakutik but died in office shortly thereafter. Pachakutik has still kept the prefecture, in spite of controversy about the inability of Chávez's successor (not running for election) to contain the dramatic development of illegal mining currently devastating the Yutzupino River; she has even been accused of complicity with illegal miners while the passivity of the Lasso-anointed governor has also been pointed out. The elected prefect, José Toapanta, has previously served as the mayor of Archidona for the PSP (2009-14) before running for prefect in 2019 for an alliance between the CD and CREO. The brother of Lucio Gutiérrez, Gilmar, attempted a second time to get elected prefect of a province which is the stronghold of the PSP, but once again failed.

Orellana

Prefect:

Magali Orellana [inc.] (UP-PSP) 34.4%
Bolívar Mieles (PSE-RETO-MOVER) 28.9%
Daniel Lozada (Pachakutik-MDS-CREO) 17.4%
Monica Guevara (CD-Orellanense en Acción) 7.5%
Salomon Torres (RC) 6.6%
Estuardo Hidalgo (ID-Avanza-PSC) 5.1%

Incumbent prefect Magali Orellana, a member of Pachakutik until 2017 and now part of the UP, has been reelected, this time in alliance with the sole PSP when, back in 2019, the Alianza PAIS was also part of her coalition. Former prefect (1999-2004) Daniel Lozada, previously elected for the PSC, was this time running for an alliance comprising Pachakutik and CREO; meanwhile, the PSC was here allied with the ID...

Pastaza

Prefect:

André Granda (Movimiento Semilla-MDS) 29.5%
Wilfrido Aragón (Pachakutik) 19.3%
Polo Lascano (Unidos por Pastaza-CREO) 16.7%
Raúl Tello (Integración, Progreso y Cambio) 14.7%
Germán Ledesma (CD-PSP-PSC-Avanza-SUMA) 12.2%
Paolo Espín (RETO-PID) 5.6%

The 32-year-old André Granda, who already unsuccessfully ran for assemblyman in 2021 for the MDS, has been elected the new prefect of Pastaza. He ran an effective campaign on attacking the apparently bad record of the incumbent prefect (not running for reelection) who had been elected in 2019 for an alliance between the PSC and Unidos por Pastaza. Two former assemblymen failed in their second bid for prefect. Raúl Tello, has already been a candidate for prefect in 2014 for the PSP-CREO alliance before serving as an assemblyman for Unidos por Pastaza; he is now the member of something called Integración, Progreso y Cambio. Germán Ledesma, a former Avanza assemblyman, had resigned his seat in 2014 to unsuccessfully ran for prefect, then for an alliance between Alianza PAIS, Avanza and the PS-FA.

Morona Santiago

Prefect:
 
Tiyua Uyunkar (Pachakutik) 46.6%
Celestino Wisum (RC-SUMA) 36.7%
Guillermo Estrella (ID) 8.1%
Washington Vallejo (PSP-CREO) 7.2%

Pachakutik is keeping control of the province it is leading since 2000 thanks to the election of the 30-year-old Tiyua Uyunkar, currently serving as president of the Achuar nation. In that office, he had opposed the illegal logging of balsa wood (mostly destined to build wind turbines in China) which gained him some international coverage. Celestino Wisum, the candidate supported by the RC, is for his part a Shuar (the other main Jivaroan group with the Achuar; the Shuar are living in the forested hills and the Achuar in the forest lowlands) as well as a former Pachakutik mayor of Taisha who previously ran for prefect in 2019 for a PSC-SUMA alliance.

Sevilla Don Bosco referendum:

The overwhelmingly indigenous parish voted in a landslide (82.7%) to split from Morona canton and become a new canton, the second one in the province, after San Juan Bosco Canton, named after the founder of the Salesian order.

Zamora Chinchipe

Prefect

Karla Reátegui (Pachakutik-UP) 56.1%
Bladimir Armijos Vivanco (PSP-CREO) 36.1%
Edgar Ortega Encalada (Avanza) 5.4%

A former vice-prefect under Salvador Quishpe (2014-18), Reátegui already ran for Pachakutik in 2019 but was then defeated by a slim margin by Cléver Jiménez, a former Pachakutik assemblyman and famous opponent to Correa who was then supported by a five-party alliance (Juntos Podemos-UP-MDS-PSE-United Ecuadorian Movement). Jiménez’s attempt to get reelected for a sixth party (AMIGO) was thwarted when the CNE ruled his candidacy invalid leaving Bladimir Armijos, a former CREO mayor of Yantzaza and a promoter of ‘responsible mining’, as the main opponent to the Pachakutik candidate.


The RC won the highest number of prefectures (9: Azuay, Cañar, Guayas, Imbabura, Manabí, Pichincha, Santa Elena, Santo Domingo and Sucumbíos), followed by Pachakutik (6: Bolívar, Cotopaxi, Morona Santiago, Napo, Tungurahua and Zamora Chinchipe, all located in central highlands or in the Amazon) and the PSC (2: Esmeraldas and Los Ríos). The remaining provinces were won by the ID (Chimborazo, in alliance with Amauta Yuyay), SUMA (Loja), the UP (Orellana), the MDS (Pastaza) and local parties (Carchi and El Oro). CREO failed to elect a single prefect.

In term in mayorships, Primicias is reporting, that, when taking only cantons won alone (and not in alliance with other/others parties) Pachakutik has won the most cantons (18), followed by the RC (16), CREO (6) and the PSC, SUMA and the ID (4 each).


Composition of the councils in the major cities

In Quito: Pabel Muñoz will not have a majority in the Metropolitan Council, made up by 7 RC counselors, 4 Pachakutik-PID-MOVER (Yunda’s list) counselors, 4 PSE-SUMA (Freile’s list) counselors, 3 ID, 2 RETO-CREO and 1 PSP-MDS (Páez’s list). This could be the recipe for a potential disaster as the two previous administrations faced a lot of problems in reason precisely of the lack of majority and the division of the ruling group in the Metropolitan Council.

Furthermore, some RC counselors may be turn out unreliable, especially someone like Wilson Merino, the young founder of a foundation dedicated to children suffering from cancer who spent the first part of 2022 astroturfing on social networks his new political movement (‘Imparables’) supposed to terminate old politics and promote a horizontal and citizen organization, only to negotiate with Muñoz a spot on the RC list as he had failed to register his movement.

In Guayaquil: Álvarez will conversely enjoy a majority (9 out of 15 seats) in the municipal council where the PSC, which got the remaining 6 seats, will not have much latitude to counter the new mayor nor to rebuild itself after its historical defeat. Additionally various people, right and left, have called Álvarez to create a commission to investigate all the public contracts awarded by the PSC municipality and there is surely a lot of skeletons to be found in a closet that has remained sealed for 31 years.

In Cuenca: there is no majority in the municipal council for Cristian Zamora, the mayor elected with the smaller share of valid votes (18.6%) this year. Zamora will need the support of at least three municipal groups to reach a majority. The largest group is the RC with 4 seats, followed by the ID-MOVER (3 seats), the New Generation Movement of outgoing mayor Pedro Palacios (3 seats), the Pachakutik-MDS (3 seats) and the CD-RETO-PID-CREO (2 seats). Marcelo Cabrera's Igualdad failed to enter the municipal council which, combined with the defeat of the old (72) caudillo in his bid for prefect, may spell the end of the provincial movement.


Finally, José Arroyo (RC-ID-PSE) has become the first openly LGBT mayor in Ecuador, having been elected in a landslide (63.7%) the new mayor of Pujilí (Cotopaxi) against the incumbent mayor who had made homophobic attacks against his rival during a meeting. The 70,000-inhabitant canton of Pujilí is poor, predominantly rural and populated by inhabitants mainly (51.8%) self-identifying as indigenous.

[Sir John Johns]

Concerning the referendum results, the final, certified, results are still missing in two provinces, Esmeraldas and Guayas. In the latter province, a full recount of voting reports presenting inconsistencies is still underway, the consequence of the discovery of the alleged ‘parallel vote counting center’ which appears now to just be a nothingburger: the now sacked provincial director of the CNE has explained having setting up such center upon request from the national CNE to speed up counting operations (well, this hasn’t been a great success). Allegations of fraud are further undermined by previous comments from the usual suspects claiming Enrique Pita (the vice-president of the CNE who discovered the parallel center) was actually a Correísta mole.

Nevertheless, even if incomplete, the results are pretty clear, at least for question 1, the one which had received the most support (48.1% of ‘yes’): rural areas and to a smaller extent poor urban neighborhoods voted for ‘no’ while urban areas, in particular the wealthiest ones, voted ‘yes’. Indigenous-populated areas have been the most opposed to the proposals put to referendum by the government.


Anyway, looks like President Lasso has been hoisted with his own petard and I’m not sure he would survive that:

https://twitter.com/eluniversocom/status/1625243463082995720

Journalist denounces before the Assembly suspicions of contributions by drug trafficking to the presidential campaign of Guillermo Lasso.

More precisely, Andersson Boscán, one of the star journalists of La Posta website, has handed over some 35,000 documents to the parliamentary commission investigating the alleged corruption network controlled by Danilo Carrera, the brother-in-law of President Lasso, and also involving Rubén Cherres, a discrete business and very close friend of Carrera who is now accused of being in collusion with the Albanian mafia.

Now a fugitive, Cherres has indeed been the business associate of an Albanian businessman based in Guayaquil since a decade. This latter is suspected of having used the banana export companies he is the shareholder to hid cocaine in banana shipments to Europe. The fiscal situation of the Albanian businessman is additionally very suspicious as, during several years, he has sent more money abroad that the total revenue he had officially declared.

In addition to possibly laundering drug money (notably through the eight differences construction companies he suspiciously registered the exact same day), Cherres has been recorded by the policemen discussing with Carrera about the selection of Guido Chiriboga as the new national president of CREO, the appointing of various officials in the custom administration (presumably to help the criminal business of his associates) and lobbying to advance the careers of Bernardo Manzano (the agriculture minister who has just resigned) and Víctor Araus, a police general who has later seen his US visa revoked without any explanation (Araus has confirmed having met with Cherres and Carrera). Also mentioned by Cherres is a contribution to the 2021 presidential campaign of Lasso by him and his associates, amounting to at least $1.5 million in order to purchase Covid test kits, masks and T-shirts.

Lasso was summoned before the parliamentary commission in the Carrera case but declined to appear. Neither has he provided an explanation over the apparent great influence of Carrera (and possibly Cherres) on the appointments made in his government. The identity of the official who has ordered the discontinuation of the investigation on Cherres and his ties with Albanian mafia is remaining unknown.

[Sir John Johns]

* The election of the parish council (junta parroquial) in Calacalí (canton of Quito), a 4,500 inhabitants rural parish, 17 kilometers north to urban Quito, will be repeated as the four lists obtained a combined 1,806 votes (46.6% of the total votes), which is less than the amount of null votes (1,882 accounting for 48.5% of total votes); blank votes account for 4.9% of the total votes. According to the Constitution, when the total of null votes are superior to the sum of the valid votes obtained by the lists or candidates running in an election, said election must be declared void and a new one should be held. This is the first time since such provision has been introduced (in 2008) that an election has to be repeated due to a number of valid votes inferior to the one of null.



* The canton of Quito should anyway return to the polls in the next months to approve or reject a proposal to ban metal mining in the six parishes (Calacalí, Gualea, Nanegal, Nanegalito, Nono, Pacto) constituting the ‘commonwealth’ (mancomunidad) of Andean Chocó, an area covering the northwest part of Quito Canton and home to a biosphere reserve and a high biodiversity: 700 bird species, 140 amphibian species, 100 mammal species (including the spectacled bear) and 46 reptile species. The CNE has indeed validated 206,517 signatures gathered by the Quito sin Minería (‘Quito Without Mining’) ecological group, more than the 197,427 required to force a consulta on the matter.



* Yet another attack against an elected official: the incumbent mayor of Camilo Ponce Enríquez (Azuay province), Baldor Bermeo, who had been defeated on 5 February when running for the Igualdad-Participa alliance by a candidate running for a MDS-UP-Moviento Alianza Ponceña Progresista, has been severely injured on 13 February by several bullet shots during an assassination attempt. Bermeo had already survived a shooting on last 14 June that left three dead and five injured. Bermeo had to be rushed to a hospital in Machala (because there is none in his 36,000-inhabitant canton) with his life in serious danger. Ponce Enríquez is the most violent canton in Azuay province (25 violent deaths registered in 2022 against 33 in Cuenca, a way more populated canton) and the main reason is: illegal mining. The attack against Bermeo in 2022 took place in one of his mines; his brother, also a miner, was murdered in 2013. Two businessmen in mining have also been assassinated last year in the canton, as part of disputes between criminal groups over control of the lucrative gold extraction.

[Sir John Johns]

The recounting operations have finally been concluded with the final results (still subject to potential challenges) in the referendum being:

Question 1 (extradition of nationals accused of crimes): Yes 48.5% No 51.5%
Question 2 (autonomy of the Fiscalía General) Yes 43.3% No 56.7%
Question 3 (reduction in number of legislators) Yes 46.9% No 53.1%
Question 4 (minimum number of members for political movements): Yes 45.4% No 54.5%
Question 5 (reducing the attributions of the CPCCS) Yes 42.4% No 57.6%
Question 6 (abolishing the direct election of the CPCCS) Yes 42.1% No 57.9%
Question 7 (water protection areas) Yes 44.6% No 55.4%
Question 8 (financial incentive for generation of environmental services) Yes 44.0% No 56.0%

In term of total (valid and invalid) votes:

Question 1 (extradition of nationals accused of crimes): Yes 35.8% No 38.0% Blank 17.6% Null 8.5%
Question 2 (autonomy of the Fiscalía General) Yes 31.3%  No 40.9% Blank 19.1% Null 8.6%
Question 3 (reduction in number of legislators) Yes 33.9% No 38.3% Blank 19.1% Null 8.7%
Question 4 (minimum number of members for political movements): Yes 32.7% No 39.3% Blank 19.3% Null 8.7%
Question 5 (reducing the attributions of the CPCCS) Yes 30.8% No 41.9% Blank 18.5% Null 8.8%
Question 6 (abolishing the direct election of the CPCCS) Yes 30.2% No 41.5% Blank 19.5% Null 8.7%
Question 7 (water protection areas) Yes 31.9% No 39.6% Blank 19.9% Null 8.6%
Question 8 (financial incentive for generation of environmental services) Yes 31.3% No 39.8% Blank 20.4% Null 8.5%

Map of the result for question 1, the one which garnered the most support (note: in Guayas, the parishes of Eloy Alfaro, Durán Canton; Tarqui, Guayaquil; and Milagro, Milagro are split in two according to the limits of the local electoral districts).



The parish where the 'yes' received the most support (91.4%) was La Puntilla (Samborondón Canton) in Guayas, a super-chic district beside the sea established in the 1990s/2000s to welcome the wealthiest (and whitest) inhabitants of Guayaquil and home to countless villas with swimming pools, gated communities, malls and the Kennedy Clinic Hospital, the private hospital where President Lasso is currently recovering after having suffered last week a broken left fibula (not a good month for him). La Puntilla has always voted for Lasso by overwhelming margins in the most recent presidential elections.

The parish where the 'yes' received the least support (2.6%) was Cochapamba (Saquisilí Canton) in Cotopaxi, a remote indigenous community in the Andean páramo where the majority of the population is still speaking Kichwa and make a living from farming and sheep-rearing. According to the 2010 census, 99.0% of the population there had unsatisfied basic needs, only 31.3% of households were served by the public water system and only 0.4% by a motorized garbage collection service. The parish has voted for the candidate supported by Pachakutik in the most recent presidential elections, even during the heyday of the Correa presidency and this is where Leonidas Iza has been formally invested as president of the CONAIE in 2021 during an indigenous traditional ceremony.

The opposition between these two parishes, ,which have very little in common, is a good summary of the results of the referendum. As a general rule, the more a parish is urbanized, affluent, white and enjoying developed and functioning public services, the more it supported the 'yes'. As a general rule, cities and towns backed the 'yes' while the rural parts of the country (bar a few exception) voted for the 'no', sometimes by very important margins. I'm not sure there is such a stark rural/urban divide existing in another Latin America where right-wing parties are usually doing okay if not great among rural voters. Here, this is a close result but what the map is showing is a series of blue spots in an ocean of red.


The 'yes' prevailed in the urban parts of Quito (with its strongest results in the wealthiest parts of the northern part of the city - 77.0% in Rumipamba, 72.4% in Iñaquito) and in the adjacent Tumbaco Valley (71.9% in Cumbaya, a very wealthy suburb; 59.2% in Conocoto, 58.2% in Nayón); in all urban parishes of Guayaquil bar Pascuales (49.4%) with weaker results in the peripheral and poorest parishes of Ximena (55.6%) and Febres Cordero (54.9%), home to numerous slums and hardly hit by criminality, in Durán (51.1% at cantonal level) and in Milagro (51.4% and 51.3% in the two urban electoral districts); in all urban parishes of Cuenca bar one (Hermano Miguel: 47.6%), all urban parishes of Loja and Ambato, all urban parishes of Riobamba bar the less urbanized one (Yaruquiez: 47.1%), in three out of five urban parishes in Ibarra and in all but one urban parishes of Azogues - each times contrasting with the rural, more indigenous, periphery which went for the 'no'. The same in Carchi where only Tulcán, the main city, supported the 'yes', in Zamora Chinchipe where only the capital, Zamora didn't vote for the 'no'. Other urban areas having voted for the 'yes' are including Esmeraldas (57.5% at cantonal level), Babahoyo (54.8% at cantonal level), Santo Domingo (53.1% at cantonal level) and parts of Portoviejo, Salinas and Quevedo which however went for the 'no' at cantonal level (respectively 45.9%, 47.9% and 49.9%). By contrast, the 'no' swept all urban parishes in Manta (42.9% for the 'yes' at cantonal level), Machala (47.4% at cantonal level) and all urban parishes in Latacunga bar La Matriz (61.0% for the 'yes') where is located the city's colonial cathedral.

Among the very few rural areas where the 'yes' prevailed are the mining area in southeast El Oro, around Zaruma (61.5%), Portovelo (52.6%), Paccha (58.7%) and Piñas (59.0%) which voted for Hervas in the 2021 presidential first round, the canton of El Carmen in northeast Manabí (50.4% at cantonal level) which is usually voting for CREO even if I don't really know why), the rural hinterland of Esmeraldas City, the Santiago River Valley in Esmeraldas , the surrounds of Ambato and the mestizo-populated parts of Tungurahua province as well as Penipe Canton in northeast Chimborazo; finally the Galápagos archipelago. Also voting for the 'yes', various small towns like Gonzanama (57.5%) and Cariamanga (53.8%) in Loja, Gualaceo (51.0%) in Azuay, Vinces (54.5%) in Los Ríos, San José de Chimbo (53.1%) in Bolívar or Puyo (54.6%) in Pastaza.


The 'no' prevailed elsewhere, including in the some of the poorest parts of the major cities (the aforementioned Pascuales in Guayaquil; the peripheral northern parishes - 51.1% in Comité del Pueblo; 51.6% in El Condado - and southern parishes - 58.4% in Argelia, 59.3% in Guamani, 59.6% in Turubamba). The strongest results for the 'no' largely match the distribution of the indigenous communities with northeast Pichincha around Cayambe, the Saraguro-populated area covering northern Loja-northwest Zamora Chinchipe and a diagonal between northern Cotopaxi and southeast Chimborazo being especially noticeable on the map.

[Sir John Johns]

An article about the recent Ecuadorian elections published and translated into English on the website of a Paraguayan political magazine and written by Juan Francisco Camino, an Ecuadorian political scientist.

In addition to emphasize the victory of the Citizen Revolution in the local elections, Camino is drawing a second lesson from the election:

The results also allow us to affirm that, on the side of the executive, one of the most important reasons for its defeat has been the absence of the State. In two years of government, the Ecuadorian state has shown itself incapable of providing basic public services to citizens, which has translated into problems of insecurity, lack of access to medicines, abuses in labor relations and educational infrastructure.

The absence of the State has also been reflected in the very low budget execution. According to the Fundación Ciudadanía y Desarrollo, most of the ministries reached 30% of budget execution as of the first semester of 2022. This showed a weakening of public services, which in turn has had an impact on how citizens perceive the State. It seems that the national government, advised by libertarians* in favor of a minimal State, did not understand that the Ecuadorian reality demands a present State, which provides public services for the poorest sectors, since an Ecuadorian with an average income (200 dollars per month) needs public health, education, and security, to at least survive every day.

But this election also leaves some lessons for the rest of the political organizations. The null vote has been significant and is a symptom of the wear and tear of the political system. For example, in the province of Pichincha, this option reached 17.98% of the votes and surpassed the candidate who reached third place (15.76% of the valid votes). For the mayoralty of Quito, on the other hand, the null vote reached 13.76%, surpassing 8 mayoral candidates. For the mayoralty of Guayaquil, the null vote reached 10.68%, being the fourth option among the voters of this canton. The massive nullification of the vote should call the attention of all political organizations in the country, as it could later translate into an “Out with All”, something that Ecuador already experienced between 2005 and 2006, and which is currently present in Peru.

* The mentioned libertarian advisers are the members of the Ecuador Libre think tank, founded by Guillermo Lasso himself, and whose head, Aparicio Caicedo, was a key presidential adviser until his recent resignation, in the wake of the referendum defeat. Caicedo has been in recent months at the center of various controversies over his interference in the appointments of key officials and his name is now mentioned in the El Gran Padrino case involving Danilo Carrera and Rubén Cherres.



Meanwhile, a field reporting from Primicias in Calacalí is giving indications on why the null vote prevailed there in the election of the parish council. Firstly, a campaign for null vote has been initiated by a local activist to protest the disqualification of two lists (PSE and SUMA) by the CNE. Secondly, several voters who had cast a null vote are giving additional reasons to explain this move, reasons that should be connected to Camino's article:

She explains that, out of the candidates there were, she barely knew the one running for reelection: Eduardo Logaña, of the Democratic Left (ID) party. ‘He did nothing for the barrios’ Seminario blurts out with much indignation.

‘The others only appear during the campaign. These are persons who have done nothing for the village’ emphasizes the inhabitant who reminds the problems faced by Calacalí.

1 The frequent interruptions in water in water supply. ‘They provide us with the service between five a.m. and eight a.m. and then they take it away from us for the whole day’ she says.

2 The pollution from the factories in the surroundings. ‘The odors are very strong, but no one does anything about it’ she affirms.

In the Magdalena barrio, Jacqueline C., 54, laments the unresolved problems in Calacalí are tarnishing the touristic sector.

She cast a null vote. And says that the current parish council hasn’t worked for them. That there are projects that have not been completed and, additionally, there is no water and the local roads haven’t been maintained.

But that’s not all. The school in the village isn’t in a good state.

Indeed, as acknowledged by a member of the outgoing parish council, there is a hole in the roof of the school that haven’t been repaired due to a ‘missing’ revenue that should have been provided by the parish’s slaughterhouse.

[Sir John Johns]

Seems everything is heading towards a premature end of the Lasso presidency, the question being now how this will happen

https://twitter.com/wambraEc/status/1629316049949667329

The CONAIE is announcing resolutions:
- breaking the agreement with the government
- demanding the resignation of Guillermo Lasso for the Gran Padrino corruption case
- demanding the National Assembly the political trial [impeachment] of Lasso
- mobilization on 8 March to join the march for Women’s Day and the one of 28 March [to support the submission to the National Assembly of a bill on water resources].

The CONAIE is hence withdrawing from the dialogue process engaged with the government since last July, is demanding the resignation of Lasso or his ‘political trial’ by the National Assembly and has also warned the president it would declare a national strike and levantamiento in case the president ‘intends to dissolve the state functions and govern by decree (i.e. trigger a muerte cruzada).

The determination of the indigenous movement will be certainly fostered by the murder by hitmen, yesterday, in the Amazon province of Sucumbíos of Eduardo Mendúa.

https://twitter.com/confeniae1/status/1630012213200056321

The responsible for international relations in the CONAIE, Mendúa was a leader of the A’i Cofán, an indigenous nationality in the Amazon northeast whose history is absolutely depressing: deadly diseases bring by colonizers; slavery during the rubber boom in the 1900s; social and cultural disruption due to Christian missionaries (especially the evangelical ones); expropriation of lands by white/mestizo settlers since the 1970s; conflicts with illegal and criminal groups operating on the border with Colombia; and finally opposition to oil extraction in their lands, from which they have benefited little, if at all, while facing the environmental devastation provoked by repeated oil spills, leading to a legal dispute before Ecuadorian, US and international courts against Chevron to pay compensations for the dumping of oil waste in indigenous territory.

Mendúa was leading the local opposition in Dureno (Sucumbíos) against plans by Petroecuador to develop oil extraction projects in the area, hence why the CONAIE is blaming Petroecuador and the Lasso government for the murder of Mendúa. On a side note, oil exploitation in Ecuadorian Amazon is currently temporarily suspended after the collapse of a bridge on 22 February, the consequence of a phenomenon of regressive erosion that is putting the country’s main pipeline at risk.


Nevertheless, a political trial of Lasso, as demanded by the CONAIE, will not be that easy to obtain. Unlike a parliament-initiated muerte cruzada which must be justified by an ‘acute political crisis or internal commotion’, proceedings for a political trial (juicio político) of the president could only be started for three reasons (crimes against the security of the state; crimes against humanity; bribery, embezzlement or illicit enrichment), should received the support of at least 46 legislators and be sent to the Constitutional Court for being reviewed. If qualified by the Constitutional Court (independently of the status of the judicial proceedings in case of bribery, embezzlement or illicit enrichment), the impeachment motion is going before the National Assembly plenary to be approve by a two-third majority (92) of legislators and, if passed, unlike in the case of a muerte cruzada, there is no early elections as then the vice president is assuming the duties of president until the end of the term in office. A muerte cruzada triggered by the National Assembly seems to have discarded over a constitutional uncertainty about the possibility to trigger it more than once in a legislative term (it has only been triggered by the parliament in June 2022 and failed).

Additional problems connected to the choice by the parliamentary opposition for a political trial to remove Lasso.


Firstly, there is no guarantee that the motive to impeach Lasso (accusations of financing of his 2021 presidential campaign by individuals connected to the Albanian mafia will be qualified by the Constitutional Court. And, because Ecuadorian political class is the worst, the RC is also facing similar allegations about the possible financing of Arauz’s 2021 presidential campaign by individuals suspected of being connected to drug trafficking:

https://twitter.com/lahistoriaec/status/1628920269447331840

God bless you, Leonardo. The Correísta assemblywoman Patricia Núñez emotionally expressed her gratitude during the presidential second round for the support received from Leonardo Cortázar, involved in the El Padrino case. Now Núñez criticizes Cortázar and mentions dirty money in the campaign of Lasso.

Leonardo Cortázar is a businessman and political operative recorded in the audios leaked by La Posta discussing with Rubén Cherres about shady businesses in electricity sector, as part of the corruption network headed by Danilo Carrera ('El Gran Padrino'). Cortázar can be heard mentioning the fact his career as ‘manager’ of contracts in the public electricity sector started under the presidency of Correa and reached its apex under Lenín Moreno. Indeed, Cortázar served as the director of the Guayas branch of Libertad es Pueblo, a party led by one of the brothers of Moreno. He is additionally accused of being an associate of Xavier Jordán, a businessman prosecuted over his alleged participation in a corruption scheme in the procurement of medical devices to public hospitals who has fled Ecuador to live in Florida. Jordán is additionally suspected of having served as a front man to Leandro Norero and engaged into the laundering of money coming from drug trafficking.

The recent revelations are exposing the presumed role played by Cortázar and his (unregistered) political movement (National Democratic Action, ADN) in the campaigns of Andrés Arauz (through the distribution of toys and COVID kits) and Ronny Aleaga, a RC assemblyman. This one has already been involved in controversies over his alleged ties with Cortázar (which Aleaga dismissed as a ‘bad coincidence’ and lies coming from a ‘presumptuous’ and ‘braggart’ to exaggerate his political influence) after the publication in last May of an early 2022 party held in the Miami villa of Jordán where Aleaga can be seen in a swimming pool next to Cortázar and Jordán and the leaking in last January on an audio in which Cortázar is mentioning that ‘Aleaga is an operative of mine’.


Secondly, if Lasso is feeling he is losing the game in the National Assembly, he can decided to go for a muerte cruzada, having by this point nothing to lose. Hence, the threat of the CONAIE.


Thirdly, in case the impeachment of Lasso succeeded, the presidency would end in the hands of the vice president, Alfredo Borrero, a political light-weight with not much experience nor following, who will have even less legitimacy and latitude to govern than Lasso. Quite hard to see him remaining in office until 2025, especially as he hasn’t distanced himself from the president nor gave indication he would implement different policies. So, unless Borrero graciously resign, the opposition will have to find a way to also remove him from office.

[Sadader]

Seems everything is heading towards a premature end of the Lasso presidency, the question being now how this will happen

Hmm, I initially thought the reaction to the election was extreme. Is it certain that Lasso doesn't make it to the next election? It looks a little like the CONAIE are overextending.

It looks like investors are seeing this quite badly. Ecuador's dollar bonds have tanked from 55 cents on the dollar to 35 cents on the dollar - the expectation is certain default! So much for that restructuring. Zero faith.

[Sir John Johns]

Seems everything is heading towards a premature end of the Lasso presidency, the question being now how this will happen

Hmm, I initially thought the reaction to the election was extreme. Is it certain that Lasso doesn't make it to the next election? It looks a little like the CONAIE are overextending.

It looks like investors are seeing this quite badly. Ecuador's dollar bonds have tanked from 55 cents on the dollar to 35 cents on the dollar - the expectation is certain default! So much for that restructuring. Zero faith.

Of course nothing is never 100% certain in Ecuadorian politics but Lasso has lost so much political capital it is hard to see how he could remain in office for much long. The situation is that he has been disavowed by voters when losing a referendum seen as unlosable (at least the question about extradition) and is now facing allegations of connections with criminal organizations his administration is struggling to counter in an effective and convincing way. Additionally, his party is in absolute shambles and any attempt to relaunch his government or change his policies can only be met with skepticism as his less than two years in office have mostly demonstrated that the Lasso administration has been impotent and unable to deliver its promises while additionally being hurt by a catastrophic communication. Finally, there are growing speculations (which are only speculations) on Lasso’s health, as the president has already underwent spinal cord surgery in 2018 and 2021, has been treated for a melanoma in 2022 and has suffered a fibula fracture few weeks ago.

Meanwhile, the opposition, which is already controlling the legislature, has gained in last month election a full control on the new CPCCS (which should be led by an alliance between the RC and the PSC), the most populous provinces and the main cities of the country (it should be mentioned here that back in 2019 the Moreno administration fled to Guayaquil when Quito was paralyzed by the indigenous protests, a move which would be more difficult as now Guayaquil will be headed by an unfriendly RC municipality) while the indigenous movement has emerged strengthened from the local elections: indeed, the strong result of Churuchumbi (25.6%) in the race for prefect of Pichincha combined to the easy reelection of Caizabanda as the PK prefect of Tungurahua and the victory of the indigenous PK candidate in the race for mayor of Ambato are pretty strong indications that the unpopularity of the 2019 and 2022 indigenous paros among urban voters has probably been largely exaggerated by the medias and the political class (the under-performance of Andrés Páez is another indication of such situation).


The threat of an impending removal of Lasso has been nevertheless considered as sufficiently serious to push the so-called ‘Democratic Initiative of Spain and Americas’ to issue a statement calling for the respect of the term period of Lasso, a declaration signed by numerous right-wing and right-leaning former heads of state and government in Latin America and Spain (the inclusion of the names of Jamil Mahuad and Lenín Moreno on it is probably not a good idea, however, and this is just for the former presidents of Ecuador):

https://twitter.com/IvanDuque/status/1631274974332833793

Obviously, investors are seeing this negatively because there is considerable uncertainty about how the ousting of Lasso will happen, how much time it will take and what will follow next; and even a scenario in which Lasso manage to complete his term in office may not be as good for investors as it may sound: either he capitulate and satisfy the demands of the opposition (hence he is just a lame duck president in the two next years), either he trigger a muerte cruzada, forcing new elections (with its share of incertitude) he somehow manage to win (not the most likely outcome), only to be able to govern until the next elections in 2025, so...


The impeachment process (juicio político) of President Lasso is already on track: the special parliamentary commission investigating the Caso Encuentro (the role of Danilo Carrera in the distribution of public contracts by the Lasso government, conveniently conflated with the recent revelations on the presumed financing of the 2021 campaign by a shady Albanian businessman) has concluded its report, which is recommending the impeachment of Lasso for ‘crimes against the security of the state’ and ‘crimes against the public administration’ (the charge of ‘betrayal of the homeland’ having been ultimately dropped at the request of the PSC). The report should be now approved today by the National Assembly plenary (it needs 70 votes), opening the way for a petition demanding the impeachment of the president which must be endorsed by one-third (46 votes) of the legislators. If passed, the petition and the charges filled against the president must be reviewed under three days by the CAL (the presidium of the National Assembly) before being sent to the Constitutional Court (CC). The latter should examining the constitutionality and legality of the impeachment request and the charges filled against the president. In case the impeachment request is declared conformed to the constitution by the CC, it is returning before the CAL to be sent to the National Assembly’s Oversight Commission (currently chaired by Fernando Villavicencio, an ally of Lasso, even if not totally reliable) which issued a report under thirty days to recommend or not the impeachment of the president. In case the impeachment request is greenlighted by the Oversight Commission, it is submitted to a vote in a plenum session of the National Assembly with the impeachment needing a two-thirds majority (92 votes) to be approved.

As we can see, this is a pretty complicated and lengthy process (as provided by the 2008 Constitution to prevent a repeat of what happened in the late 1990s/early 2000s with three presidents being ousted from office by the parliament) with a lot of uncertainty for two stages of the process: the Constitutional Court and the final vote in the plenum session as it is for now unclear if the 92 votes could be reached.

There has been a lot of criticisms made by various jurists against the report issued by the commission on the Caso Encuentro (on which the impeachment of Lasso will be based on) considered as poorly written, as being of a dubious legality and for including ‘proofs’ against Lasso that turned out to be false (a tweet attributed to Leonardo Cortázar which turned out having been posted by a fake account. When serious journalism is meeting serious politics):

https://twitter.com/KarolNorona/status/1631357693431537683

But there are two rationals conflicting here: the legal one, under which an impeachment of Lasso shouldn’t happened, at least not under its current form, because it is plagued with irregularities and judicial aberrations; the political one, under which Lasso has lost the confidence of the voters and is largely unable to govern. This is the rational followed by Mireya Pazmiño, an assemblywoman (elected for Pachakutik now an independent close to Correísmo) who candidly said two days ago that if the impeachment proceedings failed, then Lasso could be removed through other means, mentioning a removal on the grounds of ‘mental incapacity’ (used in 1997 to remove President Bucaram, but the process is now much more complicated and needs, unlike in 1997, a medical examination – removal for incapacity can also been for ‘physical incapacity’ which sounds as more appropriate for the case of Lasso) or an ousting ‘by the streets’.

Of course, if we are following Pazmiño’s argumentation, Ecuador will go back to the 1990s when the legislature removed unpopular heads of state for frivolous legal motives and through largely unconstitutional proceedings. A double-edged sword (if this is used now against Lasso, this could be also used against future presidents, including RC or Pachakutik ones) and a serious blow against Correa and his 2008 Constitution which dramatically restricted the ability of the legislature to remove the head of state precisely to avoid a return to the pre-2007 situation.

[Sir John Johns]

https://twitter.com/FerminVaca/status/1632111763205308420

With 104 votes the Assembly approved the report on the Caso Encuentro. It decided to charge Lasso with the ‘commission by omission’ of various crimes. The procedure for a juicio político will be proposed by the UNES and shall be qualified by the CAL.

The resolution is revealing the votes that would eventually be expressed against Lasso in case the Constitutional Court green-lights the juicio político. 92 votes are needed to remove the president.

The report on the Caso Encuentro and recommending the impeachment of Lasso has been approved by a large majority with 104 assemblymen voting in favor (RC, PSC, Pachakutik, ID), 18 voting against (all belonging to CREO or minor parties like Avanza or Construye) and 3 abstaining (Fernando Villavicencio, Mariano Curicama and Marcos Molina Jurado, an ID assemblyman). 12 assemblymen were absent. The charge filed against Lasso will be a ‘commission by omission’ for having let the police investigation on the drug-trafficking-related business of the Albanian, Rubén Cherrez and Danilo Carrera (‘León de Troya’ case) being closed. The report has established that Lasso had been aware of the existence of the investigation since at least July 2021 even there is no proof he had ordered the dropping of the case.

The report has hence been approved in spite of previous demands from various ID and Pachakutik assemblymen to extend it to the alleged campaign financing of various politicians, in first place Andrés Arauz, by drug cartels. In the debate over the approval of the report, Pachakutik assemblyman Ricardo Vanegas claimed that the commission has deliberately neglected information coming from the Superintendency for Companies about Ecuadorian businesses controlled by the Albanian mafia in the coastal provinces and suspected of having ties with politicians from the RC, the PSC, the ID and the PSP; yet, Vanegas voted to approve the report.

Not a good start for Lasso.

[Sadader]

Constitutional court (6-3) has given the go-ahead for the impeachment proceedings. RIP Lasso - my feeling here is that there are almost certainly 92 votes against him. The only question here is whether he's foolhardy enough to go for the Muerta Cruzada instead of letting Borrero step up. I suppose I didnt understand the constitution at all; I thought the one-impeachment-attempt-only clause applied for all cases.

https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/politica/juicio-politico-al-presidente-guillermo-lasso-se-reduce-a-peculado-la-corte-constitucional-inadmitio-el-juicio-por-concusion-nota/

 

[Sir John Johns]

Guillermo Lasso isn’t facing a muerte cruzada (which can only be voted upon once in a legislature by the National Assembly, even if this is remaining quite unclear) but a juicio político, the latter being a proceeding that hasn’t been used against a sitting president since 1962 (when the Congress unsuccessfully attempted to remove President Arosemena Monroy for having allegedly received the Chilean president while very drunk) but has been regularly used and abused to remove ministers and high state officials. Unlike the muerte cruzada, it requires a prior approval by the Constitutional Court and, if the National Assembly found Lasso guilty of the charges filed against him by the legislature, he is, in this instance, removed and replaced by the vice president without early elections being needed to be called. The fact that no new elections will be summoned can increased the probability of the juicio político against Lasso being successful (as assemblymen are ensured to keep their seats until the end of the legislature) but this is countered by the ability of Lasso to trigger the muerte cruzada at any given time (the pretext of ‘grave political crisis and internal disturbances’ is hard to challenge these days). A juicio político can be started at any time by the National Assembly providing it obtains the support of at least 46 assemblymen, has been approved by the CAL and green-lighted by the Constitutional Court but this is a lengthy process requiring lot of time and paperwork and, at the end of this process, if the legislators vote against the removal of the charged official, no juicio político can be restarted against said official in the same case that has motivated the juicio político.

Speaking of what, the Constitutional Court has only kept a single charge against Lasso: peculado (‘graft’ defined as the illegal misuse, appropriation or diverting of public or private assets or money by public or private authorities having control over them by virtue of their position). The offense has allegedly been committed during the attribution of public contracts by the Ecuadorian Petroleum Fleet (Flopec, the public entity in charge of transporting by sea exported oil) to Amazonas Tanker, a joint venture established by the Flopec and a private company registered in Delaware. Amazonas Tanker is itself reportedly registered in the Marshall Islands. The contract with Amazonas Tanker has been terminated in February 2022 after the Comptroller-General’s Office has established the contract had been awarded irregularly and had caused a prejudice to the State worth $6.1 million, the Flopec having during several months spent more money in the renting of oil tankers to Amazonas Tanker that it generated profit.

Yet, the manager of the Flopec who decided to terminate the contract on the basis of Comptroller-General’s report was quickly sacked afterwards and the controversial contract resumed, presumably after an intervention of Hernán Luque, the then-head of the Corporation Coordinating Public Companies (EMCO), whose whereabouts are currently unknown as he has fled Ecuador in last January. Luque was a key piece in the corruption network established by Danilo Carrera, the brother-in-law of Lasso, and can be heard in the audios leaked by La Posta discussing notably with Rubén Cherrez (the businessman suspected of ties with Albanian mafia and himself a close friend of Carrera) about the irregular distribution of contracts by the Flopec.

According to the opposition assemblymen, Lasso has been about the contract with Amazonas Tanker, about the fact it was prejudicial to the state and also deliberately ignored a report from his own anti-corruption secretary over the dubious financial management practices inside the Flopec.

The Constitutional Court hence ruled that Lasso can be charged for ‘peculado’ in this specific case while rejecting charges of concusión (concussion: the abuse by elected officials or public servants of their positions to demand undue rights, benefits or salaries for themselves or a third party) in relation with the management of the EMCO by Luque and the sale of positions inside Petroecuador by two successive managers of the state oil company, all misdeeds President Lasso would have been aware and accomplice of.



The general context in Ecuador is very gloomy as southern Ecuador has been hit by an earthquake that led to the deaths of 14 on 18 March, as Manabí and Guayas have been hardly hit by floods this month and as a landslide in Alausí (Chimborazo) has led to the death 7 and the missing of about 60 persons. There is also no improvement in sight concerning the growing influence of the drug cartels and criminal organizations. Karol Noroña, a journalist investigating organized crime and the situation in prisons has been forced to leave Ecuador and relocate in an undisclosed place after precise and imminent threats have been made against her life. And Nathaly López, a director of the Teodoro Maldonado Carbo Hospital in Guayaquil, has been killed by hitmen, presumably because of her fight against corruption and misappropriation of medical supplies in the hospital.

[Sadader]

Period for the presentation of proofs has passed. It looks like the next stage is for some individuals to testify and for congress to hold the hearings, then the commission in charge will present to the rest of the legislators with a report containing a recommendation on how to advance the case.

Borrero was in DC for the IMF meetings and met with some of the multilateral organizations and US gov officials. Seems the US and prefers a transition to Borrero rather than the muerte cruzada. Ecuador's essentially insolvent pending reforms or meaningfully higher oil prices, and for short-term funding it seems they'll go to IADB. Once the impeachment is done, they can think about resuming the IMF programme, though they drew $1bn recently to cover the earthquake/rain impacts.

I have a pretty shallow reading on Ecuador, but honestly it might be funny if the situation wasn't so dire for millions of people. Lasso was on CNN insisting that Congress would not have the votes to remove him, and he kept threatening a muerte cruzada.

[Sadader]

wow, we got a Muerte Cruzada  

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/17/world/americas/ecuador-president-dissolves-congress.html

RC presidency/congress sweep incoming?

[Sir John Johns]

Hi. Sorry for the lack of updates in the last weeks. Currently struggling with various problems including my old computer that is regularly freezing.

Guillermo Lasso’s decision to trigger the muerte cruzada happened just after the government had scored a spectacular debacle during the renewal of the CAL (Council of the Legislative Administration, the presidium of the National Assembly) for the 2023-25 period on last Sunday.

Lasso and Henry Cucalón, a former rising star of the PSC who is serving as the minister for government since last February, have displayed a lot of efforts to enlarge the pro-government coalition in the house by generating defections in the PSC bench (which has saw four legislators deciding to leave to sit as independents the last month), trying to exploit the divisions in Pachakutik (after the disputed election as new national coordinator of Guillermo Churuchumbi, a close ally of Iza, with only about 37% of the delegates in a congress marked by allegations of frauds and irregularities) and by buying parliamentary votes with the distributions of government and public jobs (namely the appointment of the ID ‘elder statesman’ Paco Moncayo and of the leader of RETO Paul Carrasco to government posts plus the embarrassing leaking by La Posta of the audio in which Cecilia Velasque, the outgoing sub-coordinator of Pachakutik and the main opponent to Churuchumbi in the race of the indigenous party leadership, can be hearded being engaged into negotiations over public posts with the previous minister for government).

Nevertheless, the candidate for president of the National Assembly supported by the UNES, the PSC and the pro-Iza faction of Pachakutik, Virgilio Saquicela (ex-Pachakutik, ex-CREO, ex-MDS, now an independent close to the Correístas) has been handily reelected to the presidency of the legislature with 96 votes in favor, only 23 votes against and 17 abstentions when the Lasso government pretended being able to deny him a new term at the head of the National Assembly.

Furthermore, the representatives of the pro-Lasso bench (recently renamed as ‘Bancada Ecuador’) were fully ejected from the CAL as Marcela Holguín (UNES) was reelected first vice-president and Esteban Torres (PSC) elected second vice-president. The remaining of the new CAL was made up by Viviana Veloz (UNES), Ángel Maita (Pachakutik), Jorge Abedrabbo (PSC) and Yeseña Guamaní (ID) – Guamaní, of the let’s-them-eat-national-sponge-cake-day-proclamation fame, returned as a CAL member with the support of the same coalition that removed her from the second vice presidency a year ago. All candidates of the UNES-PSC-PK(Iza)-ID broad coalition all received between 94 and 100 votes when 92 votes were needed to impeach Lasso.

Neither the announcement by 11 PK assemblymen (half of the caucus) who have been absent during the vote on the new CAL that they would vote against the impeachment (somehow counterbalanced by the announcement by the coordinator of the same caucus, Salvador Quishpe, that he would voted in favor of the impeachment, after having voted against Saquicela and co in the election to renew the CAL) nor the doubts raised over the legality of the whole process (hilariously, one of the legislator who sponsored the impeachment, the ex-PK Mireya Pazmiño, is now facing accusations she has, as the chairwoman of the economic commission, approved the renewal of the controversial contract between the Flopec and the Amazonas Tankers company, hence making her suspected of having committed the exact same crime Lasso is accused of), and the possibility of a dismissal of the impeachment process by the Constitutional Court for unlawfulness were sufficient to reassure the president he could survive the impeachment.

In any case, he has clearly no majority in the parliament and is now forced to deal with the new CPCCS, at the hands of the UNES-PSC coalition, which has been sworn in on 15 May, one day after the inauguration of the mayors and prefects elected on last February.

The proclamation of the muerte cruzada has now to be examined by the Constitutional Court to determine its constitutionality as the PSC and the ID (at least its faction currently having the hand on the parliamentary group’s Twitter account) have announced they will lodge a complaint before the high court.

https://twitter.com/jaimenebotsaadi/status/1658835454748155906

https://twitter.com/BancadaID/status/1658903739053350915

The CONAIE has summoned an emergency council to collective decide what to do (probably organizing protests and blockades) in face of what it calls ‘a scenario of a Lasso dictatorship’:

https://twitter.com/CONAIE_Ecuador/status/1658815865800871936

Meanwhile, the RC, while denouncing the unconstitutionality of the muerta cruzada, is celebrating the ‘triumph’ of the impeachment proceedings and indicating it is ready to the early elections and the upcoming change it is confident (too much confident?) it will bring by winning the poll.

https://twitter.com/RC5Oficial/status/1658865447473668098

https://twitter.com/radiolacalle/status/1658899717932154882

The ex-Union for Hope bench has announced it will respected the muerte cruzada

[Sir John Johns]

Also, ten years after the collection of the signatures, the Constitutional Court has ordered on last 9 May to the CNE to finally organize a consulta on oil extraction in the Yasuní, the first ever nationwide popular initiative referendum in Ecuador which was rejected back in the days by the Correa-controlled CNE in circumstances subsequently ruled as irregular. The question will be now about the complete cessation of the ongoing oil activities in the Yasuní National Park within a year if approved by voters. The referendum is supposed to be held within 75 days after the CNE has received the notification by the court but such timetable could be disturbed by the upcoming early general elections.

https://twitter.com/Yasunidos/status/1656075690071007233

[Sir John Johns]

* The Constitutional Court has dismissed all the appeals filed to challenge the triggering of the muerte cruzada arguing it hasn’t the competence to examine whether the invocation of a motive of ‘acute political crisis and internal commotion’ used by President Lasso to trigger the muerte cruzada is legitimate. It also clarified that no other courts in the country is competent on the matter, hence preventing potential challenges by local judges like what happened in the process of removal of Llori from the presidency of the National Assembly and in the internal dispute in the Judicature Council.

Thanks to the hyper-presidentialist constitution of 2008, there is basically any legal obstacle to bar the president to dissolve the parliament while, on the contrary, any impeachment process against the head of the state needs to follow a tortuous and long path before the final parliamentary vote.


* As a consequence, the term of all legislators elected in 2021 is terminated and the country is finding itself without a parliament until the organization of new general elections. The election of national and provincial assemblymen and the presidential first round will be held, tentatively, on 20 August 2023. If required (if no candidate wins over 50% of the valid votes or has received over 40% of the valid votes and is at 10% ahead of the second most-voted candidate), the presidential runoff will be held on 15 October.

In the meantime and until the inauguration of the new authorities to complete the 2021-25 term in office (in November or December), President Lasso has full discretion to pass decrees in areas related to economic matters with only the Constitutional Court being competent to oppose the decrees, but only if it found them contrary to the constitution.

The government has already enacted an income tax reduction (to be examined by the Constitutional Court) and announced it will pass other decrees to ‘de-bureaucratize’ Ecuador. Are planned the creation of free-trade zones, the promotion of public-private partnerships, the opening of oil production to private sector, a reform of the IESS and a decree to make labor market more flexible. On the other hand, the free trade agreement recently signed with China is put on a hold as it is requiring a parliamentary approval to entry into force.

Another consequence of the dissolution of the parliament is that the state high officials couldn’t be replaced by appointees made by the new CPCCS as it also requiring a parliamentary vote.


* The big news is however that Guillermo Lasso will not running for reelection in next August, an announcement made today with the publication of an interview to the Washington Post (maybe rumors about his poor health were true). This may increase the (meager) chances of victory of a conservative candidate.

https://twitter.com/elcomerciocom/status/1659583228217286660


* Have so far officially declared their interest for running in what is already shaping as a new clown car show:

- Yaku Pérez, probably as a candidate of Democracia Sí.

- Fernando Villavicencio, who has no party to sponsor his candidacy so far, but has yet announced as possible running-mates Liliana Febres-Cordero, the daughter of the late arch-conservative president León Febres-Cordero (1984-88); current attorney-general Diana Salazar (who has immediately declined); or Patricio Carrillo, a police general who briefly served as an interior minister in 2022 before forced to resign in the wake of the María Belén Bernal case (the murder in a police school of a lawyer by her own husband, a police instructor who, benefiting from complicity into the institution, left the school premises and fled in Colombia where he was arrested three months later). Clear indications he will run on a law-and-order and anticorruption platform appealing to right-wing and far-right voters.

- Otto Sonnenholzner, a 40-year-old businessman from Guayaquil who has served as vice-president under Moreno but resigned in the middle of the pandemic, while in charge of health matters, to prepare his 2021 presidential bid which never materialized. May run for SUMA or RETO.

- Dalton Bacigalupo, an uninspiring and dull dinosaur currently serving as an ID assemblymen for Cotopaxi. This is not with him that the orange party will repeated its 2021 extraordinary result.

Rumors that Pedro Freile is interested into running (obviously not as an AMIGO candidate this time) and so are Daniel Noboa and Pedro Pablo Duart. MOVER is contemplating running Jonathan Parra, its candidate for mayor of Guayaquil in last February.

Among ‘serious’ parties, neither the RC nor Pachakutik have so far indicated a name for a potential candidate while have been mentioned as a possible CREO candidate either Juan Carlos Holguín (current foreign minister) or Henry Cucalón, (current minister for government). The PSC is pushing for another candidacy of the old leader, Jaime Nebot (already an unsuccessful candidate in 1992 and 1996 who declined to run again in 1998 and 2021), who is supposedly retired from politics.

[Estrella]

* The big news is however that Guillermo Lasso will not running for reelection in next August

I suppose this makes it one of the less dishonorable departures from office as far as Ecuadorian presidents go. Somehow.

[FredLindq]

Why is Yaku running for DSI and not MUPP?! A split in MUPP?! Will MUPP filed its own candidate?!