Filuwaúrdjan
Realpolitik
Atlas Institution
Posts: 67,713
|
|
« on: May 27, 2022, 07:31:33 AM » |
|
|
« edited: May 27, 2022, 08:43:33 AM by Filuwaúrdjan »
|
It was considered as a serious threat in Britain throughout 1940 and was certainly seriously considered as an option by the Nazi high command throughout that year: even if we ignore the known existence of blueprints, plans and proposals, their actions alone are suggestive of this - there would have been no point in the Battle of Britain otherwise. The chances of success would be a different question: Britain was sufficiently well-prepared by the autumn of 1940 that any invasion would have almost certainly have been about as suicidal as Barbarossa though in a different way,* which means that any potentially successful invasion would have to have been launched over the summer.
This is where things get interesting: the general view in Britain at first was that a summer invasion was at once overwhelmingly likely and a very frightening prospect given the Fall of France and the relatively unprepared nature of Britain's defences during the first half of 1940, but it happens that the Nazis were nowhere near as well-organised or as good at strategic planning as was (understandably at that point) widely assumed, and so preliminary preparations for an invasion only began as the window for a potentially successful assault began to close. Had an invasion occurred before British mobilisation and fortification was complete, then it would still have been a very dicey prospect and it seems likely that the general view of the British public at the time (that any invasion would be beaten back comfortably) was probably quite justified, but, of course, on paper the invasion of France should not have been successful and the Fall of Singapore should not have occurred, which are both useful warnings against assuming that the most likely outcome is the only plausible one. Wars are dangerous and risky things and those in charge can and do make catastrophically stupid decisions and lose their nerve.
Whatever the hypotheticals, it is clear that the British government was correct to treat the threat seriously, because the best way to make sure that a threat like that becomes an unlikely prospect is to accept that it is possible and to respond accordingly. As the failure of the Soviet Union to prepare for invasion, or even consider it plausible, demonstrates in reverse.
*I see no particular reason to doubt the outcome of the 1974 Sandhurst wargame - which simulated an autumn invasion - on this. While we should not confuse its findings for facts, it is perfectly reasonable to treat them as overwhelmingly strong probabilities.
|