Sweden and Finland set to join NATO in May

[Antonio the Sixth]

Good thing there's never been any historical adverse effects of NATO expansion, such as increased geopolitical tensions and fostering armed conflict. Oh wait...

lol, okay

Back in the real world, "geopolitical tensions" (a nice euphemism for naked expansionist invasion by a larger power) seem to be a problem for non-NATO countries that happen to border Russia. It's pretty obvious that if we'd let Ukraine join NATO in 2008, Putin would never have invaded.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Good thing there's never been any historical adverse effects of NATO expansion, such as increased geopolitical tensions and fostering armed conflict. Oh wait...

lol, okay

Back in the real world, "geopolitical tensions" (a nice euphemism for naked expansionist invasion by a larger power) seem to be a problem for non-NATO countries that happen to border Russia. It's pretty obvious that if we'd let Ukraine join NATO in 2008, Putin would never have invaded.

When we tried to let Ukraine join NATO in 2014, it helped to create and exacerbate a civil war in that country which directly led to the Russian seizure of Crimea

Nobody was letting Ukraine join NATO in 2014. If there had been a political will to do it, it would have been done swiftly (just like it will be with Finland and Sweden) before Russia could manufacture its pretexts for invasion ("civil war" sure).

You were always a Putin shill but it's pretty sad that none of the crimes he's committed in the past two months has led you to do any serious introspection. It's truly pathetic how "America Bad" rots people's brains.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Good thing there's never been any historical adverse effects of NATO expansion, such as increased geopolitical tensions and fostering armed conflict. Oh wait...

lol, okay

Back in the real world, "geopolitical tensions" (a nice euphemism for naked expansionist invasion by a larger power) seem to be a problem for non-NATO countries that happen to border Russia. It's pretty obvious that if we'd let Ukraine join NATO in 2008, Putin would never have invaded.

Ironically, both Russia and Ukraine would be better off right now if Ukraine had joined NATO in 2008. Ukraine would contain the strongly pro-Russian regions of Crimea and Donbass and have a natural pro-Russian majority (thus no severe tensions with Moscow), while Russia would have an ally state within NATO that would in practice hurt the cohesion of the alliance against Russia.
Russia losing its hold on Ukraine has been the second biggest setback for Russian geopolitical interests since World War I, only surpassed by the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine never had a "natural pro-Russian majority". Pre-Maidan it was split basically 50-50, but it was clear that Yanukovych's servility to Russia and naked corruption had already alienated a lot of his erstwhile supporters, and the trend was toward a consolidation of pro-EU sentiment in the country. And then, of course, Russia invaded Crimea and Donbas, and support for pro-Russian parties collapsed to like 15%. And now, after this even more naked aggression, it's down to like 1% lol.

So Putin definitely made things worse for himself by invading, yes, but I do think ultimately Ukraine was trending in that direction no matter what.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Good thing there's never been any historical adverse effects of NATO expansion, such as increased geopolitical tensions and fostering armed conflict. Oh wait...

lol, okay

Back in the real world, "geopolitical tensions" (a nice euphemism for naked expansionist invasion by a larger power) seem to be a problem for non-NATO countries that happen to border Russia. It's pretty obvious that if we'd let Ukraine join NATO in 2008, Putin would never have invaded.

Ironically, both Russia and Ukraine would be better off right now if Ukraine had joined NATO in 2008. Ukraine would contain the strongly pro-Russian regions of Crimea and Donbass and have a natural pro-Russian majority (thus no severe tensions with Moscow), while Russia would have an ally state within NATO that would in practice hurt the cohesion of the alliance against Russia.
Russia losing its hold on Ukraine has been the second biggest setback for Russian geopolitical interests since World War I, only surpassed by the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine never had a "natural pro-Russian majority". Pre-Maidan it was split basically 50-50, but it was clear that Yanukovych's servility to Russia and naked corruption had already alienated a lot of his erstwhile supporters, and the trend was toward a consolidation of pro-EU sentiment in the country. And then, of course, Russia invaded Crimea and Donbas, and support for pro-Russian parties collapsed to like 15%. And now, after this even more naked aggression, it's down to like 1% lol.

So Putin definitely made things worse for himself by invading, yes, but I do think ultimately Ukraine was trending in that direction no matter what.

It was a (slim and getting increasingly more slim) majority, but it was still a majority. It only failed to elect a pro-Moscow president once: in 2004.
Indeed, in 2010, Yanukyvch won the vast majority of his victory margin from Crimea alone. You are right the country was shifting more and more away, but the trend was very slow before 2014.

Yanukovych could only win by 3 points against a deeply unpopular incumbent PM marred by her own scandals. And that's after losing by 8 points the previous time. Even if he'd managed to last out his term, it was obvious he would have lost even worse the next time. Ukraine in the 2004-2014 decade was a deeply polarized country, to be sure, but if anything it seems to me that a clear majority was already in favor of loosening ties with Russia and strengthening them with the EU. Even Yanukovych himself initially wanted the EU association agreement, because he understood that going against it was political suicide (as indeed it proved to be)!

Maidan and Russia's reaction to it accelerated things dramatically, of course, but regardless, your idea that Ukraine could have acted as a Russian pawn within NATO just doesn't reflect the reality of Ukrainian politics at that time. Maybe things were different in the 90s (a moot point since Ukraine wouldn't have joined NATO back then), but by the time of the Orange Revolution already, it was clear which way the wind was blowing.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Good thing there's never been any historical adverse effects of NATO expansion, such as increased geopolitical tensions and fostering armed conflict. Oh wait...

lol, okay

Back in the real world, "geopolitical tensions" (a nice euphemism for naked expansionist invasion by a larger power) seem to be a problem for non-NATO countries that happen to border Russia. It's pretty obvious that if we'd let Ukraine join NATO in 2008, Putin would never have invaded.

Ironically, both Russia and Ukraine would be better off right now if Ukraine had joined NATO in 2008. Ukraine would contain the strongly pro-Russian regions of Crimea and Donbass and have a natural pro-Russian majority (thus no severe tensions with Moscow), while Russia would have an ally state within NATO that would in practice hurt the cohesion of the alliance against Russia.
Russia losing its hold on Ukraine has been the second biggest setback for Russian geopolitical interests since World War I, only surpassed by the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine never had a "natural pro-Russian majority". Pre-Maidan it was split basically 50-50, but it was clear that Yanukovych's servility to Russia and naked corruption had already alienated a lot of his erstwhile supporters, and the trend was toward a consolidation of pro-EU sentiment in the country. And then, of course, Russia invaded Crimea and Donbas, and support for pro-Russian parties collapsed to like 15%. And now, after this even more naked aggression, it's down to like 1% lol.

So Putin definitely made things worse for himself by invading, yes, but I do think ultimately Ukraine was trending in that direction no matter what.

It was a (slim and getting increasingly more slim) majority, but it was still a majority. It only failed to elect a pro-Moscow president once: in 2004.
Indeed, in 2010, Yanukyvch won the vast majority of his victory margin from Crimea alone. You are right the country was shifting more and more away, but the trend was very slow before 2014.

Yanukovych could only win by 3 points against a deeply unpopular incumbent PM marred by her own scandals. And that's after losing by 8 points the previous time. Even if he'd managed to last out his term, it was obvious he would have lost even worse the next time. Ukraine in the 2004-2014 decade was a deeply polarized country, to be sure, but if anything it seems to me that a clear majority was already in favor of loosening ties with Russia and strengthening them with the EU. Even Yanukovych himself initially wanted the EU association agreement, because he understood that going against it was political suicide (as indeed it proved to be)!

Maidan and Russia's reaction to it accelerated things dramatically, of course, but regardless, your idea that Ukraine could have acted as a Russian pawn within NATO just doesn't reflect the reality of Ukrainian politics at that time. Maybe things were different in the 90s (a moot point since Ukraine wouldn't have joined NATO back then), but by the time of the Orange Revolution already, it was clear which way the wind was blowing.

Granted, the proposition that Ukraine being in NATO would weaken its unity vs Russia was silly to begin with, now that I'm thinking about the facets and not just a few of them. Russia's entire NATO strategy would have to change if Ukraine was a NATO member. Playing nice (by Russian standards, anyway) with the membership while deepening relationships with NATO members - a soft power strategy reliant on economics instead of tanks and bombs - would be the most effective Russian strategy going forward, and one that Putin would have been capable of doing. In this world, Nord Stream 2 would be 100% likely to go ahead.

Yes, soft power was always going to be the smart approach for Russia to maintain its geopolitical influence. This should have been obvious to Putin for a very long time, and if he was such great Strategic Mastermind as some people claim he is, he would have pursued that strategy instead of attempting to preserve his empire through brute force while relying on a decrepit army.

But I guess there's a fundamental reason why he couldn't do that. Soft power is rooted on attractiveness, on the idea that your country has a positive model to offer other countries that play ball. The US has that, China has that, even the USSR had that in his heyday. But Putin's Russia has no attractive quality and no tangible benefits to offer to potential allies. The kind of society Putin is interested in building is one that can only maintain itself through brute force - that's true externally as it's true internally.

[Antonio the Sixth]

[Antonio the Sixth]

The extortion is pretty grim (considering that Erdogan didn’t raise these concerns any earlier in the process) but I think Turkey’s “allies” will suck it up. It gives the EU more opportunities to slowly supplant NATO as the principal European defence organisation - membership probably provides enough of a deterrent to prevent a Russian attack, although membership of NATO is still a bit more credible.

Remove the sanctions, let Sweden and Finland join, then put the sanctions back. If Erdogan wants to play dirty then so should we.

[Antonio the Sixth]

No need to unnecessarily alienate Erdogan in these times. What he asks for is more than reasonable.

Yeah, when has appeasing autocrats with an interest in suppressing ethnic minorities and invading their neighbors ever caused problems down the road?

oh wait

[Antonio the Sixth]

enough with the israelposting please

[Antonio the Sixth]

It's not over until the fat lady sings. Turkey isn't likely to flip again, but there's nothing stopping e.g. Hungary from throwing a spanner in the works as late as the final ratification stage (which Finland and Sweden are weeks away from, if not months).

I'd assume Biden and Stoltenberg (and most of NATO really) will try to speed things up as much as possible. And tbf Orban doesn't seem to have it it for NATO in the way he does for the EU.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Any word on Turkey and Hungary? They're the only ones from which ratification is remotely in doubt, I reckon.

[Antonio the Sixth]

The situation in Italy might also throw a wrench into things. I'm not clear if a dissolved parliament still has the power to ratify treaties, so we might have to wait until October before we see any action on that front (and even then, you could see potential opposition from parts of the right-wing coalition if they control the next parliament, especially Lega). This is really terrible timing all around.

[Antonio the Sixth]

France has ratified. Against, depressingly, the opposition of FI and the communists. Might be time to change my username back...

[Antonio the Sixth]

France has ratified. Against, depressingly, the opposition of FI and the communists. Might be time to change my username back...

So a lot of people weren't there - perhaps under the expectations of an easy pass - and RN were whipped for abstention whereas LFI went for a no vote. Everyone else went yes.

Once again, LFI are unsurprisingly preformists and amateurs compared to the rest of the parties - and especially RN who are actually filled with electoral amateurs. If you can whip your votes in a way that will look better in a few years when one checks a wikipedia chart and doesn't read the details...you did well politically.

Yeah, this is a damning example of FI building its own echo chamber and not realizing how out of touch they are. Sadly I'm used to this from them, but the communists joining them is really disappointing (even Roussel said favorable things about NATO during the campaign).

And half French MPs not showing up to vote is depressingly common even for important legislation. Our levels of parliamentary absenteeism are really pathetic.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Any news on the remaining 7 countries? Does anyone have a schedule for when their votes are scheduled?

[Antonio the Sixth]

At this point I have to imagine that Erdogan either never intended to let Sweden in, or is waiting on some secret concession from the US before moving forward. Obviously this is still a great pretext for him to latch onto.

[Antonio the Sixth]

At this point I have to imagine that Erdogan either never intended to let Sweden in, or is waiting on some secret concession from the US before moving forward. Obviously this is still a great pretext for him to latch onto.

I mean, just last week he said Sweden needed to hand over 130 "terrorists" (PKK members). It's not like Sweden was ever going to do that.

“First of all, they need to extradite nearly 130 terrorists in order for their bids to pass our parliament; unfortunately, they have yet to do this,”

Yeah, this demand was obviously a nonstarter. It's the sort of demand that's so ridiculous that it's either used as an excuse to justify your refusal or as a bargaining chip in a broader negotiation.

[Antonio the Sixth]

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1631119634035519490?s=20

Does that mean Finland is now officially willing to join without Sweden?

[Antonio the Sixth]

What's Orban's goal here? At least Erdogan is making it clear he's not "there yet" and needs more concessions, but what does this weird edging game actually get Orban??

[Antonio the Sixth]

What's Orban's beef with Sweden exactly? Erdogan's has been well documented but I wasn't clear that there were issues here too.

[Antonio the Sixth]

So when is the Turkey vote expected?

[Antonio the Sixth]

Wonderful news. At long last, we can officially say that Putin's wanton aggression against Ukraine has been a strategic disaster for Russia and reinforced Europe's geopolitical cohesion. Hopefully Sweden will soon follow suit, and NATO and Europe will be stronger than ever to face the authoritarian menace.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Wonderful news. Today the country that originally said "Nyet, Molotov!" says "Nyet, Vladimir!" A proud, independent country and a key asset in the global fight against authoritarian neoimperialism.

[Antonio the Sixth]

I'm all for EU enlargement (which isn't even the subject of this thread, so we should probably move this somewhere else) but not before we get rid of the unanimity rule.

[Antonio the Sixth]

There's no way Orban has the political leeway to stand up to the combined NATO on this. He'll grumble but I have to imagine he'll ratify Sweden's accession in a matter of months.