Sweden and Finland set to join NATO in May

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

NATO expansion generally tends to lower the chance of war in Europe, while increasing the chance of a world war.
Just remember how we got into World War I.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

NATO expansion generally tends to lower the chance of war in Europe, while increasing the chance of a world war.
Just remember how we got into World War I.

All NATO membership does is leave Russia with fewer countries to invade.

That's not the only impact it has. Though it's certainly one that is on the minds of policymakers in Helsinki and Stockholm right now.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Good thing there's never been any historical adverse effects of NATO expansion, such as increased geopolitical tensions and fostering armed conflict. Oh wait...

lol, okay

Back in the real world, "geopolitical tensions" (a nice euphemism for naked expansionist invasion by a larger power) seem to be a problem for non-NATO countries that happen to border Russia. It's pretty obvious that if we'd let Ukraine join NATO in 2008, Putin would never have invaded.

Ironically, both Russia and Ukraine would be better off right now if Ukraine had joined NATO in 2008. Ukraine would contain the strongly pro-Russian regions of Crimea and Donbass and have a natural pro-Russian majority (thus no severe tensions with Moscow), while Russia would have an ally state within NATO that would in practice hurt the cohesion of the alliance against Russia.
Russia losing its hold on Ukraine has been the second biggest setback for Russian geopolitical interests since World War I, only surpassed by the breakup of the Soviet Union.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Good thing there's never been any historical adverse effects of NATO expansion, such as increased geopolitical tensions and fostering armed conflict. Oh wait...

lol, okay

Back in the real world, "geopolitical tensions" (a nice euphemism for naked expansionist invasion by a larger power) seem to be a problem for non-NATO countries that happen to border Russia. It's pretty obvious that if we'd let Ukraine join NATO in 2008, Putin would never have invaded.

Ironically, both Russia and Ukraine would be better off right now if Ukraine had joined NATO in 2008. Ukraine would contain the strongly pro-Russian regions of Crimea and Donbass and have a natural pro-Russian majority (thus no severe tensions with Moscow), while Russia would have an ally state within NATO that would in practice hurt the cohesion of the alliance against Russia.
Russia losing its hold on Ukraine has been the second biggest setback for Russian geopolitical interests since World War I, only surpassed by the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine never had a "natural pro-Russian majority". Pre-Maidan it was split basically 50-50, but it was clear that Yanukovych's servility to Russia and naked corruption had already alienated a lot of his erstwhile supporters, and the trend was toward a consolidation of pro-EU sentiment in the country. And then, of course, Russia invaded Crimea and Donbas, and support for pro-Russian parties collapsed to like 15%. And now, after this even more naked aggression, it's down to like 1% lol.

So Putin definitely made things worse for himself by invading, yes, but I do think ultimately Ukraine was trending in that direction no matter what.

It was a (slim and getting increasingly more slim) majority, but it was still a majority. It only failed to elect a pro-Moscow president once: in 2004.
Indeed, in 2010, Yanukyvch won the vast majority of his victory margin from Crimea alone. You are right the country was shifting more and more away, but the trend was very slow before 2014.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Good thing there's never been any historical adverse effects of NATO expansion, such as increased geopolitical tensions and fostering armed conflict. Oh wait...

lol, okay

Back in the real world, "geopolitical tensions" (a nice euphemism for naked expansionist invasion by a larger power) seem to be a problem for non-NATO countries that happen to border Russia. It's pretty obvious that if we'd let Ukraine join NATO in 2008, Putin would never have invaded.

Ironically, both Russia and Ukraine would be better off right now if Ukraine had joined NATO in 2008. Ukraine would contain the strongly pro-Russian regions of Crimea and Donbass and have a natural pro-Russian majority (thus no severe tensions with Moscow), while Russia would have an ally state within NATO that would in practice hurt the cohesion of the alliance against Russia.
Russia losing its hold on Ukraine has been the second biggest setback for Russian geopolitical interests since World War I, only surpassed by the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine never had a "natural pro-Russian majority". Pre-Maidan it was split basically 50-50, but it was clear that Yanukovych's servility to Russia and naked corruption had already alienated a lot of his erstwhile supporters, and the trend was toward a consolidation of pro-EU sentiment in the country. And then, of course, Russia invaded Crimea and Donbas, and support for pro-Russian parties collapsed to like 15%. And now, after this even more naked aggression, it's down to like 1% lol.

So Putin definitely made things worse for himself by invading, yes, but I do think ultimately Ukraine was trending in that direction no matter what.

It was a (slim and getting increasingly more slim) majority, but it was still a majority. It only failed to elect a pro-Moscow president once: in 2004.
Indeed, in 2010, Yanukyvch won the vast majority of his victory margin from Crimea alone. You are right the country was shifting more and more away, but the trend was very slow before 2014.

Yanukovych could only win by 3 points against a deeply unpopular incumbent PM marred by her own scandals. And that's after losing by 8 points the previous time. Even if he'd managed to last out his term, it was obvious he would have lost even worse the next time. Ukraine in the 2004-2014 decade was a deeply polarized country, to be sure, but if anything it seems to me that a clear majority was already in favor of loosening ties with Russia and strengthening them with the EU. Even Yanukovych himself initially wanted the EU association agreement, because he understood that going against it was political suicide (as indeed it proved to be)!

Maidan and Russia's reaction to it accelerated things dramatically, of course, but regardless, your idea that Ukraine could have acted as a Russian pawn within NATO just doesn't reflect the reality of Ukrainian politics at that time. Maybe things were different in the 90s (a moot point since Ukraine wouldn't have joined NATO back then), but by the time of the Orange Revolution already, it was clear which way the wind was blowing.

Granted, the proposition that Ukraine being in NATO would weaken its unity vs Russia was silly to begin with, now that I'm thinking about the facets and not just a few of them. Russia's entire NATO strategy would have to change if Ukraine was a NATO member. Playing nice (by Russian standards, anyway) with the membership while deepening relationships with NATO members - a soft power strategy reliant on economics instead of tanks and bombs - would be the most effective Russian strategy going forward, and one that Putin would have been capable of doing. In this world, Nord Stream 2 would be 100% likely to go ahead.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Good thing there's never been any historical adverse effects of NATO expansion, such as increased geopolitical tensions and fostering armed conflict. Oh wait...

lol, okay

Back in the real world, "geopolitical tensions" (a nice euphemism for naked expansionist invasion by a larger power) seem to be a problem for non-NATO countries that happen to border Russia. It's pretty obvious that if we'd let Ukraine join NATO in 2008, Putin would never have invaded.

Ironically, both Russia and Ukraine would be better off right now if Ukraine had joined NATO in 2008. Ukraine would contain the strongly pro-Russian regions of Crimea and Donbass and have a natural pro-Russian majority (thus no severe tensions with Moscow), while Russia would have an ally state within NATO that would in practice hurt the cohesion of the alliance against Russia.
Russia losing its hold on Ukraine has been the second biggest setback for Russian geopolitical interests since World War I, only surpassed by the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine never had a "natural pro-Russian majority". Pre-Maidan it was split basically 50-50, but it was clear that Yanukovych's servility to Russia and naked corruption had already alienated a lot of his erstwhile supporters, and the trend was toward a consolidation of pro-EU sentiment in the country. And then, of course, Russia invaded Crimea and Donbas, and support for pro-Russian parties collapsed to like 15%. And now, after this even more naked aggression, it's down to like 1% lol.

So Putin definitely made things worse for himself by invading, yes, but I do think ultimately Ukraine was trending in that direction no matter what.

It was a (slim and getting increasingly more slim) majority, but it was still a majority. It only failed to elect a pro-Moscow president once: in 2004.
Indeed, in 2010, Yanukyvch won the vast majority of his victory margin from Crimea alone. You are right the country was shifting more and more away, but the trend was very slow before 2014.

Yanukovych could only win by 3 points against a deeply unpopular incumbent PM marred by her own scandals. And that's after losing by 8 points the previous time. Even if he'd managed to last out his term, it was obvious he would have lost even worse the next time. Ukraine in the 2004-2014 decade was a deeply polarized country, to be sure, but if anything it seems to me that a clear majority was already in favor of loosening ties with Russia and strengthening them with the EU. Even Yanukovych himself initially wanted the EU association agreement, because he understood that going against it was political suicide (as indeed it proved to be)!

Maidan and Russia's reaction to it accelerated things dramatically, of course, but regardless, your idea that Ukraine could have acted as a Russian pawn within NATO just doesn't reflect the reality of Ukrainian politics at that time. Maybe things were different in the 90s (a moot point since Ukraine wouldn't have joined NATO back then), but by the time of the Orange Revolution already, it was clear which way the wind was blowing.

Granted, the proposition that Ukraine being in NATO would weaken its unity vs Russia was silly to begin with, now that I'm thinking about the facets and not just a few of them. Russia's entire NATO strategy would have to change if Ukraine was a NATO member. Playing nice (by Russian standards, anyway) with the membership while deepening relationships with NATO members - a soft power strategy reliant on economics instead of tanks and bombs - would be the most effective Russian strategy going forward, and one that Putin would have been capable of doing. In this world, Nord Stream 2 would be 100% likely to go ahead.

Yes, soft power was always going to be the smart approach for Russia to maintain its geopolitical influence. This should have been obvious to Putin for a very long time, and if he was such great Strategic Mastermind as some people claim he is, he would have pursued that strategy instead of attempting to preserve his empire through brute force while relying on a decrepit army.

But I guess there's a fundamental reason why he couldn't do that. Soft power is rooted on attractiveness, on the idea that your country has a positive model to offer other countries that play ball. The US has that, China has that, even the USSR had that in his heyday. But Putin's Russia has no attractive quality and no tangible benefits to offer to potential allies. The kind of society Putin is interested in building is one that can only maintain itself through brute force - that's true externally as it's true internally.

Russia was in fact using a soft power strategy for most of the 2000s and even some of the 2010s.
It was only in 2014 they switched to hard power, and then only in one theater.
Russia sits on more hydrocarbons than any other country on earth, and enjoys a key position along east and west that gives it enormous latitude to play the economic power game should it want to.
Russia absolutely has things to offer, it just chose to deemphasize these things at a time when it could scarcely afford it.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Russia was in fact using a soft power strategy for most of the 2000s and even some of the 2010s.

Georgia (and other peoples in the northern Caucasus) would disagree with you.

I was speaking mainly in generalities. Russia's basically been reliant on selling hydrocarbons and other mineral resources to Europe for the past 20 years; that's, at core, a soft power strategy, not a hard power one. The charm offensive they've pulled re: Germany was a soft power thing if I've ever seen one.
Of course, Georgia is an exception, and one I should have mentioned. But it doesn't really change the broader picture in a fundamental way.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Vote Lib Dem on May 7 - keep Clegg as deputy PM

In case you haven't noticed, they didn't

I wasn't going to talk about it, but since two people have now brought it up, I'll make a short comment. Lol.
That little thing is kept mainly for time capsule value. It's part of the unchanging retro-ness of my signature. I've only heard positive comments about it over the years, so clearly I'm doing something right.
That is all, lol. This thread is about NATO and Russia, Nordics, that jazz. Feel free to ask anything here.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Russia was in fact using a soft power strategy for most of the 2000s and even some of the 2010s.

Georgia (and other peoples in the northern Caucasus) would disagree with you.

I was speaking mainly in generalities. Russia's basically been reliant on selling hydrocarbons and other mineral resources to Europe for the past 20 years; that's, at core, a soft power strategy, not a hard power one. The charm offensive they've pulled re: Germany was a soft power thing if I've ever seen one.
Of course, Georgia is an exception, and one I should have mentioned. But it doesn't really change the broader picture in a fundamental way.

You are right about Germany, but Russia used hard power plenty of times post-1990 - besides Ukraine and Georgia, there were the interventions in Syria and Transnistria, and the provision of troops to provide “stability” in Belarus and Kazakhstan. This is a grey area w.r.t. hard/soft power, but they also gave strong support to the closely linked Wagner PMC group in Libya, Mali and other unstable countries.

This is in addition to committing troops to various international missions like the anti-piracy campaign off the Somalian coast. High-profile poisonings aren’t necessarily military action, but I would argue the polonium/novichok assassinations in Britain constituted a use of hard power.

No state pursues a purely “hard” or “soft” power strategy, but (in recent decades) Russia has probably relied on strength of arms more than any other major power (except the USA). The contrast between its regular conflicts and China’s lack of them is striking.

This is fair. Of course, I'm honing in on the economic side of it, which by default will be more soft power-oriented; this provides a profoundly different picture.
Some similarities between France and Russia in how they've blended soft and hard power for their own purposes over the past 20 or so years, here.
And it's true that China's lack of regular conflicts is quite striking, especially vis a vis Russia.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

It is concerning, the potential for NATO expansion to create a world war.
I hope it never gets to that point.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

It is concerning, the potential for NATO expansion to create a world war.
I hope it never gets to that point.

At this point, if a world war actually happens, it was always going to happen.

I'm not talking about a world war sparked by what happened in Ukraine.
I'm talking long-term.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

It is concerning, the potential for NATO expansion to create a world war.
I hope it never gets to that point.

Offs, tim, give it a rest. Putin has been threatening invasion of these countries which drove them into the arms of nato, with 110% justification.

Don't attempt to blame the NATO for this or even offer some half-assed both sides analysis because it is just plain wrong-headed.

You need to look at things from a global perspective here. What happens in Ukraine is and will continue to have global impact, shaping how China might act towards us, among other things.
There have been multiple occasions in which we have had global-spanning international alliances spanning the globe. The late 1800s and early 1900s were one such occasion, and the 1930s were another.
In both cases, we saw world wars.
The world is composed of various power centers fighting for influence and territory using all the things in their disposal, and always has. And the more a NATO-type alliance expands and the more of them there are, the more flash points can create a global conflict between said power centers. Are we to myopically assume that tensions will just die off completely, forever, just because said countries are NATO members? Do we know how things will look like 20 or 25 years from now? How do we know that the tools we've used won't be turned onto us?
Of course the political will for war needs to exist, but that's something that tension can go a long way towards furnishing. When there is a sense of desperation or urgency, of course political leaders will find it relatively much more expedient to roll the dice.
The post-World War II world order could be destroyed by a major international war on multiple continents. We already see a proliferation of pacts and other things on the world stage. Biden himself understands this too, I think. He's flat-out committed to no Americans fighting in Ukraine. Good for him.
All this isn't "half-a**ed both sides analysis". It's recognition of geopolitical reality.
What you and I prefer is far from guaranteed to be the dominant paradigm globally anyway. To just assume that it will be in perpetuity, or act as such, is foolish. Geopolitical power knows neither morality nor political ideology. The real world ain't like a comic book where the baddies, as a rule, tend to lose in the end.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

It is possible for both of these things to be true at the same time:

1) Russia has totally legitimate national interests and security concerns, and yes the West went badly wrong during and after the fall of the USSR in not sufficiently understanding and assisting these;

2) Russia's present conduct is totally outrageous and indefensible, and what happened previously is absolutely no excuse - the rest of the world is totally entitled to react appropriately, and that includes its neighbours pursuing whatever makes them feel most secure.

Oh, the world is totally entitled to act the way it desires in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and I'd be lying if I claimed I didn't approve, on net, of the beating Russia is getting right now.

The thrust of what I'm saying is 1) you need to consider long-term and short-term, not just one or the other, and 2) the idea that NATO-style structures are good without limit and the more of them exist and the more powerful they are is automatically better, is basically the road to a world war. Such maximalist thinking is not how the Pax Americana is likeliest to be preserved, especially as the American military-industrial complex will have to do double-duty to maintain America's pre-eminent position.

(Of course, me being American, an analyst type, and IR realist all influence me here)

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

It is possible for both of these things to be true at the same time:

1) Russia has totally legitimate national interests and security concerns, and yes the West went badly wrong during and after the fall of the USSR in not sufficiently understanding and assisting these;

2) Russia's present conduct is totally outrageous and indefensible, and what happened previously is absolutely no excuse - the rest of the world is totally entitled to react appropriately, and that includes its neighbours pursuing whatever makes them feel most secure.

Oh, the world is totally entitled to act the way it desires in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and I'd be lying if I claimed I didn't approve, on net, of the beating Russia is getting right now.

The thrust of what I'm saying is 1) you need to consider long-term and short-term, not just one or the other, and 2) the idea that NATO-style structures are good without limit and the more of them exist and the more powerful they are is automatically better, is basically the road to a world war. Such maximalist thinking is not how the Pax Americana is likeliest to be preserved, especially as the American military-industrial complex will have to do double-duty to maintain America's pre-eminent position.

(Of course, me being American, an analyst type, and IR realist all influence me here)

Realism is an archaic idea of global relations because it assumes state actors act logically. That myth should have been busted by now.

Arguing that realism is archaic because of some incompetent leader is on par with claiming that tanks are outdated weapons because [insert conflict where tanks got destroyed here].
Incomplete thinking that fails to take into account everything and overlooks key facets.
Realpolitik has always been the most successful geopolitical policy.
In reality, it is not at all true that every state works logically, never has been, but it's a good working assumption and a good framework to see the world, both because you don't want to be caught napping, and because there are no alternatives that make zero application of it.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

It is concerning, the potential for NATO expansion to create a world war.
I hope it never gets to that point.

Offs, tim, give it a rest. Putin has been threatening invasion of these countries which drove them into the arms of nato, with 110% justification.

Don't attempt to blame the NATO for this or even offer some half-assed both sides analysis because it is just plain wrong-headed.

You need to look at things from a global perspective here. What happens in Ukraine is and will continue to have global impact, shaping how China might act towards us, among other things.
There have been multiple occasions in which we have had global-spanning international alliances spanning the globe. The late 1800s and early 1900s were one such occasion, and the 1930s were another.
In both cases, we saw world wars.
The world is composed of various power centers fighting for influence and territory using all the things in their disposal, and always has. And the more a NATO-type alliance expands and the more of them there are, the more flash points can create a global conflict between said power centers. Are we to myopically assume that tensions will just die off completely, forever, just because said countries are NATO members? Do we know how things will look like 20 or 25 years from now? How do we know that the tools we've used won't be turned onto us?
Of course the political will for war needs to exist, but that's something that tension can go a long way towards furnishing. When there is a sense of desperation or urgency, of course political leaders will find it relatively much more expedient to roll the dice.
The post-World War II world order could be destroyed by a major international war on multiple continents. We already see a proliferation of pacts and other things on the world stage. Biden himself understands this too, I think. He's flat-out committed to no Americans fighting in Ukraine. Good for him.
All this isn't "half-a**ed both sides analysis". It's recognition of geopolitical reality.
What you and I prefer is far from guaranteed to be the dominant paradigm globally anyway. To just assume that it will be in perpetuity, or act as such, is foolish. Geopolitical power knows neither morality nor political ideology. The real world ain't like a comic book where the baddies, as a rule, tend to lose in the end.

One can make such a generic "more International entanglements and alliances creates additional theoretical chances 4 some Flashpoint to occur leading to International conflict" about literally every treaty or military Alliance the US is involved in. By that logic perhaps we should attempt to dismantle NATO to reduce the number of flashpoints as you repeatedly refer to them.

But you are not being realistic. The issue here is rather whether or not Finland and Sweden likely joining NATO creates any tangible increased threat of War, balance versus the additional solidification of both Swedish and Finnish, plus general NATO and American interests, and likewise minimizes the chance that Russia would attempt to pull another Ukraine style invasion of Finland if and when they get the chance. The answers are quite clearly know, and absolutely yes in that order.

Overall, realistically, Finland becoming part of NATO markedly decreases the likelihood of War through reducing its primary threat being Russian expansionism. The cost benefit analysis of this is so lopsided that frankly this decision is pretty much a no-brainer, realistically speaking.

The problem with how you are approaching this is thinking that my thinking is that ANY singular metric should alone determine our policy, as well as, one again, failing to understand that you have to look at the broader world, not just Eastern Europe.
In IR, maximalist thinking of any kind is probably bad. The key is flexibility. Not locking yourself onto one track; working to maximize or minimize things at will for sake of the national interest.
NATO existing is good. NATO choking out Russia to the point to which China has it as a vassal state is probably bad. (Of course, if we have a great relationship with China, it might actually be good)
Again, for a moment, forget about Ukraine. Think about the wider world, think long-term, think about how China has a full billion more people than us and how it's still a rising power. Some balance among second-tier states is good, but also, how said states interact is also important. Relative power is as important as absolute power. We need a critical mass of second-tier states on our side. That's why we have NATO. But we have the luxury of being able to avoid having China have a strong stable of allies while also having a stable of allies on our own side. Hence, there is a sweet spot that I think US policy should hone in on.

The Ukraine conflict may have key implications globally, but to conflate what is good in Eastern Europe with what is good globally, is mere tunnel vision.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Turkey Puts Sweden’s NATO Bid Back on Agenda Next Week

The Foreign Affairs Committee in Ankara listed Sweden’s bid among the topics for debate on Dec. 26, according to an invitation from the panel’s chairman, Fuat Oktay, seen by Bloomberg.

Nice to see the progress here, even if it's slow.