2022 French legislatives

[Zinneke]

They've agreed to it, but this is the last nail in the coffin for them. The party will rip apart because many will still want to hedge their bets tying themselves to Macronisme instead of following the diktat of the Strasserite Robespierre redux.

Overall I'm sad because it's the final death of the pro-EU Left. And of the governmental Left in general. I would still vote for a joint LFI-PS-EELV-PCF ticket if it weren't for janluk - he is an execrable social fascist and any legislative gain serves to reinforce his image. A shame Roussel cannot be put front and centre this campaign.

[Oryxslayer]

Three tested Custer 17 scenarios:



No pacts



FI-EELV-PCF pact



Full Left pact and Far Right pact.


Suggests that both transfers between alliances are near perfect and the 33-33-33 split seen in round 1 isn't going anywhere. The one exception appears to be whatever Zemmour ends up doing, which could send some voters unsurprisingly to LR. I wonder how many candidates Reconquete will actually be able to muster.

[warandwar]

They've agreed to it, but this is the last nail in the coffin for them. The party will rip apart because many will still want to hedge their bets tying themselves to Macronisme instead of following the diktat of the Strasserite Robespierre redux.

Overall I'm sad because it's the final death of the pro-EU Left. And of the governmental Left in general. I would still vote for a joint LFI-PS-EELV-PCF ticket if it weren't for janluk - he is an execrable social fascist and any legislative gain serves to reinforce his image. A shame Roussel cannot be put front and centre this campaign.

Roussel would be better suited as the spokesman of a medium tier sausage brand like Johnsonville Brats or the late afternoon entertainment at a senior citizens home. Those are his real strengths, outside of pandering to cops.

[Estrella]

Yeah, Roussel being somehow better than Méluche is a strange idea. He has all of his downsides - the Jacobinism, authoritarian tendencies, sneering cultural superiority, focusing on dumb sh*t only millionaire pundits and Valeurs actuelles readers care about, dodgy foreign policy, an incoherent economic platform that would banktrupt the country in a week - without any of his charisma (making an idiot of himself isn't charisma) or the ability to, you know, make people vote for him.

[Хahar 🤔]

They've agreed to it, but this is the last nail in the coffin for them. The party will rip apart because many will still want to hedge their bets tying themselves to Macronisme instead of following the diktat of the Strasserite Robespierre redux.

The question of whether the Socialist Party should ally with the larger party to its left or instead with the non-Gaullist right feels very fifty years ago.

[Coldstream]

I’m not sure what the PS gain by allying with LFI, I have to imagine most of their remaining MP’s would rather see Macron in charge than Melenchon. Just seems to be a pointless suicide attempt, unless they are completely bankrupt.

The remaining sensibles in PS would be better off joining with Macron, trying to take over the LREM machinery by outnumbering the ex-LR types and then trying to beat Phillippe in the grand primary of the centre in 2027 to ensure there’s a centre left standard bearer in 2027. It probably wouldn’t work, but it’s a lot better an idea than becoming thralls to Melenchon.

[parochial boy]

Well, because doing that would basically mean confining the PS to its grave. And even the most centrist of the PS remaining stragglers don't really want to support a right wing party implemented a right wing programme in the hope that some day the will get crushingly defeated in the succession battle. Anyone can see how little influence the ex-PS defectors in Macron's set up have actually had over the last five years.

What is worth mentioning though re-the fail(ing) negotiation - it already does seem to be in the process of tearing the party apart. With on the one side the most rabid anti-Mélenchon types like Cambadélis and Occitanie president Carole Delga; and others like the mayor of Nantes Johanna Rolland and Rennes mayor Nathalise Appéré siding with Faure in supporting an FI alliance. The pro-alliance seemingly are in the majority in the party and among the 12 people who still vote for it, but it doesn't seem too far fetched to imagine that by the end of the legislatives the PS have in essence ceased to exist as an autonomous entity. Will likely be a UDI type shell for various notables that eventually withers away as they retire or move on.

In a similar vein, it's also very much the case that the failed negotiations have as much, if not more, to do with the enormous levels of bad blood between FI and the PS than to any insurmountable programmatic differences. Far more than between LFI and the other left parties. I was just watching an interview with Adrien Quatennens earlier today and he as much as implied that. As in, that there was a readiness to compromise with EELV and the PCF; and a desire to find common ground. However, with the PS there was far more bitterness over what was perceived as a Hidalgo campaign consisting of nothing except attacking Mélenchon during its dying phases, and that any alliance would require a "clarification" about where they stood. Similarly, as mentioned there are figures like Delga in the PS who are completely set on directing all of their ire at Mélenchon - instead of perhaps reflecting on what they have done badly themselves and how the results of all that speak for themselves.

Anyway, point being that no-one really comes out smelling like gold here. But at least LFI have been some way consistent in what they want; probbaly too demanding against a PS that still has the local notables network. But if certain figures in the Socialist party really want to have a hissy fit then that's their choice and not something evil man Jonluk forced them to do.

[Oryxslayer]

Well, because doing that would basically mean confining the PS to its grave. And even the most centrist of the PS remaining stragglers don't really want to support a right wing party implemented a right wing programme in the hope that some day the will get crushingly defeated in the succession battle. Anyone can see how little influence the ex-PS defectors in Macron's set up have actually had over the last five years.

What is worth mentioning though re-the fail(ing) negotiation - it already does seem to be in the process of tearing the party apart. With on the one side the most rabid anti-Mélenchon types like Cambadélis and Occitanie president Carole Delga; and others like the mayor of Nantes Johanna Rolland and Rennes mayor Nathalise Appéré siding with Faure in supporting an FI alliance. The pro-alliance seemingly are in the majority in the party and among the 12 people who still vote for it, but it doesn't seem too far fetched to imagine that by the end of the legislatives the PS have in essence ceased to exist as an autonomous entity. Will likely be a UDI type shell for various notables that eventually withers away as they retire or move on.
 

Something else that is probably on the minds of these 'local barons' is well...the situation is reverse outside of national politics. PS (and LR/UDI on the other side) remains dominant and LFI councilors are essentially nonexistent. They don't want to kneecap their own future prospects, whereas the national party needs some allies to survive.

Its a weird bifurcation of party power, and if the national scene is going to continue to be dominated by personalistic parties and candidates, then it might be best to separate. Getting tied to a persistent total national loser will eventually bring local consequences just like alliances with parties that are perceived to be tainted. Local party stability might be best preserved by having a degree of  separation between the local and the national, similar to a number of other countries.

[Zinneke]

There's several reasons why in locals the PS and EELV do better. LFI are overestimating their appeal. It's clear the "vote utile" pushed a politician regularly polling 10% to his dizzy heights of 20 and 3rd place.

Also it's only natural that in locals incumbents have an advantage. "If you want to get elected locally you just have to be an incumbent" is a regular joke in political circles. In big cities the trend towards EELV and PS is more fundamentally because they a) trust these people with things like bike lanes but have no trust in them to stick to their manifestos at national level b) have generally better candidates (Piolle is a better politician tha Jadot I'll admit now, but he couldn't be a team player).

They've agreed to it, but this is the last nail in the coffin for them. The party will rip apart because many will still want to hedge their bets tying themselves to Macronisme instead of following the diktat of the Strasserite Robespierre redux.

The question of whether the Socialist Party should ally with the larger party to its left or instead with the non-Gaullist right feels very fifty years ago.

Put it this way though, if the PS dies we no longer have a serious left-wing force that is pro-EU.

[parochial boy]

Put it this way though, if the PS dies we no longer have a serious left-wing force that is pro-EU.

Which, if anything, shows quite how wrong the "real divide is globalist v nationalist now" pundit analysis actually was. By all means, there a lot of people on the left, and a lot of people who voted Mélenchon, who are broadly pro-EU. Yet for them, the importance of supporting a left wing programme pre-empted the need to signal support for the European Union. Meaning that there are still a lot of people for whom the left-right divide signifies an actual political and lived reality.

At any rate, EELV are probably well on the way to being a more serious force than the PS. But - for FI (over)playing their hand right now, well, it's what we were saying was going to happen way back in the Autumn; that the left party that came on top of the pile was always going to have the objective of trying to force their hand in the aftermath. As much as anything, the way that the French system functions incentivises them to do this.

A pro-EU left, in the shape of the PS or not, isn't going to dissapear. And FI very probably won't establish themselves as uncontested leaders on the left in any case. In all honesty that would be expecting people to develop partisan loyalties that they really don't have; and the left will stay plural in a way where parties fluctuate up and down depending on the circumstances and the individuals. As you say, there are a lot of people who will go "well the mayor is doing a good job with the buses and the public library, so I'll vote for them again" or whatever. But the big tactical vote does probably signify to the left as a whole that people can be fairly forgiving with a candidate who isn't perfect and that they have all the reasons to actually sort themselves out and follow what the electorate is telling them.

[adma]

A pro-EU left, in the shape of the PS or not, isn't going to dissapear. And FI very probably won't establish themselves as uncontested leaders on the left in any case. In all honesty that would be expecting people to develop partisan loyalties that they really don't have; and the left will stay plural in a way where parties fluctuate up and down depending on the circumstances and the individuals. As you say, there are a lot of people who will go "well the mayor is doing a good job with the buses and the public library, so I'll vote for them again" or whatever. But the big tactical vote does probably signify to the left as a whole that people can be fairly forgiving with a candidate who isn't perfect and that they have all the reasons to actually sort themselves out and follow what the electorate is telling them.

And given the personality-based nature of so many French electoral entities over time, don't rule out the possibility of a future left-entity breakaway from the grand coalition assembled by Macron.

[Oryxslayer]

Any analysis of the state of play has to begin with first the history of presidential majorities, that initial projection from Harris, and this initial table. What we see here is that the most common set type, by far any away is the seat won by a narrow plurality versus multiple opponents. There are only a comparative handful of seats one might designate as overwhelming strongholds for one particular faction of the other. This means that in an environment favorable to the president’s supporters it becomes easy for the presidential alliance to sweep up over 300 seats, even if they are a newcomer. With LREM already holding the vast majority of the divided seats, and likely guaranteed to advance to the runoff in almost every seat, it therefore becomes a theoretically simple task for the Presidential majority to retain their majority.

So why does Harris, and me personally, view the baseline outcome to be a LREM+ majority comparative to the one won in 2017, despite the fact that LREM holds a bunch of unfavorable territory. The answer lies in the parties of the parliamentary right, and what seats they hold. If the Right does not align with LREM, they will likely get eaten by both the Far Right and LREM+. If the right does align with LREM however, Harris suggests the new alliance will win the same number of seats, despite the larger number of answers. This will be examined in more detail later, but the short answer is that tying their brands together benefits neither overall when it comes to seat counts.

Let us first examine those seats that are seemingly poised to fall to either the Left or the far Right – both suggested by the chart to be around 100. The Left’s number is inflated by the overseas territories which for the rest of the analysis are set aside because of their peculiar parochial nature. The parties to Macron's left have the additional issue that in many of their supposed targets the Far Right gets few votes, making it a two-pole race. Many of these seats that could be part of the Left’s column had divided races in 2017. These divisions led to one of the more radical left-aligned parties advancing vs LREM, and then losing as LREM used its prior significant support among urban left-aligned voters to win the runoff. Theoretically there are no institutional limiting factors on any left aligned party from advancing in these seats, but alliances or lack thereof will likely play a huge factor in the efficiency of vote transfers against LREM.

Which is important when we look at total party support in both of the polls done so far. Compared to Round 1, PS, EELV, and LR+ are all slightly up and LFI, LREM+, and RN+ are all slightly down. The resulting changes though seemingly maintain the near 33-33-33 split between the three larger tents, before factoring in expected turnout differentials.  It also suggests there are some Macron voters who prefer the minor left parties, and they could be willing to stick with said parties under an alliance, but a hostile inter-factional relationship could send them to LREM+ in the runoffs. This is one example why unity, or lack thereof, among those to LREM+’s left is key to the electoral circumstances.

The parties that consider themselves to be “left” aren’t behind a cordon. This is not the case for RN and any other parties they could rope in. It is still likely that the rest of majority of the rest of the electorate gangs up on or abstains from a runoff scenario with FN. Their ceiling is perhaps lower than what the chart suggests, since the Far Right is only in a situation to exploit existing bases at the moment – not foster new ones.



Which brings me to this map. Seats are segregated into three categories for each of the three blocks: First round margins greater than 20 points and >45% of the vote, first round margins between 20 and 10 points and >40%, and whatever else did not meat those thresholds. Even if the parties do not end up in these alliances, the map is valuable to showing what areas are seemingly viable territory for the insurgent opposition. The other thing the map conveys is the structural weakness of the LREM+ block, but given their dominant position, LREM should at the moment be expected to win the vast majority of the seats that did not favor a party.

In the unlikely event the legislative contests structurally favor a different block then LREM’s, there may be an issue with LREM+ winning a majority on its own. That is however a topic of future analysis. This analysis hopes to capture the present starting point, and why it expects a presidential majority accompanied by gains made by the other insurgent factions that flank LREM on either side.
 
RN+ Seats

There are 108 seats, that are not overseas, which met one of the two map thresholds for the combined Far Right parties based on round one data. 22 of these seats met the highest thresholds. All but one of the 10 seats won by the far right in 2017 - Dupont-Aignan’s seat of course which is not in the 108 at all – is either in this group of 22 or very close to it.

We can further subdivide these seats into three rough categories based on the 2017 elections. There is the small number of seats that RN+ (then FN) won in 2017. There is next the large body of seats where RN advanced to the second round, most often alongside LREM+, and proceeded to lose to voter consolidation around their opponent. About 60% of the seats above one of the two thresholds fit into this category. Sometimes RN candidates barely lost the runoff, sometimes they lost it more convincingly. Then there is the final smaller category of seats where RN failed to advance in 2017. Usually this resulted in LREM+ versus LR+ runoffs, with RN receiving varying types of third places. Consistently, even when LREM+ finished first, LR+ won these contests – off unintentional support from FN.

This shows that in spite of disorganized local presence of FN, and despite the psychological cordon which will unite their opposition in runoffs, FN+ is in a position to make gains. In these areas, the electoral scorecard is now so slanted in their favor that it would be hard not to win. The decline of LR+, partially to FN and partially to LREM, will mean that these seats will overwhelmingly feature LREM+ vs FN+ runoffs – even many of the ones with LR+ incumbents. Abstention and changing loyalties mean that RN candidates would just need to walk Le Pen’s presidential path – even imperfectly – to win the seat.

The opportunity for RN+ beyond these seats though is limited. The main reason is that in the majority of France, voter consolidation should still easily quash a RN candidate. Their voter support though is such that many contests will end up with them advancing. The concentration of the Left and Far Right in different areas means that (excluding chance randomness and incumbents) there are only in a few areas where LREM+ wouldn’t be RN’s runoff opponent. LREM incumbents benefit from these engagements. RN opportunity additionally shows why an alliance between LR and LREM might not help LR. LR+ are comparatively exposed in this block of seats, and tying the party to the locally unpopular Macron will wipe away any remaining goodwill and opportunity at winning runoffs.
 
Left Seats

There are only 64 non-overseas seats above the thresholds that favored the combined left based on the Round 1 results. There are two main reasons for these limited results. One, many of their seats as previously explained, are two-pole contests whereas comparatively FN’s best seats have meaningful results for all three alignments. The second reason though is the concentration of margins in urban seats that are won by immense margins. Despite these two reasons, the left presently only won a third of the 64 seats in 2017. We could say that a chunk of these seats abre gentrified left, which backed LREM and then FI both by large margins. Another chunk fell victim to parliamentary discord – either cause divisions failed to send a Left candidate to the runoff, or sent one there who could not appeal to all 2017 legislative “left” party voters. Finally, the lack of direction among Left parties and their voters in 2017 did not benefit turnout among favorable voters and shifted seat baselines in favor of LREM+.

This is unlikely to happen again in 2022, just because of the dissatisfaction with LREM among those to their Left. Some candidate will rise to round 2, and the lack of conservative voters to consolidate behind LREM+ in these seats will give the victory to whatever other candidate is on the ballot – be they radical or PS. No consolidation or alliance should be needed in these situations.

There are however possibilities beyond these seats, as well as seats one or another of the parties to LREM+’s left is defending. However, serious expansion into the marginal categories requires several things to go right. Unity is a clear goal. It should reduce the number of drop-off votes in runoffs, potentially will energize turnout, and will send more candidates to more runoffs meaning more opportunity.  Another potential favorable event would be a LREM-LR alliance, since that would bury LREM’s brand in these urban areas. Such an alliance would guarantee round 1 majorities of the vote in favored quarters, but voters in areas that favored LFI in round 1 would now have absolutely no reason to distinguish LREM from conservatives. This is the other reason why LREM+’s projected seat total does not rise in Harris’s hypothetical alliance projection.

Overall, the parties of the Left have more potential in this starting alignment than the Far Right. The Far Right appears to have a high ceiling but low floor. The left will either be constrained to a lower ceiling, or push past it for a more fluid and fluctuating total. A ceiling still exists thanks to vote concentration, and it is still well below the majority wanted by Melenchon, but its precise location is fluid based on local and inter-party factors.

The Other Seats

The remaining mainland seats that are neither fiercely for the Left or Far Right based on round 1 results constitute a majority of the electorate. Either LREM+/Macron won them, or one of the other factions won them by a close enough margins that the normal process of block divisions and turnout favors LREM and their allies. The vast majority of these seats are presently held by LREM+. The next largest group is that of 2017’s political Right. These seats were either won in tight contests, most often against LREM, or blowouts caused by local incumbents and circumstances. A slight adjustment in turnout, or in conservative voter alignment, would swing many of these seats to LREM. What is currently happening and expected to happen to LR goes beyond slight into the realm of significance. Just as LR faces large losses to FN in the north and south, they face the potential of even more losses to LREM in the geographic “centre.” It is these seats which would be preserved by a LREM-LR accord.

LREM and their allies are likely guaranteed runoff positions in these seats, just through the nature of the contest. They are the party that appeals everywhere – even though they may lack roads to 50 percent everywhere – and the anticipated favorable turnout will slant the electorate. Depending upon where the seat is on the map, Macron’s allies my advance alongside one of parties of the extremes, guaranteeing victory over candidates which lack the numbers to win a runoff. In other cases, there will be the question if the electorate would favor whomever is the other party to advance – be it leftists and LR+, or the far right and a socialist candidate – to stop LREM. At the moment it is hard to imagine this type of voting taking place en masse in these divided seats. Rather, it is easier to imagine voters to LREMs left or right consolidating behind them against a candidate to their right or left respectively. It is far, far, easier to imagine surging abstention among groups without a runoff candidate. As long as LREM+ candidates advance, and there are few competitive seats where this could be said to be unlikely, then consolidation in the runoff will bring victory. That is an environment in which works to LREM’s advantage.

Finally, a note on triangulaire or tri-party runoffs. However, the rules do not incentivize this, as shown by 2017 only having one triangulaire. Three parties need to get 12.5% of total voters, and with turnout likely to be around 50%, the vote would need to be perfectly distributed given the presence of other parties which will syphon a chunk of the vote. That one 2017 three-way was close to 25-25-25. Given that most of the map is not perfectly divided but instead noticeably favors LREM and one other faction, a favorable triple-split is less likely. If, however party alliances are perfect, then such runoffs potentially become more common, though still should not predominate.

[Ethelberth]

The Republicans had problems in presidental elections, but your map show them great results in legistative elections. No brown seats, so RN will have no seats, strange.

[AelroseB]

https://twitter.com/2022Elections/status/1520842485685174273

https://twitter.com/MarieGentric/status/1520851431854641152

Leftist legislative pact set to go ahead--officially--tonight and tomorrow.

[Oryxslayer]

The Republicans had problems in presidental elections, but your map show them great results in legistative elections. No brown seats, so RN will have no seats, strange.

Your anger should be directed then towards the color wheel and the colorblind, for a multi-hue brown against a backdrop of yellows and reds is a recipe for visibility issues. That's just contrast vs homogeneity.

[parochial boy]

Leftist legislative pact set to go ahead--officially--tonight and tomorrow.

100 seats for EELV apparently, including the one Sandrine Rousseau was standing in (Paris 9th, which is totally intuitively in the 13th Arrondissement); and they will get the PS's seats should things fall apart. Depending on which seats they actually are, that seems like a pretty decent haul for them - apparently the PCF and FI were still bickering over the Communists' wish for 25 seats including their 11 incumbents.

In any case - cautiously optimistic at the moment. I'm genuinely surprised and impressed that they could actually all pull this off.

[H. Ross Peron]

Yeah, Roussel being somehow better than Méluche is a strange idea. He has all of his downsides - the Jacobinism, authoritarian tendencies, sneering cultural superiority, focusing on dumb sh*t only millionaire pundits and Valeurs actuelles readers care about, dodgy foreign policy, an incoherent economic platform that would banktrupt the country in a week - without any of his charisma (making an idiot of himself isn't charisma) or the ability to, you know, make people vote for him.

In practice Roussel's economic policies strike me as muscular social democracy of the high modernist era, with a strong emphasis on industrial policy. Hardly incoherent, regardless of what one may think of his culture wars pandering etc.

[America Needs R'hllor]

This union is genuinely impressive. I still wouldn't support any LFI candidates, but hopefully this gives the French left a future.

[Grand Wizard Lizard of the Klan]

Btw. are talks also including regionalist parties, Corsican or Breton ones?

[Zinneke]

The Parti Radical de Gauche have rejected any alliance with LFI saying that Europe and the Republic are non-negotiable. Logical decision.

Btw. are talks also including regionalist parties, Corsican or Breton ones?

It varies massively according to regions. EELV are the party that usually tries to federate regionalists but this alliance with LFI might compromise that, depending on if Mélenchon can "behave" a bit (he has so far, to his credit).

What's interesting is that regionalists are (finally) trying to create a national movement (this isn't contradictory given how horrifically centralised France is compared to its neighbours and how regionalism as a national movement would do a world of good to its Paris-based political class) https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/les-regionalistes-se-structurent-pour-peser-en-vue-des-legislatives-20220121

[H. Ross Peron]

PCF is probably in:

https://twitter.com/2022Elections/status/1521411034233380865

[Leading Political Consultant Ma Anand Sheela]

The Parti Radical de Gauche have rejected any alliance with LFI saying that Europe and the Republic are non-negotiable. Logical decision.

Somehow I doubt Mélenchon is going to lose any sleep over losing this particular bunch of fraudsters and losers.

[CumbrianLefty]

Well done to the PS for (finally) making a good decision.

[Oryxslayer]

Well done to the PS for (finally) making a good decision.

The PS I don't believe have actually signed on yet, though there is now an expectation and public pressure for them to do so. 

[KaiserDave]

So right now it's PCF-EELV-LFI. With NPA and possibly PS joining in? Genuinely impressive. Great news.