Colombian congressional and presidential elections - March 13/May 29/June 19, 2022

[Hash]

Petro has 8.4 million votes, which is more than he won in the 2018 *runoff*, and also far more than the 5.8 million votes in the Pacto's primary in March. So this is a good result for him and truly an historic result for the left, but he'll be overshadowed by Rodolfo's success.

Rodolfo has 5.9 million votes. Again, he did very well, and at this point he is probably the slight favourite to win the runoff, although I would invite everyone to calm down and remind people that this is a runoff that was unexpected until 2 weeks ago, so it is very unpredictable (unlike a Petro/Fico runoff would've been).

Fico will get a bit over 5 million votes. This is a bit more than the 4.1 million votes in the right's primary in March, but way less than Duque's first round total in 2018 (7.6 million). We'll see that, unsurprisingly, machines don't mean much if anything in presidential elections, which are defined by emotions, not structures. Above all, it's a massive defeat for the traditional Colombian right, and a reflection of just how hated Duque and the government are.

Just 880,000 votes for Fajardo - just a bit more than what he himself got in the primaries (723k) but way less than the centrist primary's turnout of 2.28 million votes in March (and that was very bad turnout for them)...

Turnout is over 54%, with probably 21 million people turning out - very high turnout (by Colombian standards), higher than in 2018 by a little bit.

Just for self-congratulations, I want to point out that I'm pretty proud about my gut feeling prediction:

Petro: first but a bit below 40% (Rodolfo's surge might be getting to him now too)
Rodolfo: second at or over 25% (sustained momentum and positive trend)
Fico: third in the low 20s%
Fajardo: in the ditch at 2-4% (bottom is falling out and the trend is very bad)

[Hash]

I know why Rodolfo's victory speech is a Facebook livestream from his apartment, but why is it from the kitchen?

[Logical]

Meme Tiktok Boomer VS Literally VeNeZuELa!¡?!¡ leftie.
What a match up.

[Hash]

Quick map of results as of now:



The patterns are much as I predicted but I'm surprised by Rodolfo's nationwide strength, even though he has the most pronounced favourite son vote. He won two-thirds of the vote in Santander, although his second best result was Casanare (64%), an uribista stronghold, rather than neighbouring Nte de Santander (54%). In general, his results outside of Antioquia suggest that a lot of old regional uribista votes - in the Llanos, Caquetá, Tolima, Meta but even the Eje Cafetero - went to Rodolfo, not Fico. On the other hand, Petro's strongholds are, as expected Bogotá (47.1%), Valle (53%), the Caribbean (nearly 55% in Atlántico and over 50% in Córdoba, where he was born, and Sucre), the Pacific and the southwest (over 70% in Nariño and Putumayo, leftist strongholds). Fico only won expats (thanks to Miami fascists) and Antioquia, although even there his result (48.8%) there is less than Duque's first round result in 2018 (53%), and Duque wasn't the most paisa guy imaginable.

I also want to point out that Rodolfo won Vichada, a department which he didn't know existed until a few months ago.

[Hash]

Fico has endorsed Rodolfo - largely, in his words, to save the country and because Petro would be a danger for the country.

The runoff, I warn, remains unpredictable but Rodolfo has got to be the initial favourite. Truly amazing and incredible thing, really, whether you like it or not. This has been a very different election from any past ones, and a massive break from the past 20 years of politics.

[Associate Justice PiT]

This has been a very different election from any past ones, and a massive break from the past 20 years of politics.

     Without a doubt, because this is the first time in many years there wasn't an Uribista candidate in the second round. Hernandez came out of nowhere and took second place in large part because Colombians are tired of the corruption and violence of Uribismo. I think it was just last week I first heard Hernandez's name, when my wife told me that she was planning to vote for him (previously she had backed Fajardo). Had Gutierrez advanced, I would have considered Petro the favorite to win. As is, I agree that Hernandez has a small but real edge.

[Hash]

Results by municipality:



Shows the regional patterns even better, and then reveals some interesting things in certain places. I'll have more to say about that later, as well as many more maps.

My quick analysis for now:

1. Petro's result is amazing for the left - 8.5 million votes, 40.3%, is a new record for the left (in terms of votes; Petro's runoff % in 2018 is still a bit higher). He has a hold on left-wing indignation (populism?), and the votes of a lot of the urban youth, urban poor and peripheral ethnic minorities. However, his success is definitely overshadowed by the fact that, for the first time in many months, Petro is no longer the favourite to win. In fact, he now faces an uphill battle to find another 10% from unlikely sources in a runoff matchup which he didn't see coming and for which he is very much unprepared. It's incredible, really: for months Petro was the anti-establishment candidate, practically the only one who had managed to capitalize on the desire for change, but in the very last moments of the race he was surprised and usurped here by Rodolfo Hernández.

2. I can never say too many times how incredible Rodolfo's success is - in an historical context, in a political context, in an electoral campaigns context etc. - it's really quite unprecedented, and comparisons to international examples fall short because he is a very strange persona whose success & its explanation isn't really comparable to 'far-right populism' or whatever (it is, in parts, but it's a simplistic reading of the Rodolfo phenomenon imo). I will arrange my thoughts better later and try to have something more straightforward to say later on (and on my Medium I will have a long biography of him soon). Rodolfo was, as I said before the first round, in a real sweet spot in terms of his numbers and outlook, and that carried through (and evidently kept building up) through the last week, creating this great result for him. But I reiterate for now that while there's an element of unpredictability in the runoff, Rodolfo has got to be the initial favourite, if only because it will be much, much easier for him to gain votes from Fico (who has endorsed him) and even Fajardo.

3. Fico is the loser, obviously. Him being the kingmaker (kind of) doesn't change that, sorry sweaty right-wing pundits. He is, on paper, a good candidate: in an environment like 2018 or before, he would have won. But he carried the weight of being, clearly, the continuity candidate when the huge majority clearly voted for change, and in a big way, as well as being identified as Duque/the government's candidate. That was toxic, and he really was unable to ever defeat that perception. The 'anti-Petro candidate' posturing worked for him in March, and worked until early May, but completely stopped working once it became clear he was the weakest candidate against Petro in the runoff and that Rodolfo was surging and with the best chance of defeating Petro. Also, in case anyone was still wondering, machines don't work in presidential elections and bring very little overall - Fico was the candidate of the huge majority of political structures from all traditional/neo-traditional parties and uribismo (even more than Vargas Lleras was in 2018), and, well, salió mal. Presidential elections are now all about emotions, not structures.

4. Fajardo, well, the writing was on the wall, unfortunately. He played his cards quite poorly from May 2018, and the centrist coalition was the biggest disaster (and most of it self-inflicted). The centrist 'third way' appeal he got in 2018 is gone, his old voters went to Rodolfo (for those still in a 'neither Petro nor uribismo/right' mood) or Petro (for those who repented their centrist ways and got radicalized by the Duque trainwreck).

5. Turnout was high. 21.1 million votes, nearly 55%. I think this is the highest first round turnout since 1974, narrowly beating 1998 (the 1998 runoff had, however, much higher turnout, over 60%). On this note, I think Petro's best hope for the runoff is that turnout drops - Rodolfistas who are unhappy to see the likes of Fico behind their candidate, or Fico voters unsure about the 'jump into the void' with Rodolfo etc. - but I don't think this is particularly likely for now.

I'll have much more to say later on, but I'm closing up for tonight. I hope my analysis was useful and interesting tonight.

[H. Ross Peron]

This is a superficial observation, but its amusing how the coastal-interior divide in Colombia is an inversion of Peru.

[Adam Griffin]

This is a superficial observation, but its amusing how the coastal-interior divide in Colombia is an inversion of Peru.

Sans coasts, it reminded me a tad of Bolivia.

[Sebastiansg7]

This is a superficial observation, but its amusing how the coastal-interior divide in Colombia is an inversion of Peru.

That is because Colombia's hinterland is more developed than the coasts, and has more ethnic minorities, and Petro is popular among the ethnic minority urban and rural poor.

[Sebastiansg7]

I don't see how Petro can break 50%, I think he already lost. I'll probably still vote for him with much skepticism (not particularly a fan of the guy). The problem with Petro is that he carries too much baggage for the majority of people from medium to small cities, and rural areas in the Colombian hinterland.

[H.E. VOLODYMYR ZELENKSYY]

Do you think Bukele is an accurate comparison for Rodolfo, Hash? That’s who immediately comes to mind based on what little (really just the basics) I know about him.

[Associate Justice PiT]

I don't see how Petro can break 50%, I think he already lost. I'll probably still vote for him with much skepticism (not particularly a fan of the guy). The problem with Petro is that he carries too much baggage for the majority of people from medium to small cities, and rural areas in the Colombian hinterland.

     Baggage is a good way of putting it. It's not an accident that Petro's worst departments were near the Venezuelan border; Hernandez's native son status in Santander aside, the fear of Colombia turning into another Venezuela weighs heavily on the minds of a lot of people.

[Hash]

Do you think Bukele is an accurate comparison for Rodolfo, Hash? That’s who immediately comes to mind based on what little (really just the basics) I know about him.

Kind of, yes. I really think Rodolfo is a very sui generis persona who has aspects of Trump, Berlusconi, Bukele and others of that genre but also has some differences.

Their political success in both cases is rooted in 'popular' and 'colloquial' anti-establishment/anti-corruption/anti-system rhetoric, although in both of their cases it's somewhat hypocritical (Bukele for his political history and his connection to certain cases of FMLN corruption, Rodolfo for his continued friendship with some corrupt traditional politicians in Santander). Although in reality, once in power, they don't really entail significant changes to the socioeconomic model (Rodolfo's socioeconomic, security, environmental etc. policies would most likely end up being a continuity of the Duque and previous administrations' policies, just under different language).

The extent to which Rodolfo is a threat to institutional stability and democracy remains to be seen, and I don't think he would represent the same threat of authoritarianism as Bukele (besides, Duque has already done a good job at dangerously weakening the separation of powers and basic checks and balances, but serious people gave him a pass because he dislikes populism or something), although Rodolfo does seem to share some of Bukele's disregard for democratic norms and constitutional rule of law.

Unlike Trump, who was a polarizing candidate and later president from the beginning, Rodolfo is not polarizing: according to polls, very few people actively dislike him. So in this sense he is also similar to Bukele, who is very popular.

It's also interesting that despite their differences in age, social media played a big part in their appeal, although I think Rodolfo's campaign was even more digitally-based and grassroots-driven that Bukele's campaign, although I didn't follow the details of Bukele's 2019 presidential campaign.

[Hash]

Results in major cities

Bogotá (3.76 million valid votes)
Petro 47.05%
Rodolfo 22.15%
Fico 19.24%
Fajardo 7.95%

Turnout: 64%

In 2018, Fajardo narrowly won the city with 34% against 30% for Petro and 27% for Duque. Confirming and amplifying the results of the March elections, Petro won the city by a very wide margin, as expected. Bad memories of his tough administration, which may still have played in 2018, have certainly faded away and been replaced by more recent bad memories of Peñalosa and Claudia López's unpopular administrations. The big surprise is Rodolfo coming a distant second, ahead of Fico. Still one of the best results for Fajardo, unsurprisingly. Of course, I'll have the results by locality for you as soon as possible.

Medellín (1.13 million)
Fico 53.57%
Petro 24.47%
Rodolfo 12.56%
Fajardo 6.18%

Turnout: 64.3%

A favourite son vote delivers Medellín for the former mayor, Fico, who remains popular in his hometown. He actually matched Duque's result from 2018 (and won about 65,000 more votes), which I'm pretty sure didn't really happen anywhere else except a few places in Antioquia. Petro does much better than in 2018 (7.7%), even better than his runoff result (21.7%), and replaces Fajardo as the distant runner-up to the right. Given that this is Medellín, that's about as well as he could have realistically expected to do.

Cali (988.4k)
Petro 53.36%
Fico 22.53%
Rodolfo 14.12%
Fajardo 4.89%
Rodríguez 2.5%

Turnout: 55.9%

Confirming and amplifying the results of the March elections, Cali is now a petrista stronghold. In 2018, although Petro won it in the runoff, he had placed third in the first round (26%) behind Fajardo (32.6%) and Duque (28.5%), so there has been a very massive shift to the left, in good part likely because of the strength of the 2021 protests in Cali. A poor result for Rodolfo: the right-wing vote (concentrated in wealthier areas now) in Cali was a bit radicalized by the disturbances and violence in the 2021 protests and the mismanagement thereof by the left-wing mayor, so it likely found itself more motivated to support Fico (who focused more on security/law and order compared to Rodolfo).

Barranquilla (493.3k)
Petro 51.9%
Fico 27.94%
Rodolfo 13.9%
Fajardo 3.3%

Turnout: 43.8%

Petro wins by the first round in La Arenosa, with a much better result than in 2018 (38%). Fico finishes in a relatively strong second, with nearly 28%, because of the support of the Char clan (although, as in 2018, machines generally didn't move their parts much at all compared to March).

Cartagena (357.2k)
Petro 55.9%
Fico 24.83%
Rodolfo 11.79%
Fajardo 3.15%

Turnout: 43.8%

Petro wins in the first round in La Heroica, doing about 10 points better than in the first round in 2018. Again, Fico is in second here, likely because of the limited support from machines (the machine support is more obvious in rural municipalities in Bolívar).

Bucaramanga (340.9k)
Rodolfo 64.45%
Petro 20.12%
Fico 11.47%
Fajardo 1.83%

Turnout: 66.9%

With very high turnout, Rodolfo wins in a landslide in his hometown, as expected.

Cúcuta (337.95k)
Rodolfo 50.28%
Fico 29.66%
Petro 13.69%
Fajardo 3.01%

Turnout: 55.3%

Cúcuta remains very hostile to the left, as in 2018 (Petro does improve from his 6.5% in the first round then), and Rodolfo - in part due to santandereano favourite son status - finishes in a solid first, ahead of Fico, who gets nearly 30%. So the anti-Petro vote on the Venezuelan border remains obvious but it is now dominated by Rodolfo. Cúcuta has very high unemployment and has struggled with the Venezuelan border closure (as well as the refugee influx), so Rodolfo's anti-establishment rhetoric found fertile ground here.

Ibagué (275.17k)
Petro 35.09%
Rodolfo 32.11%
Fico 25.17%
Fajardo 4.11%

Turnout: 62.8%

An impressive victory for Petro in the capital of Tolima, considering he had won just 16.5% four years ago (and 34.4% in the runoff). As in other cities, a lot of fajardista voters from 2018 likely went to Petro this year (Fajardo won 30.5% here in 2018).

Pereira (245.84k)
Petro 36.15%
Rodolfo 28.85%
Fico 25.86%
Fajardo 5.57%

Turnout: 57.4%

Petro won Pereira, the capital of Risaralda, with 36.2%, which is a huge improvement from 2018 (12.7%) and even the runoff (34.6%), a lot of that likely came from Fajardo's 2018 vote - he had won Pereira with over 40%. In second, a surprisingly strong result from Rodolfo, who beats Fico in a place where many saw Fico do a bit better because of cultural proximity to Antioquia.

Villavicencio (242.63k)
Rodolfo 47.04%
Petro 28.73%
Fico 18.07%
Fajardo 2.86%

Turnout: 64%

Rodolfo wins the capital of Meta by a large margin, taking a lot of the Duque vote from 2018 (46%) as elsewhere in the Llanos Orientales/Orinoquía where the right-wing uribista vote from past elections decamped in big numbers to Rodolfo.

Manizales (214.27k)
Petro 33.88%
Fico 27.45%
Rodolfo 25.49%
Fajardo 9.15%

Turnout: 64.5%

Gustavo Petro 'wins' the capital of Caldas with just a third of the vote, with both Fico and Rodolfo getting good results. Petro significantly improves on his 2018 performance (8.4%), so his result is quite impressive, as in Pereira one hour (well, if you're lucky) down the road. In 2018, Fajardo had won all three capitals of the Eje Cafetero, with 50% in Manizales - now, he won just 9.1%, but that's still one of his best results anywhere this year, and has to do with Manizales being a big university town.

Soacha (199k)
Petro 55.23%
Rodolfo 25.48%
Fico 11.17%
Fajardo 3.8%

Turnout: 67.5%

In this large low-income suburb (or urban extension of Bogotá to the south), Petro wins big with 55%, about 20 points better than in 2018.

Santa Marta (191.67k)
Petro 51.41%
Fico 22.74%
Rodolfo 19.29%
Fajardo 2.66%

Turnout: 51.3%

Another first round victory for Petro in a Caribbean capital. The difference between Fico and Rodolfo for second is smaller here than in Barranquilla and Cartagena: probably because the machines that were for Fico are weaker in Santa Marta (the dominant machine here is Carlos Caicedo, who is for Petro).

[Associate Justice PiT]

     Interesting to see that Petro seems to have peeled off a lot of the support Fajardo lost from 2018. It doesn't surprise me in Manizales since they both have a lot of appeal with college-educated voters, but the same trend appears in other cities that are not as known for being home to universities.

[Hash]

I've published my long-ish profile of Rodolfo on my Medium blog here, please read it a for a hopefully more nuanced take than TRUMP MAN

Results by locality in Bogotá:





The familiar patterns to anyone who knows a bit about Bogotá geography. Fico won Usaquén and Chapinero, the wealthiest localities home to the city's wealthiest neighbourhoods. Both also happened to be Fajardo's best areas: in cities, Fajardo's vote is quite correlated to Fico's vote (which in turn is correlated to income), so he did best with wealthier voters, which isn't surprising considering who the last remaining Fajardo voters were. Petro won everywhere else, and did best (besides rural Sumapaz) in the poorest parts of Bogotá - over 60% in San Cristobal, Usme, Bosa and Ciudad Bolívar. Rodolfo placed second in Bogotá but didn't win anywhere. His support was quite evenly distributed, just a bit weaker in wealthy areas and the historic centre. His best result was 26.1% in Mártires, a decayed lower middle-class area west of downtown with some pretty rough and crime-filled parts. He also generally did quite well in socioeconomic strata 3 (lower middle-class/middle) areas, like parts of Kennedy and Fontibón as well as the north of Usaquén.

There are some nice maps by UPZ (planning zones) here:

https://twitter.com/pranauri/status/1531475930643939334
Cali:





Again the patterns here are not surprising and correlated to income. Petro won everywhere except infamous Comuna 22 in the far-south, which is the wealthiest comuna of Cali (small population, a lot of gated communities) and which saw some pretty disturbing scenes of (racist) vigilante actions by armed residents LARPing as paracos during the 2021 protests. Fico came close in Comuna 2, 17 and 19 which are the other upper middle-class/wealthier areas of the city. Petro did best in the poorest parts of the city, like Aguablanca (Comunas 13, 14, 15 and 21) and Siloé (20). Again, Rodolfo's support is evenly distributed, except weakest in the wealthiest parts and Petro's low income strongholds, and Fajardo did best in wealthier areas, like Fico (9.5% in comuna 22...).

Manizales:





Manizales is not one of the 3 big cities but I always look at results there because (a) they're easy to assemble and (b) Manizales is a great city. The patterns are not surprising either but Petro's levels of support remain quite impressive compared to 2018. He won all but one comuna although his support didn't break 40% anywhere. He only lost in Palogrande, where Fico won 43.7%, which is the wealthiest comuna in the city, with the wealthiest neighbourhoods (there's also wealthy areas in comuna 6, where Fico was close to Petro as well). Fajardo's support is also correlated with wealth/Fico, although he also broke 10% in comuna 4, which has a few university campuses (and is a pretty well-off part of the city as well). Petro's support was fairly evenly distributed but generally did better in poorer parts of the city, but this is less obvious than in Bogotá or Cali. Rodolfo's support shows a bit more variation, reaching 33% in San José (a low-income area north of the historic centre with a small population) and 30.3% in Ciudadela del Norte (lower-income peripheral neighbourhoods, many of them newer, on the outskirts), and falling to 13% in Palogrande.

I'll do Medellín later but Fico won every comuna there and did ridiculously well in Poblado, of course. If I can figure out zones and match them to comunas easily, I can try to take a look at other cities.

[Hash]

Some recent news:

A CNC poll released on May 31 showed Rodolfo leading Petro by 2 (41-39) with a surprisingly large number of undecideds (14%). GAD3, a Spanish pollster which has recently been accredited by the CNE, has started doing a tracking poll (a new concept in Colombia) for RCN, and their first two days have Rodolfo leading by ~7 (52-45) while today's poll has it down to 4.8 (50.4-45.6). Both show that the election is still open (a point stressed by a lot of analysts too), although Rodolfo is the favourite, and that Petro is struggling to get the kind of transfers he needs (or, more to the point, prevent Rodolfo from getting the transfers he need).

In terms of endorsements received:

For Petro

• Luis Gilberto Murillo (Fajardo's running mate, former environment minister)
• Alejandro Gaviria (former health minister, centrist pre-candidate) - as expected, Gaviria is a genuine classical liberal deeply attached to institutions and democratic norms, and who told the FT before the election that a 'controlled explosion' of the volcano under Petro was preferable than bottling it up. Also Rodolfo called him an academic that nobody understands.
• Ariel Ávila (Green senator-elect) - not very surprising either
• Guillermo Rivera (former interior minister, centrist coalition member) - former interior minister under Santos II, close to Juan Fernando Cristo (a progressive Liberal dissident like him)
• Mabel Lara (journalist, Nuevo Liberalismo senatorial top candidate) - she justified it in terms of Petro giving a voice to marginalized regions and peoples like the Pacific and Caribbean, an issue dear to her (she is an Afro-Colombian from Cauca)
• Antanas Mockus

Many have noted that Petro has rallied many former santista cabinet ministers (Murillo, Gaviria, Rivera as well as former labour minister Griselda Restrepo) in addition to the former santistas he already had (Roy Barreras, Alfonso Prada etc.). It's all part of his campaign's main strategy, which is to appear as the 'responsible change' as opposed to the 'jump into the void' with Rodolfo, as the cautious institutional option against the crazy Bukele-Trump-AMLO populist (Barreras said statesman vs. populist).

For Rodolfo

• Fico - of course - and most of uribismo including old favourites like María Fernanda Cabal, Paloma Valencia and José Obdulio Gaviria
• Catalina Ortiz (outgoing Green representative from Valle) - Ortiz is a loyal fajardista who doesn't really like petristas in Valle or anywhere
• Horacio José Serpa (outgoing Liberal senator) - son of late santandereano Liberal politician Horacio Serpa, had supported Alejandro Gaviria and then Fajardo. Seems to be from a mix of regionalism and Rodolfo's alleged centrism. Rodolfo and Serpa sr. had some differences and didn't get along well.

However, yesterday Sergio Fajardo, Carlos Amaya (who had previously said he would support Rodolfo against Petro but is now 'asking direction from God', or milking the moment for all its worth), Jorge Enrique Robledo (who'd rather eat broken glass than ever vote for Petro) and Juan Fernando Cristo met with Rodolfo to work on a 'programmatic agreement', i.e. get Rodolfo to modify or beef up his platform in exchange for a full endorsement. The conditions posed seem to be: no alliances with uribismo, guarantee for gender equality policies (after Rodolfo's machista comments), a realistic tax reform (Rodolfo is selling the fake myth that no tax reform is necessary if you just miraculously abolish corruption tomorrow), defend the institutions (hopefully to calm down the Bukele fanboy authoritarianism, hatred of Congress and dangerous idea to declare a state of internal disturbance in August to rule by decree for 90 days, and then dare the ConCourt to tell him he couldn't do that), good international relations (Rodolfo wants to close like half of the embassies) and peace negotiations with the ELN (which Rodolfo supports but doesn't want to 'waste time and money' on lol). None of these conditions seem particularly impossible to meet for Rodolfo, who is keen on getting Fajardo's endorsement (and Fajardo obviously leans much more towards Rodolfo than Petro, not surprising when petrismo spent 4 years viciously attacking him).

On the other hand, Rodolfo got *dis-endorsed* by Green senator-elect Jota Pe Hernández (the YouTuber), apparently because he doesn't want to be in the same boat as uribismo. In this video you can see how obnoxious and narcissistic this clown is.

To deflect petrismo's attacks that Rodolfo is an uribista or is the uribista Plan C, Rodolfo posted a Twitter thread listing his 20 differences with uribismo:

https://twitter.com/ingrodolfohdez/status/1531429081056780291

In which he comes out against neoliberal policies, for the peace agreement and talks with the ELN, for reestablishing relations with Venezuela, for LGBT rights including marriage and adoption, for abortion rights as stipulated, in favour of the legalization of medical and recreational marijuana, against fracking and against aerial aspersion with glyphosate.

[Peeperkorn]

5. Turnout was high. 21.1 million votes, nearly 55%. I think this is the highest first round turnout since 1974, narrowly beating 1998 (the 1998 runoff had, however, much higher turnout, over 60%).

Hi Hash, and thank you for your always brilliant and very informative posts.

Question: What were the reasons for the high turnout in 1998?

[Velasco]

1/ "I'm going to revive the countryside, leaving behind neoliberalpoliciesand violence..."

2/ "I'm going to reduce the size of the state, end corruption and replace inefficient public servants"

3/ "I'm going to reduce corruption (...)"

4/ "My government will be austere (...)"

I mean, these statements sound good to common people. The question is whether Rodolfo Hernández has drafted specific plans, or rather they are declarations of intent (I gather from Hash posts it's the latter, but I haven't checked)

By the way, "Ing" means "Ingeniero (engineer)"

[jaichind]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-04/petro-retakes-the-lead-in-colombian-presidential-election-race

Centro Nacional de Consultoria poll has Petro retaking the lead over Hernandez 44.9% to 41.0%

[Hash]

5. Turnout was high. 21.1 million votes, nearly 55%. I think this is the highest first round turnout since 1974, narrowly beating 1998 (the 1998 runoff had, however, much higher turnout, over 60%).

Hi Hash, and thank you for your always brilliant and very informative posts.

Question: What were the reasons for the high turnout in 1998?

Thank you.

The 1998 elections took place after the extremely controversial Samper presidency, in a highly charged political environment (Proceso 8.000, coup rumours, plots, wave of guerrilla violence and paramilitary expansion) with intense polarization between samperistas and anti-samperistas and a widespread hope for peace (8.9 million votes in an unofficial 'mandate for peace' referendum vote in October 1997). The presidential campaign itself was long with lots of twists and turns. The independents tercería, behind Noemí Sanín (and her running mate, Antanas Mockus), finished a strong third and was a big voto de opinión phenomenon in urban areas (she won in Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Villavicencio etc.) which drove up turnout.

1998 still holds (and will hold for the foreseeable future) the record for highest runoff turnout: 62.6%. It was during this runoff campaign that Pastrana's campaign had met with Manuel Marulanda, Tirofijo, the commander of the FARC, which many consider to have been the master stroke that won the close election for Pastrana against Serpa.

Anyway, polls confirm that the race has gotten very tight: CNC now has Petro leading 45-41 and GAD3's tracking poll today has Rodolfo's lead down to just 1.6 today. GAD3 has detailed crosstabs including vote transfers and they reveal that Fajardo's voters are now breaking for Petro and Rodolfo is showing signs of weakness with Fico voters -- he basically needs 80% or more of Fico voters to win, and today's poll has him at exactly 80% with Fico voters, as a few are looking at blank votes, abstention or even Petro (in addition a small but not entirely insignificant 5% of Rodolfo first round voters are switching their votes). It could be the consequence of Rodolfo finally facing scrutiny after getting a free ride as 'lol grandpa on TikTok' from the media for months, uribistas/right-wingers not overly keen on voting for Rodolfo after he recently came out as #woke and also first round rodolfistas realizing that Rodolfo can't win without loathed uribismo (ie the Jota Pe Hernández vote). It would be ironic if Petro won because a lot of Fico voters cast a blank vote, after Petrismo spent the past four years crucifying and vilifying everyone who voted blank in 2018. I told you that there was an element of unpredictability in the runoff given the unique circumstances!

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Polling update:

GAD3 (6/4): Rodolfo +1.3 (R 48.1% P 46.8% VB 5.1%)
Guarumo (6/4): Rodolfo +3.1 (R 46.4% P 43.3% VB 8.4%)
Yanhaas (6/3): Petro +1 (P 42% R 41% VB 13%)

Basically boils down to a statistical tie with undecideds and blank votes being in a decisive spot. All polls continue to confirm that Rodolfo is struggling because of weak transfers from Fajardo and Fico and loses among women (probably the result of his recent 'women should stay home' comments, to clarify his prior 'women should support their husband from home, no one wants women involved in government' comments).

As for Guar(h)umo, kind reminder that Guar(h)umo is a biased right-wing pollster which cooks up numbers in coordination with Duque's gnomes.

https://twitter.com/Rodrigo_Lara_/status/1533439674252988422

(I have to say I really like outgoing senator Rodrigo Lara becoming a cynical, no holds barred political commentator on Twitter)

Other news:

Late on Saturday, Rodolfo abruptly called off the talks with Fajardo and others, calling them a mere courtesy whose time had passed. He said that they were trying to change his winning platform. Fajardo, Amaya, Cristo and Robledo had no choice but to accept that negotiations were closed. A lot of right-wingers, critics of the centrist coalition and ultimately Rodolfo himself had pointed out the arrogance of a candidate who won 885,000 votes was trying to 'impose' his own platform on a candidate who won 6 million votes.

It gives an interesting indication of how Rodolfo would govern: willing to talk with others and listen to them, but ultimately making the decision on his own, somewhat impetuously.

This may help Rodolfo shore up Fico's voters, who are more important, given that a few right-wingers were complaining about how he was willing to meet with Fajardo while all but ignoring Fico and the right besides 'welcoming' their endorsement.

Meanwhile, the remnants of the Centro Esperanza just keeps turning into the saddest story of a bunch of pathetic losers. Sergio Fajardo has said he wouldn't vote for Petro, but wouldn't say if he'd vote for Rodolfo or blank (as in 2018). A lot of this has to do with Fajardo holding grudges against Petro & his barras bravas on social media for the way they vilified him and gave him hell for his 2018 blank vote and his infamous whale watching trip to Nuquí the weekend before the runoff. Yet, I feel we're not far from a repeat of the whales once again, because I guess Fajardo just needs to prove he's indecisive. Petro has chimed in to say that he would have supported Fajardo in a runoff against Rodolfo...

Carlos Amaya is on Twitter speaking some evangelical preacher again, asking God for wisdom to make decisions (even though we kind of know his decision) and sure that everything will be well.

The Nuevo Liberalismo has formally announced its support for Rodolfo after some sort of 'internal consultation' in which W Radio says 90%ish were in favour of supporting Rodolfo. Rodrigo Lara Restrepo said this internal vote is probably the Galán family dinner table. Kind of sad to see the Galán brothers go down this way, but I guess the entire point of this charade for them is for Carlos Fernando to run for mayor next year again. Pathetic.

Meanwhile, Jorge Enrique Robledo, who has an intense and irrational hatred for Petro, is now engaging in some sort of bizarre... domestic birtherism? Was Petro really born in Ciénaga de Oro, or was he actually born in Zipaquirá? It's very sad (and honestly pathetic) to see Robledo, who was one of the best senators over the past 20 years, go down this way.

https://twitter.com/JERobledo/status/1533813664674992128

In daily Locombia/Polombia/Cocolombia news, a superior tribunal in Ibagué sentenced Iván Duque to 5 days house arrest and a fine for not obeying a Supreme Court ruling from last year declaring the Nevados national park a subject of rights. Of course, the sentence is being appealed and Duque isn't going to jail. In any case, the sentence is probably unconstitutional: a random court cannot send a sitting president to jail. Only the commission of absolutions accusations in the House is allowed to absolve the president of crimes, and they do that quite well!

And here's your daily cryptic tweet from the misunderstood genius Enrique Peñalosa, who is certainly planning his next failed electoral campaign by following his own strategy of 'insulting voters and calling them idiots'

https://twitter.com/EnriquePenalosa/status/1533148504197054464

[Peeperkorn]

In daily Locombia/Polombia/Cocolombia news,

Congolombia is my favorite.

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In today's GAD3 tracking, Petro takes the lead by 0.7% - so still a statistical tie - 47.8% to 47.1%, with 5.1% blank votes.

Here are the details of where Rodolfo is losing ground:

https://twitter.com/JorgeGalindo/status/1534289495805333510

Including the Llanos in there is a bit silly - that's gotta be a very tiny subsample, and unless something weird is happening, there's no way that Rodolfo is going to underperform his own first round results there. More significant (statistically and politically) are his losses with women, Fico and Fajardo voters.


In endorsement news, Carlos Amaya endorsed Rodolfo yesterday. I mean, Amaya had already said *before* the first round that he'd support Rodolfo against Petro, so this is not surprising in the least, but as I said, he wanted to milk the moment for all its worth. Antonio Navarro Wolff, now one of the co-presidents of the Greens with Mockus and the little-known but sketchy Carlos Ramón González, endorsed Petro - like Petro, he was in the M-19 and he very briefly served as Petro's first secretary of government in Bogotá in 2012.

Fajardo's movement Compromiso Ciudadano and Robledo's party Dignidad did not formally endorse anyone and leave their members free to vote as they please. Robledo has said he'd vote blank again.

In Robledo news, somehow he has gone further down the rabbit hole of his own domestic birtherism nonsense, to argue that Petro was born in Zipaquirá and not Ciénaga de Oro, which of course is truly the most important issue of our time

https://twitter.com/JERobledo/status/1534272979286249472

Liberal senator Mario Castaño, reelected in March, was arrested. He faces an investigation for corruption and criminal conspiracy in the Supreme Court. He is accused of being at the head of a network which embezzled funds from public contracts. Once the new Congress takes office, the seat should go to Sara Castellanos (from the Christian evangelical MCI family enterprise) - I don't take the 'empty seat' mechanism would apply here as he hasn't yet taken office for the new term.

In KKKolombia/Congolombia news, during a debate on a bill to ban gay conversion therapy, openly gay Green rep. Mauricio Toro (unfortunately defeated in March) was recused by a Christian activist for being... gay. Apparently that's a conflict of interest, and apparently the bill is not of general interest because it doesn't ban therapies to 'convert heterosexuals into homosexuals' (...). The debate was suspended. The Christian evangelicals celebrated the suspension of debate because the bill attacks "individual liberties and fundamental rights".