Should Napoleon’s and Hitler’s invasions of Russia really be considered similar

[Cassius]

I’d certainly agree that the comparison can be overplayed, not least given the massive changes in military technology, tactics and logistics that occurred between 1812 and 1941-45. I would say though, to counter your first point, that one of the principle justifications for Napoleon’s invasion of Russia was the fact that Russia was not keeping to the terms of the ‘continental system’ (by which Napoleon sought to block the import of British goods to Europe), so it’s arguable that the war in Russia formed a part of his overall strategy to defeat the British.

I’d also argue that one of the key mistakes often made about the campaign of 1812 is that it’s often assumed that it was an unwinnable campaign. It wasn’t and this sets it apart, in my view, from the German war on the Eastern Front, which I think could only have been winnable had the Germans gone into that war with a rather different and more limited set of objectives, as opposed to a war of conquest designed to set the stage for mass colonisation and ethnic cleansing, which would have required there to be a very different leadership in charge of the Third Reich.

The German war aims of 1941-1945, of course, were not the aims of Napoleon; his goal was simply to assert French pre-eminence over the Russians, something that he could have done had he been able to defeat the Russian army and render it an ineffective fighting force (as he had been able to do against the Austrians and the Prussians in previous wars). This was possible, although thanks to the overall soundness of the Russian strategy during the campaign (avoiding major set piece engagements prior to Borodino, dispersing troops and focusing on grinding down the French), Napoleon was unable to make it happen. Of course, unlike in, say, the campaigns of 1805-1807 or 1809 (in the case of the Austrians), the Russians had the advantage of a vast interior into which they could retreat and thus make this strategy work, in a similar manner to the Second World War (although I’d say that advantage was even more pertinent in 1812). Nonetheless, had they not adopted this strategy and had, instead, attempted confront Napoleon in a pitched battle early on, there’s every chance that there could have been a repeat of the earlier campaigns.

On the topic of retreat, another difference that should be noted is that whilst, for most of the 1812 campaign, the Russian high command made a virtue of retreat (despite the heated debate within the high command over this strategy), Stalin took the opposite approach of ‘no step back’ during the first two years of Barbarossa, which ultimately proved very costly (although, in fairness to Stalin, he was operating in an era of much more fast paced warfare, so retreat was more of a luxury than for the Emperor Alexander).

Really there are sundry similarities and differences between the two campaigns. In 1812 the French army was ultimately destroyed by a combination of terrible weather, logistical problems and repeated harrying during their retreat by the Russian cavalry. Although all of these things presented problems for the Germans a century later, the Wehrmacht ultimately lost because it was battered to bits in battle by a Red Army that was both quantitatively and, ultimately, qualitatively superior in terms of its fighting capacity. On the other hand, both the French and the Germans severely underestimated the fighting ability of the Russian and Soviet armies as well as the ability of the Russian and Soviet governments to endure setbacks, which meant that neither were able to achieve the expected quick victory, leaving them in a very poor position indeed after just a few months.

I do think it’s reasonable to compare the two campaigns and draw out the parallels that exist between them, whilst also acknowledging that, given the time that elapsed between the two, treating them like two peas in a pod or as part of some facile nostrum like ‘never start a land war in Asia’ is not a particularly illuminating way of looking at things.