Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Stranger in a strange land]

Seeing some people commenting on Twitter (so take this with a HUGE grain of salt), that it is (was?) Russia's plan to reinstall Yanukovych as president of whatever is left of Ukraine after all of this. The Russians cannot possibly be **that** stupid, right? It's one thing to put someone in power from the opposition that people do not have any real strong feelings towards, but that guy? If Yanukovych is eventually reinstalled, he wouldn't last a year.

Well, Putin has already disproven that he's this great strategic mind many assumed for a long time. Especially with how poorly the ground war is going. So another strategic error like this wouldn't surprise me at all. No more.

What other even semi-prominent Ukrainian Quisling could they find to install as head of a puppet government? There’s a reason why no one took the Apartheid Regime’s Bantustans seriously (not even the regime itself), and why Israel can’t just set up a compliant “Palestinian State” in Areas A & B of the West Bank, annex Area C, and call it a day. You need at least a few credible collaborators for something like this to work

[Stranger in a strange land]

Full list here:

On the unexpected side, Serbia voted in favor as well

https://twitter.com/Brynwales/status/1499075649146961930

That is quite a shock, I thought they would be in the abstain category.

Serbia is currently following the old Tito strategy, meaning it is trying to keep good relations with everyone.

However, judging from my social circle and the media in Rep. Srpska / Serbia, the reactions are far more negative compared to Crimea.

Serbs generally didn't give a sh*t about Crimea (no shots fired), and kind of just wanted to "stick it to the Americans/NATO/EU" for Kosovo.

But this invasion is a completely different ball game. A lot of people still remember the Yugo wars, and pictures of blown-up kids have caused many to take a more pro-Ukrainian stance in this case, regardless of Russian support for Serbia in the Kosovo dispute.  

This is good news. Some other welcome surprises:
- IRAN abstained
- the UAE voted in favor
- Kazakhstan abstained
- Brazil voted in favor, despite Bolsonaro's earlier support for Putin

[Stranger in a strange land]

Notable that Israel voted in favor of condemning Russia.  They've made a mess of things trying to appease both the west and Russia.

How much of the actions of the Israeli government are driven by getting, and keeping, the votes of Russian-speaking Israeli voters?
Iirc, I remember reading somewhere that 25% of the Israeli population speaks Russian.

Even if true, I bet a lot of them are from Ukraine (IIRC most of the remaining Soviet Jews in Ukraine spoke Russian, including Zelensky's family) or have family there, and even the ones from Russia, Belarus, or elsewhere in the former USSR have little love for Putin.

[Stranger in a strange land]

Does the Taliban control Afghanistan's UN vote? I was thinking the UN doesn't recognize the de facto government that controls Afghanistan.

It doesn't. But the de facto result would be the same either way, most likely.

Not a single country has recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, not even Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or the UAE, who were the only ones to recognize them when they governed the country last time.

[Stranger in a strange land]

So back in the early Cold War, the US needed to get its hands on a MiG-15 to test its capabilities so it launched the aptly-named "Operation Moolah" to offer $100K to any Eastern Bloc pilot who would defect with one. A Polish pilot flew his plane to Denmark in early 1953 and received a bounty, plus political asylum in the UK and later the US: he lived in Pennsylvania until his death and owned a valve factory and a race track. A few weeks after the end of the Korean War, a North Korean pilot, who claimed to be unware of Moolah, defected with his MiG and got the 100K.

Maybe we could offer something similar for Russian pilots, tankers, and SAM/electronic warfare operators? We know their morale isn't great and their command is more than transparent that it doesn't give a sh[inks] about them. At this point, one million dollars plus political asylum in the Western Country of your choice if you defect with your vehicle or aircraft, or 100K plus political asylum for yourself and your immediate family if you desert, surrender, and turn over your weapons. For sure cheaper than actually fighting, plus we know that Russian conscripts aren't enthusiastic about the War (which surprised me, I really expected they'd do a better job indoctrinating them), and we know that many young Russians want to move to the West.

[Stranger in a strange land]

Russia has now likely lost more troops than the US did in Iraq and Afghanistan combined.

https://twitter.com/jimsciutto/status/1501860795843416068

Would be huge, though I'm still skeptical. Ukrainian figures are most likely an exaggeration to boost their fighting moral. Didn't the US estimate Russian losses at around 4k 2-3 days ago? Seems more plausible to me.

Anyway, it speaks volumes how Putin is ready to send his soldiers to death for his delusional Greater Russia fantasies.

6k dead is a lot in a modern war, but the Soviets did lose 8.7 Million in WWII. The sacrifice endured in World War II, which for Russians and Slavs was truly a war for survival as a people, is extremely important to Russian identity. Correspondingly, the sacrifice of lives to preserve Russia is a major national ethos. Anyone in Russia who views the war as important to Russia's security and future isn't blinking an eye.

The average Russian clearly don't see the invasion of Ukraine as essential to the survival of Russia.

That's why Putin is trying to hide it from the Russian public as much as possible.

I'll also note here that in the modern world, with its lower birthrates, higher dependency ratios, and need for labor with unique skills rather than just more-or-less interchangeable factory or farm workers, the value of a working-age citizen to a State is MUCH higher than it was in the early or mid 20th century.

[Stranger in a strange land]

I suppose bringing in a load of African soldiers to be shot at (and doubtless killed in large numbers) would bolster the "Ukrainians are all racist Nazis" narrative some Putinists are so fond of.

It would probably radicalise some racist Ukrainians and boost Azov recruitment, which could then be used to justify the invasion that had already happened.

And this is almost certainly why they’re recruiting and sending in Africans as opposed to say, Serbs, Armenians, or Central Asians.

That being said I’m not sure how practical getting them to Ukraine is at this point.

[Stranger in a strange land]

German ministry of defense has made its first decision on how to use its new 100 billion Euro budget.

https://mobile.twitter.com/AFP/status/1503299897868664833

good news for everyone (except German taxpayers and Russia)!

I thought the Germans were banned from running any military.

They will be straight into Poland.

You are thinking of Article V and Japan. And even then, it was just a ban on offensive wars.

Article 9. Article 5 of the NATO charter is the language about how an attack on the sovreign territory of one is to be treated as an attack on all.

But, no, Germany isn't banned from having a military. In fact both Germanies had pretty big and well-equipped ones during the Cold War. I don't know German, but to my understanding, Bundeswehr means "Federal Armed Forces".

[Stranger in a strange land]

https://twitter.com/ragipsoylu/status/1503397795323162633

Let's crunch some numbers here:
Russia started the invasion with around 200,000 men, not all of whom are on the Kyiv Axis. Around 10% have been killed, wounded, captured, or deserted at this point. Russia also needs to put troops behind the lines to secure their supply lines. A single tank takes many trucks and supply vehicles to keep it fueled and supplied. Let's say he has about 100K men to surround and attack Kyiv, a city of 3 million.

They seem to have lost 20,000 men (including around 6,000 killed) so far, and urban combat in the largest cities hasn't even started yet. Actually taking Kyiv is going to require house-to-house fighting, and I don't see the Ukrainians giving up. Yes, Putin can keep calling up reservists but the skill, motivation, and fitness of these men is going to be questionable, and going to decline with each call-up. Yes, he could get Kyiv in the end, but that will take months and probably cost as many men as the US lost during the entire eight-year Vietnam War against a smaller population base.

[Stranger in a strange land]

Apologies if someone already posted but some interesting results from the Russian poll published in WaPo last week:

"DO YOU SUPPORT OR DO NOT SUPPORT THE MILITARY OPERATION OF RUSSIA ON THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE?"
(age w/net support/oppose:)
18-24:29/39
25-30:37/30
31-35:45/24
36-40:52/29
41-55:63/22
56-65:71/14
66+:75/16

(locality)
city >1+M:48/31
city 500k-1M:56/31
city 100k-500k:56/24
city 50k-100k:63/23
city <50k/rural:65/16

(career stage)
studying:36/31
working:56/24
neither studying nor working:49/28
retired:69/17

(if working, for a federal, municipal, or private enterprise)
federal:61/19
municipal/local:77/12
private employee:49/29
private owner: 64/20

(financial situation in past year)
worsened:47/32
stayed the same:62/20
improved:67/15

> Russian polls

I guess FL Quinnipiac polls are more accurate.

tea leaves, tarot cards and chicken bones are more accurate

I don't actually think so: while we obviously can't take such a poll at face value, we can assume that anyone willing to say they're opposed is actually opposed and probably strongly so, and considering the current environment in Russia, people who say they don't know are probably opposed as well, even if only softly.

And this poll does show a trend that one would expect and is a big problem for Putin: support for the war is highest among the elderly (those who grew up in the Soviet Union and probably still wish to see it restored), and lowest among the younger generations, who would actually be fighting in the war.

[Stranger in a strange land]

Here's a interesting article from a Chinese professor that's been translated about the possible impacts from the war from a Chinese perspective.

https://uscnpm.org/2022/03/12/hu-wei-russia-ukraine-war-china-choice/

III. China’s Strategic Choice

1. China cannot be tied to Putin and needs to be cut off as soon as possible. In the sense that an escalation of conflict between Russia and the West helps divert U.S. attention from China, China should rejoice with and even support Putin, but only if Russia does not fall. Being in the same boat with Putin will impact China should he lose power. Unless Putin can secure victory with China’s backing, a prospect which looks bleak at the moment, China does not have the clout to back Russia. The law of international politics says that there are “no eternal allies nor perpetual enemies,” but “our interests are eternal and perpetual.” Under current international circumstances, China can only proceed by safeguarding its own best interests, choosing the lesser of two evils, and unloading the burden of Russia as soon as possible. At present, it is estimated that there is still a window period of one or two weeks before China loses its wiggle room. China must act decisively.

2. China should avoid playing both sides in the same boat, give up being neutral, and choose the mainstream position in the world. At present, China has tried not to offend either side and walked a middle ground in its international statements and choices, including abstaining from the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly votes. However, this position does not meet Russia’s needs, and it has infuriated Ukraine and its supporters as well as sympathizers, putting China on the wrong side of much of the world. In some cases, apparent neutrality is a sensible choice, but it does not apply to this war, where China has nothing to gain. Given that China has always advocated respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it can avoid further isolation only by standing with the majority of the countries in the world. This position is also conducive to the settlement of the Taiwan issue.

3. China should achieve the greatest possible strategic breakthrough and not be further isolated by the West. Cutting off from Putin and giving up neutrality will help build China’s international image and ease its relations with the U.S. and the West. Though difficult and requiring great wisdom, it is the best option for the future. The view that a geopolitical tussle in Europe triggered by the war in Ukraine will significantly delay the U.S. strategic shift from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region cannot be treated with excessive optimism. There are already voices in the U.S. that Europe is important, but China is more so, and the primary goal of the U.S. is to contain China from becoming the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region. Under such circumstances, China’s top priority is to make appropriate strategic adjustments accordingly, to change the hostile American attitudes towards China, and to save itself from isolation. The bottom line is to prevent the U.S. and the West from imposing joint sanctions on China.

4. China should prevent the outbreak of world wars and nuclear wars and make irreplaceable contributions to world peace. As Putin has explicitly requested Russia’s strategic deterrent forces to enter a state of special combat readiness, the Russo-Ukrainian war may spiral out of control. A just cause attracts much support; an unjust one finds little. If Russia instigates a world war or even a nuclear war, it will surely risk the world’s turmoil. To demonstrate China’s role as a responsible major power, China not only cannot stand with Putin, but also should take concrete actions to prevent Putin’s possible adventures. China is the only country in the world with this capability, and it must give full play to this unique advantage. Putin’s departure from China’s support will most likely end the war, or at least not dare to escalate the war. As a result, China will surely win widespread international praise for maintaining world peace, which may help China prevent isolation but also find an opportunity to improve its relations with the United States and the West.

The only problem Xi Jinping has in backing away from his 'limitless partnership' with Vladimir Putin is that he can ill afford to do so.  After all, how does he think other nations will react if and when China again offers an olive branch of friendship and alliance when it has proven such words aren't worth the paper they are printed on?  With Russia as a cautionary example, who is going to want to ally themselves with China?  They are already short on allies as it is.

That's why it was a "partnership" rather than a formal alliance.

[Stranger in a strange land]

The Case Of Russia's Apparently Back From The Dead Black Sea Warship

Tl;dr the rocket barrage against the Vasily Bykov mentioned a few days ago most likely didn't work. Ukraine was right to request anti-ship missiles.

The real takeaway from this article is that many Ukrainian reports of casualties, battlefield victories, etc, are exaggerated or outright fake news.

That  is not the point of the article at all.  It explicitly was limited was limited to saying that the reported sinking of a Russian vessel, which was reported as "probably" sunk, apparently was only damaged. There's nothing whatsoever in there about all the other reports of large amounts of Russian troop and equipment losses being over-reported.

It's very difficult to sink warships with land-based artillery because it's hard to get a direct hit with an armor-piercing shell, usually at long distance, and more importantly, ships can usually sail around them or bombard them from a distance with bigger guns, missiles, or airstrikes, which is why you don't see coastal defense artillery anymore. The fact that they even got a hit on the Vasily Bykov is pretty impressive.

[Stranger in a strange land]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

You forget that Russian troops can’t just sit there indefinitely without supplies.

And Russian forces haven't fully secured the areas behind their lines: the invading force is too small and they invaded during mud season so they're too road-bound. There are left-behind and stay-behind Ukrainian forces sheltering among a population which hates the occupiers. Russia invaded thinking the Ukrainian army would fold like the ANA and they could just drive into Kyiv the way the Taliban rolled into Kabul. But now, sitting abandoned without supplies, duped by their commanders and not even understanding why they're fighting, their expensive gear falling apart due to lack of maintenance, it's the Russians who look A LOT more like the ANA.

[Stranger in a strange land]

This may well go nowhere, but it is at least being discussed:

https://www.twitter.com/AFP/status/1506967225122631687
How long would it take for Ukrainian forces to train with a new type of anti-ship weapon (including maintenance etc.)? If they can’t do that, the only ground/ship-based ones NATO and the EU can give them are ex-Soviet P-15s and maybe older P-5s (from Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and perhaps the USA).

They could give them some jet munitions with anti-ship capabilities, but the Ukrainian Air Force is only getting smaller and probably has higher priorities.

So I checked wiki to see if the Harpoon can be launched from land, and indeed it can be. Looks like Norway's new Naval Strike Missile can be as well. Looks like the US Navy's missile technician school is only five weeks, so training the Ukrainians to use them might even be doable within the timeframe of the current war.

[Stranger in a strange land]

Is this more idiotic or more infuriating? It’s your chose.

https://twitter.com/shaunwalker7/status/1507019467519275028?s=21

This dumb**s does realize that most Ukrainians are very Orthodox Christian, right?

They either don’t know or consider them not real Christians. Flip a coin, there’s evidence for both viewpoints for her (and she’s not the only one, either).

Based on my experience with this type, she most likely doesn't consider Catholics or Orthodox to be Christians. But this makes the whole scene even more dystopian than it already is.

[Stranger in a strange land]

I’m confused about the oil tanks thing. It’s pretty clearly a legitimate military target and I guess the Russian position is that Ukraine isn’t allowed to shoot back.

Does Russia not understand the concept of a war?

Literally no, they do not. Their negotiator made that quite clear when he said it (the attack) didn't help progress or some sh**t. Leveling Mariupol, a city of 500K to the ground does? Raping teenage girls does? Bombing women and babies in a theater does? Russia, and not just Putin, believes they are entitled to peace and prosperity while committing heinous acts of literal terrorism abroad.

They also use WW2 as a shroud to justify getting whatever they want, no questions asked. At least in this respect, Russia is arguably an even more extreme version of the UK.

I don’t think it’s arguable. In fact the UK is FAR from the worst offender when it comes to this.

[Stranger in a strange land]

"How could these cowards refuse to fight and die in the trenches for their homeland?" I ask from behind my computer screen

Give me liberty or give me death!

Or maybe you have gotten too comfortable and think that freedom comes for free.

Several thoughts on this:
1) Ukraine banned men of military age from leaving not just to staff its military, but to keep them at their jobs. Essential work needs to go on even during wartime, particularly with anything involving food & weapons production, supply chains, and infrastructure. Ukraine can't possibly draft all military aged men into the army, and apparently there are so many volunteers that a draft is unnecessary.
2) If you let people flee from an invader, they'll just keep fleeing until there are no safe countries left.  
2a) And make no mistake, the Russian army is an invader which seeks to oppress not just Ukraine, but as much of Europe as they can get away with- I have no doubt that if Ukraine had fallen in 1 or 2 weeks as predicted, the next targets would have been the Baltic States, followed by Poland, and China would have made a grab for Taiwan
2b) Also, I find it pretty richly ironic that a lot of Right-Wing MGTOW & MRA types are criticizing Zelensky for this, when they also demand that El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala have essentially this exact policy to stop migration at the US's Southern border. Although in all fairness, the policy against leaving should probably also apply to childless women.
3) Of course, Zelensky's leadership by example here is absolutely critical. Had he decamped to Poland as many suggested and recommended, Ukraine would likely have fallen by now. Which makes his decision to stay stand as a lesson in leadership for the ages: if the enemy is coming for your capital, don't be a Ghani. Be a Zelensky. Better to die on your feet than live on your knees, and if you fight, you just might win and save yourself and many, many others.
4) Russia has revealed genocidal intent against Ukraine, both in its rhetoric and its actions. It's do or die for Ukraine. The Ukrainian Army and TDF now have the same "secret weapon" that Israel had in its wars against the Arab States. What Golda Meir told Joe Biden during his first trip to Israel as a freshman senator: "We have nowhere else to go." The fact that Jews and Ukrainians were both subjected to genocide - and Ukrainians subjected to genocide by the country that's invading them now -  heightens the sense of danger, purpose, and duty even more.
4a) If you don't like Israel or are upset by me using it as an analogy, I'd point out that essentially the same situation applies for Palestinians and Lebanese. Which is why Israel could never dislodge Hezbollah and it can never fully defeat the Palestinians.

[Stranger in a strange land]

https://mobile.twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1517918177887498244
👀

Mobilisation is probably a smaller political risk than abandoning the war after the Donbas offensive, if Putin thinks he can win the whole of Ukraine with mobilisation.

Unfortunately, as we’ve seen repeatedly in this war, “thinks he can” and “can” are very different things. And he (or possibly some people around him) think they’re just one big blow away from the long-promised total victory. So I fully expect him to declare full mobilization, and send either aging or very young and poorly-trained and equipped conscripts into the Donbas meat-grinder. And Ukraine has also declared full mobilization, has shown it has more than enough motivation to fight, and is going to get more and better weapons from the west as the war goes on.

[Stranger in a strange land]

The most revealing thing about that interview was that he gave it at all - most people in his position would not be talking to the press at present. Mind you, most would have resigned from all their tainted board posts and yet...

And we should note that this point is not a hypothetical one: he is far from being the only senior European politician to have acquired questionable board memberships with the Russian petro-chemical combines after retirement. But the others have hastily dropped theirs and are keeping very quiet right now. I don't think the difference here is a moral one - these are hardly good or moral people - but more of a comment on quite how monstrously vain and arrogant Schröder is.

Quite true. I recall his legendary TV appearance on election night in 2005 when he repeatedly and stubbornly insisted - although under the likely influence of alcohol - that he won the election and that his SPD would refuse to even talk with the CDU about forming a governing coalition with Merkel at the top. A day later this position was quickly shelved by the SPD and Schröder grudgingly admitted that his appearance hadn't been "optimal". Had almost something Trumpian if you think about it. Why is it that "Trumpian" personalities happen to like Vladimir Putin so often?

Putin is very, very good at manipulating narcissists, and something (I haven't quite been able to pinpoint what) causes them to EAT UP the KGB tough guy persona.

[Stranger in a strange land]

https://twitter.com/kylegriffin1/status/1519686692596334592

Excellent. Congress needs to take this up swiftly.

Question for the Americans in here, this should go through almost unanimously, right?

The usual suspects (Qanon Rs & the squad) would certainly vote against.

Right, but it or something very close will likely pass by something like 410 YEA - 15 NAY - 10 ABS

[Stranger in a strange land]

https://mobile.twitter.com/HN_Schlottman/status/1519659488592240641?cxt=HHwWgoC9...
Pretty big that someone like him would be there.

One thing I have to say about this war is that it does feel like a mix between Power Rangers, a "Wrestling" Match, and Blazing Saddles.

We are now at the part of the show where the main boss goes in to fight himself. So yeah. This war now has bosses, not just mini-bosses like that Chechen piece of sh**t or various other villains making cameos.

Kadyrov, in all likelihood, never set foot in Ukraine, or only did so VERY briefly for a few photo ops. Gerasimov personally leading the offensive from near the front seems more likely, just because it's LITERALLY do-or-die for him.

[Stranger in a strange land]

A military can't run if everyone is sitting around skimming off the top to the point that there is barely anything left to actually go towards actual operations.

Even Russian writers who generally take care to be extremely careful about politics would often happily slip in jokes and dark references to corruption in the military in their work - up until a few months ago, anyway. Which gives an indication of a few things.

This is happening too often for them to be accidents. I can't help but think that there are more than a few Russians who are against the War and disgusted by the atrocities that have occurred.

[Stranger in a strange land]

Russians may be entering Sieverodonetsk, but they've not proven good at all at actually thriving in urban combat. Given how long it took them to almost completely subdue Mariupol, which is way way way behind their lines, I'm not betting on them having an easy time with Sieverodonetsk, a city that's literally right on the front lines and easily resuppliable for the Ukrainians.

Entering does not equal "is about to fall," far from it. Probably just means we're gonna be spending two months hearing about the battle of Sieverodonetsk.

Also worth pointing out that this is literally, like, basically a stones throw westwards of where the offensive started from three weeks ago.

How does their progress in the Donbas Offensive compare with say, Verdun or the Somme?

[Stranger in a strange land]

Edit: additionally, if Russia "wins" land by even more barbaric and dangerous tactics (i.e. nukes), it loses even more internationally. China, for instance, would not want Russia to suggest to Taiwan etc. that they must develop their own nuclear programs or get nuked, but this is what nuking Ukraine would do.

That is already explicitly part of the PRC's red line on an all-out assault on ROC.   The PRC has been very public, clear, and explicit that ROC getting nuclear weapons or making consituatonal changes to the ROC Constitution that cuts territorial ties to Mainland China would automatically mean an all-out PLA assault on ROC.  

There was actually a secret ROC nuclear weapons program that got started in 1967 under Chiang Kai-Shek.  It was so secret that when ROC Prez Chiang Ching-Kuo's health deteriorated in the mid-1980s his stepmother Madame Chiang Kai-Shek stepped in as the head of an alternative chain of command to help move this nuclear weapon program along to make sure most of the military and political leadership is kept in the dark about it.   Had it progressed I think ROC would have had nuclear weapons by the early 1990s.  In 1987 this program was discovered by the CIA which pressured the ROC to terminate the program for fear that the PRC will find out soon and launch an all-out assault on ROC.  There was talk in the KMT administration in the 1990s of restarting it but it was decided that it was KMT policy to prioritize negotiations with CCP as the long-term solution to PRC-ROC problems.  A core DPP value is anti-nuclear power and DPP administrations have done everything to remove nuclear material from ROC including shutting down all nuclear power plants.  As a result, we can safely assume that a DPP or KMT administration would not have anything to do with nuclear weapons. 

PRC-ROC relation is a flashpoint for conflict but ROC getting nuclear weapons can be safely ruled out as a source of open conflict.

Even if Taiwan didn't, there's a high chance that Vietnam, South Korea, or Japan would, all of which would make confrontations between these countries and China MUCH more dangerous in the future.

And also, Russia actually using nuclear weapons in Ukraine might very well cause the Taiwanese to think differently about nuclear weapons. Even if the probability is low, it's still high enough to be a major reason why Russian use of nuclear weapons would be a danger to China.

[Stranger in a strange land]

https://twitter.com/markos/status/1531469113570103296?s=20&t=jUly8iIlsYA7RWJ...


Looking at Russia's population pyramid shows why increasing the age limit for signing military contracts was necessary if the government wants to avoid mobilization:

This isn't talked about enough: unlike the USSR in the mid-20th century and the Russian Empire in earlier times, today's Russia has a catastrophically low birth rate (FWIW, so does Ukraine, but they're not the ones who instigated the war). Life expediencies are longer nowadays (though still shockingly short in Russia, especially for men, and work forces are much more specialized, meaning that instead of being mostly interchangeable farmers and factory workers, each soldier lost is another young man who can't later go on to become a programmer, plumber, technician, or business owner. Yet Putin is throwing away young men in the prime of life as though he's Stalin or Nicholas II. And it's quite telling that in a country of about 150 million, about 15% of whom are men 18-40, so 22.5 million or so of prime military eligibility, many of whom, lets face it, have poor employment or educational prospects, he struggles to find even a hundred thousand more willing to go and fight in Ukraine.