Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[Storr]

Lads driving up in a civilian spec SUV:

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1568704969078890498?s=20&t=w5Nev-R...

[Torie]

This is all great, and often incredible, stuff - but Russia (well, Putin anyway) are hardly likely going to take this lying down once they have recovered from the shock, surely?

He/they are going to try *something* - the question is what, and how much it should concern not just Ukraine but the rest of the world.

Well the plan to freeze out Europe seems now like a total fail with the collapse of the Russian lines screwing up the narrative of a long slow hellish stalemate seeming without end, and for what, for the Russian symps to hawk (what's Tucker Carlson going to do now)? So I don't know. That is beyond my pay grade. Saber rattling of nukes did not seem to fly either.  

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

This is all great, and often incredible, stuff - but Russia (well, Putin anyway) are hardly likely going to take this lying down once they have recovered from the shock, surely?

He/they are going to try *something* - the question is what, and how much it should concern not just Ukraine but the rest of the world.

There haven't been defeats as large as this for them since the first phase, but there have been some, and the Russian responses in the first phase are also instructive as to what Russia might do first. Some combination of:
- A propaganda blitz
- War crimes in occupied areas
- Missile strikes

[CumbrianLefty]

But they could pass off those first phase reverses as still compatible with the "longer term plan".

I don't see how they can do so now, even the most credulous won't really buy it.

Which maybe increases the likelihood that Putin might try to do something totally desperate.

[Torie]

This is all great, and often incredible, stuff - but Russia (well, Putin anyway) are hardly likely going to take this lying down once they have recovered from the shock, surely?

He/they are going to try *something* - the question is what, and how much it should concern not just Ukraine but the rest of the world.

There haven't been defeats as large as this for them since the first phase, but there have been some, and the Russian responses in the first phase are also instructive as to what Russia might do first. Some combination of:
- A propaganda blitz
- War crimes in occupied areas
- Missile strikes

Some combination of:
- A propaganda blitz
- War crimes in occupied areas
- Missile strikes

My impression is that the missile strikes are down. The problem is that when you fire one, some long range missile from the other side then finds out where it was fired and pays a house call. The Russians can't use aircraft anymore either. So yeah, maybe try to hold on to what it has left, and totally Russianize it with war crimes on steroids. The downside of that, is that it might force NATO's hand. There is no free lunch here for Putin I suspect.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

This is all great, and often incredible, stuff - but Russia (well, Putin anyway) are hardly likely going to take this lying down once they have recovered from the shock, surely?

He/they are going to try *something* - the question is what, and how much it should concern not just Ukraine but the rest of the world.

There haven't been defeats as large as this for them since the first phase, but there have been some, and the Russian responses in the first phase are also instructive as to what Russia might do first. Some combination of:
- A propaganda blitz
- War crimes in occupied areas
- Missile strikes

Some combination of:
- A propaganda blitz
- War crimes in occupied areas
- Missile strikes

My impression is that the missile strikes are down. The problem is that when you fire one, some long range missile from the other side then finds out where it was fired and pays a house call. The Russians can't use aircraft anymore either. So yeah, maybe try to hold on to what it has left, and totally Russianize it with war crimes on steroids. The downside of that, is that it might force NATO's hand. There is no free lunch here for Putin I suspect.

The missile strikes do seem to be occurring much less frequently now, but they never came at even intervals to begin with - so Russia can probably launch tens in one of its missile tantrums if it's prepared to wait a few days or weeks afterwards.

Many of the long-range Russian missiles are launched out of the practical range of most Ukrainian countermeasures. Russia does not have air superiority over Ukraine, but it can still use aircraft - and the lack of air superiority is exactly why we've seen such heavy employment of long-range missiles instead of shorter-range kinds of airstrikes delivered by jets within Ukrainian airspace.

For instance, the Kh-22 missile is fired exclusively by Russia's long-range bombers from deep within Russia. It isn't very useful anymore, but you use what you have - and it can, at least, be employed as a terror weapon. Tens were fired shortly after several important foreign leaders left Kyiv.

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

But they could pass off those first phase reverses as still compatible with the "longer term plan".

I don't see how they can do so now, even the most credulous won't really buy it.

Which maybe increases the likelihood that Putin might try to do something totally desperate.

If the entire first phase could be sold as a feint and Snake Island a good will gesture, they can do the same with the Kharkiv losses (they ignored the first successful Kharkiv counteroffensive, after all). The Donbas losses are tricker, but if they can put a stop to those, they can highlight their miniscule gains elsewhere in the Donbas and tell their true believers that Kharkiv merely distracted Ukrainians while Russia advanced where they wanted to.

[Middle-aged Europe]

Well, there was always some concern that Putin could resort to using tactical nukes on the Ukrainian battlefield if things start to go south for him. I suppose this would lead to international sanctions against Russia that make the ones that are already in place like a slap on the wrist. If he tries to do more than that I suppose there's a fair chance that he gets fragged. Either way, I'm not actually that worried at this point.

[Torie]

This is all great, and often incredible, stuff - but Russia (well, Putin anyway) are hardly likely going to take this lying down once they have recovered from the shock, surely?

He/they are going to try *something* - the question is what, and how much it should concern not just Ukraine but the rest of the world.

There haven't been defeats as large as this for them since the first phase, but there have been some, and the Russian responses in the first phase are also instructive as to what Russia might do first. Some combination of:
- A propaganda blitz
- War crimes in occupied areas
- Missile strikes

Some combination of:
- A propaganda blitz
- War crimes in occupied areas
- Missile strikes

My impression is that the missile strikes are down. The problem is that when you fire one, some long range missile from the other side then finds out where it was fired and pays a house call. The Russians can't use aircraft anymore either. So yeah, maybe try to hold on to what it has left, and totally Russianize it with war crimes on steroids. The downside of that, is that it might force NATO's hand. There is no free lunch here for Putin I suspect.

The missile strikes do seem to be occurring much less frequently now, but they never came at even intervals to begin with - so Russia can probably launch tens in one of its missile tantrums if it's prepared to wait a few days or weeks afterwards.

Many of the long-range Russian missiles are launched out of the practical range of most Ukrainian countermeasures. Russia does not have air superiority over Ukraine, but it can still use aircraft - and the lack of air superiority is exactly why we've seen such heavy employment of long-range missiles instead of shorter-range kinds of airstrikes delivered by jets within Ukrainian airspace.

For instance, the Kh-22 missile is fired exclusively by Russia's long-range bombers from deep within Russia. It isn't very useful anymore, but you use what you have - and it can, at least, be employed as a terror weapon. Tens were fired shortly after several important foreign leaders left Kyiv.

OK.

Here is Zelinsky's opinion. Man the guy is eloquent. He is indeed a gift from God for Ukraine.

"“It is the most difficult winter for the whole world,” Volodymyr Zelenskiy said at the Yalta European Strategy Conference in Kyiv organized by Ukrainian businessman Victor Pinchuk. He termed choking off energy to Europe Putin’s “last argument.”

Zelenskiy urged Ukraine’s allies to expand offers of anti-missile systems to protect the country’s energy infrastructure, which he predicted would be a target for Russian troops, and acknowledged the risk of foreign aid to Ukraine fading over time.   

[Storr]

https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1568673945712459776?s=20&t=w5Nev-R2...

[Frodo]

Could Ukraine even get back Crimea at this point

Maybe not in the coming weeks, but there's an opening in the longer run, as I understand it. Zelenskyy definitely stated that getting back Crimea is what he intends to get done, especially after Putin rejected an earlier offer to negotiate a settlement and a potential backoff from seeking NATO membership (which again proves that this whole "NATO is a threat to Russia" and "encirclement" is total nonsense, and always has been). There's also a reason Ukraine did some sabotage operation in Crimea lately, which they just recently admitted. It's all designed to weaken Russia's military capabilities here.

The only question is how far Putin is ready to go here, because losing Crimea would extremely hurt his standing in Russia, no matter how his propaganda show on the news tries to frame it.

When this is all over, we should reopen the offer of NATO membership to Ukraine. 

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Wouldn't Russia sooner drop nuclear bombs than let Ukraine do a sustained invasion of what they see as Russian territory?

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Wouldn't Russia sooner drop nuclear bombs than let Ukraine do a sustained invasion of what they see as Russian territory?

One should never rule it out (especially in Crimea's case), but you're making the mistake of believing that Russian leaders care about what is considered Russian territory beyond the threat its loss might pose to their own leadership. Attempts to use nuclear weapons also pose risks to their leadership.

There are less risky alternatives/complements to nukes which haven't yet been employed, full mobilisation being the most obvious of them. Mobilisation might be the biggest available boon to Russia's military, but Putin refuses to pursue it, most likely because of the political risk to himself. This may well change depending on how the Ukrainian offensives continue from here.

[nicholas.slaydon]

Wouldn't Russia sooner drop nuclear bombs than let Ukraine do a sustained invasion of what they see as Russian territory?

Putin and Russian leaders may say so, but that all comes down to whether you believe that Russia would risk using nuclear weapons (Personally, I don't think nuclear weapons pose a real threat to any country, as I don't believe that any world leader is bold enough to use  nuclear weapons, or indeed would be obeyed if they made such an order). Even against Ukraine, which itself is not a nuclear armed country, using nuclear weapons against Ukrainian forces would force the hand of any sane government to not only sever all ties with Russia period, but in a way would force their hand to start calling for, and indeed preparing a regime change mission in Russia.

[Torie]

Wouldn't Russia [Putin] sooner drop nuclear bombs than let Ukraine do a sustained invasion of what they see as Russian territory?

And therein lies the exit ramp. No as to nukes. Yes as to a regime change. The transfixing properties as to a mother Russia in a place run by cynical avaricious thugs goes only so far with the Russian elite. The masses far away from the elite zip codes are but cannon fodder.

[Storr]

https://twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1568699284719280131?s=20&t=w5Nev-R2On...

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

If Russia doesn't regain its footing, this war could be over sooner rather than later.
Maybe Ukraine could try to send resources attacking Kursk Oblast if it makes enough gains?

[Splash]

This is all great, and often incredible, stuff - but Russia (well, Putin anyway) are hardly likely going to take this lying down once they have recovered from the shock, surely?

He/they are going to try *something* - the question is what, and how much it should concern not just Ukraine but the rest of the world.

Well the plan to freeze out Europe seems now like a total fail with the collapse of the Russian lines screwing up the narrative of a long slow hellish stalemate seeming without end, and for what, for the Russian symps to hawk (what's Tucker Carlson going to do now)? So I don't know. That is beyond my pay grade. Saber rattling of nukes did not seem to fly either.  

And the other option that is mentioned quite often (general mobilization of the population) wouldn't be a short-term solution either since such a thing would take significant time to carry out. Not to mention that it's clear Putin is aware of the political risks that involves given that he has so far preferred to replenish his losses with criminals and impoverished conscripts from the hinterlands.  

[Torie]

https://twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1568699284719280131?s=20&t=w5Nev-R2On...

Linked before I think, but worth linking again for those fond of maps (anyone here into maps?).

This utility was very accurate in mapping out in close to real time the collapse of the Russian line.

https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/10-september-ukrainian-military-are-on-the-outskirts-of-lysychansk

[Frodo]

With all the combat experience Belarussian opponents of Lukashenko are getting fighting for Ukraine, the time may soon come for an insurgency to be launched (from Ukrainian soil) against his regime, perhaps eventually overthrowing him:

‘LUKASHENKO IS EASIER TO UNSEAT THAN PUTIN’
A band of Belarusians is resisting the threat of a neo-Soviet empire by taking up arms in Ukraine.

The members of the Kalinouski Regiment are motivated by a belief that the Belarusian regime is both much weaker and much more dangerous than many assume. Lukashenko, they argue, is deeply unpopular. They reckon that no more than 10 to 20 percent of the population supports him—mostly pensioners, bureaucrats, and security-service employees who depend on the state for jobs in a failing economy—and he knows this. Lukashenko has no ideology, but he will do anything to stay in power. That means that when Russian President Vladimir Putin threatens, as he did at the end of June, to transfer nuclear missiles to Belarus, the world should pay attention. Putin might want to avoid the geopolitical consequences of using nuclear weapons for the first time since 1945—but Lukashenko might not care.

Putin could also force Lukashenko to send Belarusian troops to fight in Ukraine, but that kind of decision could have unintended consequences. Kukhta, Rokosh, and the others all say their regiment has been contacted directly by soldiers and officers now serving in the Belarusian army who want instructions on how to surrender if they are ordered to cross the border into Ukraine. Kukhta, the man of few words, gave them blunt advice: “Put your hands up and your weapons down.” He predicts that the majority of the Belarusian army’s tanks and trucks would wind up in the control of the Ukrainian army. Although there is no way to verify that claim, at least one Belarusian border guard has successfully escaped to the Ukrainian side already, declaring that he wanted to join the fight against Russia. Sakhashchik, who also predicts that the majority of ordinary soldiers would not fight, made a video appeal back in February, calling on Belarusian soldiers not to join the invasion: “This is not our war. You will not defend your homeland, home, or family and will not receive glory—only shame, humiliation, and death.”

The Kalinouski fighters think Belarus has another kind of significance too. After all, if the Russian leader wants to reunite Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine into some kind of neo-Soviet empire, Lukashenko’s loyalty is a necessary ingredient. But what if the Belarusian pillar disappears? Then everything else—the empire, the war with Ukraine, Putinism itself—might crumble as well. This, they want the world to know, is an opportunity that should be taken, not least because, as one of them put it, “Lukashenko is easier to unseat than Putin.” Right now nobody other than the Poles and of course the Ukrainians is assisting the Kalinouski fighters. But maybe someday others will. Rokosh tells me that he wants the fighters eventually to get access to better Western and NATO intelligence about what goes on inside their country so that they can plan their next steps better. The Biden administration’s warnings last autumn about the coming war in Ukraine convinced many people across Eastern Europe, Belarus included, that the Americans know a lot more than they let on. Alongside Gene Sharp, the fighters have also read Charlie Wilson’s War, the book that describes how, in the 1980s, a single congressman persuaded Washington to help the Afghans overthrow their Soviet occupiers. If it happened once, maybe it could happen again?

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Speaking of missile tantrums of 10+ projectiles, here we are:

https://twitter.com/Caucasuswar/status/1568723608327049217
Maybe they're being used to hinder the offensive, but most are probably just being thrown at Kharkiv City in line with previous strikes.

[Splash]

Speaking of missile tantrums of 10+ projectiles, here we are:

https://twitter.com/Caucasuswar/status/1568723608327049217
Maybe they're being used to hinder the offensive, but most are probably just being thrown at Kharkiv City as usual.

Given that their targeting systems are seemingly stuck in the 1980s, I doubt that Russia is capable of identifying and tracking the highly mobile mechanized infantry that Ukraine is using to carry out this counteroffensive. As you said, they are probably just targeting population centers, but they could also be firing them at their own ammo/supply depots that they left behind in their retreat (lol).

[Mehmentum]

Russia could resort to WMDs, but I think chemical weapons would be their next move.  Actually using nukes would be utter madness.  If Putin tries it, he is not sane (possible).  Not only would it force countries like India to ostracize them and risk NATO directly intervening (thus risking a nuclear war and the end of civilization), it'd also present an internal risk to Putin's regime.  Chemical weapons would still generate backlash, but they aren't unprecedented in modern warfare (see Syria).

I have doubts as to whether Russia is capable of taking advantage of full mobilization.  Its not just a question of the morale of these troops, is Russia really capable of equipping and supplying them?  They've had enough logistical problems with their main army.  I could see them making some initial gains, but once they're out from the railroads I think they bog down and get chewed up just like the initial invasion.

[Frodo]

Addendum: Here is an almost 5 month old article on the matter of Crimea (I surmise that it has been put up before here). The author goes to close to the gates of the place of the ripe hanging fruit in characterizing it. Things didn't progress according to his schedule obviously, but it perhaps offers up some insight as to why Russia took the bait or whatever it was and redeployed military assets to Kherson. Perhaps it is true that what lies beyond is the soft underbelly of the peninsula itself.

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-and-how-russian-occupied-crimea-can-fall-ukraine

Given how badly things are going for Russia, and how hard up for troops they are short of full wartime mobilization, they are going to have to decide whether it is more important to hold on to Transnistria with Russian units that aren't doing anything at the moment, or to transfer that manpower to Crimea to assist in its defense, giving Moldova its territory back after thirty years of occupation.  And they better make that decision soon...  

[TiltsAreUnderrated]

Mobilisation could take a long time and Russia might not be able to fully exploit it, but I've not seen a good case for it not having the potential to help at least somewhat. Even underequipped extra troops are better than no extra troops.

It can be pursued and bring fruit, but the political will isn't there.