Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

On Macron's idea.  I actually would like to see it.  I want to see a  French brigade swap with an Ukraine and face the Russians.  I suspect the result will be quite shocking to Macron.  I always said that the idea of NATO officers "training" Ukrainian officers last year in the lead-up to the Ukraine counteroffensive was absurd. An experienced Ukrainian officer has a lot more to teach a NATO officer in my view.

Ukraine is in fact among the most competent militaries in Europe for these sorts of conditions.

[Open Source Intelligence]

All things equal many other EU leaders are rejecting  Macron idea of NATO troops in Ukraine.  I think Lithuania did indicate that they were for Macron's idea.  Most likely Macron saying this might be a trial balloon as well as setting the stage for this idea to be part of public discourse in EU.  

I believe Western and Central European troops will deploy to Ukraine when I see it.

http://www.warontherocks.com/2024/02-the-russo-ukrainian-war-at-two/

podcast

On the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ryan and Mike Kofman sit down to chat about where the war stands today and where things are heading. It is, to be candid, a pessimistic conversation. They cover the fall of Avdiivka, military leadership changes, Ukraine's mobilization challenges, Congressional dysfunction, European defense spending, and more.

[jaichind]

But I was told by Zelensky that the Ukraine KIA is only 31K.

[Lord Halifax]

But I was told by Zelensky that the Ukraine KIA is only 31K.

regardless of whether that's true or not they still need more troops, there's no need for all your cynical comments.

[SnowLabrador]

There just isn't any good news for Ukraine lately, is there?

[Woody]

The Russians claimed to have already issued over two million Russian passports in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/02/27/7443914/

Quote from Agarkov: "One of the priority tasks is registering the residents of our new territories (that's how Russians refer to temporarily occupied areas − ed.). Currently, over two million passports have already been issued to the new citizens of the Russian Federation."

[Hindsight was 2020]

There has not been a more clear cut good vs. evil conflict since WWII:

"The head of the Russian occupation administration of Zaporizhia, Yevgeny Balitsky, admitted that Russia is massively deporting Ukrainians who do not support Russia.

The official admitted that the Kremlin is carrying out ethnic cleansing in the occupied territories of Ukraine"

https://twitter.com/den_kazansky/status/1762398536874741872?s=20

Absolutely disgusting, could you imagine knowing this was going on if a poster here would with trollish glee promote the idea Russia treats the occupied regions good in any way? Like posting about how many duel citizen passports they issued or posted vids of cities Russia bombed out being cleaned up? Man anyone who did that would just be a massive piece of crap

[jaichind]

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/28/foreign-troops-ukraine-theyre-already-there/

"Foreign troops in Ukraine? They’re already there."

Though official numbers are a bit murky, some 20,000 foreigners from over 50 nationalities make up Ukraine's international legion, according to Ukrainian officials. 

[Hindsight was 2020]

https://twitter.com/paulmcleary/status/1762848086152421393?s=20
This is embarrassing on our part

[jaichind]

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polish-farmers-rally-warsaw-against-eu-policies-ukraine-imports-2024-02-27/

"Poland mulls wider ban on Ukrainian food imports as farmers warn of more protests"

The Poland-Ukraine situation continues to get worse.  If I were Ukraine I would back down.  Beggers cannot be choosers.

[CumbrianLefty]

https://twitter.com/paulmcleary/status/1762848086152421393?s=20
This is embarrassing on our part

And it is good to see Germany stepping up to the plate in certain respects, despite the criticism that they (sometimes justly) receive. When are these shells likely to reach the front line?

[Virginiá]

https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/28/politics/pentagon-considering-tapping-last-source-ukraine-funding/index.html

The Pentagon is weighing whether to tap into the last remaining source of funding it has for military aid to support Ukraine’s war effort against Russia even without guarantees that those funds will be replenished by Congress, multiple defense officials told CNN.

The Defense Department still has around $4 billion in presidential drawdown authority funds available for Ukraine, which allows the Pentagon to draw from its own stockpiles to send military equipment to Kyiv.

But the Pentagon had previously been reluctant to spend any of that remaining money without assurances it would be reimbursed by Congress through the administration’s $60 billion supplemental funding request, because taking from DoD stockpiles with no plan to replenish that equipment could impact US military readiness.

“At issue here again is the question of impacting our own readiness, as a nation, and the responsibilities that we have,” he said last month when asked about the money. “And so, yes, while we do have that $4.2 billion in authority, we don’t have the funds available to us to replenish those stocks should we expend that. And with no timeline in sight, we have to make those hard decisions.”

[Antonio the Sixth]

https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/28/politics/pentagon-considering-tapping-last-source-ukraine-funding/index.html

The Pentagon is weighing whether to tap into the last remaining source of funding it has for military aid to support Ukraine’s war effort against Russia even without guarantees that those funds will be replenished by Congress, multiple defense officials told CNN.

The Defense Department still has around $4 billion in presidential drawdown authority funds available for Ukraine, which allows the Pentagon to draw from its own stockpiles to send military equipment to Kyiv.

But the Pentagon had previously been reluctant to spend any of that remaining money without assurances it would be reimbursed by Congress through the administration’s $60 billion supplemental funding request, because taking from DoD stockpiles with no plan to replenish that equipment could impact US military readiness.

“At issue here again is the question of impacting our own readiness, as a nation, and the responsibilities that we have,” he said last month when asked about the money. “And so, yes, while we do have that $4.2 billion in authority, we don’t have the funds available to us to replenish those stocks should we expend that. And with no timeline in sight, we have to make those hard decisions.”

This is so unbelievably idiotic. The US military has tons of spare, and besides they have no plausible reason to be fighting a war in the next decade. The Pentagon should be scraping the bottom of its reserves to send to Ukraine right now and it's shameful that they keep dithering over bullsh*t reasons like this.

[jaichind]

https://www.tysol.pl/a118063-tusk-rozmawiamy-z-ukraina-o-calkowitym-zamknieciu-granicy

"Tusk: We are talking to Ukraine about completely closing the border"



Further escalation between Ukraine and Poland.

I wonder if this will include Lithuania since a lot of Ukriaina goods enter Poland via Lithuania as a way to get around the Poland blockade

[Storr]

https://www.tysol.pl/a118063-tusk-rozmawiamy-z-ukraina-o-calkowitym-zamknieciu-granicy

"Tusk: We are talking to Ukraine about completely closing the border"

Important: "However, he noted that this would be a temporary solution and "painful" for both parties."

Subsidies do make sense as a long term solution: ""I am ready to take hard decisions when it comes to the border with Ukraine, always in consultation with Kiev, so that there are no unnecessary tensions. But we must find a long-term solution," Tusk said.

He added: "We will talk about possible grain subsidies and other measures that will allow us to sell Polish grain as quickly as possible." According to him, the state can help in purchasing this grain, so that, for example, Polish grain will be more attractive in terms of prices than Ukrainian grain."

[Storr]

“Yesterday, 02/27/2024, at about 19:00, there was a strike on the gathering place of personnel of the 155th separate marine brigade (military unit 30926, Vladivostok) in the settlement of Olenivka, Donetsk region.

The command held an awarding of servicemen. The strike was carried out by two HIMARS missiles. As a result of the strike, 19 soldiers were killed and another 12 were injured.

According to the source, among the dead:
• Roman Kozhukhov, lieutenant colonel, deputy brigade commander;
• Alexander Abilov, major;
• Nail Shakhmanov, captain;

The commander of the 155th Marine Brigade, Colonel Mikhail Gudkov, was wounded.

The source reports that the command was aware of the work of an enemy reconnaissance UAV in their area, but ignored this information.”

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1762910185507483816?s=20

[jaichind]

Pro-Russian sources report continued Russian advances West of Avdiivka.  It seems they will just keep on moving until the Ukrainanas can form a defense line

[Open Source Intelligence]

Pro-Russian sources report continued Russian advances West of Avdiivka.  It seems they will just keep on moving until the Ukrainanas can form a defense line

ISW from yesterday.

Russian forces are attempting to exploit tactical opportunities offered by the Russian seizure of Avdiivka and appear to be maintaining a relatively high tempo of offensive operations aimed at pushing as far as possible in the Avdiivka area before Ukrainian forces establish more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines in the area. Russian forces temporarily decreased their tempo of operations as they cleared Avdiivka following the Russian seizure of the settlement on February 17, but have since resumed a relatively high tempo of assaults further west and northwest of Avdiivka.[1] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on February 27 that Russian forces have recently increased the size of their assault groups in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast) from small squad-sized groups to platoon-sized and even company-sized groups.[2] Russian forces are currently focusing assaults west of Avdiivka in the direction of Berdychi, Orlivka, and Tonenke, where Ukrainian forces established immediate defensive positions to cover their withdrawal from Avdiivka and to receive oncoming Russian offensive operations.[3] Lykhovyi and Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Ukrainian forces have stabilized their defensive lines along the Tonenke-Orlivka-Berdychi line as of February 27.[4] Ukrainian military observers characterized Ukrainian fortifications west of Avdiivka as “disappointing” and ”problematic,” however.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are struggling to hold defensive positions immediately west of Avdiivka and forecasted that Ukrainian forces will concentrate on a defensive line further west that Ukrainian forces began constructing in November 2023.[6]

Russian forces are likely continuing attempts to advance in order to deprive Ukrainian forces of the respite that would allow Ukraine to establish a more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive line in the immediate vicinity of Avdiivka. The seizure of Avdiivka has allowed Russian forces to press on positions that Ukrainian forces have manned for a shorter period than Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka or further west, and Russian forces are likely sustaining a high operational tempo to try to exploit this tactical opportunity. Russian forces may be able to seize settlements immediately west and northwest of Avdiivka in the coming weeks, but terrain and water features further west of Avdiivka, particularly the body of water that runs between Berdychi-Semenivka-Orlivka, will likely slow the already relatively slow rate of Russian advances in the area. This difficult terrain will likely constrain further Russian tactical gains and allow Ukrainian forces to establish prepared defensive positions that will likely prompt the eventual culmination of the current Russian offensive effort in the area at least until or unless the Russians reinforce their attacking elements.[7]

This force posture does set the Russians up for the feigned retreat trap that the Ukrainians were reportedly adopting (German Army strategy post-1943 on the Eastern Front). But the Ukrainians have to get setup first.

[Open Source Intelligence]

Also from the same ISW report, there's been a lot of Russian military reorganization this past week. There's what is stated below plus the military districts of Russia proper were reorganized. The Eastern (Far East) and Central (Siberia and lands west) Districts are largely unchanged. They reinstituted the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts. Leningrad takes over all of the former Northern District. The Southern Military District incorporates 4 or 5 Ukrainian oblasts in addition to Crimea which was already in the Southern District. Meanwhile the naval assets of every military district are stripped out and are under one Russian Navy Command.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2024

Russian forces are likely attempting to create an operational maneuver force for the exploitation of recent Russian advances in the Avdiivka direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 27 that Russian forces have formally transferred responsibility for the Donetsk City-Avdiivka axis to the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and formally transferred the Central Grouping of Forces’ previous area of responsibility (AOR) in the Lyman direction to Russia’s Western Grouping of Forces.[8] Russia’s Western Grouping of Forces (likely comprised almost entirely of elements of the Western Military District [WMD]) assumed responsibility for at least a portion of the Lyman direction in late fall and early winter 2023 after the Russian command transferred the bulk of the committed formations of the Central Grouping of Forces (primarily comprised of elements of the Central Military District [CMD]) to the offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in October 2023.[9] Russian officials have recently praised the Central Grouping of Forces for the seizure of Avdiivka and have notably highlighted CMD Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev and increasingly identified the Avdiivka direction as the AOR of the Central Grouping of Forces.[10] The Russian command may have decided to codify the de facto command structure that has existed in the Avdiivka area since late Fall 2023 to explicitly establish a maneuver force intended to exploit recent Russian advances in the area. The Avdiivka-Donetsk axis is a relatively narrower AOR compared to the AORs of other Russian force groupings in Ukraine, and this focused responsibility suggests that the Russian military command likely intends for CMD elements to continue offensive efforts in the Avdiivka area in the near and medium term.

The Russian command likely hopes that the reorganization of command structures will establish more cohesive Russian grouping of forces throughout the theater in Ukraine. Russian forces recently reorganized the command structure of the Russian grouping of forces in southern Ukraine, abolishing an unnamed grouping of forces that defended against the Ukrainian summer 2023 counteroffensive and distributing its elements between the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces (AOR in Kherson Oblast and western Zaporzihia Oblast) and the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (AOR in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and western Donetsk Oblast).[11] The Russian Western Grouping of Forces has launched an ongoing multi-axis offensive operation along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border and has designed elements of that operation based on its control over a cohesive force grouping along a wide AOR.[12] Mashovets noted that the transfer of the Avdiivka-Donetsk City axis to the Central Grouping of Forces bisects the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces, which previously had responsibility for the frontline from the Bakhmut direction through the Marinka direction.[13] It is unclear if this bisection will generate further command and control (C2) difficulties for Russian forces near Bakhmut and west and southwest of Donetsk City beyond the pervasive C2 issues that Russian forces already face writ large in Ukraine.[14] This apparent Russian reorganization effort suggests that the Russian command may be attempting to implement lessons it has learned about organizing command structures in areas in which it intends to prioritize offensive efforts as the more cohesive Russian groupings of forces are engaged in more concerted or broader offensive efforts.

[jaichind]

I continue to believe that for 2024 Russia's plans are much more limited and will just focus on clearing all fortified positions in the Donbass and completely clear Donbass.  This frees Russia up in 2025 to advance in several possible directions.

[Open Source Intelligence]

I continue to believe that for 2024 Russia's plans are much more limited and will just focus on clearing all fortified positions in the Donbass and completely clear Donbass.  This frees Russia up in 2025 to advance in several possible directions.

Unless they're content and wanting to end the war soon, why be limited when your opponent is outmanned and outgunned?

[Storr]

https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/28/politics/pentagon-considering-tapping-last-source-ukraine-funding/index.html

The Pentagon is weighing whether to tap into the last remaining source of funding it has for military aid to support Ukraine’s war effort against Russia even without guarantees that those funds will be replenished by Congress, multiple defense officials told CNN.

The Defense Department still has around $4 billion in presidential drawdown authority funds available for Ukraine, which allows the Pentagon to draw from its own stockpiles to send military equipment to Kyiv.

But the Pentagon had previously been reluctant to spend any of that remaining money without assurances it would be reimbursed by Congress through the administration’s $60 billion supplemental funding request, because taking from DoD stockpiles with no plan to replenish that equipment could impact US military readiness.

“At issue here again is the question of impacting our own readiness, as a nation, and the responsibilities that we have,” he said last month when asked about the money. “And so, yes, while we do have that $4.2 billion in authority, we don’t have the funds available to us to replenish those stocks should we expend that. And with no timeline in sight, we have to make those hard decisions.”

This is so unbelievably idiotic. The US military has tons of spare, and besides they have no plausible reason to be fighting a war in the next decade. The Pentagon should be scraping the bottom of its reserves to send to Ukraine right now and it's shameful that they keep dithering over bullsh*t reasons like this.

Exactly, this tweet sums it up for me:
"The administration could have made this decision at any point during the past three months.

They chose to wait until Ukraine's ammunition ran so low Ukrainian troops were unable to casevac wounded from the front due to their inability to provide suppressive fire. Criminal."

https://twitter.com/JimmySecUK/status/1762876195316629608?s=20

[jaichind]

I continue to believe that for 2024 Russia's plans are much more limited and will just focus on clearing all fortified positions in the Donbass and completely clear Donbass.  This frees Russia up in 2025 to advance in several possible directions.

Unless they're content and wanting to end the war soon, why be limited when your opponent is outmanned and outgunned?

Maybe.  I think for domestic reasons concerning excess losses I think Russia will take it slow.  Meaning I think Putin would view excessive casualties as a greater political problem than the war dragging on an extra year or two.

[Open Source Intelligence]

I continue to believe that for 2024 Russia's plans are much more limited and will just focus on clearing all fortified positions in the Donbass and completely clear Donbass.  This frees Russia up in 2025 to advance in several possible directions.

Unless they're content and wanting to end the war soon, why be limited when your opponent is outmanned and outgunned?

Maybe.  I think for domestic reasons concerning excess losses I think Russia will take it slow.  Meaning I think Putin would view excessive casualties as a greater political problem than the war dragging on an extra year or two.

Now as in the next month is the time to move from the Russian perspective. To analogize this into sport because war and sport are philosophically the same thing, I played rugby for 12 years which is very much a winning territory game in contrast to American football where ball possession is more important than territory. Coaches of mine would hammer into us that in the immediacy of the turnover or after breaking through the defensive line you gain so much territory as the defenders have to react in an unorganized fashion and setup their defensive lines correctly as opposed to having to grind through phases into a well-prepared defensive structure. With the Ukrainian defensive line broken through at Avdiivka, now's the time to push forward for Russia. If you just wait six months, then go again, you're just giving them more time to setup a defensive structure right there, especially when this has been a heavily attrition-based conflict. You don't harm your enemy through attrition and then let them recover.

If Russia were content and like the de facto borders they have now to play for a treaty, that's one thing, but I don't think this conflict is at that point, and why would you play for a treaty now with the current state of Ukrainian military readiness unless you think the Ukrainians are so desperate they'll agree to bad terms from their point of view?

I would take any pause here from Russia as a sign more that they need the pause themselves or don't think the current operating conditions are advantageous (e.g. waiting for the thaw of winter and mud to go away).

[Hollywood]

Pro-Russian sources report continued Russian advances West of Avdiivka.  It seems they will just keep on moving until the Ukrainanas can form a defense line

ISW from yesterday.

Russian forces are attempting to exploit tactical opportunities offered by the Russian seizure of Avdiivka and appear to be maintaining a relatively high tempo of offensive operations aimed at pushing as far as possible in the Avdiivka area before Ukrainian forces establish more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines in the area. Russian forces temporarily decreased their tempo of operations as they cleared Avdiivka following the Russian seizure of the settlement on February 17, but have since resumed a relatively high tempo of assaults further west and northwest of Avdiivka.[1] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on February 27 that Russian forces have recently increased the size of their assault groups in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast) from small squad-sized groups to platoon-sized and even company-sized groups.[2] Russian forces are currently focusing assaults west of Avdiivka in the direction of Berdychi, Orlivka, and Tonenke, where Ukrainian forces established immediate defensive positions to cover their withdrawal from Avdiivka and to receive oncoming Russian offensive operations.[3] Lykhovyi and Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Ukrainian forces have stabilized their defensive lines along the Tonenke-Orlivka-Berdychi line as of February 27.[4] Ukrainian military observers characterized Ukrainian fortifications west of Avdiivka as “disappointing” and ”problematic,” however.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are struggling to hold defensive positions immediately west of Avdiivka and forecasted that Ukrainian forces will concentrate on a defensive line further west that Ukrainian forces began constructing in November 2023.[6]

Russian forces are likely continuing attempts to advance in order to deprive Ukrainian forces of the respite that would allow Ukraine to establish a more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive line in the immediate vicinity of Avdiivka. The seizure of Avdiivka has allowed Russian forces to press on positions that Ukrainian forces have manned for a shorter period than Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka or further west, and Russian forces are likely sustaining a high operational tempo to try to exploit this tactical opportunity. Russian forces may be able to seize settlements immediately west and northwest of Avdiivka in the coming weeks, but terrain and water features further west of Avdiivka, particularly the body of water that runs between Berdychi-Semenivka-Orlivka, will likely slow the already relatively slow rate of Russian advances in the area. This difficult terrain will likely constrain further Russian tactical gains and allow Ukrainian forces to establish prepared defensive positions that will likely prompt the eventual culmination of the current Russian offensive effort in the area at least until or unless the Russians reinforce their attacking elements.[7]

This force posture does set the Russians up for the feigned retreat trap that the Ukrainians were reportedly adopting (German Army strategy post-1943 on the Eastern Front). But the Ukrainians have to get setup first.

I disagree with the ISW analysis of the terrain.  The thin line of very tiny communities near the stream and lakes doesn't provide for much cover from aerial assaults, which have become terrifyingly more frequent in recent weeks.  There aren't many roads to move supplies or manpower, and nothing but low terrain farmland behind this position.  The ISW is kind of downplaying the speed of the Russian advance into this area, suggesting that Ukraine has time to prepare defensive positions.  The Russians have already entered Berdychi, Orlivka and Tonenke, and are continuously rotating men between the battlefront and the men resting in recently captured towns in the rear position. In contrast, many UAF troops are getting gassed from these tireless Russian attacks. 

I think a better analysis of the situation would be that Ukraine is holding this line of town to slow the Russian advance, so Ukraine can build a second defensive line from Novoselivka to Novaprokrovske, and prevent Russians from getting around their best defensive positions.