Russia-Ukraine war and related tensions Megathread

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/CNN/status/1505824062647398400

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/michaeldweiss/status/1505952644875132932

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/mjluxmoore/status/1505973168938307584

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation refutes the information of the Ukrainian General Staff about the allegedly large-scale losses of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, during the special operation in Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces lost 9861 people killed, 16153 people were injured.

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1505260472492347395
https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1504058093159727108
https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1505972610177421316

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/mjluxmoore/status/1505973168938307584

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation refutes the information of the Ukrainian General Staff about the allegedly large-scale losses of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, during the special operation in Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces lost 9861 people killed, 16153 people were injured.

Wait, the Russians are claiming this? Doesn’t Russia always report hilariously low casualties? If this is there number either it is a typo or they are allot worse off than we though.

Yes. The article said that the Ukraine claimed 14.7k killed while Russia disputed the number and said that the actual number is 9861.

According to preliminary estimates of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, from the beginning of the special military operation in Ukraine to March 20, the Russian Armed Forces lost 96 aircraft, 118 helicopters and 14.7 thousand military troops.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation refutes the information of the Ukrainian General Staff about the allegedly large-scale losses of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, during the special operation in Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces lost 9861 people killed, 16153 people were injured.

The numbers have now been removed from the website entirely.

[pppolitics]

According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, during the special operation in Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces lost 9861 people killed, 16153 people were injured.

So, there you have it!

[pppolitics]

According to estimates, Russia has 175k to 190k troops in Ukraine.

If 26,014 are either killed or injured, that's 13.69% to 14.87% of the total number of troops in Ukraine.

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1506000982366371847

[pppolitics]

According to estimates, Russia has 175k to 190k troops in Ukraine.

If 2,6014 are either killed or injured, that's 13.69% to 14.87% of the total number of troops in Ukraine.

You may correct that comma? Anyway, I skeptical the number is actually this high, though they certainly lost way more than the US did in 18 years in Iraq. A massive failure for a so-called "superpower".

Western intelligence estimates say it is likely that at least 7,000 Russians have been killed and as many as 20,000 injured, and assuming that the combat forces are bearing the brunt of the casualties, that could mean up to a third of the main combat force is now out of action, Lee said.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/20/russia-ukraine-military-offensive/

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1505991365217628160?cxt=HHwWgMDR6dzKre...

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/mjluxmoore/status/1505973168938307584

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation refutes the information of the Ukrainian General Staff about the allegedly large-scale losses of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, during the special operation in Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces lost 9861 people killed, 16153 people were injured.

Wait, the Russians are claiming this? Doesn’t Russia always report hilariously low casualties? If this is there number either it is a typo or they are allot worse off than we though.

Yes. The article said that the Ukraine claimed 14.7k killed while Russia disputed the number and said that the actual number is 9861.

According to preliminary estimates of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, from the beginning of the special military operation in Ukraine to March 20, the Russian Armed Forces lost 96 aircraft, 118 helicopters and 14.7 thousand military troops.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation refutes the information of the Ukrainian General Staff about the allegedly large-scale losses of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, during the special operation in Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces lost 9861 people killed, 16153 people were injured.

The numbers have now been removed from the website entirely.

Is this a journalistic freudian slip, where they accidentally published the truth?

probably

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1505863194073616386

[pppolitics]

A US senator took notice.

https://twitter.com/ChrisMurphyCT/status/1506020163254071296

[pppolitics]

Now this is strange

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1506005447106613251

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/TheAtlantic/status/1506025991881252871

[pppolitics]

This is a great time for Moldova to kick Russian troops out of Transnistria.

[pppolitics]

This is a great time for Moldova to kick Russian troops out of Transnistria.

As great as that would be, I am not sure Moldova has the active forces to take out the Transnistrian and Russian forces. With that said, if Ukraine ends up with a victory, I would support Ukraine going in* and helping Moldova clear out their territory of Russian forces. Having Russian forces (however small) in Moldovan territory is not good for the national security of Ukraine.

EDIT: *Only if Moldova asks Ukraine, of course.

The only thing that keeps Moldova from crushing Transnistria is Russia.

Now that Russia is pre-occupied with Ukraine, it's a perfect time to crush Transnistria.

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1506287799141638150

[pppolitics]

Yes I know the irony of me posting this since I still believe Ukraine is going to lose short term, but if the encirclement thing is true that would be bad for the Russians.

Russia is not even demanding leadership change or "demilitarization" anymore, so Ukraine has already "won" that much.

[pppolitics]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

[pppolitics]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

[pppolitics]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

You forget that Russian troops can’t just sit there indefinitely without supplies.

[pppolitics]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

You forget that Russian troops can’t just sit there indefinitely without supplies.

Logistics will be one of their biggest challenges, but three things either have or are about to make such challenges easier:

- The establishment of a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea (done)
- The destruction of threats to their navy (mostly done; they’re already using Berdyansk to resupply)
- The fall of Mariupol, which sits behind their land bridge (almost inevitable)

Their only supply lines near Kyiv are narrow and run through Belarus and then the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, so this is where the problems could remain most acute.  

You have to remember that Russia is being cut off from the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has the support of US, Canada, EU, UK, Sweden, Australia, etc.

The longer the war lasts, the more it becomes a drag on Russia.

[pppolitics]

Ukraine is winning in the sense that it looks much less likely now that Russia will be able to implement regime change in Kyiv. Its strategic objectives are, in the short term, in jeopardy (with the exception of establishing a land bridge to Crimea, and taking the DPR/LPR areas, where they have partially achieved their aims).

Preventing the best outcome for Russia in the face of overwhelming odds is something to be proud of and averts the total disaster of a bloody Russian occupation, but even if the advances completely stop for a time, it might not feel like V-day over there. The war takes place almost exclusively on Ukrainian land and the bombing of its infrastructure and mass killing/displacement of its citizens is way worse than anything that has happened to Russia as a result of sanctions. This has set back, and will continue to set back, the socioeconomic progress of Ukraine by decades - especially when you consider the knock-on effects like the rise of dangerous militia.

It has lost territory, and every day it fails to take that back is another day in which Russia can dig in, fortify, and enact population transfers. Ukraine's ability to conduct counteroffensives is limited and risks destroying heavy weaponry for which resupply isn't currently available, with the exception of limited domestic capacity vulnerable to airstrikes (c.f. the recent bombings of two aircraft repair facilities). Russia has a relatively unimpeded military-industrial complex, larger stores of old kit, and the possibility (according to the ISW) to bring in more reinforcements within a few months.

The ISW claims the conflict is approaching a stalemate. Even if Ukraine is armed to the point where Russia never desires to beak that stalemate again, Ukraine may be unable to take its territory back or rescue its surviving people there. The very existence of a long-term territorial gain would motivate any Russian dictatorship to have another try (with lessons learned), and the ongoing border dispute would damage Ukraine's long-term prospects of joining organisations like the EU.

Russia is losing because Ukraine has kept its gains minimal so far, and those minimal gains aren't worth the international backlash. That doesn't mean the gains don't exist, or that the international backlash will translate into the kind of support Ukraine would have been willing to give up Kherson for.

This analysis is all subject to change if the rumoured Ukrainian counteroffensives are real and if they succeed in taking back most or all of what was lost since February 24, but as the war is likely to be fought mostly on Ukrainian-held land, the feeling of victory is only going to be so strong should they win (unless they push into areas of Crimea and the Donbas that they haven't held for a long time).

The loss that Russia is taking is unstainable.

You presume that Russia can keep up the assault, months after months, years after years, which it clearly can't.

The best the Russian can do is pullback and occupy a small part of Ukraine.

I do not presume they can keep up the assault, although they will certainly regain the capacity to attempt another assault in time (that could take months or years, but it'll happen eventually). What I presume (with good reason) is that, even with the hostile populations in the occupied areas, it will be much easier for them to hold onto what they've gotten so far than take new territory, and that they will probably succeed in this.

The Russians clearly can’t hold the territory that they are occupying with the current rate of loss.

What they would need to do is retreat to a few strongholds.

The current rate of loss is mostly a result of going on the offensive. If Ukraine goes on an offensive and Russia changes gears, you should expect Russian losses to decrease relative to Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian forces may outnumber Russian ones, but not by the three-or-four to one ratio preferable for urban assaults. Part of the increase in losses is just the nature of any offensive (even a successful one) where the attacker doesn't have an overwhelming advantage.

Ukraine has been resupplied with light arms and handheld weapons, not what is required to go on an offensive. They cannot match Russian mechanised units and artillery and can only contest their own airspace thanks to SAMs for the time being. Large offensives will be difficult for an army that cannot really restock what is required for large offensives or secure air superiority. Think back to the miles-long Russian convoy - that was a logistical failure, but one that they (mostly) got away with because it was crawling with SAMs and Ukraine was denied most of the airspace around it. Ukraine would have a much harder time doing that even for a series of smaller convoys. All this will make large offensives even more challenging for Ukraine.

You forget that Russian troops can’t just sit there indefinitely without supplies.

Logistics will be one of their biggest challenges, but three things either have or are about to make such challenges easier:

- The establishment of a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea (done)
- The destruction of threats to their navy (mostly done; they’re already using Berdyansk to resupply)
- The fall of Mariupol, which sits behind their land bridge (almost inevitable)

Their only supply lines near Kyiv are narrow and run through Belarus and then the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, so this is where the problems could remain most acute.  

You have to remember that Russia is being cut off from the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has the support of US, Canada, EU, UK, Sweden, Australia, etc.

The longer the war lasts, the more it becomes a drag on Russia.

It isn’t being cut off by the world. It isn’t even being cut off by most of the West: the SWIFT bans affected a small minority of (admittedly large) Russian banks and oil/gas bans look unlikely in Europe. The sanctions mean the Russian victory is likely to be pyrrhic, but they are unlikely to prevent the Russian war machine from keeping itself afloat. The sanctions in place are much weaker than those against Iran, which (despite being much worse equipped to deal with them) still managed to maintain support for its allies in Syria and Yemen.

Ukraine has some support from the West, but the military aid is limited to smaller, cheaper weapons, and whether there will be enough humanitarian aid to fix the damaged cities is an open question. A long war could allow Ukraine to retrain their army to use complex Western systems such as Patriot missiles, but the price tag might be prohibitive for the sale of such systems in significant numbers. If cost wasn’t an issue, Slovakia would already have had its single battery of S-300s backfilled - but that’s not the case.

Where do you think tech in new Russian military equipment comes from?

[pppolitics]

https://twitter.com/nytimes/status/1506429277767671809