S019 v Lincoln

[Attorney General, LGC Speaker, and Former PPT Dwarven Dragon]

Questions for both the respondent and the friend of the court presently arguing in support of the respondent:

Do you believe a fetus can possess legal personhood? The amicus brief repeatedly insists that an unborn fetus is a person with a right to life and the respondent's brief implies the same. If a fetus is not a person, then what precisely do you mean when you appear to be referring to it as such? If a fetus is a person, how exactly do you you expect the court to apply such an unprecedented change to such a basic and foundational legal concept?

Note this question is not at all rhetorical - personhood has a very specific legal definition, and it grants an individual extensive rights and privileges. If a fetus is considered to be a human life, is it not therefore entitled to the human rights guaranteed by our constitution? For example, would it not be unconstitutional to arrest a pregnant mother, because to do so would require illegally detaining her unborn child? I'm sure I do not need to remind you that our constitution grants all persons the right to due process and equal protection under the law.

If you argue that a fetus can possess a right to life, then how could this law possibly be considered narrowly tailored? Contrariwise, if this is not what you're arguing, I would genuinely appreciate if you could explicitly state what precisely is the legitimate government purpose behind these abortion restrictions, and furthermore explain how this law is narrowly tailored to achieve those ends.

1. Yes, a fetus, or at the very least a viable fetus (as it can maintain its life on its own), can possess legal personhood. I would argue that this is not really a foundational new concept. While this court may not have recongized this before (I am not going to make a definite statement because I joined the game well after its original creation), I would argue the concept was always there, right there in our constitution. Again, I will quote the relevant section:

Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the Republic of Atlasia, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the Republic of Atlasia and of the Region in which they reside, and shall in all cases be afforded equal protection under the law.

look at the bold: "all persons born are citizens". Not "all fetuses born are persons and thus citizens" or even "all humans born are persons and thus citizens", but simply "all persons born are citizens". It is illogical to presume anything other than the status of person originating at some point before one is a citizen. If one is not a person before birth, then how can one become a citizen at birth, when only persons can become citizens at birth? Again, the section does not provide for fetuses or humans becoming citizens at birth, but only persons. If one does not have the status of person established at some point before birth, then their birth does not result in becoming a citizen. Of course, we have never had a controversy over whether one's birth makes them a citizen in Atlasia - all born in Atlasia successfully become citizens at birth, and this is not controversial at all. Thus, we all acknowledge at some level that these are Persons being born - just as Section 1 Dictates. Again, the phrasing is "all persons born", not "all who are persons at birth" - indicating that one's becoming a person happens before they are born, and thus, fetuses have to be persons at some point before birth.

The Court should apply the 'change' by issuing rulings that recognize that the rights the constitution guarantees to "Persons" apply before and after birth, while the rights of "citizens" apply after birth only. In Section 5, where I find the governmental interest in setting this abortion restriction, it states:

Section 5.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

The term "person" is used, so an implication of both before and after birth is set here.

With respect to a "legal definition", I would argue that it is unnecessary for the court to go there. The constitution clearly implies that at least some fetuses are persons in section 1, and there is nothing in section 5 to indicate the meaning is any different there, so we should presume the document is internally consistent and carry over the words and implications of section 1. Further, as explained above, a dictionary/encyclopedia based definition of person leads to the same conclusion. Only what is actually stated in the constitution is binding, not some "legal definition", and I believe the constitution is clear.

Further, I'm not sure what exact "legal definition" the judge is using. A quick search reveals that each RL US State defines Person slightly differently: https://www.ncsl.org/documents/lsss/tue_haskins_handout2.pdf . However, I'll note that most definitions include the word "individual(s)" or the phrase "natural person", so let's explore that:

Individual:  a single human being as distinct from a group, class, or family. (Oxford)

We defined that a human is a person in an earlier post, so this definition doesn't weaken my argument at all when we consider how the constitution uses the term "person"

Natural Person: In jurisprudence, a natural person (also physical person in some Commonwealth countries) is a person (in legal meaning, i.e., one who has its own legal personality) that is an individual human being (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_person)

So, simplified, "a natural person is an individual human being". Again, a human is a person as shown in an earlier post. The constitution extends the universe of persons to fetuses, case closed. (Before you look too hard at "legal personality" to try to glean something, that simply means "to be capable of having legal rights and duties within a certain legal system" (https://www.definitions.net/definition/legal+personality), so it doesn't change the definition of humans or persons. Our constitution provides the rights of section 5 to all persons, which per section 1, is a status established before birth, therefore the fetuses protected by the bill at issue do enjoy a "legal personality".)

So, even if the Court were to rule it must use a legal definition of person, I do not see how that weakens my or Ted's case in any way.

----------------------------

2. Yes, a fetus is entitled to the rights provided by the Constitution. The hypothetical offered above represents a conflict of interests: The interest of the state in deterring crime, and the interest of the state in protecting the fetus's right to liberty. I would argue that in this situation, the state cannot simply "do nothing" - otherwise there would be an effective 'purge' (If you don't get the reference: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Purge) during pregnancy, and given the frequency of that status, the danger to all life and thus liberty (a status only possible in life) in society would be pretty severe. Therefore, if the state did nothing, it is infringing on the rights of Section 5 far more broadly than if it takes action.

True, imprisoning the woman does impact the liberties of the fetus, but what alternative does the state have? Early Delivery of the fetus - what if this results in the death of the fetus, always a possibility with early births? Surely a temporary denial of rights - expiring when the woman is released from prison, or perhaps earlier if the fetus is born during the sentence and released to some other guardian - is preferable to a permanent denial of rights through causing fetal death due to Early Delivery. And again, doing nothing about the criminal pregnant woman is simply not an ethical response.

But, you might say, none of this negates the fetus's fundamental rights. Well, I would point you to the principle of strict scrutiny:

In U.S. constitutional law, when a court finds that a law infringes a fundamental constitutional right, it may apply the strict scrutiny standard to nevertheless hold the law or policy constitutionally valid if the government can demonstrate in court that the law or regulation is necessary to achieve a "compelling state interest". The government must also demonstrate that the law is "narrowly tailored" to achieve the compelling purpose, and uses the "least restrictive means" to achieve the purpose.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strict_scrutiny

Imprisoning a pregnant woman who has committed some crime meets a test of strict scrutiny. The government's interests in deterring crime and protecting society from it are obvious here. The action is narrowly tailored and uses the least restrictive means - the government infringes upon the least possible number of individual rights by taking action against the criminal to prevent further broader societal impact. The government keeps the remaining infringement of rights temporary - at most, the length of the prison sentence - by not subjecting the fetus to a dangerous early delivery. There is no "less restrictive" means to achieve the valid governmental interests in deterring crime and protecting society from it, therefore in the hypothetical offered the government can override the fundamental rights of the fetus.

------------------

3. The phrase "narrowly tailored" is not present in Politics Fan vs The South or in any of my previous posts. Instead the precedent states:

"The state has the authority to place reasonable restrictions on abortion access when there is an important and legitimate government purpose for doing so"

and

"The limitations the state can place upon abortion access, must be tailored to only cover such legitimate government purposes without being overly broad."

I explained in an earlier post why there is an important and legitimate interest for the bill to protect. With respect to its tailoring to those purposes without being broad, the bill does this by only protecting those fetuses likely to have a chance at viability outside of the womb, as illustrated in an earlier post. A complete abortion ban, hypothetically, would indeed be too broad as it would lock off the liberties of the woman and protect organisms that do not yet represent a life that can sustain itself. Instead, this law is closely tailored to protect potentially viable fetuses, and thus life that is offering a potential societal contribution, and thus worthy of governmental interest and protection, regardless of such life being a person or not (while we believe such life is a person, it is not necessary for the court to find that it is to identify a governmental interest). The law confines itself to this group by not providing fetal protection before 20 weeks, where viability is nonexistent or very close to it. As stated by the Government:

II. THE PCAP SERVES THE LEGITIMATE GOAL OF PROTECTING UNBORN LIFE

As the Court has repeatedly ruled, we may look to common law to guide our interpretations of the Atlasian Constitution. In the United States, protection of life has been repeatedly upheld as a legitimate governmental interest to be weighed against the aforementioned right to privacy. This question is central to many substantive due process cases surrounding rights to medical autonomy, from abortion (Planned Parenthood v. Casey) to assisted suicide (Washington v. Glucksberg).

Lincoln's interest in protecting life, well into the range of "fetal viability," is entirely legitimate. As Mr. Dragon's brief discusses, the law is grounded in science suggesting that not only are the fetuses being protected viable outside the womb, but are capable of experiencing pain independently of their mother. This is simple: if a fetus may survive outside the womb, and it's developed enough to experience essential human functions like pain, Lincoln has a legitimate interest in ensuring its protection.

III. THE PCAP IS NARROWLY TAILORED TO PROTECT THE UNBORN

The PCAP is as narrowly tailored as possible to protect pain-capable unborn children. This is facially obvious: as in the link posted by Mr. Dragon, fetuses are capable of feeling pain at 20 weeks, the point at which the law prohibits abortions. Anything less restrictive would allow pain-capable fetuses to be aborted. Furthermore, the law allows a full five months for pregnant women to make decisions about their future. This is a generous timeframe, one ending well into the second trimester. There is no less "broad" way for Lincoln to protect the unborn -- and the least broad option is still broadly protective of women's rights.

Therefore the law clearly compiles under the actual provisions of Politics Fan vs The South, even if it is not "narrowly tailored".

As "narrowly tailored" was the government's phrasing and not my phrasing, I'd encourage Ted to expand on this answer as needed.

With respect to the desired exceptions issued by the Petitioner, I note that the Petitioner was a member of the Lincoln Council when this bill was being debated, and he did not offer any amendments covering any of these situations. I might have even supported some of them which would have allowed them to pass. But Petitioner did not offer any of them, and it is not the job of the Court to cover for the Petitioner's legislative failures.

Request for clarification on this point: do you allege here that the petitioner lacks standing on these issues? That he cannot raise an issue before the court if he did not previously raise the issue as a legislator?

If so, what precedent or legal principle do you base this argument on?

If not, I would appreciate it if you could elaborate upon your rationale for mentioning the petitioner's legislative role at all. How precisely is it germane to your case?

Nope, I'm not arguing anything about Standing, as the precedent is pretty clear that standing simply doesn't exist in Atlasia. Politics Fan vs The South states:

We therefore must conclude that no standing requirements can feasibly exist within our system.

Instead, I'm responding to the Petitioner's apparent assertion that the court should obligate the government to provide a right to an abortion in the cases noted in the article he cites. I asserted that there is no constitutional basis for the court to do this, and instead that the petitioner would need to pursue such changes through a legislative process.



I'll respond to your other post later in the weekend.

[Attorney General, LGC Speaker, and Former PPT Dwarven Dragon]

Could you please elaborate on the distinction being made by this change? What health does the region not consider to be "physical"; how is such a distinction to be assessed, and by who?

Based on the argument presented by the friend of the court, it would seem the intention is to completely remove mental health from being a valid consideration. If so: where does the region draw the line between the mental and the physical, how do they reach this conclusion, and why do they draw the line at that point?

I have focused my argument on the physical vs mental distinction because that was the question raised by Justice Ilikeverin, but that's not the only consideration here. The frivolous excuses raised by doctors seeking to please their patients by offering a late term abortion have revolved around other issues too - financial concerns (i.e. "economic health", even though this would never dictate an abortion vs putting the baby up for adoption), family troubles (i.e. "familial health", even though this would never dictate an abortion vs putting the baby up for adoption), or even just the age of the woman (as its own exclusive factor, not the age and the condition it has brought with it, just the number in and of itself). Really, it's amazing how much abortionists have managed to justify under the umbrella of "Health". In fact, an abortion ban with a broad "Health" exception is really no different than an explicit allowance for abortion until birth.

Heck, even NARAL Pro-Choice America is fine with some abortion bans as long as they have a health exception. (see: https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/state-law/new-york/, "NARAL Pro-Choice America supports the legal framework established in Roe v. Wade and does not oppose restrictions on post-viability abortion so long as they contain adequate exceptions to protect the woman’s life and health."). This isn't because NARAL has some problem with late term abortions, it's because they know that a health exception, in practice, allows almost any late term abortion to take place, so as long as it's there, the ban or restriction is fine because it does nothing.

The distinction between "eligible" and "ineligible" health conditions relies upon several things: 1) the pregnancy must have caused the health condition to occur, 2) ending the pregnancy must resolve the condition, and 3) there must be no other solution to resolve the condition.

Yes, an abortion for health reasons is an act by the state to preserve the life and liberty rights enjoyed by the woman. But at the point the bill restricts, there is also the life and liberty rights of the potentially viable fetus for the government to take into account. Thus, if at all possible, it will pursue another avenue so that no life is sacrificed.

If the pregnancy did not cause the condition to occur, there is no reason for the government to interfere with it - the way to improve the life and the health of the woman must lie elsewhere.

If the abortion does not resolve the condition, then again, the solution must be elsewhere. Sure, perhaps the pregnancy brought upon it (i.e. a woman lost her job after becoming pregnant due to a discriminatory employer), but the abortion is not going to make it go away. The fetus should be taken to term, put up for adoption if necessary, and then the state should pursue a solution that will actually resolve the condition at issue, rather than taking life to only provide a temporary solution or no solution at all.

Finally, if there are other solutions at hand, such as adoption, or the baby being raised by a relative, or if the health condition is minor and can be ignored, or if the baby could survive an early delivery with appropriate medical care - and the lack of an actual abortion will not prevent the state from preserving the life of the woman - the state should make use of that option, rather than resorting to sacrificing a life.  This last part will be explored more in reference to your hypothetical at the end.

At least most mental health conditions would not fall under these factors, regardless of their physical origin - if the thought of having to raise the child is severely affecting the woman, but the child being raised by someone else would resolve it, the abortion is not necessary to protect health, and thus an abortion should not be performed.

Initially, of course, whether these factors are met would be determined by the abortionist, perhaps in consult with other employees at the facility. If law enforcement was alerted to a potentially lawbreaking incident, those officers would make a determination based on their decision to charge the abortionist or not. If the abortionist pled not guilty, then the final decision is of course made by a judge or jury in a court of law.

As you are certainly aware, the distinction between "physical health" and "mental health" is a false dichotomy: physical health can severely affect the mind and mental health can severely affect the body. From a biological perspective, these categories do not even exist - the brain cells and neurochemicals that affect "mental" health very much do exist physically.

Fundamentally, wherever the line is drawn, is not the region taking the category of "women who need an abortion for health reasons" and arbitrarily subdividing this group into two categories, of "women with health reasons we deem legitimate" and "women with health reasons we deem illegitimate"? What rational basis exists for the abrogation of their equal protection of the laws?

Again, the line is drawn according to where the abortion itself is necessary to preserve health, as the bill in question dictates - if it is not, or if it would not resolve the condition, or if there is some other solution - then it should not be performed. Mental Health conditions often have some underlying cause unrelated to the abortion, and as stated above, do not typically pose life or death questions, thus they would typically not be eligible.

Yes, the region is creating categories, and the basis is very simple - there are two lives to preserve here - the woman and the fetus. Usually, both can be saved. If so, the region should do that. The region should only be pursuing an abortion where it is the only solution to preserve the woman's rights under section 5, and where doing it would preserve those rights.

The friend of the court here alleges the distinction present is that mental health needs are ignored by the new law because they are more likely to be frivolous. Assuming this distinction between "mental" and "physical" is even valid, why would this be case? Under the requirements of the new law, would not these women supposedly seeking some frivolous excuse for a late-term abortion instead just use an equally frivolous excuse that's still legal under the umbrella of "physical health"?

Perhaps, but all laws have loopholes, and no law is perfect. The region believes the language enacted is the best language possible to achieve its purposes.

Furthermore: even if one assumes the distinction being made between "health" and "physical health" is real and meaningful, and even if one assumes a rational basis exists for this distinction to be made and enforced, how could this restriction possibly be considered "narrowly tailored" with respect to the precedent of Politics Fan v South?

While I will repeat that "narrowly tailored" is not present in Politics Fan v The South, and instead arose in Ted's brief (see my last post), this is indeed narrowly tailored to the purpose of protecting all life involved in the situation. It gets medical practitioners to pursue whatever solution will preserve both lives in question whenever possible. Where the fetus's right to life is unclear (before viability), abortion is permitted carte blanche (the 20 week period) out of respect for the rights of the woman. Where the state can preserve one and only one life, the freedom to choose which is allowed. Any other version of the law (either an earlier restriction or a later or more loose restriction) would be too broad - either infringing on the woman's rights in cases where only she has a clear right to life, or infringing upon preservable right to life rights of the fetus.

(content warning: the following paragraph describes a hypothetical r*pe victim's situation in some detail and briefly discusses suicidal ideation)


The arguments before the court have alluded to the lack of an exception for rape, so allow me to use such a scenario as a hypothetical here. Imagine a woman was violently raped, and afterwards suffered from severe depression and post-traumatic stress disorder as a result. Furthermore, she became pregnant, but due to the trauma associated with even the awareness of her pregnancy, and the avoidant behavior common among PTSD patients, she does not seek an abortion until after the 20 week limit has passed. In the 25th week of her pregnancy, her medical care providers and other medical professionals unanimously conclude an abortion is necessary. In their assessment, if forced to carry the fetus to term, the patient would in all likelihood kill herself rather than give birth -- and if she's placed on some sort of intensive 24/7 suicide watch until the baby is born, being forced to give birth would cause so much more additional trauma that her suicide would be imminent and inevitable.


(end of content warning)

Frankly, how does this situation differ in any way from something like an ectopic pregnancy? Why would the law allow an abortion in one instance but not the other?

Let's look at the 3 conditions I outlined above and see whether this qualifies:

1) Did the pregnancy cause the condition at issue: Yes
2) Does an abortion resolve the issue: As far as we can tell, Yes.
3) Is there another solution: Well...

This is actually a really interesting question because there isn't a clear answer. Likely, an abortion would have to be done in this circumstance, and a case brought to court based upon that, and then we would have to see what the judge or jury decides. But the best educated answer I can give is:

In this case, the doctor and his colleagues should carefully look at all angles of the situation. For instance, is it just the normal birthing process that would bring about the trauma - i.e. would doing a birth by c-section at the appropriate time alleviate it - if so, do that, combined with the suicide watch noted above.

If it is truly determined that the only solution to resolve it is an immediate abortion - then the conditions are met and the abortion in this hypothetical is indeed permitted under this law.

As far as an ectopic pregnancy goes, the process is much simpler:

1) Did the pregnancy cause the condition at issue: Yes
2) Does the abortion resolve the issue: Yes
3) Is there any other solution: No. An ectopic pregnancy never results in a viable life, and endangers the life of the woman, and so must be ended.

Therefore the abortion is allowed.

[S019]

Questions for the petitioner:

The heart of your argument, by my assessment, is that two elements of the bill are unconstitutional: the first being the new restrictions to abortion access (the reduction from 24 to 20 weeks, the narrowing of the health exception to only cover "physical" health) the second being the criminal penalty against doctors who violate the restrictions. Is that a fair assessment?

Yes, I believe that those two elements in particular are unconstitutional

You appear to be placing great emphasis on the latter portion of LPCAP, and indeed in your OP appear to be citing it as sufficient justification to deem the bill unconstitutional via the precedent of Politics Fan v South. Let's set aside the other part of LPCAP for a moment, and focus on this part with the crime. Can you elaborate on why you believe a crime against doctors who perform a procedure that has been deemed illegal is unconstitutional on privacy grounds?

I believe that it is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with past court precedent. The court has ruled that abortion restrictions can be implemented when there's a legitimate government purpose, I don't believe that punishing doctors serves that purpose. Also I believe that punishing doctors who perform abortion is a direct obstacle to the right to elective abortion, which is an extension of the right to privacy, because it reduces the access to elective abortion.

Would this bill still be unconstitutional, in your opinion, if the first section of the bill did not exist, and the criminal penalty only covered those abortions already prohibited by existing statute? If it only enforced abortion restrictions this court has already deemed constitutional? Or if instead the bill was criminalizing some other medical procedure - for example, genital mutilation?

No, it would not, because later sections with the bill only deal with unsuccessful abortions that result in live births, at that point to kill the child is basically infanticide. I would say it's unconstitutional for criminalizing genital mutilation though.

It's possible I misunderstand you, but I do not understand how a criminal penalty could be an unconstitutional violation of privacy. An abortion restriction is either "tailored to only cover... legitimate government purposes without being overly broad" (and thus constitutional per the precedent of Politics Fan v South), or it does not meet said criteria (and thus unconstitutionally violates the expectation of privacy between a patient and doctor). If the government has a legitimate and constitutional reason to restrict something, does that not necessarily imply they can use the force of law to enforce the restriction?

Yes it does, but the government has not provided a legitimate reason for this regulation other than limiting a woman's right to privacy.

(more questions to come, for both parties)

[S019]

     To Mr. S019 (and reviving this thread), does considering the framework outlined by Planned Parenthood v. Casey as cited by Mr. Dragon in his amicus brief affect your argument that setting a limit of 20 weeks to legally perform an abortion is unconstitutional?

It's complicated, I do agree that Casey is precedent and in my view, a 20 week ban does still constitute an undue burden, earlier I cited the reasons for late-term abortions. Additionally, I believe punishment of doctors constitutes an undue burden. Late abortions are already illegal in many states and punishing doctors will discourage doctors from providing this crucial care, forcing them to flee to the South or Fremont or carry an unwanted child.

In fact, Colorado, in Fremont, is a state with legal late term access, but 87% of counties in CO have no late term abortion access.

https://naralcolorado.org/laws-policy/in-our-state/

Forcing women to travel to another region for healthcare is clearly an undue burden, especially since the Atlasian constitution guarantees healthcare to all:

Section 13. The right of citizens of the Republic of Atlasia to health care, including but not limited to care necessary to prevent and treat illness, shall not be denied.

[S019]

Question for the petitioner:

Setting aside the rest of the bill here, could you elaborate on why specifically you believe the reduction from 24 weeks to 20 weeks is unconstitutional?

The right to abortion was established as an extension of the right to privacy in Roe v Wade, as I mentioned earlier. I also noted how in that decision, Justice Blackmun wrote, "For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health." The reduction to 20 weeks is not related to maternal health and thus I believe it is unconstitutional because it violates past precedent delineating the right to privacy

In the real world, only 1.3% of abortions in the United States occur 21 or more weeks after pregnancy has commenced - and most abortions that do occur after that point are for medically necessary reasons. There's no reason to believe Atlasian-specific data wouldn't show a similar or lower incidence of abortions at 21+ weeks after pregnancy.



Setting aside everything else in the bill, why would it be unconstitutional for the regional government to set the limit at 20 weeks, when only a negligible number of elective abortion procedures occur later?

As the petitioner, it is my view that the right to abortion, guaranteed by the right to privacy is absolute or nearly absolute, the right to privacy of those 1.3% of women is still violated by abortion restrictions.

[Mike Thick]

May it please the Court, I will respond to the Justices’ questions shortly. I have been out of town for the past several days, and missed most of the discourse here.

[Mike Thick]

May it please the Court, I will respond to the Justices’ questions shortly. I have been out of town for the past several days, and missed most of the discourse here.

Unfortunately, work-related obligations have prevented me from responding to the honorable Justices' questions in a timely fashion, and I don't think I will be able to do them justice (no pun intended) in the foreseeable future. Lincoln will allow Mr. Dragon's responses to stand as our own. I apologize to the Court for the confusion and delay.

[S019]

Are there any more questions from the court for either me or the respondent?

[S019]

Bump?

[Attorney General, LGC Speaker, and Former PPT Dwarven Dragon]

Bump?

Either they're involved in lengthy deliberations, they're on a long break, or they have decided to quietly dismiss the case. Either way there's no reason for either of us to worry about this thread - it's clear the questioning is over. They will issue a formal decision when or if they choose. It is not our place to try to speed up or criticize procedures or work patterns.

[windjammer]

We are still deliberating.

[S019]

bump?

[windjammer]

With BK having to recuse himself from this trial for personal reasons and with the 4 remaining justices being unable to reach a decision:


The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court

[Attorney General, LGC Speaker, and Former PPT Dwarven Dragon]

With BK having to recuse himself from this trial for personal reasons and with the 4 remaining justices being unable to reach a decision:


The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court

So the law is upheld?

[windjammer]

With BK having to recuse himself from this trial for personal reasons and with the 4 remaining justices being unable to reach a decision:


The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court

So the law is upheld?

Yes

[S019]

Even though, I am unhappy with this decision, I thank the court for their time and I respect their decision.