1960 Republican Vice Presidential Choice
johnpressman:
Hello everyone. In 1960, LBJ, Kennedy's Vice Presidential choice, probably won him the Presidency. Henry Cabot Lodge was probably the worst Vice Presidential choice of all time (William E. Miller?).
The question is: Could Nixon have made another choice as his running mate that could have won him the 1960 election?
A follow up question would be: Could Kennedy have chosen someone else (Symington, Jackson) and still won?
NewFederalist:
Nixon needed to win Illinois... Everett Dirksen?
johnpressman:
Everett! I wonder why he was never considered. The other names that I heard were in contention were; Thurston Morton, Gerald Ford, Walter Judd and John Sherman Cooper. Rockefeller declared himself out of the running early, despite the "Pact of Fifth Avenue".
Speaking of Illinois, William Stratton was a two-term Governor of Illinois, succeding Adlai Stevenson, an obvious choice as Illinois is a "swing Stae"in Presidential politics, yet I have heard little about him.
Lincoln Republican:
John, an interesting subject. (although it has been covered before in this forum, but it doesn't hurt to discuss it again, and thank you for bringing it up again) I have been meaning to respond to this for some time, but first wanted to refer again to my copy of "The Making Of The President 1960" by Theodore H. White.
At the meeting that took place to discuss the Vice Presidency, White states "He (Nixon) had tentatively chosen Henry Cabot Lodge as his running mate months before, assuming Rockefeller would not accept the post; but he now gave every man a chance to speak."
White states that Nixon was of the view that his best chance of victory was to fight the election on foreign policy. Says Nixon, in the meeting that took place to discuss the Vice Presidential choice, "If you ever let them (the Democrats) campaign only on domestic issues, they'll beat us---our only hope is to keep it on foreign policy." White states that twenty of those present at this meeting agreed with Nixon "that Henry Cabot Lodge was the best man to lift Americans' imagination to the problems of foreign policy and, since this was already Mr. Nixon's prior decision, so it was to be."
Another very interesting aspect of the 1960 campaign was the Republican plank on civil rights and Nixon's campaign handling of this matter.
White states "Now, in Chicago, Richard M. Nixon found himself faced on the eve of a national campaign for the Presidency with precisely this strategic delemma, shaped over the week end in tactical form. The original draft plank preapred by the Platform Committee was a moderate one: it avoided any outright declaration of support for Negro sit-in strikes at Southern lunch counters and omitted any promise of federal intervention to secure Negroes full job equality---both of which the Democrats, at Los Angeles, had promised. This plank, as written, would almost certainly have carried the Southern states for Nixon and, it seems in retrospect, might have given him victory. Barry Goldwater now insists that the original "moderate" Republican platform plank on civil rights would have guaranteed a 1960 Republican victory; and that the Rockefeller-Nixon rewrite of that plank cast victory away. On Monday, July 25th, it is almost certain, it lay in Nixon's power to reorient the Republican Party toward an axis of Northern-Southern conservatives. His alone was the choice."
"Nixon made his choice, I believe, more out of conscience than out of strategy. But conscience is different from a personal code of history or a realization of the shape of great events. Nixon insisted that the platform committee substitute for the moderate position on civil rights (which probably would have won him the election) the advanced Rockefeller position on civil rights (which might also have won him the election in the North, had he understood the Rockefeller position). Later, under the strain of the election campaign, in September and October, the temptation of victory came so close that he apparently could not decide whether he was campaigning for Northern electoral votes or Southern electoral votes; he thus later completely befuzzed his original position in Chicago and succeeded, in the end, in alienating Northern Negro and Southern white, losing both along with the election. This is one of Nixon's characteristic and fatal flaws---that he presents too often a split image."
I am of the view that it would not have mattered who Nixon had as a running mate. He was not going to win this election, due to his handling of the civil rights issue.
Nixon picked Lodge because he believed his best chance of victory was to fight the election on foreign policy, as stated above, and Lodge was the logical choice in this case. Lodge was, after all, besides being a former Senator from Massachusetts, he was currently at this time the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.
Of course, as is always the case in picking a running mate for a non incumbent, other names were discussed and bandied about, and you have done a good job in identifying some of them.
In 1960, Nixon fell 50 electoral short of victory. This is a fair number of electoral votes to have to make up in a closely contested election. Nixon would have had to have won a combination of some of the following states in order to win the election:
Illinois 27 EV lost by 0.19%, Missouri 13 EV lost by 0.52%, New Jersey 16 EV lost by 0.80%, New Mexico 4 EV lost by 0.74%.
Nixon's loss in the 1960 election had nothing to do with Henry Cabot Lodge and no other running mate would have made the difference between defeat and victory. Nixon's loss was sealed when he vacilated on the civil rights issue as discussed above.
As for Kennedy, you have named some other good choices, Symington and Jackson. Kennedy would have won the election with either of these as well as with Johnson.
johnpressman:
Excellent post, Winfield! You have done your homework. I have read "TMOTP 1960" too many times and you have refreshed my memory as to the factors behind Nixon's choice of Lodge. It was VERY typical of Nixon to put a question before the GOP leaders, only to have really made up his mind long beforehand (Agnew?).
I do have to disagree with you on all three of your points, however. You even help my argument on Lodge costing Nixon the election with his announcement that Nixon would choose an African-American Cabinet member.
The election of 1960 was so unbelieveably close that a very few votes in a few states would have easily tipped the election to him. Although Nixon believed that the nation had watched Lodge on TV during U.N. hearings and that his nomination would focus the campaign on foreign policy, Lodge added NOTHING to the race, costing Nixon votes, if anything, by his off-the-cuff comment. Although he wasn't the albatross that Eagleton or LeMay were, the Presidential election is won by winning states and their electoral votes. One could easily make a blanket statement that Lodge could not help Nixon win ANY SINGLE STATE! I do not understand Nixon's thinking that the choice of Lodge would keep the electorate focused on foreign affairs. It seems out-of-character for Nixon not to realize that he would not win any New England states by picking Lodge and that he needed a candidate who would help him win certain key states.
A candidate with strong recognition in the Border or Midwestern States, however, concentrating his campaign in his home quadrant, would have offset LBJ's contibution to the Democratic ticket. A Dirksen or Ford or a Cooper/Morton choice could have swung key states to Nixon, giving him the win. One point you might be overlooking is that, with the exception of California, every closely contested state swung to Kennedy! A
little "push" would have easily tipped the election his way.
As to your point on the 1960 GOP Civil Rights Platform, Nixon was in a no- win situation. His support of a strong anti-segregation position would not, in any way, have won him any states that would have voted for Kennedy. He was not going to usurp the Democrats on that issue, winning black or liberal voters that would have voted for JFK. Taking a more moderate position would not won him any Southern states from LBJ, except possibly Texas. You may differ with me that a moderate GOP position on the civil rights issue would have offset Johnson's contribution to the Democratic ticket, bringing the Carolinas into the GOP collumn. I believe, however, that the only way to win more Southern States is to fight fire with fire; pick a Southerner like Morton or Cooper to go head-to-head with LBJ.
I also believe that had Kennedy had chosen ANY other running mate besides LBJ, he would have lost. Symington would not have tipped any states to Kennedy save Wisconsin and Jackson would have brought in Washington and possibly Oregon. The choice of either of these candidates in lieu of LBJ would have brought Texas and the Carolinas into the Nixon collumn. Remember, 50 votes in the Electoral College is not much when a few votes can tip states' Electoral votes one way or the other, especially on a regional basis. I just don't understand why Nixon didn't realize that the Northeast and the Deep South were hopeless, the West was safe for the GOP, and that the election would be decided in the Midwest and Border states and that he needed help in one of the two contested quadrants. This nebulous idea about keeeping the electorate mindful of foreign policy with Lodge is SO unlike him! He did learn a lot in 8 years, however.
Navigation
[0] Message Index
[#] Next page