Why is it taking Israel so much longer to capture Gaza than it took for to capture Sinai in 1967?

[TheReckoning]

In 1967, Israel invaded and occupied all of Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank in a just six days. In 2024, why is it taking over 6 months to capture just a tiny piece of that land, despite Hamas being a much less formidable enemy than Egypt/Jordan/Syria were in 1967?

[Hnv1]

Because it's one of the most densely populated urban areas in the world and the fact that Egypt closed its borders means they can storm Rafeh where 1.4 million people are

[Pres Mike]

Netanyahu is trying to prolong the conflict so he remains in power. Israel wants a snap election and polls show he'll lose by a lot

The IDF is also trying to minimize Israeli causalities

[SInNYC]

Winning a symmetric military war against another [weaker] military is very different from winning an asymmetric war.

[patzer]

International pressure.

If the international community were entirely willing to turn a blind eye in the way they did with Artsakh last year, the war would have been over within a few months at most, Egypt would be home to a few million refugees, and former residents would have already started returning to Gush Katif.

[CumbrianLefty]

Sinai being sparsely populated if not uninhabited for the most part is a massive factor, seriously.

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Urban warfare is hard.

[Oryxslayer]

Everyone mentioning  the difficulty of Urban Warfare or various outside factors ignores the fact that both were factors during the Six Day War in the same territory in question. Ignore the Six Days, Israeli forces during that war took Gaza in basically 1 day and Sinai in 4. Gaza was just as now a urban area. And the international situation was similar, cause of Cold War polarization. Technologically and logistically the difference between overwhelming Israeli firepower and Hamas is much wider than Israel and her foes in 1967, with all countries benefiting from Cold War military aid. in the case of Israel and Jordan, both from the US.

No, what is different is all stems from in some way from leadership: plans, morale, hierarchy, and how those are conveyed and react to public opinion.

Egypt outnumbered the IDF on their front. Egypt made the provocative actions of remilitarizing the Sinai border, kicking out the UNEF, and then stating in public that they would close the Straights of Tiran. There was much confusion and fog of war in the buildup to the crisis, but the general idea behind Egyptian tactics was the belief in a win-win. Israel would strike first as the aggressor if she did attack, the dug in Egyptian force would hold them off in Sinai, and then the more numerous combined forces would riposte and advance on all fronts. If Israel didn't attack, then Nasser would restore personal and Egyptian prestige by pushing the envelope, without bloodshed.

Except the Egyptian military was not in the position it believed itself to be. Most of these issues stem from Egypt's top military commander Abdel Hakim Amer, who many including himself and Nasser saw as the heir apparent. This led to him stuffing the military hierarchy with cronies and allies, and created redundant commands, all under a battleplan that depended on high command. During the 4 days this would lead to frontline commanders not knowing what to do, not getting any orders, and contently getting horribly inaccurate information to the point of falsified victories. The one order which did go through was the order to retreat to the canal, meaning all these problems just compounded during the evacuation, The army itself meanwhile going in poor morale, with many units finding themselves redeployed from the Yemeni quagmire and not getting the material necessary to return to fighting shape.

This is of course in contrast to Israeli dominance on these fronts. IDF and civilian leaders planned the broad tactics, but doctrine gave local commanders initiative. Once foes retreated, this meant the future borders were down to the officers will. Conscription and the off-and-on border clashes meant that Israeli society at the time actually was the unified armed camp many stereotype her as. Soldiers actually still could and did believe they were fighting for existence in a war of annihilation, something that would stop being so pressing after the resounding victory.

All in all, Israel versus Egypt was not a equal battle where it mattered. Once Israel assumed air superiority and Egyptian plans met contact with the enemy,  the chaos on their side all but guaranteed eventual defeat.

Lets contrast this with Hamas in Gaza. Hamas have been planning for a war of this kind for decade or more. There is urban warfare, but then there is urban warfare where the city is prepared and designs have been made for a conflict. They have chosen the battlefield. Meanwhile they are/were the de facto government of Gaza, and prepped the population for the worst (some of which has come to pass). This means for all their faults, the population of Gaza finds itself on the side facing potential extermination in a war of annihilation. This actually is one of the legacies  of 1967 and the other two wars with Egypt: among the then young idealists with nothing to lose hope transferred from the failed foreign armies to themselves and their own organizations. The fighters, from their own perspective, can therefore do little wrong.

Israel meanwhile does not have the same issues as Egypt did in 1967, but instead faces different internal issues that parallel those faced by America in Vietnam. The main difference between those two conflicts though is the distance between the battlefield and the homefront, which means means Israeli society is more connected to and more affected by the war that the US. Which means barring changes the government is more likely to take the escalatory, destructive, and eventually costly options even Nixon deemed too unviable.



That was long, but I kinda read a few books on the 20th century Israel wars in the past months, prompted by the current conflict. On the Six Day War I recommend Six Days of War by Michael Oren. But only the first half. The second half which actually covers the Six Days is just droll figures and effects of the causes laid  out in the first half. That's where the real action is, the fog of diplomacy, maneuvering, misinterpretation, negotiation, and a detailed description of how the crisis reached a boil on all sides and in capitals across the world - possible thanks to now-accessible archives in all relevant countries.

[PSOL]

It took forever for Israel to capture its internationally recognized borders against a force people internationally had little faith in. Now that’s not to say there shouldn’t have been precautions, Hezbollah and Iran abandoned the Palestinians to die and the former largely caused this mess, but years of racism against Arabs took its toll as they were close in getting to the other side of Palestine. The divided Palestinian armed forces did well against a cause they lost in the past without outside help that never came.

Hamas leadership had the same idea that Putin had when he thought invading Ukraine would be a cakewalk while the rest of the world had the idea that Palestine would quickly fold like Ukraine would have early on in the conflict. Everyone was wrong.

[wnwnwn]

Israel plan to eliminate Hamas but not kill all Gazans at the same time (even if one could say that the latter is only to avoid much backlash and there are plans for reocupation and reeducation).
Even if the hostages aren't released, getting thousands of Hamas fighters killed is the best thing for israeli interests, and it can justified after October 7 (at leats to zionists).
Also, the international reaction of antizionists helps Bibi reputation among zionists.

Six months have happened and with preasure from his right and his left, the israeli goverment will start the Rafah campaing at some point, even if there is no refugee agreement with Egypt.

[Zinneke]

International pressure.

If the international community were entirely willing to turn a blind eye in the way they did with Artsakh last year, the war would have been over within a few months at most, Egypt would be home to a few million refugees, and former residents would have already started returning to Gush Katif.

Former *illegal settlers

[Secretary of State Liberal Hack]

International pressure.

If the international community were entirely willing to turn a blind eye in the way they did with Artsakh last year, the war would have been over within a few months at most, Egypt would be home to a few million refugees, and former residents would have already started returning to Gush Katif.

Former *illegal settlers

Patzer doesn't think Palestinians are people deserving of property rights and think vague words from some 2000 year old holybook take precedence.

[patzer]

International pressure.

If the international community were entirely willing to turn a blind eye in the way they did with Artsakh last year, the war would have been over within a few months at most, Egypt would be home to a few million refugees, and former residents would have already started returning to Gush Katif.

Former *illegal settlers

I'm personally of the opinion that no human should ever be considered illegal based on where they live.

[Zinneke]

International pressure.

If the international community were entirely willing to turn a blind eye in the way they did with Artsakh last year, the war would have been over within a few months at most, Egypt would be home to a few million refugees, and former residents would have already started returning to Gush Katif.

Former *illegal settlers

I'm personally of the opinion that no human should ever be considered illegal based on where they live.

I find that hard to believe given you're basically a fascist except when it comes to this issue.

But yes, it's interesting how the Conservative Right wail against illegal immigration yet support the Israeli setter movement, which is exactly that.

[patzer]

I find that hard to believe given you're basically a fascist except when it comes to this issue.

But yes, it's interesting how the Conservative Right wail against illegal immigration yet support the Israeli setter movement, which is exactly that.

Nah, I'm generally of the opinion that freedom of movement worldwide is a goal that should be worked towards. It can't just be implemented in an instant for obvious reasons, but just as a matter of principle restrictions on migration have increased massively in the last century with no clear benefit in doing so.

When it comes to the matter of Israel, it's very much a double standard that millions of Arabs are fully free to live throughout Israel, but no Jews are able to live in the Gaza Strip and large areas of the West Bank, and Jews are even denied the right to pray on Temple Mount.

[Stranger in a strange land]

1) Defeating a less well-trained and equipped conventional army in desert warfare is VERY different from taking a huge city with a 100% hostile population, and yes, Gaza was a city in 1967, but it was much smaller than it is now, and Egypt didn't even really try to defend it
2) Israel had the element of surprise in 1967 (they shouldn't have, since tensions had been escalating for a while and both sides believed war was imminent, but they did)
3) Very poor command on the Egyptian side in 1967
4) In 2023-2024, Netanyahu is trying to prolong the war because he knows he'll lose power and probably go to jail as soon as it's over

[Devils30]

Israel isn’t going all in, if they did they could capture all of Gaza but then what? The last thing they want is to police that place day to day. Bibi has never had much of a plan.

[TheReckoning]

Israel isn’t going all in, if they did they could capture all of Gaza but then what? The last thing they want is to police that place day to day. Bibi has never had much of a plan.

So what are they doing right now then?

[EastAnglianLefty]

When it comes to the matter of Israel, it's very much a double standard that millions of Arabs are fully free to live throughout Israel, but no Jews are able to live in the Gaza Strip and large areas of the West Bank, and Jews are even denied the right to pray on Temple Mount.

Millions of Arabs who are Israeli citizens are free to live throughout Israel. Arabs who are not Israeli citizens are not free to do so, and indeed Arabs in the West Bank frequently have their homes knocked down if they haven't received permission for them.