🇧🇬 Bulgarian elections megathread (next up: European and National (?) Parliament 09 June 2024)

[DavidB.]

Any combination of GERB, DPS and BSP is about the worst possible outcome when it comes to combatting corruption and state capture, no?

What's the upside for BV in allying with VMRO? Is VMRO like Slovak SNS in that they have a lot of money due to participating in government some time ago?

[Beagle]

Any combination of GERB, DPS and BSP is about the worst possible outcome when it comes to combatting corruption and state capture, no?

Yup. YMMV depending on your pet issues; in some areas BSP are surprisingly open to reform, in others GERB have actually made attempts to improve the status quo, and there are many who, for example, claim the process of obtaining an ecological assessment is captured by the DB-aligned Greens. But on the whole the status-quo/'paper ballot'/Magnitsky coalition is the worst case scenario for the fight against corruption.

* The political individuals sanctioned by the US and the UK under the Magnitsky act are all from GERB, DPS and BSP.

What's the upside for BV in allying with VMRO?

Eh, BV have lost a sizable chunk of their support due to abandoning the moderate pro-Russia lane and rely on the personal popularity of their leader (like virtually every other Bulgarian party) and, to a lesser extent, some corporate vote*.

Spoiler alert! Click Show to show the content.

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Recently it was brought to my attention that BV have inherited the Lider/Kovachki feudal vote. Long-time observers of the Bulgarian political scene (should any exist) will recall how one municipality stuck out like a sore thumb on every electoral map from 2007-ish to 2016, voting for the Lider party or whatever coalition it was in, despite the party typically coming in substantially below the 4% hurdle. This is Bobov Dol, a coal mining/power station community, where the owner of both the mine and the power station  had his employees vote en bloc for this party. While the mine is practically closed nowadays, BV - who got just 4.6% of the nationwide vote - received upwards of 40% in a couple of Bobov Dol precincts.

 

So, the upside for BV is that they gain a coalition partner who still has some residual support - 2 MPs worth as per the last election, a political machine in one town in the Southwest of the country where they still win precincts, as well as being on brand for "agreeableness". BV, after all, declared their availability for any and all political constructs that would have been created in the short-lived 22-23 parliament.

Is VMRO like Slovak SNS in that they have a lot of money due to participating in government some time ago?

Yup (x2). The term long-time VMRO leader Karakachanov spent as defense minister in the Borisov III government proved very, er, fruitful.

[RGM2609]

My question would be, what advantage do PP and DB see in running together? Their combined sum is lower and it's not like DB is in serious risk of falling under the threshold.

[Beagle]

My question would be, what advantage do PP and DB see in running together? Their combined sum is lower and it's not like DB is in serious risk of falling under the threshold.

Uh... well, it's a very good question. As I may have alluded to in the past, the political leadership of the smartbeautiful leaves a lot to be desired. The honest answer may very well be that PP and DB have given up on the prospect of governing in these turbulent times and see themselves as the heroic opposition, standing athwart overwhelming corruption, yelling "Hey, not without us Stop!" After all, the 2014-2015 foray into the Borisov II government by the current DB leaders was ended when they resigned in the expectation that once the people [tm] know the truth [tm], the wave of national indignation will sweep out GERB, DPS and BSP and lead to a golden age of honesty and goodwill in government. And, well, we all saw how that turned out - their parties, running separately, all failed under the threshold at the 2017 election, Borisov received an extremely pliable parliament and ran the country virtually unchallenged for another 4 years.

But the answer that the PP and DB leadership would give in public is probably threefold:
- the Venn diagram of DB supporters almost completely overlaps with that of PP supporters (especially after some activists on the right wing of DB component DSB left the party because it was subsumed in the liberal/progressive DB); although, obviously, PP's circle is at least double the size;
- the parties parliament votes are almost completely aligned and they have agreed to disagree on the few issues that separate them;
- the explosion of parties that claim heritage from the old SDS led to the impression that the 'Old Right' is incapable of leading even like-minded people, much less the nation as a whole. The 'Harvard crew' had a long history of support for DB parties and causes, so when they founded their own party, it was seen as confirmation that the tendency to splinter is alive and well. So the assumption is that by presenting a united front, PP and DB will convince wavering people to drop their doubts about their capabilities to lead and govern.

[Beagle]

Needless to say, this thread provides all the timely and accurate information you pay for it. So it should come as no surprise that I'm not updating during the campaign, especially given that in many ways this campaign has been ongoing for more than two years now and it is highly unlikely that anyone is left that can be remotely swayed by the promises and allegations that fly around, nor by the various stunts that (mostly) the fringe parties attempt.

It also should come as no surprise that some (many) of my statements turn out to be wrong. Like this for instance:

Euro adoption seems to be the only thing the parties can agree on (along with EU funds absorption/Schengen it seems).

Still, the political will is definitely there on both sides and I think the process is more likely than not to end with Euro adoption on 1 January 2024, even if the legal framework and/or the deficit ratio criteria are not completely fulfilled.

Nah. The caretakers have abandoned all attempts to enter the Eurozone in the coming 18 months, at least. According to the noises from Brussels and Frankfurt, the failure to pass the required legislation is actually not the (main) issue. Of far bigger concern is the inflation, which is predicted to fall from 13% in 2022 to 7.8% in 2023 - still way ahead of where it should be to adopt the Euro. And, as previously mentioned, the budget deficit will also balloon in 2023 - various tricks were adopted to keep it to 2.9% in 2022, and thus under the 3% threshold required for the Euro, but the projection for 2023 is almost 7%. The caretaker government recently came out with a report about the severity of the situation, prescribing an 'extra profit' company tax towards the end of the year and various other unpopular measures and laying the blame squarely at the PP-BSP-ITN-DB government of 2021-22 and its spendthrift ways. Of course, this can be viewed as yet another shot by President Radev against his former protégés in PP, and it is also likely true that the revenue collection has slackened substantially, especially from GERB-adjacent big business, but undoubtedly the Petkov government vastly overspent (let's charitably call its policies Keynesian) and, as it seems, achieving 'left wing goals through right wing means', ie pumping spending without raising taxes, may not actually be possible.

I was also wrong about:

BV surprised many, myself included, by teaming up at the last minute with VMRO.

Nu-uh. The BV-VMRO alliance fell apart, because VMRO pulled out when they were requested to fund 80% of the campaign against 20% of the electable spots on the lists. Now VMRO are campaigning on a 'Select "none of the above"' platform, claiming that no party actually represents Bulgarian interests. According to them, the major parties are simply puppets of Brussels (GERB), Washington (PP-DB), Ankara (DPS) or Moscow (BSP, Vazrazhdane). Which, ok, fair enough, but surely this choice is important enough to pick one or the other. At the 2022 election, the "None of the above" vote almost doubled, compared to November 2021, and a similar increase might be on the cards in 2023, but I sincerely doubt VMRO will deserve any credit for it.

As to BV, they picked up another oligarch's support instead. It remains to be seen whether this will be enough to re-enter parliament.

The ennui of the 5th election in 2 years has carried over to the pollsters, who seem to have conducted only one survey between themselves and just rehash the results, fudging a number here or there, but otherwise all predicting almost exactly the same outcome:
PP-DB ahead of GERB by a sliver with both just above 25%;
DPS slightly ahead of Vazrazhdane in the 12-13% range - considering the unpollable vote in Turkey for DPS, their third place is not as contested as the Bulgaria-only numbers may show;
BSP is on track to record their worst result yet, with 7-8% - but, as you may recall, BSP have overpolled in all recent elections, so it would not come as a huge surprise if they stumble even further down.

BV, Levitsata [The Left] and ITN all poll under the 4% threshold, but close enough that it is entirely plausible that one or more of them ends up in parliament. Considering the MoE, the pollsters are essentially shrugging their shoulders and saying 'who knows'.

The smart money, however, is on a 5 party parliament and, given the considerations about the local elections coming up in the autumn that I discussed earlier, a short lived 'expert' government, backed either by PP-DB-GERB or GERB-DPS-BSP. The Bulgarian smart money has definitely been dumb in the past, but the other realistic scenario is simply yet another wasted parliament, and since we live in the stupidest timeline, this may very well be what we are going to get. After all, to get to the promised 3 in 1 election in October, we will need one more round in June or July.

Unless there are questions or some extremely noteworthy developments, I expect that the next time I post will be some time after election day - the return of the paper ballot will mean that we poll workers will have a much busier time during the election day and especially during the counting and reporting.

[𝕭𝖆𝖕𝖙𝖎𝖘𝖙𝖆 𝕸𝖎𝖓𝖔𝖑𝖆]

Unless there are questions or some extremely noteworthy developments, I expect that the next time I post will be some time after election day - the return of the paper ballot will mean that we poll workers will have a much busier time during the election day and especially during the counting and reporting.

I have a question! How do Bulgarian Turks tend to vote in Turkish elections?

[Logical]

Unless there are questions or some extremely noteworthy developments, I expect that the next time I post will be some time after election day - the return of the paper ballot will mean that we poll workers will have a much busier time during the election day and especially during the counting and reporting.

I have a question! How do Bulgarian Turks tend to vote in Turkish elections?

I have no idea how Bulgarian Turks In Turkey vote but here are 2018 elections results for Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria.

Legislative (16% turnout)
CHP 549
AKP 270
IYI 190
HDP 154
MHP 58

Presidential
Ince  (CHP) 729
Erdogan (AKP) 318
Aksener (IYI) 108
Demirtas (HDP) 78

[Storr]

It's election day!

Meanwhile, on March 21st a Bulgarian police raid recovered an unnamed Jackson Pollock piece, with an estimated value of €50 million, that was formerly owned by Nicolae Ceaușescu.

It is only logical that I now expect to see news that Jason Bourne was seen giving chase to terrorist double agent art smugglers through Sofia in the coming days.

[Harlow]

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1642570747263475714?s=20

Exit poll. I don't really see how this results in anything but more instability.

[Mike88]

Another exit poll is a bit more favourable to PP/DB, but still a close call:

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1642575469450067968

[Mike88]

The exit polls may have had it wrong:

https://twitter.com/EuropeElects/status/1642642733146730498

[DavidB.]

The exit polls may have had it wrong:

This is still within the margin of error, no? (Although 26.9% to 24.6% is on the boundary of it...) Just a number of shy V voters, who were therefore underpolled + eager "smartbeautiful" PP/DB voters being slightly overpolled (or not even that).

[President Punxsutawney Phil]

Is there a workable government under these numbers?

[Mike88]

The exit polls may have had it wrong:

This is still within the margin of error, no? (Although 26.9% to 24.6% is on the boundary of it...) Just a number of shy V voters, who were therefore underpolled + eager "smartbeautiful" PP/DB voters being slightly overpolled (or not even that).

Yes, it's still within the margin or error, but the exit polls, at least the ones available, predicted a narrow PP-DB win, when in fact it seems that GERB polled almost 2% ahead of PP-DB.

Don't know what kind of government could come out of this. The results are almost copypaste of the previous election(s). This situation is becoming Israel 2.0.

[DavidB.]

GERB-DPS-BSP. The corruption coalition. That, or round 6.

[MRCVzla]

Parallel counts at 100%:
Alpha Research (Dnevnik)
GERB-SDS 25.7% (71)
PP-DB 25.1% (69)
Vazrazhdane 13.9% (38)
DPS 13.6% (37)
BSPzB 9.0% (25)
ITN 3.9%
BV 3.0%
Levitsata! 2.3%

Gallup International (BNT1)
GERB-SDS 26.2% (68-71)
PP-DB 24.6% (64-67)
Vazrazhdane 14.5% (38-40)
DPS 13.4% (35-37)
BSPzB 9.2% (24-25)
ITN 4.0% (0-11)
BV 3.0%
Levitsata! 2.4%

Market Links (bTV)
GERB-SDS 25.6% (70)
PP-DB 25.3% (70)
DPS 14.5% (40)
Vazrazhdane 13.9% (38)
BSPzB 8.1% (22)
ITN 3.8%
BV 3.6%
Levitsata! 2.2%

Trend (NOVA)
GERB-SDS 26.2% (69)
PP-DB 25.0% (66)
Vazrazhdane 13.7% (36)
DPS 13.0% (34)
BSPzB 9.1% (24)
ITN 4.3% (11)
BV 3.0%
Levitsata! 2.3%

Preliminary results are already available (updated every hour) here: https://results.cik.bg/ns2023/rezultati/index.html
At the moment of this writing, 35% of the precincts are counted. PP-DB has a 1pp lead over GERB-SDS, Slavi' ITN is back for now.

A long night/day still comes but everything is still blocked. In every majority calc, GERB has to be involved, round 6 (in June/July or in October along the locals) is still very likely, and yes, it's kind of Israel.

In Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu is the problem along the kahanists (in the eyes of Yesh Atid/Benny Gantz/Labour/Meretz)
In Bulgaria, Boyko Borisov is the problem along the DPS and the nationalists (in the eyes of PP/DB/Slavi/Maya Manolova)

And both follow similar patterns (in both cases, the opposition formed government briefly until some of them left and the coalition collapsed, but in Bulgaria the part when Boyko returns like Bibi as not reached yet), ofc there is no Palestine-like situation inside Bulgaria, but there are similarities between constant electoral repetitions.

[Logical]

99.56% counted
GERB-SDS 26.54%
PP-DB 24.61%
Vazrazhdane 14.19%
DPS 13.55%
BSP 8.96%
ITN 4.12%
--------------------------
BV 3.09%
Levitsata 2.24%

ITN passed the threshold but I still don't see any government under these numbers.

[Beagle]

GERB-DPS-BSP. The corruption coalition. That, or round 6.

At the 99.06% projection, GERB-DPS-BSP will have 127 MPs, so a rather precarious majority for even the status-quo/corruption/suicide-pact coalition. When Bulgarian voters choose chaos, they mean it. They, of course, also have to live with the consequences, but, evidently, they enjoy them.

The aforementioned projection:

GERB - 69 (+2)
PP-DB - 65 (-8 from the combined 2022 result)
Vazrazhdane - 37 (+10)
DPS - 35 (-1)
BSP - 23 (-2)
ITN - 11 (+11)
BV - 0 (-12)

Lots of thoughts, little time, choose a topic, if any:
- Why PP-DB became the big losers of last night - especially since the large Sofia precincts didn't report until late in the count*, the GERB margin hovered around 3% at some point, instead of the 1.8% it actually is, so the narrative is of a crushing GERB blow against the united reform parties. Of course, it is pretty crushing, it's just maybe not quite as severe as pundits have proclaimed it this morning.

Spoiler alert! Click Show to show the content.

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I should know, 'my' PPDB precinct (163/365 votes for PPDB, 68 for GERB, 39 Vazrazhdane, 26 BSP) didn't finish the count until midnight, almost entirely because of the new requirement to show and count by voice each and every ballot paper/machine printout to a mobile phone that was livestreaming/recording the process.

- The revival (no associations with Vazrazhdane intended) of ITN. Note that I may not have much of value to say, I was utterly shocked that they actually made it back in, albeit entirely by virtue of 6000 or so Bulgarian expats in the UK.

- The post-election posturing of the various parties.

- other (what?). Just don't ask 'who forms the government now', because I don't know... and, evidently, nobody else does.

[MRCVzla]

Preliminary final results at 100% of the protocols counted:
GERB-SDS 26.51% (69) (+2)
PP-DB 24.54% (64) (-9)
Vazrazhdane 14.15% (37) (+10)
DPS 13.72% (36) (=)
BSPzB 8.94% (23) (-2)
ITN 4.11% (11) (+11)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BV 3.08% (-12)
Levitsata! 2.24%

Turnout at 20:00 was 40.6% (up 1.2% respect to last October)

Potential but unlikely coalitions:
GERB+PP/DB+BSP: 156
GERB+VAZ+DPS: 142
GERB+PP/DB: 133
GERB+DPS+BSP: 128
PP/DB+DPS+BSP: 123

[MRCVzla]

Yesterday, the Central Election Commission made public the list of the 240 elected MPs, Boyko Borisov is finally taking their seat this time to lead any potential coalition/government talks (PP/DB -mostly the earlier- rejects vehemently being part of a coalition with GERB), meanwhile Slavi Trifonov doesn't take his mandate and ceeded to other ITN hacks. The ratio of the PP/DB coalition ended up as 38:26, many DB candidates got benefit of the preferential voting 7% threshold and rearranged the list orders. President Radev has one month to convene the new parliament.

Also 1/5 of the protocolls/acts were wrongly transmitted at the preliminary results and corrected before the final ones were published (without any substantial change in the seat allocation), some PP-DB candidates/MPs reclaimed this as most of the wrong protocolls affected the PP-DB joint lists in GERB friendly precincts, and more than 40k votes (mostly in paper ballots) were invalid in contrast to less of 10k in last October' round 4 were the voting was only at machine ballots.

[Sadader]

looks like the GERB / PP-DB working coalition is progressing a bit

https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/bulgarian-pro-eu-parties-take-major-step-towards-forming-government

The first joint actions of GERB with PP-DB were undertaken last week when the two formations agreed to prepare the draft laws on Schengen, the Eurozone and the funds from the Recovery Plan. The two formations have 133 MPs and can easily form a Euro-Atlantic majority in the 240 MPs parliament.

I don't think Eurozone accession for 2024 is back on the table, given the convergence report will be prepared for June (and to waive the HICP inflation breach I think the Council would want to see more consensus within Bulgaria, or a functioning government at the very least). Though to be honest I have no clue.

[Beagle]

I have a question! How do Bulgarian Turks tend to vote in Turkish elections?

Just with a month's delay, I can quote a Bulgarian Turk journalist:

Long gone are the days when about 80 percent of the expatriates supported the Social Democrats, the formation of Bülent Ecevit, then Demirel, then Deniz Baykal. Since the emergence of Erdogan and what he has managed to do in his best years for Turkey, the ratio is now 1:1 - 50% support Erdogan, 50% are for the united opposition

Context is the campaign events that both camps hold on a daily basis in Bulgaria proper. Kılıçdaroğlu even came in person for a campaign swing in the Turkish regions. DPS leader Karadayi may or may not have expected that Kılıçdaroğlu would hold outright campaign speeches at their joint rallies that were held in remembrance of the Revival Process and the Big Excursion. FWIW, 2 days earlier Karadayi had joined Çavuşoğlu (Erdoğan's FM) for an event in Northeast bulgaria, where the speeches were rather tame and only obliquely referred to the campaign. Most observers seem to think, though, that DPS have thrown their lot with the opposition, as their relationship with Erdoğan has always been fraught with tension - culminating in the DOST project (see the 2017 election thread for more details) that was heavily supported/financed by the AKP.

looks like the GERB / PP-DB working coalition is progressing a bit

https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/bulgarian-pro-eu-parties-take-major-step-towards-forming-government

The first joint actions of GERB with PP-DB were undertaken last week when the two formations agreed to prepare the draft laws on Schengen, the Eurozone and the funds from the Recovery Plan. The two formations have 133 MPs and can easily form a Euro-Atlantic majority in the 240 MPs parliament.

I don't think Eurozone accession for 2024 is back on the table, given the convergence report will be prepared for June (and to waive the HICP inflation breach I think the Council would want to see more consensus within Bulgaria, or a functioning government at the very least). Though to be honest I have no clue.

Ah, well, about that. GERB and PP-DB (and ITN) have elected a chairman of parliament and entered into an agreement to rotate the chairmanship and the chair of the legal affairs committees every three months (with the full expectation that three months will be the entire lifespan of this parliament). The two parties also agreed on a priority legislative program of some 30 laws that need to be passed in this session (which, again, may very well be the only session) and that both parties will support.

However PP-DB have drawn their lines in the sand that they will not support any government proposed by GERB and that they will nominate the PP leaders as ministers in a hypothetical government with their mandate. Since the PP leaders are pretty unpalatable to GERB, the expectation is that either:
a) GERB proposes an expert cabinet that will draw on the support of DPS, BSP and ITN for investiture (which is not in GERB's interest and I would be shocked if it happens)
b) GERB bites the bullet and supports the PP-DB proposed cabinet for 3-6 months, pulling the plug just after the local elections at the latest
c) Government formation again devolves to the third mandate, Radev - presumably - gives it to BSP yet again and - presumably - we go to the polls in... we'll see.

As of today, President Radev has promised that the parliament will be kept in session until June, even if it does not elect a government, so that it can pass a string of crucial laws. So an election in July may not be on the cards, but the sixth parliamentary election will almost certainly happen by the end of 2023 one way or another.

And finally, to lighten the mood, a joke by Boyko Borisov when he was recounting his meeting with Radev (his first in 3 years) to the press:

Radev said to me, 'If I delay giving out the mandate to your party, people will accuse me of dictatorship'. I said, 'Hold on, I thought I was the dictator! If all dictators in the world were like you and me [Radev and Borisov], it would be great! May all countries have dictators like us.'

[Beagle]

I have a question! How do Bulgarian Turks tend to vote in Turkish elections?

I have no idea how Bulgarian Turks In Turkey vote but here are 2018 elections results for Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria.

Legislative (16% turnout)
CHP 549
AKP 270
IYI 190
HDP 154
MHP 58

Presidential
Ince  (CHP) 729
Erdogan (AKP) 318
Aksener (IYI) 108
Demirtas (HDP) 78

Similar results this time around, although turnout was a bit higher:
Kılıçdaroğlu - 72.57%
Erdoğan - 19.37%

As to the topic at hand, in the month since the last update, a lot has happened and nothing has happened.

It is easier to start with the latter - although the now ex-EU commissioner Maria Gabriel will put a GERB-DPS-ITN
'expert' government to the vote, her only hope is to find 5 renegades from the other parties to support her, or (slightly) more realistically, 10 renegades to be absent from parliament on that day. But nobody really thinks that such a government would be sustainable and the vote will only be a part of the performances the various parties are putting up to show how earnestly they try to avoid the 6th round of elections. PP-DB also have next to no chance to get GERB support for their own proposed minority government, led by an academic who served as Education minister in the PP (Petkov) government  - mostly because of the recalcitrance of the PP leadership. And after 4 consecutive fumbles on the Radev-Ninova axis, nobody expects anything different on the third try, so a 6th election seems much likelier than not. Especially since parliament, which has been sitting for a month, is still not working - only a single law is on the verge of being passed, dealing with the procedure for investigating and removing the chief prosecutor.

And therein lies the 'a lot' that has happened. The chief prosecutor, who last made an appearance in this thread here:

The catalyst for the protests of the summer of 2020 and the upswell in support for the 'Parties of the Protest' was the entry of the chief prosecutor's own thugs* into the Presidency and the arrest of two of Radev's advisors on the flimsiest of pretenses after Radev expressed his opposition to some brazenly corrupt acts of the prosecutorship.

* ostensibly The Bureau for Protection of Witnesses, in recent years this force has become the Pretorian guard of the chief prosecutor, being directly under his command

... is in the process of being removed, but he is going down fighting. The result are headlines such as:

Deputy chief prosecutor demands (and receives) police protection, because he is in fear that the chief prosecutor will have him killed

Chief prosecutor gathers his associates, plays them a salacious recorded call, says he has 150 more of them

Chief prosecutor states intention to clean the filth from parliament, threatens to charge Boyko Borisov

Now, to adequately explain the situation would require a much deeper dive, with a throwback to the beginning of the century/first page of this thread and the paranoid schizophrenic then chief prosecutor. However, I don't think there are too many who are interested and, anyway, it is not really election related.

But to summarize: 6th election still looms large, however the backdrop may or may not be different, if and when the current chief prosecutor puts out warrants against GERB figures and/or spills the beans. The next couple of weeks will see GERB- and PP-DB-led 'expert' governments with a short lifespan proposed, but neither has a plausible path to success, and then we will be faced with either BSP/Ninova or, less likely, ITN leading a last ditch effort to prevent an immediate dissolution of parliament. Before the prosecutor's volte-face, BSP seemed amenable to a partnership of sorts with GERB and DPS, mostly to prevent a Radev appointed government to be in charge of the local elections in 4 months, so the 'paper/Magnitsky/corruption coalition' may be resurrected, or GERB and PP-DB (or parts thereof) will figure out a cooperation that can work for both. Neither option is looking hopeful as of today, though.

[Beagle]

As stated many times earlier, I don't do 'breaking' news here. But this is an exception - in the last 3 hours the rumors have been picking up pace and now there are pretty official signs that GERB and PP-DB have reached the form of cooperation that can work for both. The rudiments are:
- Maria Gabriel (GERB) will return the 1st mandate unfulfilled, despite the agreements with DPS and ITN;
- Nikolay Denkov, the PP PM-designate, will pick it up and propose a government in which Gabriel will be appointed deputy PM and FM;
- As of now, it is completely unclear if other GERB figures - either political or technocratic nominees - will be invited to take part, but the bulk of the ministers will be supplied by PP (not DB);
- That government will be voted in by GERB and PP-DB. Maybe with DPS and ITN support, maybe not, who gives a
- Denkov will deposit his resignation due in 6 months time, at which point Maria Gabriel will be given the PM-ship for a GERB-nominated government, with PP-DB supplying the deputy PM and FM figure for a further 6 months;
- The next parliamentary elections may or may not be held at the same time as the EU election 2024 (June 9), but at present the agreement is for a 1 year period.

Obviously very tentative, very much subject to change, but maybe round 6 will not be held in 2023.

[Beagle]

Going by the page views, by now the Bulgarian elections scriptwriters have jumped the shark and most of the audience has already tuned out. So, if you're just here for the tl:dr version - the GERB:PP-DB coalition arrangement is off, at least for now, and certainly in its original proposed form. Only to correct some errors in last week's post, that arrangement was for 9 months of a Denkov partisan PP government and 9 months of a Gabriel government, with no GERB representation outside of Gabriel in the first 9 months. The remainder of the post  is a brief explanation as to the why.

A leaked conversation did come out. Not the expected leak, though. Instead, one of the ITN renegades, who had jumped on the PP bandwagon, uploaded a complete 5-hour recording of the PP broad leadership meeting where Kiril Petkov and Assen Vassilev were cajoling the remainder of their colleagues into accepting the terms of the GERB coalition arrangement. They succeeded, if only barely - 27 for, 24 against in the broader format, 4 yeas, 3 nays in the executive council. However, in doing so, they used quite forceful and blunt language to lay out the political situation, the prospects for all the major political players and to temper the high expectations for the future by some of their more optimistic colleagues. The ex-ITN - and now ex-PP - man announced that the reason he went to the press with the recording was a number of statements which amounted to 'we have to give up on the fight against corruption in order to at least get the EU recovery funds, Schengen, Eurozone etc. done' and 'Boyko Borisov is no longer our chief enemy, the deep state is'*. Something which raised a lot of outcry was a statement that the proposed new leadership of the state security services (which currently are all Radev's men) has met with the approval of the 'embassies' - a cue for Vazrazhdane et al to bewail our surrendered sovereignty. The straw that broke the GERB camel's back was, ostensibly, the requirement that the PP ministers execute a purge of all mid- and low level state agencies, directorates etc., which would have meant that much of the GERB political machine would be dismantled.

So, for now, GERB have retracted their support for the Denkov government and demand a) that Gabriel is given the mandate instead and b) that the political nominations are withdrawn and that the government is composed entirely of technocrats. In the coming week, we shall see if the purported pressure that the EU/US have put on GERB and PP to come to terms (as per the leak) will bear fruit.

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* Other potential reasons, in no particular order: disappointment at not being given the sports minister portfolio, which he held in the Petkov government, and/or being given no leadership positions in the party; addiction; bribes etc.

There were tons of other juicy details in the leak; to me, the most interesting were the ones concerning the conflict between President Radev and the entire Bulgarian political system, but, given the level of interest, I think I'll stop here and cross fingers and toes that Everton manage to survive in the Premier League, albeit quite undeservedly.