🇧🇬 Bulgarian elections megathread (next up: European and National (?) Parliament 09 June 2024)
Beagle:
Quote from: Battista Minola 1616 on October 06, 2022, 08:31:33 AM
Is the reason DPS won a lot of municipalities in Montana Oblast but zero in Sliven Oblast despite the latter being just as Romani and much more Turkish (I love Wikipedia) that BSP has much more residual strength in the former just like in all the northwest which lowered GERB's score?
Yeah, succinctly put. My mother is from Montana, so I could go on another gratuitous multi page tangent, but I'll just mark three additional factors:
- there is a difference in the make-up of the Roma population in the two districts - Sliven is much more Kalderash, the Montana Roma are mostly Kopanari; the distinction these days is becoming less and less, since both groups have switched to surviving on remittances from family making their living in Western Europe. But the thing is, the Roma vote in Montana is less uniform for DPS, however it is much more socially acceptable for ethnic Bulgarians to vote DPS there. You get villages without any Roma (or Turkish) inhabitants voting DPS in the Northwest, which would be unthinkable anywhere else in the country.
- chicken or egg situation, of course, but GERB have less mayors and local influence in Montana region, which makes it harder for them to organize a machine vote there. By comparison, they are in total control of Sliven.
- I'm sure you realize that, but land doesn't vote. The municipalities in Sliven region are all populous, with the smallest having 13 thousand inhabitants. By comparison, just 3 of the 11 municipalities in Montana have a population exceeding 10 thousand. More than a few of the DPS municipalities in the Northwest were won by margins of a couple of dozen votes. And, given the abject poverty of most of these places, vote buying is very fruitful there.
And here I will still go on a minor tangent - with a huge thank you to GMantis - because I was curious which municipalities have an unbroken BSP streak since 1990. As far as I can see, there are only 32 remaining (3 more fell in 2021):
EDIT: turns out Brezovo fell in 2022
- Brezovo in the center of the country, with a population of 6170 (a decrease of 16% between the 2011 and 2021 census) - a rural, mountainous place without any tourism, mining or significant industry. The municipal center has a population of 1610, which is positively metropolitan in comparison with...
- Makresh in the northwest of the country, with a population of 1067 (a decrease of 35% (!) between the 2011 and 2021 census) - a rural, mountainous place without any tourism, mining or significant industry. The municipal center has a population of 416, which is positively metropolitan in comparison with...
- Treklyano in the west of the country, with a population of 434 (a decrease of 32% (!) between the 2011 and 2021 census) - a rural, mountainous place without any tourism, mining or significant industry. The municipal center has a population of a 195. It is home to 7 of the municipality's total of 8 (not a typo) children aged between 0 and 5. Given that the municipal council is 11-member-strong and that each municipality has at least 16 required employees, about 10% of the population are actually directly employed in governing or administrating Treklyano. This is the smallest municipality in Bulgaria and there is nothing justifying its continued existence.
Quote from: Battista Minola 1616 on October 06, 2022, 08:31:33 AM
And relatedly, why is the northwest the most Socialist area of Bulgaria?
In a word: demography. A more detailed answer would, by necessity, include history - at least the 1923 Communist uprising, but probably also late 18th-early 19th century Ottoman Empire history and, maybe, the 1688 Catholic uprising. I could also speak about how the Bulgarian Northwest was the last place in the country to be reached by the Columbian exchange and how the region feels the effects to this day. But the simplest answer is that for economic reasons the young people from the region are emigrating in droves - internally, mostly to Sofia, but also to the EU - leaving behind an increasingly aging, impoverished and nostalgic population.
GMantis:
Quote from: Battista Minola 1616 on October 06, 2022, 08:31:33 AM
Is the reason DPS won a lot of municipalities in Montana Oblast but zero in Sliven Oblast despite the latter being just as Romani and much more Turkish (I love Wikipedia) that BSP has much more residual strength in the former just like in all the northwest which lowered GERB's score? And relatedly, why is the northwest the most Socialist area of Bulgaria?
Not really. DPS' vote in Montana Oblast is well above the minority percentage in every municipality (according to the 2011 census, meaning that it's likely higher now, but unlikely to explain such large discrepancies), while it's below that in all municipalities of Sliven Oblast. For example, there were only 21% minorities in Valchedram, but DPS received 57% of the vote there; 16% minorities in Yakimovo, but DPS received 46% of the vote; etc. Meanwhile, in Kotel where ethnic Bulgarians are less than 40%, DPS received just 17% of the vote; in Sliven municipality with 17% minority population, DPS got just 4%. The real explanation is control of voters. Poor and uneducated voters (among which the Romanis are disproportionately represented) are far too often manipulated, bribed or even coerced into voting for whichever party is able or willing to get their votes. The structure of Romani society, which has strong elements of clannishness, means that its even easier to control their vote if you can win over their leaders, which the DPS has managed over the years. And the reason is not, as I thought for a time, that DPS managed to gain the loyalty of these voters by appealing to minority interests - DPS results in local elections in Montana oblast have been abysmal, because DPS wouldn't waste efforts on elections they can't win anyway. As for Sliven oblast, the minority groups there are mainly located in two of the four municipalities - Sliven itself and Kotel. In a large city like Sliven, it's far more difficult to gain exclusive control of voters like that, because there are many competing interesting to control them effectively and a more prosperous economy making pressuring voters more difficult. As for Kotel, DPS is trumped there by a different type of control. Basically GERB, having first seized the local administration, then forced the majority of employers (which aren't that many in a poor municipality like Kotel to align with them, after which there was no significant difficulties in turning out the vote in favor of GERB. This is what I called the "campaign vote" in one of my previous posts. The actual mechanisms of achieving this varies from offering economic incentives to outright threatening employees that they will lose their jobs if they don't support the correct party. These dark blue municipalities which sprang out of nowhere on election maps are just the most visible part of a huge distortion of the democratic process and one of the main reasons GERB continue to be nearly unbeatable despite their dubious at best record.
As for the northwest, there are multiple reasons why it is (or rather was) the most Socialist area in Bulgaria. Some of these are historical. The northwest was the main core of the uprising the Communist Party staged in 1923 and consequently suffered the worst reprisals after the uprising was quelled. As as a consequence, it was one of the main areas of partisan activity during WWII, which solidified the region as stronghold of the Communist Party. Perhaps more importantly, the northwest has the greatest concentration of voters inclined to back the BSP. It's among the poorest regions in Bulgaria, it's very rural and the population is older than the average - all of these factors skew it in favor of the BSP. Furthermore, it has next to no Turks, so DPS until recently had little success there. Of course, with the passage of time, traditional voting becomes less important, while the consistent inability of BSP to be a real socialist party has gradually alienated its voters. And in even in such an aging region the number of people who vote for BSP solely because of nostalgia for the pre-1989 period naturally decline. Furthermore, DPS has made great inroads with the Romani, who previously either supported BSP or didn't vote at all, weakening the party further.
GMantis:
Sorry I didn't see your post Beagle before I posted mine. Not that we have a very divergent viewpoint, but I would have tried to reword my answer. And while I certainly appreciate your answer, there are some points with which I can't agree.
Quote from: Beagle on October 08, 2022, 04:25:15 AM
Yeah, succinctly put. My mother is from Montana, so I could go on another gratuitous multi page tangent, but I'll just mark three additional factors:
- there is a difference in the make-up of the Roma population in the two districts - Sliven is much more Kalderash, the Montana Roma are mostly Kopanari; the distinction these days is becoming less and less, since both groups have switched to surviving on remittances from family making their living in Western Europe. But the thing is, the Roma vote in Montana is less uniform for DPS, however it is much more socially acceptable for ethnic Bulgarians to vote DPS there. You get villages without any Roma (or Turkish) inhabitants voting DPS in the Northwest, which would be unthinkable anywhere else in the country.
The Romani voters in Sliven oblast went over en mass to GERB after voting DPS for many years so I don't think there is really much of a difference in their outlook from those in Montana. As for Bulgarians voting massively for DPS, I have my doubts - though of course I won't dispute your personal observations. Still, from the rather cursory check I made it seems that DPS is heavily concentrated in exactly those villages which have a large Romani population. And many Romani don't identify their ethnicity in censuses anyway.
Quote
- chicken or egg situation, of course, but GERB have less mayors and local influence in Montana region, which makes it harder for them to organize a machine vote there. By comparison, they are in total control of Sliven.
The problem with this argument is that GERB is very much in control in many of these municipalities as well. The mayors of Yakimovo and Brusartsi, which both had over 40% votes for DSP, are from GERB from example. DPS meanwhile has next to no influence in the oblast - no mayors, no control of municipal councils. Which is why I question the theory of many ethnic Bulgarians voting for them - if they don't control the municipalities, how would they "persuade" so many to vote for them?
Quote
- Brezovo in the center of the country, with a population of 6170 (a decrease of 16% between the 2011 and 2021 census) - a rural, mountainous place without any tourism, mining or significant industry. The municipal center has a population of 1610, which is positively metropolitan in comparison with...
No, Brezovo's actually in the middle of the Thracian plain (see map) - probably the most prosperous agricultural region in the country. I think the real reason for its long support for BSP was that it was a hotspot of partisan activity in WWII.
Quote
- Treklyano in the west of the country, with a population of 434 (a decrease of 32% (!) between the 2011 and 2021 census) - a rural, mountainous place without any tourism, mining or significant industry. The municipal center has a population of a 195. It is home to 7 of the municipality's total of 8 (not a typo) children aged between 0 and 5. Given that the municipal council is 11-member-strong and that each municipality has at least 16 required employees, about 10% of the population are actually directly employed in governing or administrating Treklyano. This is the smallest municipality in Bulgaria and there is nothing justifying its continued existence.
Certainly. The problem is that no municipality has ever been abolished(Srednogorie was dissolved by partitioning it into six municipalities, which is probably not what you had in mind). In fact the trend has been exactly the opposite. Since the fall of communism, when the opinion of the people began to be taken into account, 16 new municipalities have been created, some consisting of a single town - all due to popular demand. I'm certain that no one but the actual inhabitants of Treklyano would be more adamantly opposed to their municipality being abolished and they have good justification for that. As bad as the demographic and economic situation is there, it would decline even faster without it being a separate municipality. For example, Treklyano has a basic school, which it would never be able to justify if it wasn't a municipality center. Without the school, it would likely lose what little remained of their economically active population.
Battista Minola 1616:
Thanks to both of you for your replies! They are much more informative and in depth than I could ever ask for. Posts like these are why this thread is one of the best in the entire forum - simply unmatched.
Beagle:
So, after all that, the Bulgarian politicians recognized the burden of the moment and, while recognizing the many tangible and intangible differences that separate them, they used the past two months to engage in conversations about the local and global economy and the EU recovery funds and the war in Ukraine and justice reform and constitutional law and I am kidding. There is no particular end in sight, either to the perpetual (and common) squabbling, or to the general deadlock, with no party or even broad camp achieving anything close to a breakthrough. In all likelihood, there is no end in sight of the elections, either.
But with the end of the year comes a time to reflect on what one won and lost over the past period and I thought I'd write up the winter of Bulgarian broad and deep discontent resigned apathy through the eyes of the main political players.
President Rumen Radev
WON: the dubious privilege of governing Bulgaria through the caretaker government(s) for now and the foreseeable future; free invites to the Vienna Philharmonic NYE concert;
LOST: the Schengen-zone accession fight (just like the North Macedonia fight earlier); a lot of the smartbeautiful support (because of his role in the Petkov government downfall, the actions of his caretakers etc.) and, in general, the uncontested position as (informal) leader of the vast Bulgarian anti-GERB majority. He is still the most popular politician in the country, but his approval rate is markedly down (in the negative territory now), and it is no longer a given that a party that he founds or supports will automatically become the biggest. For the past 6 months or so, I thought the likeliest outcome out of all, well, what this thread is about, is for Radev to establish some personalist Sanacja-lite regime, which, like Boyko Borisov before him, would pay lip service to parliamentary democracy, but in fact would be rule by fiat. At this point, though, I think his broad support is no longer there and a pure Radev-ite party would just add another fracturing point to the already splintered Bulgarian society.
GERB:
WON:every vote in parliament of actual significance - see the spoiler if you're interested about the actual issues of the day;
LOST: the purely symbolic vote over a proposed 'expert' non-partisan government headed by a renowned neuro-surgeon - the government was never likely to pass, but it was surprising that the cabinet included a fair few blasts from the past, with a number of BSP- and DPS-adjacent politicians, the obligatory Tsar government throwback and one or two PP-ers. Mostly, though, it was full of GERB B- and C-listers. A more permanent loss, which GERB surely must acknowledge now, is the tolerance, not to speak of trust, of the overwhelming majority of Bulgarians. Despite the chaos of the past year, there is no discernible flow back to GERB.
Spoiler alert! Click Show to show the content.
Show
Reminder of the state of play in the 240 seat National Assembly: GERB - 67, PP - 53, DPS - 36, Vazrazhdane - 27, BSP 25*, DB - 20, BV - 12
The meaningful votes have been passed with the support of the following parties:
- Electing the chairman of the assembly (after 3 days and complete gridlock, the oldest MP who by law chairs the first meeting got the job permanently; there is a lot to be said about that GERB-er, but that will wait for another time): GERB + DPS + BSP
- Repealing (to all extents and purposes) voting by machine, restoring the paper ballot and some other electoral code trickery: GERB+DPS+BSP
- Slashing the insane amounts of deficit social spending which were voted for in the first reading of the 2023 budget amendments: GERB+DPS+DB+BV
- [symbolic] Military aid to Ukraine: GERB+PP+DPS+DB+BV
- Buying 8 more F-16s: GERB+parts of PP+DPS+DB+BV
FAILED:
- the GERB-proposed 'expert' government: GERB+DPS+BV
- A whistleblower protection act, the passing of which is tied to EU funding: PP+DB+BV
PP:
WON: I guess the support of the majority of Atlas forumers, as they (or at least one wing of the party) are positioning themselves into the sort of economically left-wing, socially liberal, pro-Western party that many here were clamoring for BSP to magically transform itself into. Of course, each of the statements can be qualified - they are still against raising taxes since 'the country is choc-full of money, but it gets stolen'. That wing of the party also voted against further F-16s, since the money would be better used to raise pensions (for the 5th raise in 12 months).
LOST: the image of a competence which the Harvard crew embodied early on (see also DB). BSP support is also no longer expected after the fight over the paper ballot and Ukraine aid. More pertinently, they lost even the semblance of support by President Radev they once enjoyed. Last month Radev launched a broadside against PP, calling them crooks and charlatans, and labeling himself as the first victim to be swindled when he appointed the Harvard crew to his caretaker government.
DPS:
WON: This is not particularly new, but - indispensability. As in, 'there is no way to govern without at least being tolerated by us'. And by this I don't mean parliamentary support, but rather the captured prosecutorship, administrative courts, state revenue agency and all other ostensibly non-political institutions where DPS has gained control over the past two decades.
LOST: by and large, their EU affiliation. For many years, ALDE was happy enough with DPS, as they funded gatherings and conferences, wined, dined and entertained the visiting high-, mid- and even low-tier functionaries and, all in all, shared the loot liberally. The present RE leadership, however, is apparently less tolerant of DPS, so they have limited the joint activities to a minimum (which may or may not have something to do with their courtship of PP).
Vazrazhdane:
WON: Vazrazhdane are the party of petulant naysayers, so the more bills that are passed 'because the EU said so', the better. And, given that the brief life of this parliament will be occupied mostly with measures needed for the release of EU recovery funds/Schengen accession/Euro adoption, they make much hay of the 'all other parties are bootlickers and cronies, we are the only one who want an independent Bulgaria'.
LOST: Apparently, the prospects of a breakthrough or at least a significant increase in support once people saw their increased parliamentary group in action. As mentioned earlier, I have no doubt that their platform is more popular than the 10-12% in support measured in polls. It's just that they are so clearly grifters and that the persons that they most appeal to are the least likely to make the effort to turn out, that they are stagnant in support.
BSP:
WON: Got nuffin.
LOST: ooh, where do we start:
- 1 MP (who got expelled because of his support for Ukraine and opposition to the paper ballot);
- their sole Sofia district mayor (pretty much likewise);
- the court case about the earlier expulsion of Ninova's opposition from the party leadership, so they are now reinstated and they are now stymied;
- the entirety of their party organization in Plovdiv, Bulgaria's second largest city, which has followed the local oligarch/party boss into the folds of GERB (although this is not exactly new).
DB:
WON: Also not new (or particularly helpful), but GERB's unsolicited support for a government with the third mandate, as long as PP are excluded. Also, given that the smartbeautiful tend to be hyper-political and very high-propensity voters, the decline in polling participation rates/turnout means that their share is looking likely to increase, even if the actual voter count remains pretty much the same.
LOST: The separate identity between PP and DB, at least early on in the life of the parliament. Both acted in a way which could be summarized as, 'it is incumbent on the caretaker government/GERB to find support for their policies from DPS and Vazrazhdane; if they wanted [something] done, they should not have brought down our government, which would have made it reality without the need for new elections'. This ITN-like recalcitrance, IMO, is unlikely to have made anyone likelier to vote for them. DB did help vote down the increase in the minimum wage/pensions and other social benefits that PP proposed, as Bulgaria is looking at an unprecedented deficit for 2023, but in general it is hard to explain why one should vote for DB over PP unless it is for the personalities (like I do) and most DB-ers are tainted by a long political career compared to the PP newcomers.
BV:
WON: the image of a sensible, grown-up party? Hard to say for me, really, I know nobody who would admit to have voted for BV, nor have I stumbled upon any pundit analysis that rings remotely true about BV.
LOST: The voters who went for Yanev because of his pro-Russian statements must have been sorely disappointed to see BV by and large toe the 'Euroatlantic' line in parliament, issuing statements of condemnation against Russia and supporting the military aid to Ukraine. Yanev, who famously got sacked from government because he refused to refer to the invasion as a 'war' and insisted on the term 'special military operation' enlightened us all that the actual start of the war was the mobilization order by Putin and since then there is a war of aggression against a sovereign state which must be opposed by all means, short of direct military involvement. Which... OK, I guess?
ITN:
WON: uh, free publicity for Slavi Trifonov's facebook screeds. Also, the party subsidy. Yes, despite holding a referendum to limit the party subsidies, ostentatiously returning the amounts due to ITN back to the budget in 2021 and early '22 and other posturing, nowadays ITN take the full amount they are entitled to.
LOST: virtually all of the party's ex MPs, who have departed for the caretaker government, PP, BSP, BV or private life. The pollsters still register some signs of life - after all, the party at the end came just 12 thousand votes short of re-entering parliament due to strong holds in the vote abroad, particularly in the UK and Spain - but there is no serious prospect of them making the threshold in the upcoming new election.
And yes, nothing has changed about the likelihood for a new election - it is not a done deal, but it is by far the likelier option than a government formed by DB or BV with the third mandate (for many reasons, it is unlikely that Radev will present BSP with the third mandate for the fourth time). Strictly speaking, the ball right now is with PP, but they have made it abundantly clear that they are simply going through the motions, setting impossible hurdles just to propose a minority government (between themselves and DB only). The first hurdle was for President Radev to veto the return of the paper ballot, which he did - but the veto was overridden by GERB+DPS+BSP - and now they demand 'a sizable support' in parliament of a statement of priorities, some of which are impossible for GERB/DPS to contemplate, let alone endorse, such as the removal of the chief prosecutor or the investigation of the massive highway construction giveaway. So, barring a huge surprise, we are heading for the next round of early elections on 19 or 26 March, or possibly 2 April.
Polls for a spring election are eerily unanimous: other than a further - potentially catastrophic - decline in turnout, nothing in particular will change. PP are clearly bleeding support (mostly to the abstention rate), BV's entry is on a knife's edge, DPS may or may not choose to mobilize the Turkish vote, but realistically GERB will again be short of a majority, even with DPS support, and an anti-GERB coalition will be even more of a pipe-dream, given how unpalatable Vazrazhdane are. The dark joke is that the parties are already laying the groundwork for the combined regular local/early parliamentary elections in the fall. At least I hope it is a joke.
In light of all this, I guess it is pretty understandable how in recent surveys 2 out of 3 Bulgarians expect the country as a whole to be worse off in 2023 than in 2022.
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